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Abstract 
 
This thesis traces an idea of auditory influence or sonorous individuation through three 
distinct areas of sound-art practice. These three areas are discussed according to a kind of 
spatial contraction, passing from the idea of auditory influence in acoustic ecology and 
field recording practices, to its expression in work happening at the intersection of sound-
art and architecture, and finally towards headphonic space and the interior of the body. 
Through these diverse fields and divergent practices a common idea pertaining to the 
influence of the auditory upon listening subjects is revealed, which itself brings up 
questions concerning the constitution of a specifically auditory subjectivity in relation to 
the subject ‘as a whole’.  
Towards the expression of a theory of sonorous individuation appropriate to 
practices approaching sonorous matters in the mode of a sonic materialism, the 
philosophical work of Gilles Deleuze is called upon as a critical framework. This 
philosophical framework is adopted as it clearly expresses a spatio-temporally contingent 
theory of individuation. This particular contingency becomes necessary in exploring 
works wherein the production of acoustic space is understood as being indissociable from 
a subjective ‘modulation’ or process of sonorous individuation, in which auditory 
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individuals or listening subjects are bound within and influenced by acoustic spaces in 
which a sound takes place and a self takes shape. 
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Introduction: The Conditions of Sound 
Developed throughout this text is a theory of sonorous individuation, tracing the spatio-
temporal relations between sound, subject and individual as well as the field of reciprocal  
influence that they constitute. This text proceeds according to the sounding of bodies, 
addressing individuals as such, according to their affective and resonant capacities ahead of 
a certain symbolic efficacy wherein representation and recognition define the foreground 
and apparent. The routes followed or lines traced are those mapped out or articulated within 
the work of a number of contemporary sound artists; amidst a multitude of others, the work 
of Jacob Kirkegaard, Mark Bain and Alvin Lucier are considered exemplary insofar as they 
are heard, felt, read and seen to express particular yet differing notions of sonorous 
individuation. While it would be too simple to say that any of the approaches considered 
herein could be reduced to a single mode of engagement, it is argued that a particular 
primacy of material affectivity is expressed in such practices by way of individual, somatic 
resonant capacities. The problems that the work of these artists present us with—
problematic not in the sense of a detrimental negativity but rather in the Deleuzian sense of 
an ‘impersonal field of singularities out of which thought draws its localized solutions’1, or 
                                                
1 Alberto Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation Between Kant and Deleuze 
(Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2. 
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‘the subliminal objects of little perceptions’2—are considered according to the manner in 
which they address their listening subjects and the faculties to which they appeal. The 
pieces, performances and ideas under consideration make of their occupants and audience 
patient subjects; subjects not of a word, voice or name but cast as such by way of an 
anomalous ‘interpellation’—or more properly an individuation—by way of a noise, a sound 
less displaced than affecting peculiar displacement and a modulation of individuals. 
Instilled in the individuals addressed as such through intensive sonority is less quietude and 
contemplation than the excitement of an affective capacity, a resonance between bodies, 
between objects. 
 Herein the influence of an idea is traced, an idea of sound, less a concept than a 
‘genetic’ or rather catalytic element of nature that finds its base and ungrounding in a kind 
of white noise, the site of a generative potential exceeding each instance of audition. As an 
Idea, noise is positioned as excess, as that which persists despite imperceptibility; to 
concern ourselves with its influence is to investigate the ways in which sound insinuates 
itself into the determination of individuals. Here we must note a difference regarding the 
individual, conceived as the concrete support of the personal and subjective. Louis 
Althusser conceived of this pre-subjective, concrete individual as an order of being bearing 
difference and distinction from the subject proper, conceived according to political and 
symbolic definition.3 For Althusser this individual is nonetheless ‘always-already’ 
interpellated, always already a subject insofar as its place in a societal or symbolic network 
is established ahead of its birth and despite insistence to the contrary. It is around the 
individual implicated within ideological interpellations determining subjectivity, yet 
nonetheless existing in excess of that which we call the subject, the personal or the self, that 
this text orientates itself, focusing upon a particular materialism and an ontology of excess, 
focusing upon that commonly thought beyond the limit of discrete being and the image of 
the self. While oscillating around a complex notion of the listening subject, the trajectory 
followed herein is one that leads beyond this preliminary anchor point, finding it 
impossible to maintain sole consideration of the body at the expense of a more generalized 
anybody more adequately taking into consideration the complex apparatus and assemblages 
of resonant connectivity and capture. The particular limits of the sonic, of audibility, 
                                                
2 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 205. The Deleuzian 
concepts of problems and Ideas is discussed at length below. 
3 See Louis Althusser, On Ideology (London and New York: Verso, 2008) 44-51, in particular 48. 
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determine this site wherein matter is rendered audible as being inescapably somatic. The 
determination of sound space occurs according to an occupying ear or membrane, 
determining sounds as such, grounding the audible. What we call sound space refers to and 
requires the conception of a somatic territory, yet one which extends bodies beyond the 
body, beyond the strictly organic corpus, yet also beyond the body singular, beyond the 
body considered discrete and as the sole constituent-complex of individual identity. Allied 
with a particular idea of sound corresponding to an ontology of excess—according to which 
being and the constituent elements of reality are thought to dramatically exceed 
subjectivity, individuality and that which appears discrete—is an asserted primacy of the 
impersonal stating that there is more to being in, or in relation to, sound than appears to the 
listening subject. 
 Where sound was considered unbound or found a certain ‘liberation’ in Brandon 
LaBelle’s Background Noise, his more recent Acoustic Territories can in part be read as 
accounting for its reterritorialization, detailing his ‘perspective on how sound conditions 
and contours subjectivity by lending a dynamic materiality for social negotiation’.4 
Constituting a key relation between LaBelle’s work and my own is a central concern for the 
conditioning of subjectivity according to a ‘dynamic materiality’. Difference is to be found 
in the extent to which, where LaBelle places a specific emphasis upon a set of social 
conditions, my own is more strongly concerned with a particular materialism and an 
explicit engagement with determinism, with the notion of a dynamic materiality as the 
primary field of interactions and a particular site of subjective influence or conditioning. 
Posited in place of a holistic subject is an impersonal audition considered anterior to the 
alteritous definition of personal space. Personal space is here taken to be synonymous with 
a proxemic territory defining alterity—a mutable and mobile territoriality that is culturally, 
socially and materially contingent—a space set apart from that which is not I.5 Such a 
personal territory does not necessarily name a proximal intimacy, but rather the 
maintenance of a minimal distance, as in the space of utmost auditory intimacy—perhaps to 
be found through the exclusion of all others and extensity in the anechoic chamber—the 
                                                
4 Brandon LaBelle, Acoustic Territories: Sound Culture and Everyday Life (New York and London: 
Continuum, 2010), xix. 
Brandon LaBelle, Background Noise: Perspectives on Sound Art (New York and London: Continuum, 2007). 
5 Much is said of territories in what follows, yet the approach taken herein is perhaps more closely allied with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis on the vicissitudes of territoriality than that which finds expression in Brandon 
LaBelle’s more recent Acoustic Territories. 
 4 
difference within one’s self is heard to become other, the sounding of the inescapable 
proximity of a beyond within. 
 Recent assertions of an intrinsically, inherently and, most problematically, 
‘unignorably’ relational sonority are taken herein as too simplistic as sound may agitate, put 
up a wall, mask, saturate and obliterate, deafen and drive apart, sound may be ignored or 
fall beyond the constitutive and culturally determined thresholds of listening practice.6 With 
the development of audile technique and the training of the ear comes an audition highly 
capable of scission, of isolating objects, silencing, localization and distinct, alteritous 
identifications setting the self apart in space—perceptive actions more readily ascribed to 
an eye opposed to an ear yet nonetheless apparent in the multitudinous examples found in 
Salter and Blesser’s empirical accounts of aural architectures.7 Despite these capabilities, 
many of which are described in the most limited and negative definitions of noise, there 
nonetheless remains a certain inescapable affectivity to the perturbations of the air we label 
sound after the ear. Sound makes and marks a difference within the self, it finds a resonant 
capacity between the subject and individual, it is the individual that cannot escape, that 
does not or has not learned to ignore or tune out the world, that may be forced into relations 
through the inability to close the ear or hermetically seal off the somatic membrane. Sound 
may drive apart, mark a distance or territory, yet an affective relation persists despite such 
alteritous consequences, an inescapable relation that locates a difference within the self. 
More generally, sound functions as if a driven wedge, appearing in-between, forcing apart 
while filling, occupying, drawing into new relations. While the individual finds itself 
interpellated as a subject, enmeshed within a network of symbolic relations, the individual 
is herein thought to nonetheless persist in excess; the subject sets itself apart, finds 
definition through alterity, it is the individual that is trapped on every side by inescapable 
relations and occasionally sinister resonances.8 It is the individual that exists in a state of 
                                                
6 See LaBelle, Background Noise, ix and Salomé Voegelin, Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a 
Philosophy of Sound Art (New York and London, Continuum, 2010), xi-xvii. This criticism does not, of 
course, summarize nor apply to the totality of the arguments put forward by these authors, but rather identifies 
a common ideological position regarding immanence, intimacy and immediacy that prevails in many 
discussions of sound and is taken herein as an oversimplification of both the complexity of sonority and the 
listening subject. 
7 Barry Blesser and Linda-Ruth Salter, Spaces Speak, Are You Listening? Experiencing Aural Architecture 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007). 
8 Here I borrow the title of David Toop’s book Sinister Resonance: The Mediumship of the Listener (New 
York and London: Continuum, 2010), which is notable for more reasons than I am able to summarize here, 
but particularly for the ambiguity and complexity it affords sound across a broad historical, artistic and social 
continuum that extends into the inaudible. 
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unknowable connectivity and utmost intimacy with the noise of the world, that which finds 
definition according to a resonant and affective capacity anterior to an attunement to, or a 
tuning out of, those signals more consistently determined according to the efficacy of the 
symbolic. 
 Amidst this lack of discretion we find a point of confusion that is considered 
generative and positively problematic, a site of informative interactions that describes a 
world saturated with ‘incessant vibrations’, considered less as that which describes the 
mechanical or electronic pollution of an auditory environment or soundscape, than the 
energetic nature of the world.9 Where a field of incessant vibrations may be taken to define 
a clamorous and deafening din, it is also understood herein as that constituting a 
nonetheless imperceptible void, those movements, oscillations, affects and perturbations 
that persist below the thresholds of perception and saturate that which we call silent, hollow 
or empty. The listening practice assumed in accordance with such assertions is not, 
therefore, one that remains satisfied with the phenomenologically apparent or empirically 
given, nor is its particular force and subjective impression sacrificed towards the efficacy of 
representation and the symbolic; rather, a listening practice is assumed that gives itself over 
to a trajectory towards the void, led not so much by the tune of a mysterious piper than by 
‘the wailing of elements and particles’.10 Such a listening practice may in some ways be 
described according to a subterranean audition, listening beneath the surface of expressive 
objects and events towards their internal and intensive difference that itself finds expression 
in noise; the practice of creating openings into subterranean, invisible and typically 
imperceptible fields of noise is an approach that typifies the appeal to power made in the 
key artworks considered throughout this text. Accordingly, the notion of the void is treated 
as synonymous with that of an imperceptible spatium more than a sterile and vacuous lack, 
with the ubiquitous noise of material interactions more than sacred silence.11 Where this 
noise that persists is ascribed a recursive ontological status it attests to a fundamental 
notion of ungrounding and the affirmation of an antecedent anti-essentialism that undercuts 
or exceeds what Seth Kim-Cohen has referred to as the ‘dead end’ of phenomenological 
                                                
9 R. Murray Schafer, The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the World (Vermont: 
Destiny Books, 1994), 74. 
10 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 274. 
11 On this latter point it is not my intention to posit a binary opposition between noise and silence, but rather 
to say that what we consider silent is overwhelmed with the clamor of imperceptible movements 
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essentialism.12 A particular emphasis is placed upon intensity and sensation, but as events 
that do not remain within the domain of the phenomenological but lead towards the 
imperceptible. While phenomenological or empirical models are considered insufficient for 
the consideration of sonic conditions, it is not my intention to reduce the continuity, 
intensity and material specificity of the sonorous to extensive linguistic discretion, but 
rather to direct listening towards the imperceptible beyond, to the conditions of both sound 
and listening. The discussion of noise according to a catalytic generativity, ascribing it a 
certain—although nonetheless ambiguous—positivity is not to suggest that we should, in 
fulfillment of Russolo’s dream, fill the earth with what Schafer described as infernal and 
incessant machines, but that in putting an ear to the ground and listening beyond, less 
towards the heavens than into the depths rumbling beneath that which appears given to the 
ear, we create an opening onto intensively different signals forcing audile techniques and 
the information of individuals. In putting an ear to the ground one listens, beyond given 
signals and apparent orders, through an opening onto fields of incessant vibrations and 
noisy, confused individuations residing beyond us, in excess of recognition and given 
thresholds of perception, to the background noise beyond the consistency and discretion of 
the identifiable periodicity and the I. 
 A theory of sonorous individuation is developed herein alongside an assumed 
fundamental contingency and as such this sonic component that asserts itself into a wider 
theory concerned with the determination of the being of the sensible, or a sensory 
individual, is considered to be inseparable from specific spatio-temporal productions, with 
the individual determined as such in relation to its conditions. The approach taken herein is 
in many ways aligned with a number of recent texts that have approached sound arts 
practice, or the practice of sound in the arts, from a perspective of its spatial implications, 
broadly considering sound in the production of place across space and time.13 Where the 
emphasis placed upon the spatial has perhaps been at the expense of the importance of the 
                                                
12 See Seth Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear: Toward a Non-Cochlear Sonic Art (New York and London: 
Continuum, 2009), xix. 
13 Such texts include Colin Ripley, Marco Polo and Arthur Wrigglesworth (eds.) In the Place of Sound: 
Architecture, Music, Acoustics (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 2007), Mikesch W. Muecke and 
Miriam S. Zach (eds.), Resonance: Essays on the Intersection of Music and Architecture (Ames: Culicidae 
Architectural Press, 2007), Ros Brandt, Michelle Duffy and Dolly MacKinnon, Hearing Places: Sound, 
Place, Time and Culture (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), Blesser and Salter, Spaces 
Speak, Are You Listening?Experiencing Aural Architecture. Labelle, Background Noise, LaBelle, Acoustic 
Territories, John M. Picker, Victorian Soundscapes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), amongst others 
considered herein. 
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durational—as Christoph Cox has suggested, considering the ephemerality of the primary 
subject matter—what follows identifies an inseparable spatio-temporality within the 
intensive matters of spatial production.14 The assumed fundamental contingency finds 
expression in the asserted spatio-temporal dependencies of the concrete individual and the 
broader subject matters considered herein. 
 In accordance with the assumption of a fundamental contingency considered 
essential to understanding individuation, this thesis is also broadly concerned with the role 
of sound in the production of diverse spatio-temporal complexes. This concern will be 
articulated across three broad spatial layers or territories, or according to a three-stage 
spatial contraction, in the midst of which the individual takes place: the noise of the world, 
the noise of architecture and the built environment and the noise of the (im)personal 
individual. Each of these three key sections deals with topics, practices and territories that 
are in themselves highly complex; the intention here is not to provide a definitive 
commentary on either, but rather to isolate from each the extent to which a notion of 
sonorous influence, determination or individuation is articulated. Immediately the proposed 
structure and situation is rendered problematic, as these three territories do not exist apart 
from one another, they are neither autonomous nor discrete. In acknowledging this 
unavoidable confusion, the three spaces with which this text is concerned can perhaps be 
articulated more generally and concisely as pertaining to intra-, inter- and infra-personal 
architectonics, territorialities related to the constitutive differences of a complex listening 
subject more than their clear alignment with the more distinct spaces already mentioned. 
While the aforementioned distinct spaces are neither autonomous nor discrete there are 
differences peculiar to each that must nonetheless be dealt with. While we admit their 
interrelations we are not so naïve as to assume an unproblematic smooth flow of vibrations, 
matter and influence from one site to another, as at each stage we find a constitutive 
resistance. The blurring of these distinctions and an acknowledgement of their reciprocal 
determinations is one of the core concerns of this text, yet in beginning we must assume 
such distinctions in order to approach the genetic or catalytic sites of the diverse practices 
considered herein. The three proposed layers or spatio-temporal territories are in many 
ways engendered by the practices under consideration, as there is, initially at least, an 
                                                
14 Christoph Cox, ‘About Time’ in Art Forum, November, 2007. Cox’s remarks refer specifically to LaBelle’s 
Background Noise and Alan Licht’s Sound Art: Beyond Music, Between Categories (New York: Rizzoli, 
2007). 
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intention to address them on their own terms, according to the spatial practices, contexts 
and metaphors they themselves operate within, to accommodate and contextualize a broad 
range of practices that are concerned with differing notions of auditory space—as well as to 
lend a certain structural coherence to the early stages of this argument. The broadest of 
these layers or territories is, accordingly, the most immediately problematic; in considering 
the noise of the world in a sense that is distinct from that of more localized architectonics, 
we consider a world set apart from that which inhabits it, or at least part of it—it is to this 
overtly romanticized notion of the world that we first turn in dealing with the most 
‘naturalized’ notion of a sonic environment.  
 Chapter One, ‘The Noise of the World’, attempts to invert the traditional ideological 
framework of acoustic ecology or soundscape studies, moving away from centralized ideals 
of purity, silence and solitude, towards an ideological restructuration around an inclusive 
and positively problematic  noise that negates the necessity of its characterization as the 
‘enemy of the acoustic community’ and its binary opposition to silence, towards an 
ecological praxis built around a noise that names the world.15 This repositioning or 
restructuration is performed in an attempt to move away from an idealized and romantic 
natural order and towards the more complex notion of an associated milieu, as is required 
by the contemporary developments of phonography, field recording and acoustic ecology 
heard within the work of Toshiya Tsunoda, Justin Bennett, Andrea Polli, Stephen Vitiello 
and Lee Patterson—to name only a small few—whose widely varied practices take the  
notion of the environmental beyond a narrow conception of the natural. While such 
practices perhaps jar with the most limited interpretations of the rubric of acoustic ecology, 
this term is retained herein as the most broadly applicable descriptor of such practices 
insofar as the ecological is understood to express a broad and dynamic field of 
interrelations and reciprocal determinations not restricted to purely audible qualities, nor an 
ethnographic or anthropological practice of documentation. Taken in this expansive and 
primarily relational sense, the constitutive practices of an acoustic ecology are better 
understood as expressing a complex and contingent notion of an auditory environment 
whose components are not limited to the well defined image of the natural; in the words of 
                                                
15 Barry Truax, Acoustic Communication  (Westport and London: Ablex Publishing, 2001), 66. 
In the former category I include such texts as Sarah Maitland, A Book of Silence (London: Granta 
Publications, 2008) and George Prochnick In Pursuit of Silence: Listening for Meaning in a World of Noise 
(New York: Doubleday, 2010).  
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Gilbert Simondon: ‘this environment, which is at the same time natural and technical, can 
be called the associated milieu’, a milieu retaining a sense of ‘ecological’ determination 
while moving beyond ideals that have colonized the natural.16  
 This opening builds upon an equation of noise with difference in an attempt to 
restructure acoustic ecology around a generative noise rather than a pure silence. This 
restructuration can be read as an attempt to embed Deleuzian difference at the ideological 
core of acoustic ecology; taken as the foundation of this critical engagement is Deleuze’s 
statement that ‘Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by 
which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse’.17 Given are qualified 
empirical and phenomenal appearances, recognizable sound events and objects, the 
generative potential of which is considered to reside in a difference equated with noise. The 
rubric of acoustic ecology is here maintained in opposition to its obliteration as penance for 
romantic naturalism, a gesture that would lead only to a fanatical coagulation around 
unambiguous noise. The critical trajectory taken herein is one of a careful ungrounding, a 
restructuration from the inside out in an attempt realign acoustic ecology’s ideological 
kernel. In doing so we maintain something of the spatio-temporal relations of sonorous 
agents studied in acoustic ecology—the expansive and predominantly inhuman populous of 
Truax’s acoustic community—while shedding their subjection to the purity of silence and a 
romantic natural order. Through this ungrounding we find the relational schema of acoustic 
ecology more capable of engaging with the contingencies and interactions of a more 
diverse and problematic field situation, stretching from the earth, through infra-, inter- and 
intra-personal architectonics, towards the conditions of the individual. This trajectory is 
followed as it expresses the relational, spatio-temporal contingencies constitutive of the site 
of sound and the listening subject, while tracing the lines of an affective auditory objectility 
that is heard, felt and understood to implicate the individual as such within the work of 
artists considered herein, most notably that of Mark Bain and Jacob Kirkegaard. While the 
implication of an auditory individuality in excess of the I cannot be thought to provide an 
exhaustive account of that to which any artworks considered herein appeal, the argument 
that follows makes an attempt at accounting for that which lies beyond the listening 
subjects described by the ‘social turn’, providing both critique and complement to the 
growing number of texts devoted to the implication of the auditory within the symbolic 
                                                
16 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 61. 
17 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 280. 
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structures of the interpersonal. 
Bain’s work explicitly expresses an architectonic contingency, a reciprocity 
between spatial materials, sonic matters and listening subjects, concerns that appear in the 
work of a number of artists discussed in chapters two and three. In chapter two— 
‘Architectonic Noise’—we will follow the production of auditory space in and around the 
architectural as a means of developing a historical framework for the auditory ideas put into 
practice in the work of contemporary practitioners that are of primary interest to this thesis. 
In addition to the historical context provided within this chapter, attention is devoted to the 
ontological implications of practices built upon diverse notions of auditory spatial 
production, specifically the identification of matter as always being in motion—beyond 
apparent and often visible stability—that extends from the sonorous excitation and 
saturation of space. 
 Chapter Three attempts an explicit outline of a theory of sonorous individuation 
appropriate to the works considered herein, an essential spatio-temporal contingency 
constituting the ground of such a theory having been prepared in the former two chapters. 
Here attention is given to the notion of the individual as being distinct from or in excess of 
the subject, a distinction that is necessary for considerations of auditory influence according 
to a primarily affective impression rather than explicitly symbolic operations. It is through 
focusing upon a distinction that acknowledges difference within the self that we arrive at a 
notion of the individual appropriate to an affective theory of sonorous individuation, a 
theory that I believe finds praxical expression in the work of a number of artists exploring 
the spatial implications of auditory production. This theory is built upon the philosophy of 
Gilles Deleuze, and in particular the theory of individuation developed in Difference and 
Repetition. Adherence to Deleuzian philosophy guides the methodology applied within this 
thesis, a method which operates according to critical interpretation of the complex or 
‘problematic’ spatio-temporal situations produced through the sonic expressions of the 
artists considered herein. The argument to be presented is less concerned with fidelity to the 
intensions of the artists whose work is of primary concern than with the consequences and 
impacts of their sonic expressions, adhering to what is perhaps best described as a 
functional infraesthetics. This approach is in many respects concomitant with the attention 
given to sonority by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, yet the bulk of this 
thesis attempts to avoid much of the terminology developed in this text in an attempt to 
enable critical engagement with ideas that are often obscured by the crippling repetition of 
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Deleuzo-Guattarian terms at the expense of the generative difference they were intended to 
inject into the world of critical discourse. This third and final chapter concludes with an 
attempt to reconnect with the work of Deleuze and Guattari in order to draw upon the 
specifically sonorous implications of their work while enabling critique of its application 
within the specifically sonic arts. While this thesis attempts to provide a critical 
interpretation of the problems concerning audition and auditory experience to which 
Deleuzian terminology is most readily applied—most notably issues of immanence, 
relation and connectivity—in critical and ‘reflective’ discussion, Deleuzian philosophy is 
nonetheless considered to most suitably account for the expression of a praxical theory of 
sonorous individuation that I believe to be evident in the key works considered herein. 
Through the application of this philosophical framework to the works considered herein I 
believe that we uncover a common image of the auditory individual and the means of its 
acoustical influence, determination and reciprocal implication within acoustic space. 
 In what remains of this introduction I wish to broadly situate the argument presented 
herein within the context of contemporary ‘sound studies’ or ‘auditory culture’ while 
addressing some of the key concepts and terms that will be deployed and developed 
throughout this thesis. 
 
A Notable Absence 
 
The body of this text bares an absence, yet an absence that lends definition to the trajectory 
that is to be taken through sound art practice: the absence of Xenakis. While in some senses 
emblematic of a relationship between architecture and sound—in particular the production 
of sonic space more than the sonic production of space—it is the nature of this relationship 
that is brought into question and redressed in many contemporary practices that focus upon 
the spatial implications of sonic expressions. The relation this thesis bares with the work of 
Iannis Xenakis is complex in a manner that is characteristic of both Xenakis and the matter 
under consideration. For each resonance there is an overarching dissonance, frequently 
foregrounded yet often acting quietly in the background, preventing the smooth integration 
of concepts at the most fundamental level. The conception of sound and the sound object 
active in Xenakis’ practice is of importance to that presented here; at all levels Xenakis 
conceives of sound in terms of a multiplicity, at a micro level as a collection of elementary 
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particles and at a macro level a single event is recognized as ‘a cloud of sounds’.18 Yet 
where there is an intimate proximity there is the hushed presence of an antithetical praxis. 
The importance of a particular model of architecture—which is now, within architectural 
theory, almost routinely subject to criticisms of hylomorphic assertions, hegemonic 
prescription and delusions of autonomy—to Xenakis’s work is at the core of this absence.19 
It is precisely Xenakis’ metaphysics that is brought into question and in many cases 
inverted by the work considered in this text, work that is focused on space defined 
according to emergent form over geometrical prescription. It is not with metaphysics per se 
that I take issue here, but rather with the assertion of a metaphysics of prescription over one 
of contingency and generative interaction. The antithetical nature of this most intimate of 
relationships is heard most clearly in the call to ‘free oneself, as much as possible, from any 
and all contingencies’, as such a call is, as far as the argument presented here is concerned, 
contrary to ontological foundations of sound.20 The definition of architecture as we find it 
in Xenakis’ work must be brought into question; this architecture presents itself as a 
function of a metaphysical practice built upon a perceived purity found in mathematics, a 
practice which engendered, from common formulations, both the architectural and sonic 
forms of the polytopes, a praxis which makes clear the structure or influential hierarchy of 
Xenakis’ thought that is behind his claim that ‘everything that is said here on the subject [of 
music] is also valid for all forms of art (painting, sculpture, architecture, films, etc.)’.21 
The trajectory that this text follows through sound art practice requires that we 
address a definition of architecture and of architectonic space that is not universal but of 
particular relevance to the practices and materials under consideration. The architectures 
presented herein are primarily architectures that depend; these are contingent, ephemeral 
                                                
18 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music: Thought and Mathematics in Music (New York: Pendragon Press, 
1992), 31. 
19 The idea of autonomy in architecture comes under fire from a number of directions within contemporary 
architectural theory. Fernández-Galiano, for example, has criticized the idealization that abstracts 
architectonic space from its use, occupation and degradation. The work of Jonahan Hill and Jane Rendell 
draw use towards the foreground by focusing on issues of architectural appropriation, deformation and the 
positioning of the ‘user’.  Jeremy Till’s Architecture Depends, calls for an architectural practice which takes 
greater account of, and influence from, societal, historical and ethical contexts. Mostafavi and Leatherbarrow 
have produced a text which, by focusing upon the effects of weathering upon buildings, seeks to more openly 
include temporal deformations and material contingencies within architectural considerations. Within a more 
philosophical framework John Protevi has developed a clear Deleuzian critique of hylomorphism with a 
particular focus upon architectural practice see Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politic 
(London and New York: The Athlone Press, 2001), 7-14. 
20 Xenakis, Formalized Music, xi. 
21 Ibid., 5. 
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and ambiguous spaces that are perhaps more precisely discussed in the terms of Lefebvre’s 
notion of spatial production.22 This is a position that once assumed yields a consequential 
inversion of the traditional architectural relationship between formal definition and material 
organization. Such a notion displaces spatial organization in terms of prescription and 
geometry-centric design in favour of an understanding of space as something produced 
through use, as being environmentally and contextually contingent, as having identity and 
function only to the extent that it is dialogically determined. Space emerges as space in 
action through interactions; such an assertion is, in this instance, built upon the fundamental 
agitations expressed as sounds to bolster discussion of its role in spatial production. Yet 
more generally this implies space as the product of bodies in motion and therefore invokes 
a broad field of productive vibrations, collisions and interactions, appealing to practices 
operating beyond the bandwidth of audibility that nonetheless help delimit its diffuse 
territoriality. The focus placed upon architecture as spatial production shifts the discourse 
of spatial determination away from design and towards notions of appropriation and 
occupation; design is not disavowed but rather placed in a more dialogic structure with use, 
abuse, decay and weathering. Yet this emphasis upon use is not a call for a celebration of 
the ‘creative user’, as a shift in the focus of architectural discourse towards that of the user 
does not go far enough. While such positions open debate towards use and appropriation, 
by maintaining the concept of the user they protect and distinguish the position of the 
architect in equal measure. The matter under consideration herein requires that this be a 
discussion of agents, subjects and individuals rather than one of users. Only through 
considering the agents and subjects of spatial production is this necessary reciprocity 
addressed. 
 
Intimacy, Audition and the “Tyranny of the Visual” 
 
The focus of this text is placed upon the sonorous, considered as a particular bandwidth of 
vibrations amidst a larger vibrational continuum. Despite the emphasis being placed upon 
sound, the eye is not herein opposed to the ear in the somewhat tired rehearsal of  an 
‘ocular tyranny’ or the superiority of ‘the senses’, discussed as if sight were not one such 
                                                
22 On this point of architectural dependence in practice see Jeremy Till, Architecture Depends, (Cambridge 
and London: MIT Press, 2009). 
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sense, an assertion that seems only to affirm its elevated position. Admittedly, we must 
acknowledge the transparency commonly ascribed to sight, as that which renders true, 
consistent and identifiable common empirical events, a transparency that has helped 
solidify a hierarchy of the senses based around the attainment of certitude and 
identification. There is no doubt as to the prominence of ‘visual culture’ over other areas of 
sensory or ‘sensual culture’, and the rigidity with which this hierarchical structuring of the 
senses has come to condition global—although not universal—cultural perceptions should 
of course be challenged in order to better understand and appreciate the nuances of the 
sensory complex. My aim, however, is not necessarily to champion one sense over another, 
but rather to render problematic the senses and perception in general, to make repeated 
attempts at establishing a trajectory towards the imperceptible, to a ground constituting the 
conditions and potentials of the perceived. While this text does, of course, bear a bias 
towards audition and sonority, it is not my intention to contribute to critiques of the 
‘tyranny of the visual’, as is prevalent in many texts on sound and ‘auditory culture’. While 
sound may indeed have suffered a lack of attention in many fields, to set one’s argument 
out in opposition to a ‘great ocular tyranny’ appears somewhat naïve or misguided. 
Assumed by such critiques are a number of ideals of the sonorous, such as that of intimacy, 
opposed to the ‘distance’ of vision, a sensuousness that is lost in the ‘rationality’ and 
discretion of the visual. While such ideals constitute the starting point of my own interest in 
sound and the direction this thesis is to take, these ideals are not  taken as the privilege of 
sound or hearing, nor perceptual states that cannot be attained through vision. I believe this 
to be a question, not of necessarily redressing a hierarchy of the senses or righting the great 
disservice done to sound throughout human history, but more one of material intensity.  
 Perhaps the clearest account of this uncritical and idealized engagement with 
audition and perceptual hierarchies can be found in Salomé Voegelin’s Listening to Noise 
and Silence wherein detailed accounts of engagement and auditory experience are given 
over to somewhat romantic idealization. For Voegelin:  
Sound’s ephemeral invisibility obstructs critical engagement, while 
the apparent stability of the image invites criticism. Vision, by its 
very nature assumes a distance from the object […] The visual ‘gap’ 
nourishes the idea of structural certainty […] By contrast, hearing is 
full of doubt […] Hearing does not offer a meta-position; there is no 
place where I am not simultaneous with the heard. However far its 
source, the sound sits in my ear. I cannot hear it if I am not immersed 
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in its auditory object, which is not the source but sound as sound 
itself.23 
While there are a number of resonances between Voegelin’s approach to sound and my 
own—an interest in notions of ‘sound itself’, auditory objects and resonant intimacies, as 
well as the semblance of stability or solidity—we should question this setting of hearing 
against seeing, of sight against sound, or rather, as appears to be the case, of sound against 
seeing. The contrast enforced here is one between an intimacy of audition and the distance 
of sight, yet it is only clearly articulated where sound, as the medium of hearing, is 
contrasted with sight and not its equivalent medium: light. Not considering light in this 
juxtaposition undermines the auditory privilege Voegelin is trying to establish. As sound 
passes into the ear and into the body, light passes into the eye, and while one can be closed 
and the other cannot—except, perhaps, where the ears are plugged or stopped up with wax 
to guard against desire for audile temptations leading to death, to the void and to oblivion—
this does not change the necessarily immersive nature of the medium. There is little in the 
above, regarding the question of intimacy and distance that cannot be said of sight insofar 
as light—and not only sight—is taken into consideration. Should such qualities be thought 
the preserve of the sonorous, we need only make reference to the work of James Turrell, 
whose light installations focus on upon the medium of sight, upon its material possibility, 
as much as an object to be perceived. In Turrell’s work, what is to be seen is the possibility 
of seeing, the problem to which the eye appears as a response, the material intensity of light 
considered not as transparent medium but as a saturating, distorting opacity informing 
experience. The object of Turrell’s work is light itself, not simply as invisible medium at 
the service of vision and identification, but as itself a material objectivity. In much of 
Turrell’s work, the viewer encounters light itself, abstracted from its use as a means of 
spatial or ecological perception, allowing for an emphasis to be placed upon the intensity 
and sensory experience of light. The means of such presentation lead to what we might 
consider a spatial distortion; the perception of distance is particularly problematized in 
Turrell’s work, light and colours saturate a space to the point of a dissolution of 
perspective, such as the use of blue in Ganzfeld: Tight End (2005) within which one is 
forced to take slow steps in order to avoid collisions with the walls which one can only 
assume must be present. In other instances the appearance of a wall is just that, a 
                                                
23 Voegelin, Listening to Noise and Silence, xi-xii. 
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phantasmic apparition produced through the interaction of colours, presenting a thickness 
or solidity to the eye and the sensation of its anticipation in the body at large, as is manifest 
in Wedgework V (1974). Here we might also think of Gray Day (1997) which presents us 
with both an absolute surface and an incomprehensible depth, yet a thought would not be 
enough, as the intensity of the situation constructed through light itself becomes evident 
only in the confusing intimacy of experience. The dissolution of distance in such works is 
an absolute necessity insofar as one it to be able to perceive light as material objectivity and 
not simply as that which allows one thing to see another, where one is to perceive not the 
colour of a thing but colour itself. This dissolution of distance performs a dissolution of 
referentiality and object recognition, objective form and distance having been exploded in 
the intensive experience of light itself. 
 The dissolution of distance or a ‘visual gap’ is also performed in Luke Jerram’s 
Matrix, wherein visual forms or retinal images are not strictly produced according to artistic 
prescription or external objective  qualities, but by the internal conditioning and organic 
means of visual perception. Upon entering an almost pitch-black room, the viewer focuses 
upon a dim red light. Matrix then produces a visual impulse response; flashes of white 
light—light containing all visible frequencies—excite both the space occupied by the 
installation and the physiological means of visual perception. The forms and colours 
perceived are those produced within the organism as opposed to that which is presented by 
an object. Where the object of Turrell’s work is light itself, that presented in Matrix is 
seeing, the means of visual perception. In other words, one sees seeing; one does not 
perceive an external object but the internal apparatus and sensations of visual perception, 
that which is either thought to be ‘transparent’ or is erased from conscious perception in the 
representation and perception of objects. Matrix brings to attention an intensive experience 
of seeing attained only through the abstraction of sight from the recognition of objects; 
seeing becomes an event in-itself rather than the means by which we see something, an act 
of recognition that entails the erasure of both the mechanism and influence of  perception. It 
is in this way that Jerram’s Matrix can be said to bring the invisible or otherwise 
imperceptible to sight.  
 To focus, however briefly, upon such examples is not to undermine my own 
argument, but rather to point out that arguments which attempt to label sensory proximities, 
intimacies or intensities as the reserve of audition or hapticity participate in a certain 
sensory romanticism, fighting the corner of the long suffering perceptual ‘underdog’ of 
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audition, pinned down and oppressed by the ‘tyranny of the visual’. While examples of 
perceptual intensity—such as those experience in the work of Turrell and Jerram—can be 
found within the visual arts, of particular concern are examples from the sonic arts. The 
neglect or submission of the sonic to the visual can here be understood as serving a 
particularly useful purpose; being concerned with the intensity of sensation and perception 
as something attained through a distortion of recognition, an act of separating out the act or 
means of perception from the identity or form of an object to be perceived,  that we—those 
of us with sight—might be less accustomed to auditory means of identification allows for 
the exploitation of a certain opening, the possibility of a subtle influence, of being caught 
out or unaware. It is perhaps partly due to a certain neglect of the auditory that it serves as a 
particularly good example of the contingency and malleability of perception, while 
allowing events to slip in ‘under the radar’, according to a certain ‘unconscious’ or 
background perception. Yet even here we submit to a certain romantic ideal, as the 
development of a highly refined audile technique in blind individuals, musicians, medical 
professionals (practicing mediate auscultation), sound and acoustic engineers, amongst a far 
greater field of practitioners who take audible signals to be their object of study and means 
of expression, highlights the critical ear and the extent to which the ear and the audible, 
even where concern lies outside of linguistic communication, can serve analysis, 
recognition, recollection and representation.  
 While seeking to avoid romantic ideals according to which a peculiar uncritical 
intimacy is conceived to be a privilege of sound, there remains, of course, a particular 
specificity of sound that is behind my reasons for focusing upon it within this study and the 
privileged position it occupies herein. It is perhaps due to a certain confusion made possible 
by the bandwidth it occupies that an exclusive romanticized intimacy is ascribed to audible 
vibrations. It is around the lower threshold of audibility, where contractions and 
rarefactions in the air approach the infra-sonic, that this confusion is most clearly felt. At 
this point the distinction between the audible and the haptic becomes blurred and distance 
becomes problematic, not only the flesh but the inner organs and tissues, constituting a 
resonant membrane, report non-localizable excitations and agitations, sensations that do not 
appear to be referring to events happening ‘over there’ but to events occurring ‘in here’ at 
the surface and within the depths of the somatic spatium. It is perhaps this not uncommon 
sensation—which can sometimes be felt while standing between a wall or a glass facade 
and an idling train, bus or lorry, the oscillations of its engine exciting infrasonic resonances 
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within the occupied space—marking a feeling of the threshold of audibility, that lies behind 
the romantic and somewhat misguided notion that audible vibrations penetrate the body or 
are capable of establishing intimacy—or rather, to use an excellent Lacanian term referring 
to a simultaneous interiority and exteriority, extimacy—in a way that other vibrations do 
not.  
 
The Expanding Field 
 
The phrase ‘sound in the expanded field’ will, after the work of Rosalind Krauss, be taken 
as a means of delimiting an expansive and expanding territory of sonic practice, considered 
within the context of a field that now exceeds that delimited in Krauss’s expansions and 
extensions.24 It is not, of course, suggested that this phrase and the following argument 
constitutes the definition of sound art—nor that coming up with such a definition is of 
particular importance outside of market driven taxonomies—but merely that this phrase 
lends a certain definition to the work and approach to sound considered herein, work that 
considers the impact of the inaudible both within ‘sound itself’ and in its subjective 
impressions. One solution, of course, cannot be expected to render clear and distinct the 
entire problematic field of sound art, yet we should nevertheless be content insofar as it 
succeeds in lending clarity to a small portion of this field. Sound in the expanded field 
means to suggest that we  include within our considerations that which is beyond sound, or 
that which is not sound, yet exists in relation with it; perhaps more precisely, it is suggested 
that in our considerations of sound we place a certain emphasis on its conditions. The 
extension of the sonic field has, of late, received notable attention; Seth Kim-Cohen’s ‘non-
cochlear’ notion of sonic art focuses on a textual reading of sonic practices and its socio-
cultural impressions, and Steve Goodman’s ‘unsound’ seeks to account for the affectivity 
of the sonic continuum beyond that which is clearly defined as audible.25 Yet, more than 
the positions presented by these two authors, I am in agreement with Christoph Cox in 
assuming a definition and a position that opens sound up to what we might call its 
                                                
24 I will return to a discussion of Krauss’s famous discussion of the expanded field below, as I use it here in a 
sense taken out of context, applying it beyond its original and primary concern for critical and explicitly Post 
Modern aesthetics. 
25 Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear. 
Steve Goodman, Sonic Warfare: Sound Affect and the Ecology of Fear (Massachusetts and London: The MIT 
Press, 2010). 
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transcendent conditions, a definition of sound art as ‘that which tends to focus on the 
conditions of possibility of audition and the noisy substrate of significant sound’.26 This 
notion of a ‘noisy substrate’ goes some way towards defining the territory of sound’s 
transcendent conditions; contrary to the normative sense of the transcendent as the domain 
of conceptual reason and even eternal spirit, the term is used here in the Deleuzian sense of 
that which constitutes the ontogenetic conditions of things, of bodies, events or objects. 
Taken in this sense the transcendent is distanced from the realm of the eternal spirit, 
defining the conditions that give rise to such things, their determining factors and events. 
The consequent ontological structure sees the transcendent not as that which floats atop a 
material support but as being in excess of, surrounding and intertwined with actualized and 
recognizable forms, the state from which things emerge and the means by which they 
continually change.27 In light of the ontological implications of this (re)positioning of the 
transcendental, we will see how the notion of a ‘noisy substrate’ of sound can be considered 
as sonority’s transcendent conditions, as constituting an originary murmur, vibrational 
continuum and field of interactions out of which significant sounds emerge. In the notion of 
such a ‘noisy substrate’ we find a particular equilibrium with the concept of difference. 
  
Noise and Difference 
 
Brandon Labelle concisely draws attention towards and adopts an ‘equilibrium between the 
concepts of noise and difference’, yet we must do more than state this in the manner of a 
fact simply given, we must question the nature of this difference with which we are to 
equate noise. 28 This equation presents itself as an incredibly complex one, stretching 
beyond what I am able to address in this thesis. For now we must suffice with a very brief 
but nonetheless necessary summary of a few key areas wherein difference is closely 
associated with noise. Perhaps the most striking example of this equation with reference to 
societal politics is to be found in Jacques Attali’s famous Noise, in which the clamorous 
music of a broadly defined musical avant-garde is heard as the harbinger of political and 
social change. The economic structures of emergent musical practices and communities are 
                                                
26 Christoph Cox, ‘Sound Art and the Sonic Unconscious’, Organized Sound, 2009, 14/1: 24. 
27 The transcendental field in Deleuzian philosophy receives significant attention in later sections of this text. 
28 LaBelle, Acoustic Territories, 61. Emphasis in original. 
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heard to profess the coming of new social, political and economic orders, grouped by Attali 
into four broad epochs defined by sacrifice, representation, repetition and composition, 
respectively analogous to the transmission and transaction of music according to 
performance and oral recitation, its representation and circulation through scores, 
mechanical reproduction and distribution according to late global capitalism, and what 
amounts to a kind of return to the sacrificial, not as strict repetition but as simulacra, 
through the establishment of independent ‘D.I.Y’ networks that constitute what is in many 
ways a ‘counter cultural’ and global underground. More profoundly, this epochal 
framework is directly related, according to Attali, to the operations and desires of political 
power:  
When power wants to make people forget, music is ritual sacrifice, 
the scapegoat; when it wants them to believe, music is enactment, 
representation; when it wants to silence them, it is reproduced, 
normalized, repetition. Thus it heralds the subversion of both the 
existing code and the power in the making, well before the latter is in 
place. Today, in embryonic form, beyond repetition, lies freedom: 
more than a new music, a fourth kind of musical practice. It heralds 
the arrival of new social relations. Music is becoming composition.29 
Noise constitutes the becoming of social order and organization, it is heard by Attali as 
fluid yet nonetheless abrasive and agitative movements of social change, this is a flux that 
is not strictly smooth. It is in this sense that noise has, for Attali, both generative and 
revolutionary potentials with regard to socio-political structures, being both harbinger and 
to a certain extent a catalyst of change. Noise is here heard as an intensive force which 
individuates social organization. Considered from the perspective of aesthetics and style, 
the actions and sonorous productions of a particular avant-garde are easily labeled as noise 
from the  position of an established and dominant order, being that which is both 
marginalized and threatening. The equation of noise with difference in this instance appears 
grossly structural in its resolution, referring to the difference of that which is marginal and 
marginalized within society, defined as such according to the vicissitudes of political 
economy. 
 This equation builds upon a well defined relation of noise with alterity, drawing from 
the sense of an agitative noise of the other. The language, music and broad sonic 
                                                
29 Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1985), 20. 
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productions of ‘others’ and all that is foreign is all too easily ridiculed or dismissed as noise 
or nonsense, as interference and mere irritation. In this sense the equation of noise with 
difference remains limited, restricting its scope and potential in being considered 
destructive or as mere annoyance from the position of a well defined and organizing 
conservatism. While we remain interested in the definition of noise at a ‘molar’ or purely 
socio-cultural level, such an argument is perhaps best articulated in the words of Dick 
Hebdige for whom: 
subcultures represent ‘noise’ (as opposed to sound): interference in 
the orderly sequence which leads from real events and phenomena to 
their representation in the media. We should therefore not 
underestimate the signifying power of the spectacular subculture not 
only as a metaphor for potential anarchy ‘out there’ but as an actual 
mechanism of semantic disorder: a kind of temporary blockage in the 
system of representation.30 
Hebdige here defines noise in a typical manner, as interference within transmission, as a 
means of disorganization and confusion within systems of representation. Yet it is this 
focus upon representation—the means of which being responsible for the equation of noise 
with difference according to the organization of discrete identities and acceptable 
discursive expression from the perspective of a well defined social order, a definition which 
again limits difference through its restriction to the ‘macro’ level of differences between 
defined and discrete identities—that serves to undermine, from the point of view of the 
generative potential in noise equated with difference that we are currently trying to draw 
out, the potential in noise as the site of a continuous production of difference. Where the 
equation of noise with difference constitutes a political marginalization, we remain 
restricted to its representation, a noise that is thought to merely represent rather than be 
fully equated and synonymous with difference; in this sense difference is limited to being 
understood as divergence, as that which diverges from the norm, as that which is different 
only insofar as it is not normal. This limitation of difference is insufficient insofar as it 
serves, through its restriction to divergence, to maintain societal norms and the definition of 
recognized identities. Hebdige’s understanding of noise is limited insofar as it limits its 
producers to effectuating its representation, a restriction which leaves these producers 
easily subject to the operations of repetition understood, in Attali’s sense of the word, as a 
means of both commodification and silencing. Noise understood as only the representation 
                                                
30 Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London and New York: Routledge, 1979), 90. 
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of difference as divergence is easily silenced. Yet within Hebdige’s account, despite  
restriction to representation necessitated by his focus upon signifying cultural practice, we 
find an invitation to consider noise not only according to its external representation, as ‘a 
metaphor for potential anarchy ‘out there’’, but as ‘internal’ differential production, 
inviting potential anarchy ‘in here’, as a distorting influence within the limits and 
thresholds delimiting socio-cultural, subjective and impersonal territories. This potential is 
recognized in the identification of noise as an ‘actual mechanism of semantic disorder’, its 
‘blockage in the system of representation’ being taken here as the stoppage of a broadly 
Attalian repetition, the forcing of a continuity and composition through the disruption of 
symbolic discretion. Through this blockage of representation the equation of noise and 
difference acquires a truly productive generativity in escaping restriction to divergence. 
 The symbolic and organizational discretion limiting noise to the marginal and 
divergent  extinguishes ‘internal’ difference, that which is different not only from the point 
of view of representation or an established order, but different within the different itself, a 
productive and generative difference which constitutes both a threat to and the possibility 
of representation. It is in this sense that difference considered as divergence provides only 
an extremely limited understanding of the generative potential it is capable of accounting 
for. In its equation with noise, the internal constitutes a kind of elemental difference, 
accounting for the productive tensions between different interacting objects, the 
movements, impacts and frictions determining vibrational and sonorous productions. It is in 
this sense that we borrow from Deleuze, concisely summarized by Alberto Toscano, an 
understanding of ‘determination conceived precisely as difference’.31 It is in precisely this 
manner that I wish to express an equation or equilibrium between noise and difference, 
noise taken as the productive internal difference of sonority and not only the marginal 
status or identity of a defined practice or group of people. Noise, in the terms of an internal 
difference, is considered to be generative and determining, as both the foundational ground 
and the ungrounding dissolution of defined and clearly recognizable sonority. Difference, 
then, marks a productivity of the manner in which one thing differs from another, a 
difference between things or individuals that produces or enforces apparently discrete 
identities according to an ‘external’ determination or framing. Yet more profoundly, a 
thing, insofar as it is understood to necessarily differ within and from itself, is understood 
                                                
31 Toscano, Theatre of Production, 161. 
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to be the product of an internal differing. This internal difference or differing is to be 
considered as that which drives a thing more than maintaining it, the catalysis of its 
temporal or processual deformation, its morphological development or degradation, 
processes which are not to be strongly opposed when considered from the perspective of a 
general elementary composition. Internal difference names the potentials of a necessary 
variation and development to be found in the constituent oscillations which remain simple 
or invariant only in purely synthetic circumstance. It is this generativity of internal 
differences or differings that describes the productivity of noise as the constant and 
sufficient variability of audible and perceptible form. 
 
(non)-sound 
 
The emphasis I am keen to place upon the conditions of sound is necessarily a focus 
beyond sound, on that which is not sound yet is in it and gives shape to it. The inclusion of 
the ‘not-sound’ within sound art is, as stated above, assumed as one of its defining gestures. 
Yet, in order to accommodate the needs of the collection of works under consideration 
within this text, and in order to account for the fundamental contingencies of sound, this 
inclusion and heightened importance of the inaudible in sound art should be carefully 
considered. In defining what is not sound the tendency is to strip away layers until we reach 
an ever purer sense of sound itself. This approach can be recognized in the electroacoustic 
tradition in which visual stimuli are often considered to distract attention away from the 
‘sound itself’, leading to a tendency for the performance of pieces to be carried out in 
darkened auditoriums amid an array of loud speakers. This sensibility is also clearly present 
in the work of Francisco López, where during performance the audience will wear 
blindfolds and sit in concentric circles facing outwards from the centre in which López 
performs—an arrangement mirroring the analogy which likens the propagation of sound 
waves through space to the ripples of a pond into which a stone has been dropped. This 
structure, which positions López at the causal centre of the unfolding sound events, also 
serves to direct the listeners attention away from such a cause, away from the processes 
behind the production of sound and towards sound itself. How, in terms of a theatrical 
architecture of perception,  does such an arrangement of audience, event and performer 
structure their interrelation and organize perception? The most basic architecture of the 
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spectacle, the spatial organization by which the many observe the few, is here inverted, the 
audience turned away from the site of performance in a reorientation of attention. 
Blindfolded, the audience are discouraged from observing each other, or anything other 
than sound itself, this organization striving for a certain individualized perception and, in 
particular, audition. The situation is orientated towards an individual encounter with sound 
amidst a multitude of listening subjects. Such a structure builds upon developments in the 
acousmatic tradition, constructed around the hidden, absent or invisible source of sounds, 
focusing attention upon sound itself. The exclusion of that which is not sound leads towards 
the heightened awareness of the audible, granting increased attention to that which can only 
be heard, to the particular power of the audible. The consequence of such a particular focus 
is a tendency to think the often abstract purity of sound itself. In orienting perception 
towards that which can only be heard, to the particularity of the audible, we should at the 
same time be careful of casting off that which is not sound in our appreciation of it, for 
such a move leads one into the most obvious of Schaefferian traps, those of abstract sound 
objects and a practice of reduced listening that discards rather than includes the not-sound-
in-sound, collapsing the site of its complex contingencies and associations. Such an 
ontology of sound leads to a grounding of that which is not sound in a certain ‘impure’ 
negativity—a consequence borne in the acknowledged sonic purism of López’s work and 
his aversion to the impacts of process and causality upon aesthetics and perception—as 
opposed to the ‘affirmative’ opening out onto and implication of a transcendent substrate in 
sound. 
 Yet it would also be too simple to criticize López purely on the grounds of his 
apparent modernism and phenomenological essentialism, oversimplifying what is a 
complex approach to sound. There is a particular complexity and power in his performance 
of the sound object and fidelity towards Schaefferian ideals, a power that is lost when 
subject to commonsensical critique. It is for this reason that I believe there is something of 
the particularity of the sound object that must be rescued from itself, yet rescued from a self 
that it never had, if we are to do justice to the power of this particular principle. 
Concomitance with a contingent and contextualizing model of sound art outlined above is 
far from suggesting an accordance of the senses—on the contrary, there are works, 
considered within and of particular importance to this text, which explicitly manipulate 
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divergences and confusions between the senses.32 Opening up to material contingencies and 
‘extra-sonic’ properties does not suggest a trajectory towards common sense, accordance 
between what we see, feel or smell, against the reality of the fact that what we hear 
frequently goes unseen; it remains one of my concerns that descriptions of perceptual 
events according to a common sense, a harmony of the senses, can lead to a stripping away 
of the particular power of the sensible, the force located in that which can only be heard, 
seen, or smelt, that evades summation and identification according to commonsensical 
operations. The inaudible conditions and extensions of sound can of course be drawn out in 
sound art practice without need of visual reference, as is evident in López’s own work 
which serves as an example of sonic contingencies, as Christoph Cox highlights in 
reference to López’s Wind:  
The piece as a whole focuses on the very medium of sonic 
transport—air—and highlights the fact that sound is simply the result 
of pressure changes in that medium. Its subject matter—wind—is the 
most primeval sonic stuff […] To focus on it is to transcend the 
limits of our ordinary ontology, composed as it is of relatively stable 
visible objects.33 
Here Cox places the focus of Wind beyond its immediate sonic materiality in a manner that 
points towards an inescapable contingency, an inherent failure of the Schaefferian sound 
object that nonetheless constitutes its particular power and importance. Emphasis is placed 
upon the physical conditions of sound as much as sound itself through focusing awareness 
on ‘the very medium of sonic transport’. Any criticism of the notion of the sound object or 
purely sonic is to be primarily articulated towards any sense of purity that inheres within 
acousmatic pursuits; it is my intention to stress an inherent impurity of sound that expresses 
its complex interactions and inaudible extensions, connecting it’s appearance up with its 
transcendent conditions as much as its extension in reception and interpretation. What we 
perhaps come across in the work of López is an exercise in mapping the limits or potentials 
of the acousmatic, a striving for a certain abstraction, for a listening that attempts to unbind 
itself from recollection and association. Any successes are fleeting, being retroactively 
underwritten by memory and identification, assailing reductive audition by way of 
association. To this extent there is a certain futility in such exercises, yet the potential for 
                                                
32 For example the works of Jan Peter Sonntag which frequently manipulate the divergences between auditory 
and visual senses towards the internal production of senses of movement and nausea. 
33 Christoph Cox, ‘Sound Art’, 25. 
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catching one’s self out nonetheless remains. Yet this futility is acknowledged by López, if 
outside of his written polemics. We find the clearest and most obvious example of this, as 
expressed above, in Wind, the causal event of the sound immediately referenced, 
scuppering the potentials for a typically ‘objective’ or reduced listening. Yet here there is a 
particular tension created between an attempted abstraction, an attempt that undermines 
itself in nomenclature, that foregrounds the internal contradictions of the sound object. This 
tension was again foregrounded in performance during an event entitled ‘Sonic 
Materialities’, a performance that was part of Sheffield’s Lovebytes festival in 2010. 
López’s provocative Schaefferianism submitted itself to a peculiar self critique on this 
particular evening. His complex ecological, ethological and often entomological audition 
found itself subject to a synthetically extended, rather than objectively reduced, listening. 
Situated within the overtly artificial exoticism of Sheffield’s Winter Gardens—with 
speakers nestled amongst the carefully contained Eucalyptus and Bamboo—the site forced 
an identification and context upon the sounds being played back, associations drawing the 
sounds out-of-themselves towards the fabrication of a kind of hyper-saturated jungle 
simulacrum. An ersatz rain forest  atmosphere presented an almost comic, faux-
recontextualisation of López’s ordinarily ‘objectified’ acoustic textures and intensities, their 
origins appearing somewhat overstated. Their remains, however, a sense of striving for the 
ideals of the sound object, for sound taken ‘in itself’, an affectivity that exceeds 
recognition, despite the prevalence of recollection and association. It is this striving by 
which one attempts to catch one’s self out, to hear despite oneself, a striving directed 
towards the potentials for a productive and generative confusion in that which can only be 
heard, yet directs the listening self beyond. Practices exploring such  potentials or openings 
are charted throughout this text, practices in which something of the sound object lingers, 
despite a Schaefferian spectre, practices which grapple with an openly problematic sound 
object, an object that extends beyond itself, beyond a self that it never had. 
 In grappling with this problematic object it is associations with notions of a pure 
sound, of sound treated in abstraction, an abstraction that treats all associations as impure 
distractions, that are challenged. Such essentialism leads to a negative positioning of both 
the conditions and extensions of sound, extensions that lead beyond sound. It is an 
understanding of sound as fundamentally impure and always already leading beyond itself 
that is adopted herein. The negative positioning of the not-sound-in-sound, its conditions 
and associations, is to be avoided if we are to understand sound as emerging from a 
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complex spatium of material interactions rather than as emerging from a barren void. In 
avoiding the implication of negativity, and by extension impurity, upon the conditional 
origins of sound we can, in developing this ontology of sound, refer to an aspect of 
Deleuzian ontology in calling the not-sound-in-sound more simply (non)-sound. In moving 
away from negativity as an ontological category Deleuze conceives of (non)-being as the 
inclusion of a certain excess, or that which is beyond or more than a being, in being: 
Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the 
negative; rather, it is the being of the problematic [...] For this reason 
non-being should rather be written (non)-being or, better still, ?-
being [...] This (non)-being is the differential element in which 
affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its 
genesis.34 
Here we relate Being, or that which is in excess of an actualized instance, to the ground, the 
transcendent conditions or ‘noisy substrate’ from which a sound, an actualized and 
recognizable thing or being, emerges. The importance of (non)-being to the ontology of 
sound undergoing development here is two fold: Being and being, or in reference to our 
specific concerns, a sound and its transcendent conditions, are not to be thought of as 
strictly discrete and distinct but rather as reciprocally determined; while Being or (non)-
being is conceived in terms of ground, the noisy substrate from which a defined and 
recognizable being (a sonorous body) emerges, its status as a genetic ‘differential element’ 
situates it as being included within the being of which it is the transcendent condition. In 
referring to an ontology that conceives of (non)-being, by extension we conceive of the not-
sound-in-sound as (non)-sound, as the inaudible and imperceptible interactions that form 
the background which inheres in sonorous qualities. As opposed to the exclusivity of ‘not 
sound’, (non)-sound should be thought of as being inclusive, referring to conditions and the 
material contingency of sound. ‘Not sound’ characterizes the acousmatic approach to extra-
sonic contingencies insofar as it focuses attention on ‘sound itself’; (non)-sound should be 
thought of as being characteristic of a sound art practice that seeks to open sound up to its 
transcendent conditions, its complex interconnections and to the not-sound-in-sound. 
 In focusing upon an inaudibility which inheres in sound, upon the importance and 
ontological status of (non)-sound, reference should be made to the work of Seth Kim-
Cohen, whose ‘non-cochlear’ approach places a particular focus on the inter-textual 
                                                
34 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 76-7. 
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extensions of sound, on the socio-cultural conditions and impacts of sonic practices, but 
also upon a notion of sound as text. His trajectory beyond the audible is one of a flight from 
the notion of the in-itself that is manifest in the Schaefferian notion of the sound object. 
Kim-Cohen suggests that an abandonment of the sound object and a decentralization of 
sonic materiality are necessary, as both threaten to lead sonic practice down the ‘dead-end’ 
of phenomenological enquiry abandoned by the visual arts with the birth of post-
modernism as an overtly conceptual practice. Sonic practice, he argues, must catch up. In 
moving away from the sound object, Kim-Cohen outlines various trajectories through 
artistic practice leading away from a central matter or phenomenological essence, a route 
that leads not only away from the center but away from centrality in general. This approach 
to the inaudible is one that can be seen to pick up where sound left off, a practice beyond 
the envelope of the audible, a symbolic continuity after sound. Where López positions his 
audience in the wake of the sound event, in concentric circles emitting out from the 
centralized point in which he stands, Kim-Cohen positions his readers just beyond the point 
at which these ripples fall silent, yet nonetheless continue to disperse. Yet what we soon 
find is that this schema appears as all too simplistic; in the abandonment of an irritable and 
centralized object, little is done to challenge or engage with its problematic status. The 
perhaps traumatic status of the object is left largely untouched and therefore continues to 
haunt the exposition of Kim-Cohen’s non-cochlear approach. 
 The sound object, having been abandoned, nonetheless lingers in Kim-Cohen’s text 
as a fearful monument or totemic presence, a relic of a past civilization—specifically that 
of Scheaffer and the GRM—that continues to both fascinate and haunt the present within 
which he writes. As such, the problematic and even traumatic status of the object cannot be 
shed and is, to the contrary, maintained in order to support an assertion of opposition to it; 
such is the all too simplistic binary structure of Kim-Cohen’s argument. While his critical 
opposition to the sound object on the grounds of its essentialism is valid, his critique does 
not go far enough to challenge it, and it is precisely the assumed opposition to the object 
that sustains it. For much of Kim-Cohen’s argument to hold, he must impose or force an 
essential purity upon a number of contemporary approaches to sonic matters—he is, in 
other words, driven to repeatedly call upon straw men in order to add weight to his thesis. 
Perhaps the most striking case of this is his account of Christina Kubisch’s Electrical 
Walks. Kubisch’s Electrical Walks involve participants donning headphones equipped with 
electro-magnetic receivers and following routes through towns and cities that Kubisch has 
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devised along lines of electromagnetic intensity coursing throughout urban environments. 
The headphones render audible the otherwise inaudible electromagnetic fields, tapping into 
the ubiquitous waveforms and frequencies that—largely—imperceptibly saturate urban 
centres. Kubisch’s headphones make perceptible the ordinarily imperceptible noise of 
electrical equipment, power lines, screens, wireless networks and so on. In doing so the site 
or territory that each irradiating object occupies is recognized as extending beyond that 
which can be seen into an invisible and largely intangible hinterland of blurred boundaries. 
Rendered audible, such irradiating fields and electromagnetic territories are revealed in a 
manner which can be both alarming and intriguing, attracting attention while potentially 
repelling the listening subject. A new topology of the city is revealed and mapped out 
according to zones of varying electromagnetic intensity; movement through such spaces 
comes under new influence according to these ephemeral fields of both attraction and 
disquiet, either due to prescription—following Kubisch’s map and instructions, themselves 
a response to these zones of intensity—or according to personal audile intrigue, listening 
subjects in search of new signal content. Kim-Cohen—quoting and excerpt from Rilke 
found in Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter—suggests that ‘Christina Kubisch’s 
Electrical Works propose that it is possible to encounter a phenomenon—in this case 
electromagnetism—and to “complete … and then experience it, as it makes itself felt, thus 
transformed, in another field of sense.”’35 This is not a wholly bad summary, accounting for 
the transposition of waveforms into the audible range, phenomena that only after such a 
process of transformation or translation are made available to the senses. Yet the problem 
here is with the extent to which Kim-Cohen is putting Rilke’s words into Kubisch’s mouth. 
It is with the suggested completion that we should take issue, as the tendency to identify 
completeness, wholeness, self-same identity and essentialism in work where there is little 
evidence of such qualities is a recurring theme in Kim-Cohen’s text. Revelation of an 
otherwise imperceptible phenomena to the senses does not necessitate nor constitute, as is 
Kim-Cohen’s reading suggests, the provision of a final link in the constitution of a holistic 
and wholly present environment, as the audible space revealed nonetheless maintains 
varying degrees of obscurity, as only particular qualities of the environment and objects 
rendered audible are revealed. Kim-Cohen will go on to state that ‘just as with Rilke, this 
longed-for completeness is a fantasy’, yet this fantasy could be said to be more Kim-
                                                
35 Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear, 109. 
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Cohen’s than Kubisch’s, whose work aims more at uncovering new layers of complexity 
and detail in the environment than necessarily conveying it as a whole.36 As opposed to a 
holism, such practices reveal a radical and impersonal alterity, degrees of difference within 
the complexity of the material world. Yet Kim-Cohen fails to recognize this: ‘contrary to a 
phenomenological conception in which these systems and their Kubisch-revealed sounds 
are adumbrated perspectives of a single entity with a consistent essence, I cannot imagine 
or name a body to which both would belong’.37 This ‘consistent essence’ is Kim-Cohen’s 
straw man, invoked in order to support binary opposition to it. Having stated that he is 
unable to imagine a body that could support such a unitary and consistent essence he goes 
no further in his investigations and walks away from the notion of the body, of any body, as 
contingent multiplicity. The completeness that Kim-Cohen ascribes to the phenomena 
rendered audible in the Electrical Walks is indicative of his broader tendency to ascribe or 
assume a consistency and stability of identity in matter. This underestimation of the 
potentials for complexity, morphology, contingency and anonymity in materials leaves 
Kim-Cohen forced to recurrently posit and assume an essence that he is at pains to negate. 
In providing a choice of either essentialism or symbolism both terms remain intact and 
simply result in championing one over the other. This dualism opens up a fissure which 
annihilates the potential for the identification of an influential continuum between blunt 
matter and symbolic meaning that could be capable of accounting for the complex 
interactions between them. This limited and pacifying understanding of material agency is 
made clear in the unproblematic purity ascribed to noise: ‘contrary to apparent 
understanding, only noise is capable of purity. Signal, a product of traces and difference, is 
always impure, always shot through with the impurity of the other. Signal is never 
selfsame, never in absolute proximity to itself’.38 Here I am in agreement with these 
reflections on the nature of signal, yet I would argue that we can ascribe a similar 
description to that of noise and need not treat signal as necessarily synonymous with signs. 
We are able to conceive of noise as pure insofar as it is equated with pure difference, 
insofar as it is taken as difference in itself, an informal chaos. Kim-Cohen’s mistake is to 
ascribe a self to the pure selflessness of noise, neglecting that noise too is never self same 
but always different. The position I will be defending is one that assumes the purity 
                                                
36 Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear, 110. 
37 Ibid., 111. 
38 Ibid., 100. 
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identified by Kim-Cohen yet does not adhere to the consistency ascribed to it. A further 
point of concordance is on the absolute proximity of noise to itself, yet only insofar as the 
‘itself’ of pure noise is utterly selfless. Purity is admitted insofar as it is a pure difference 
and that any ‘absolute proximity’ that such purity may embody marks the impossibility of 
their being any self to speak of, as both self and signal require a critical distance, 
disconnection and alterity. In place of any essence a fundamental absence of essence and 
self-similarity is posited in noise. The ‘absolute proximity’ of noise ‘in itself’, the great 
communicator connected on every side is pure only insofar as it marks a pure absence of 
identity, a ceaseless flow incapable of signal, symbol or sign. Contrasting with the 
approach taken by Kim-Cohen, the one that is to be taken herein does not pass over this 
unspeakable and inaudible ‘purity’ in silence. The tautological difference in intensity that 
such a conception of noise poses remains imperceptible from the position put forward by 
Kim-Cohen which binds itself too tightly to a purely symbolic register and therefore limits 
the scope of its argument to an essentialized linguisticism. The extent of this limitation can 
be seen in the suggestion that ‘a more productive distinction might be that between textual 
engagements with works of art versus engagements focused on material or perception’.39 
The inhibition that such a distinction posses is made clear in a discussion of Lucier’s I am 
Sitting in a Room. The encounter with Lucier forces Kim-Cohen to momentarily to reflect 
upon the inseparable reciprocity that the piece establishes between auditory phenomena, 
architectural and acoustical determinants, the essential contingency of the resonant 
frequencies exposed and—most importantly for Kim-Cohen—speech and text. The 
complexity of this piece is, for Kim-Cohen, better reduced to its conceptual schematic, as 
identified in the centralized essence of the text. On this point we find Kim-Cohen in a 
position that mirrors the ‘fundamentalism’ he locates and critiques in the work of Francisco 
López, except in this instance sound is replaced with text.40 While attention is centralized 
upon the conceptual concerns performed in I am Sitting in a Room, there appears to be 
either an unwillingness or inability to say what these are beyond the vaguest outline of the 
pieces broadly ‘interdisciplinary’ or ‘intermediary’  concerns. It is this complex of concerns 
realized in Lucier’s work that appears to pose the biggest problem to the primacy of a 
symbolic and intertextual framework that Kim-Cohen is attempting to establish, the 
                                                
39 Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear, 112. 
40 See Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear, 123-9 for his critique of Francisco López’ neo-Schaefferian 
approach to sound. 
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complicated interrelations of matter and voice, object, event and text that resist the 
reduction towards a set of keywords and references to which Kim-Cohen subjects them. 
 Rigorously conceptual approaches to sonic practice is, of course, to be championed, 
yet need not be limited to yielding simple binaries. Driven from the centralized position of 
a traumatic sound object, Kim-Cohen’s conceptualism attempts the transcendence of purely 
sonic concerns, yet this transcendence does not go far enough in remaining wholly 
insubstantial. The scope and trajectory of this conceptualism is somewhat stifled by its 
linguistic overcoding. This limitation arises from an approach that abandons the site of the 
object, leaving its status bereft of critical engagement and its conditions unchallenged. It is 
somewhat obvious that in a necessary response to phenomenological essentialism we need 
not limit ourselves to being for or against it, the simplest reduction of this latter position 
leading only to the matters for which it stands being rendered silent from the position of a 
dissociated semantic register. The alternative to this either-or situation is one which moves 
beyond the essentialized site of the object not in flight from it, a gesture akin to turning a 
blind eye, but via passage through it. In doing so, we find in the object itself the means of 
its own undoing: its fundamental or essential contingency. Whereas the abandonment of the 
site of the object leaves its ground untouched and unchallenged, a closer examination of the 
supposed consistency of the object—a critique of the in-itself in-itself—reveals sound-in-
itself to be in fact nothing, an in-itself that is not one. In the utmost proximity of the object 
we arrive at its qualitative dissolution, its fundamental selflessness, the absence of a 
consistent, unitary or selfsame identity. In the in-itself we find only an absence of self, a 
solidity and consistency revealed as contingent and in flux. To arrive at this dissolution the 
line followed need not be one of flight but one of descent through the object to the point of 
its ‘transcendent conditions’. In a critical trajectory through the ‘central site’ of the sound 
object we disclose the inaudible noise of a multitude of centres, singular events that 
constitute the conditions of a sound capable of being perceived as objective. 
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Figure 1 : Symbolism, Essentialism, Transcendence 
 
Beneath the abstracted appearance of a sound’s coherent objectivity resides its conditions, a 
multitude of bodies, ears, organs, collisions, agitations and mediums—the expanse of a 
larger vibrational continuum. Such material conditions are not considered discrete nor 
autonomous and must be considered in terms of their interactions and reciprocal 
determinations, material practices that are in themselves efficacious and generative. As 
such, we find amidst the conditions of the object its supportive subjects, faculties, 
institutions, cultures and sub-cultures that make possible the determination of its 
boundaries and distinction. It is only in this trajectory through objectivity to its conditions 
that its autonomy is challenged; the desire to transcend the essentialism of objectivity 
requires a descent into its depths. As is surely obvious, a movement beyond the object and 
sound-in-itself need not mean that we limit ourselves to purely symbolic operations, but, 
rather, that the contingency of the symbolic is mirrored in degree if not in kind in the 
material conditions constituting the fundamental contingency of the in-itself. 
 This critical framework requires that we open our approach onto that of a pre-
symbolic affectivity, a generative status of matter that gives towards that which is taken as 
given. Neither symbolic nor material efficacy can—insofar as their respective 
determinations are thought to remain unilateral—suffice, and what we, in our symbolic 
actions, pass over as silent should not be passed over in silence; the operations of material 
affectivity must be aloud to broach the surface, to pose a problem in opposition to the 
sufficiency of the symbolic. This suggested continuum stands in contrast to the exclusivity 
of the symbolic framework treated as sufficient in Kim-Cohen’s approach wherein it is 
stated that: 
if, as some would have it, there are experiences that could be 
characterized as pre-linguistic, then the minute we think or speak 
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them, we rip them from this “pure” state, corrupting them with 
language. This is problematic on two fronts […] this inevitable 
linguistic corruption […] would locate most of human experience in 
falsity or impurity […] Second, if some stimuli actually convey an 
experiential effect that precedes linguistic processing, what are we to 
do with such experiences? […] If there is such a strata of experience, 
we must accept it mutely. It finds no voice in thought or discourse. 
Since there is nothing we can do with it, it seems wise to put it aside 
and concern ourselves with that of which we can speak.41 
Having previously assumed an inherent impurity and alterity in significant symbolic 
content, we here find a certain resistance to this same notion in rebuking affronts to the 
purity of human experience defined, by Kim-Cohen, as primarily linguistic. Again, it would 
appear that these convictions are not taken far enough as the impurity and alterity that he 
identifies in symbolic efficacy are not permitted to stray from what can be considered true, 
a reluctance that falls short of the importance of a kind of ‘falsity’ identified as being at 
work within social and symbolic registers in the Lacanian notion of the ‘fundamental 
fantasy’, or, in a very different way, the ‘impurity’ identified in Deleuze’s account of the 
process of actualization and explication that marks the transition from a differential 
intensity in-itself to that which can be named and of which we might begin to speak.42 This 
exclusion of the pre-linguistic fails to grasp that which ‘finds no voice in thought’ as that 
which forces thought in the reality of an encounter—an encounter that is not limited to 
purely symbolic operations—yet is, admittedly, ordinarily ‘cancelled’ in thought insofar as 
its perception is fused with recollection. The encounters with which we are concerned, 
defined by the work to which attention is to be turned, are to be distinguished from that of 
the quotidian, of default positions and common sense, and so it is the potential they  pose 
for a forcing of thought that we are concerned with. 
 The ‘expanded field’ of which we are beginning to speak must, in accordance with 
what has been expressed so far, not only expand in one direction, that leading toward a 
scission between the semantic and the material towards a sufficiency of terminological, 
inter-textual referentiality and juxtaposition; it must be an expansion in all directions at 
                                                
41 Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear, 111-2. 
42 This notion of a ‘fundamental fantasy’ is described well by Slavoj Žižek who states that ‘for Lacan, fantasy 
is on the side of reality—that is, it sustains the subject’s ‘sense of reality’: when the phantasmic frame 
disintegrates, the subject undergoes a ‘loss of reality’ and starts to perceive reality as an ‘unreal’ nightmarish 
universe with no firm ontological foundation; this nightmarish universe in not ‘pure fantasy’ but, on the 
contrary, that which remains of reality after reality is deprived of its support in fantasy’.  See Slavoj Žižek 
The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London and New York: Verso, 1999), 51. 
The Deleuzian concepts of actualization and explication will be returned to in some detail below. 
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once that in doing so runs the risk of pulling itself apart. The risk must be taken as a 
trajectory that leads out of phenomenological essentialism towards symbolic sufficiency, 
far from being a radical development leads down what is now a well trodden path. Such a 
singular route makes progress only towards practices now well defined according to market 
taxonomies, practices grouped under the rubric of Post-Modernism. Too eager a leap into 
semantic ‘anti-essentialism’ would, rather than a progression, be something of a step 
backwards or rehearsal of steps being taken some—at the time of writing—fifty years ago. 
The assumption that sonic practice must ‘catch up’ with the conceptual or linguistic turn is 
to suggest that there is but a singular route out of Modernism and into Post-Modernism to 
which all practices should seek to adhere. What is proposed instead is the adoption of a 
notion of conceptual practice that is increasingly permeable and somewhat more loosely 
bound to language that would prevent a subjugation of sonic practices to the visual—or 
perhaps ‘post-visual’ conceptualism—and the assumption of a singular trajectory or 
progression that inheres in the unfolding of histories of art. An over zealous attempt to 
define contemporary practices through what Krauss describes as ‘the universe of terms that 
are felt to be in opposition within a cultural situation’, at the expense of ‘material, or, for 
that matter, the perception of material’, is to turn one’s back on the contingent dynamics of 
materials and the reciprocity that defines their perception and the potentials they give to be 
thought.43 
 This position does not suggest that a focus upon material affectivity attains a sense of 
purity in being beyond socio-cultural determinations which are of secondary importance to 
a ‘neo-modernist’ artistic practice; rather, it is suggested that there is a cultural inclination 
concerned with the investigation of its broad continuum of conditions and influences, 
assuming a primacy of materials in the absence of positivism, an acknowledgement of the 
‘purity’ ascribed to its materialist orientation above but on the condition that this purity is a 
pure absence of essence and the self same: a pure difference. Such practices that assert a 
primacy of materials are, nonetheless, defined less according to a notion of sound-itself as 
qualitative or phenomenological essence than according to the contingencies of the audible 
and audition, an orientation that finds a particular conclusion in the notion that sound-in-
itself is nothing. 
                                                
43 Rosalind Krauss, ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’ in Hal Foster (ed.) The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture (New York: The New Press, 1998), 46-7. 
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1. The Noise of The World: An Opening 
 
The home: idealized as a place of quietude guarding the consistency of self, the individual 
or the family name, where the sounds present are those of one’s choosing, the records one 
plays to help structure a day, a meal, lending to the building, to the place, dynamics that 
resonate with the soul or its desires. Sounds known, noises familiar, the creak of that loose 
floor board just outside the toilet, the handle of the bathroom door noticeably different from 
that of the bedroom, that pan landing on that hob, the clangs and gurgles of a central 
heating system that emerges from the background noise that is perhaps an annoyance and at 
the same time a comforting drone. Such noises are known, recognized, rarely threatening, 
they become the signal components and support of an identity, of a place, a territory that is 
not only ours or mine but a part of me, propping me up, lending me support and 
consistency through their repetitions, their punctuations, marking time, events, entrances, 
exits, the welcome audible affirmations of familiarity, of a life. Beyond this place, this 
home, this ideal, outside resides difference, the noise of the world. Such is the all too 
simple distinction between noise and signal, interiority and exteriority, self and other, that 
guards an oscillatory and fragile threshold, a domesticated territory; yet in such ways sound 
nonetheless structures space, constructs place, at the very least it lends consistency and a 
particular definition. Where we talk of and are engaged in sonic spatial productions we 
invoke a practice synonymous with territorial productions insofar as we are talking of 
sounds that take place, that in their oscillations and resonances relate bodies to one another 
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in the extensions and contractions of a broad somatic complex. This extension and 
resonance influences and informs space, performing a certain determining function in its 
disturbances, distortions and drawing of attention. In this sense these territories are not 
exclusively political or subjective insofar as their claims or taking of place is not primarily 
concerned with the expression of an identity or self awareness. The territoriality evoked is 
perhaps disempowered in this ambiguous structuration, in distancing or rather expanding its 
conception beyond that of political and subjective territoriality. Such an orientation, 
however, does not seek to negate such a political or macro-territorial orientation, nor 
challenge its importance, but rather suggests that such concerns are well addressed 
elsewhere and that the subject matter of this text requires attention to a more localized and 
particular territoriality, that of an affectivity of objects and events according to a vibrational 
materialism. It is in this sense that a certain objective territoriality is discussed insofar as 
objects influence one another, making and taking place, beyond yet impinging upon 
subjective perception. This is not an appeal to an ‘objective truth’ in the sense of something 
irreducible and undeniable, it is, on the contrary, an attempt to broach a fundamental 
contingency and affirm difference, to undermine essentialism and purity and acknowledge 
affectivity beyond the empirically given or perceptible. A territory is not simply that which 
we make of it, nor that by which it is simply given; it is towards the influence of materials 
upon territorial formations that we will constantly return throughout this thesis, to spatial 
productions active beyond yet simultaneously efficacious within intention or that space 
which is claimed according to the laying of lines. What we may call the sounding of space 
is synonymous with a praxical definition and delimitation of territories according to this 
ontological contingency and apparent ambiguity, territorial delimitation or production being 
thought as primarily complicit with material affectivity. In listening, the sounding of space 
is latched onto, inscribed, repeated; according to such operations it becomes individualized 
according to a listening practice or audile technique that affects a resonance and impression 
throughout a somatic complex. The ‘performativity’ of a waveform, hosted as well as 
expressed, defines the particular territoriality we are presently concerned with, and so we 
must concern ourselves not only with those sounds made familiar through their repetition, 
defining domestic territory and personal space, but extend our listening practice into an 
expanded field where sound may be considered a found—as much as a crafted—object. 
 This expanded sound space, a field of interactions whose objects and occupying 
bodies extend beyond the audible, constitutes what Emily Thompson has referred to as the 
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physical aspects of a soundscape: ‘The physical aspects of a soundscape consist not only of 
the sounds themselves, the waves of acoustic energy permeating the atmosphere in which 
people live, but also the material objects that create, and sometimes destroy, those 
sounds’.44 In this conception we find an understanding of the soundscape extending beyond 
the audible, taking into consideration the material complex which constitutes its conditions. 
Sonic spatial productions relate bodies beyond themselves and individuals beyond their 
selves, sympathetic resonances that relate the body to bodies in general, the body 
repositioned amidst a global anybody, somatic membranes taken, through relation, out from 
under themselves, the body referred elsewhere in sound and vibration. While the sonority 
of space requires occupation by the ear, such spaces referring to a body in general defer the 
strictly subjective in a referral beyond the perceptible, to bodies out of sight, out of sound, 
and out of mind. Acoustic space, while necessarily occupied by the ear, must be orientated 
towards its inaudible substrates and extensions, to its inherent (non)-sound, if it is to move 
beyond the trappings of phenomenological essences and the limits of the empirically given. 
The sonic events and occupations with which we are concerned, extending beyond the 
immediately given somatic territory, concerned with a broad field of material interactions 
rendered audible, can be addressed under the more general rubric of acoustic ecologies, 
which concerns itself, in the most general or generous sense, with audible relations, 
resonant connections and their environmental impression. This term, already well defined, 
brings with it traditions and associations that must be addressed if we are to make sense of 
this assertion within the context of the artistic practice discussed herein. In order to do so, it 
is necessary that we align a practice of acoustic ecology with production and engagement 
rather than preservation, documentation and measurements, around a notion of productive 
sonority rather than sacred silence. Such a practice of acoustic ecology becomes in many 
ways synonymous with sonorous spatial productions, a sounding which takes place. 
 
Ecologies of Noise 
 
Foregrounded within the practice of acoustic ecology are, of course, the sounds of ‘the 
environment’—readily understood in its most simplistically ‘naturalized’ sense—and the 
                                                
44 Emily Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural Acoustics and the Culture of Listening in 
America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2002), 1-2. 
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advocation, development and refinement of quotidian listening practice or audile technique. 
This orientation can be said to be built upon the concerns expressed in R. Murray Schafer’s 
The Soundscape, which forms the ideological cornerstone of the acoustic ecology 
movement. While the practice as a whole has been the subject of some notable critical 
attention in recent years—most notably Augoyard and Torgue’s Sonic Experience and 
Brandon LaBelle’s Acoustic Territories, texts that have served to problematize the 
limitations imposed upon the movement by its own romantic image of the natural and its 
relation to noise—there has been scarce attention paid to its core ideological and conceptual 
framework. It is not, however, my intention to provide a comprehensive review and 
restructuration of acoustic ecology in light of current practice—as any such attempt would 
fill numerous volumes—but rather to perform a kind of conceptual salvage operation upon 
the kernel of the movement’s ideological edifice, as many useful tools persist therein. The 
key points of the aforementioned recent critical reappraisals withstanding, the approach 
taken here could be simply to move on; yet to do so would neglect the potentials provided 
by the peculiarities of Schafer’s approach for many a productive disjunction. It is too 
simple a move to dismiss Schafer’s approach on the grounds of his romantic ideals, 
archetypal epistemology and overtly ‘new age’ orientation. While we must of course be 
critical of these aspects of his work, we also find therein the framework of a participative 
ecological praxis, an ear tuned to the nuances of noise and many observations that identify 
the limitations of his own ideological position, a position which radically limits the scope 
of many of his own observations and conclusions. It is this same ideological position that 
has come to define some of the most simplistic and reductive aspects of the practice of 
acoustic ecology, as it has taken shape after Schafer; yet we find within the words of 
Schafer, as well as a number of those who have helped develop his project, at the heart of 
his ideological position, the means of its own undoing and reconstruction. In delimiting a 
practice of acoustic ecology more appropriate for our needs we should first return to 
Schafer and his particular rendering of the sonic environment within the context of a larger 
vibrational continuum. 
It is not my intention to provide an overview of the field of acoustic ecology—
which is structured around the divergent emphases and methodologies of its various 
factions or communities—but rather to isolate a number of its most salient points, both 
ideological and practical. For example, of particular interest is the groundwork carried out 
within the practice of acoustic ecology towards an elaboration and documentation of sound 
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as an agent in spatial productions, its contributions to the constitution of place and locale.45 
This is perhaps most plainly evident in R. Murray Schafer’s notion of the sound mark—
understood as a component of his more generalized notion of the soundscape—wherein a 
recurrent sound event considered characteristic of its locale is to be treated with the same 
care, attention and preservation as visibly stable and consistent landmarks which contribute 
to local or national identity. Yet of further interest and greater importance is the work 
carried out at a more complex or analytical level wherein we find attention given  towards 
the influence that such sound-marks, spaces and events have upon the bodies that occupy 
them—human and otherwise. Sound is in this way considered as an active element in 
social, cultural, physical and political relations. Such concerns can be found at the heart of 
the acoustic ecology or soundscape project and are the primary focus of Schafer’s text, 
concerns warranting critical engagement. 
In the description of acoustic ecology as participative rather than strictly 
observational and descriptive, Schafer enables explicit couplings between the practice and 
that of everyday life, to a quotidian audition that need not necessarily privilege the purity of 
the ‘natural’ over the clamor and complexity of ‘noise’. Schafer’s ecological praxis is one 
not strictly of quiet audition and observation, but one in which an environment is engaged 
with through the production of sound, through the production of noise and not merely its 
measurement and documentation: ‘the basic modules of measuring the acoustic 
environment are the human ear and the human voice […] the only way we can comprehend 
extrahuman sounds is in relationship to sensing and producing sounds of our own’.46 The 
ecological auditor is in this way more embedded than detached, acting through interaction 
more than ‘objective’ distance. Within this participative model, measurement is met with 
production, a situation that structures encounter with the ambiguity of the extrahuman, with 
noise grounded in a certain confusion of bodies and objects constituting the physical agents 
of both the land and soundscape. It is in this confusion that the soundscape is heard as a site 
of both contestation and mimesis, a site in which the human and nonhuman undergo 
                                                
45 A far from exhaustive list of such factions includes the Acoustic Ecology Institute, focusing upon a 
scientific methodology as a means of investigating the environmental effects of human sound, the World 
Forum for Acoustic Ecology, which covers a far broader field of auditory interests, and the American Society 
for Acoustic Ecology. A more comprehensive overview of this global initiative can be found at 
http://interact.uoregon.edu/MediaLit/WFAE/home/ . Of particular note is the more recently initiated Positive 
Soundscapes Project, based at the University of Salford, which sought to address many of the issues I will be 
addressing here through a programme of interdisciplinary research (See http://www.positivesoundscapes.org/ 
for further details) as well as the work of the Noise Futures network. 
46 Schafer, The Soundscape, 206–7. 
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transformation according to interactive individuations and the problematization of 
discretion.47 Schafer provides only the most basic list of instruments or modules to be used  
in the practice of a participative acoustic ecology, that of the voice and the ear, a list that is 
basic in terms of its numbers more than the complexity of its components. More than the 
constituents of a list of modules, it is the implications of Schafer’s description of a practice 
comprised of sonorous productions as much as the means of audition that is important, the 
emphasis placed upon the coupling of perception and expression as constitutive of a 
technique appropriate to acoustic ecology, the involvement of the listener in the landscape. 
Schafer described a productive practice of acoustic ecology structured, in part at least, 
around a performative and participatory engagement, it is this element of his praxis that I 
wish to retain and in a sense retrieve from the broader implications of his thinking. 
 A slightly expanded set of ‘basic modules’ is put to work by Chris Watson who 
works extensively in with the practice of sound or field recording and the auditory 
documentation of place. We hear in Watson’s work the exquisite detail attained through 
such a ‘participative’ model, a practice that not only documents from a distance but finds 
Watson embroiled in the documentation and creation of acoustic environments. While 
Watson in some ways erases himself from the recording, through the use of long cabling 
enabling his audible presence to remain imperceptible, his affirmation of the microphone as 
instrument is a sign of his participative and compositional engagement in the (re)production 
of auditory fields and environments. Watson’s Weather Report presents the listener with 
fourteen-hour long recordings, condensed into eighteen minute documents, giving a dense 
and detailed account of three diverse and specific field situations; edited, layered, arranged, 
this piece does not present the most radical manipulation of sound, but the importance of 
this particular release is clear only when considered within the context of his earlier 
recording work which is comprised of ‘untreated’ documents of location specific sound-
spaces, acoustic documents concerned with the clear description of a specific locale and 
event. These earlier documents present what are—in the case of Beyond the Circle of 
Fire—otherwise impossibly proximal sites and sound-spaces, spaces such as that occupied 
by an ‘Insect Hidden in the Leaf Litter’ or the interior of a zebra carcass being fed on by 
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vultures.48 Watson’s microphone placements, these extensions of the ear, grant access to 
sites otherwise inaccessible to human ears, resolutely concrete sound-spaces that are 
nonetheless somewhat abstract due to their often all-too-intimate realism. Sound events 
such as the passing of a ‘Woodpigeon Wing Past Mics’ are presented in a manner that is, by 
virtue of the intense clarity and proximity of its recording, abstract while nonetheless 
grounded with reference to its original context. The sounds foregrounded in these 
exquisitely clear recordings present a sonic materiality characteristic of the most detailed 
and intricate sound objects, yet presented as contextualized events. Weather Report 
presents something of a different approach: sounds presented as always-already 
contextualized events, expressly referred back to the site of their original occurrence, yet in 
this instance they are presented to us layered, reorganized, composed. Weather Report has 
been described as Watson’s first ‘foray into composition’, as if the meticulous attention to 
microphone placements, the discernment of the desired signals, the attention to sound 
quality, the timing of edits and the pressing of ‘record’ and ‘stop’ buttons did not constitute 
the composition of a complex field situation in which each recording was made.49 By way 
of analogy, we may think of photographic composition, which in many cases is determined 
more by the position of the photographer’s body and lens in relation to the object being 
‘captured’ than the placement of objects, composition is, in this sense, determined in the 
relation established between photographer, camera and object. It is in a similar way that we 
can describe every act of field recording as a compositional act established in the 
relationship between the field-recorder, microphone and sound object or event. What is 
present throughout all of Watson’s work is an understanding of the creative and in many 
ways compositional act of directed and attentive listening. Nonetheless, there is a difference 
in approach made evident in Weather Report that needs to be noted. The more overtly 
composed sound-spaces presented on Weather Report have, through their layering and 
overlapping, been subject to a temporal compression which allows a greater sense of 
seasonal and macro level durational variation to be transmitted.50 A sense of duration 
inheres in Weather Report that we do not hear in his earlier recordings, being orientated 
more towards micro-sonic details, timbral variance and quality, the emplaced sound object 
                                                
48 Both examples can be found on Chris Watson, Outside the Circle of Fire (Touch: TO:37, 1998/2003). 
49 See http://www.chriswatson.net/discography.html, accessed 23/03/10. 
50 ‘The three locations featured here all have moods and characters which are made tangible by the elements, 
and these periodic events are represented within by a form of time compression’, see the back-cover of Chris 
Watson, Weather Report (Touch: TO:47, 2003). 
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and its matters of expression. The more expressly acknowledged compositional approach 
taken on Weather Report is striking as much for the foregrounding of Watson’s own role in 
the production of the sound-spaces presented as it is for the aesthetic results that distance 
this release from his earlier work. This gesture, the foregrounding of the hand or ear of the 
field-recording artist in the construction and presentation of a sonic document is a decision 
that is audible in a small number of the sound events contained within Weather Report. 
‘The Lapaich’—the second of three tracks made discrete according to the locations 
documented—opens with the sound of someone striding out into a Scottish river or stream; 
one might presume that these footsteps are Watson’s, perhaps moving to place another mic- 
or hydrophone. This simple gesture, the recorded sound of footsteps, draws attention to a 
human presence and to that of the artist within the site of an initial creative act of audition. 
Such sounds have the effect of explicitly locating Watson within the environment being 
recorded, as a part of and participant in that environment, rather than invisible/inaudible 
and abstracted observer. Such gestures contrast with the tendency in more ‘objectively’ 
orientated documents to seek the removal or transparency of the act of documentation, 
presenting the given perspective as somehow universal by way of a disembodied audition 
or gaze. Watson’s practice presents the praxical notion of a participative acoustic ecology, 
yet one where the ‘basic modules of measuring the  acoustic environment’ are not only the 
ear and voice but the noises associated with the presence and movements of the body 
within a landscape, as well as the various microphones which allow one to penetrate into 
the subtleties of its otherwise inaudible background noises and vibrational continuums. 
 
The Confusion of Objects and Events 
  
We find that there is more to acoustic ecology than the disciplinary capture of this term 
immediately permits, as is evident in the work of many artists who do not subject 
themselves to this rubric yet operate with matter and method that encroaches upon the 
delimiting  thresholds of this field. Towards an extraction or exhumation of key points and 
a distortion of its territorialized distinction we progress towards an inversion of acoustic 
ecology, keeping in tact those parts which most clearly serve present needs, most notably 
the discipline’s broad concern for the construction of differing sonic environments and 
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sound-spaces.51 To this end the discipline’s internal relation of nature and noise is to be 
further problematized along the lines of its ontology of sound, as expressed in the work of a 
number of key practitioners. 
To state that Schafer was solely concerned with ‘natural’ sounds would be to 
oversimplify his position, which took into consideration the sounds of the industrialized 
world, transport, the city and the workplace.52 Schafer can also be seen to have championed 
a pragmatic engagement with industrial design, of the kind most clearly expressed in Max 
Neuhaus’s Sirens project, which involved redesigning the sounds produced by emergency 
vehicles. Research carried out by Neuhaus, using vehicles provided by New York city’s 
police department, sought to make sirens more identifiable, informative to the public, less 
confusing for those both inside the vehicle and out; Neuhaus’s research acknowledged the 
complexity of listening and that through careful attention to sound and its reception, a siren 
need not swamp and confuse an environment but provide valuable information on the 
location, speed and orientation of emergency vehicles while preserving the audible 
dynamics of the city.53 This project is exemplary of the approach to sound design that 
forms a core component of Schafer’s participative ecology. Yet despite such considerations 
of the mechanized, post-industrial world, there resides within Schafer’s thought an 
overwhelming ideological bias towards a peculiar ‘purity’ of sound, a purity to be found in 
and between clearly distinct signals: the sound set apart from background noise. It can be 
said that Schafer’s concerns lie not with ‘sound itself’, not in notions of sonorous quality, 
timbre or pitch, so much as their audible discretion, proximity or spacing, as well as their 
symbolic and social function. In this distinct world of clear signal content resides the ideal, 
naturalized ground of Schafer’s soundscape. In this sense we can say that Schafer’s concern 
lies as much with the notion of background noise as with signal; it is where the former 
impinges upon the discretion of the latter that Schafer is able to identify what he refers to as 
the ‘lo-fi’ soundscape: ‘in the ultimate lo-fi soundscape the signal-to-noise ratio is one-to-
                                                
51 Perhaps the most prominent factions of this movement are The World Soundscape Project, the Acoustic 
Ecology Institute, the World Forum for Acoustic Ecology and the American Society for Acoustic Ecology. 
While the notion of the ‘soundscape’ and the practice of acoustic ecology has of course undergone significant 
development and change since its inception, it is with the more strictly Schaferian lineage that the current 
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52 For example, we could focus on Schafer’s identification of the whistle of the Canadian Pacific Railway’s 
trains as being a ‘sound mark’ worth protecting. 
53 For more detailed information on this project see Neuhaus’s writing on sirens and sound design, available at 
http://www.max-neuhaus.info/soundworks/vectors/invention/ (accessed 11/08/10). 
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one and it is no longer possible to know what, if anything, is to be listened to’.54 Yet the 
problem driving the internal constraints of Schaferian ecological practice can be recognized 
in the extent to which the fidelity effaced in the ‘lo-fi soundscape’ is that of a true or natural 
order of events; the lo-fi soundscape lacks fidelity to a set of determined and symbolic 
signals, while characterizing that which appears as confused and in between as lacking 
adherence to a naturalized order, the groundwork for an effacement of potential. 
It is in Schafer’s concerns for the symbolic relations of sound and the dissolution of 
phenomenological autonomy that his preference for the term ‘sound event’ over ‘sound 
object’ becomes clear. Despite the importance of distinction—attained through a silencing 
of background noise—sounds are, for Schafer, nonetheless contextual events rather than 
abstract or autonomous objects; sounds are always considered within a context rather than 
in what he identifies as the analytical abstraction of the sound object. Schafer’s assertion is 
made in opposition to the acousmatic practices pioneered by Pierre Schaeffer whose own 
sense of phenomenological purity was located not within the grounding of signals against a  
silent background, but the strictly audible qualities of ‘sound-itself’, sound as autonomous, 
decontextualized object: 
When we focus on individual sounds in order to consider associative 
meanings as signals, symbols, keynotes or soundmarks, I propose to 
call them sound events, to avoid confusion with sound objects, which 
are laboratory specimens […] The soundscape is a field of 
interactions, even when particularized into its component sound 
events. To determine the way sounds affect and change one another 
(and us) in field situations is immeasurably more difficult a task than 
to chop up individual sounds in a laboratory.55 
Schafer’s event based orientation towards units of sound can be read as assuming a 
contingent nature of the sonorous through its contextual extensions and conditions, rather 
than focusing exclusively upon internal or expressive qualities. This notion of the sound 
event supports Schafer’s concerns for an auditory emplacement, for the sonic components 
of place and auditory constituents of subjective identity. Schafer’s sound event is culturally 
contingent as well as physically so, its meaning and social function defined in the 
extensions and repercussions of the former. For Schafer, sounds cannot be productively 
considered outside of the network of their social and symbolic relations, they cannot be 
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meaningfully considered apart from their role in a working day or as the components of a 
social, urban and subjective character. While the importance of Schafer’s analytical 
network of relations and contingencies  is not something I wish to contest, it must be taken 
further, be allowed to extend beyond the constraints of its symbolic function in a manner 
that does not shy away from the abstraction implicit within the persistence of sound-itself. 
Equally, we should not reduce the scope of our discussion to one of the phenomenological 
essences dominating Schaeffer’s object; what we require is a confusion of objects and 
events, a confusion retaining the abstract power and affectivity of the sound object as well 
as the contingent relations characteristic of Schafer’s event, a difference in sound-itself that 
is met with a difference within audition, an understanding of the power of sound beyond its 
constraint within the romanticism of The Soundscape. In this confusion sound is both 
object and event in a manner more dyadic than dualistic. 
A similar attempt is made by Augoyard and Torgue in their catalogue of Sonic 
Experience. Augoyard and Torgue identify the Schaefferian sound object and the 
Schaferian soundscape as ‘fundamental interdisciplinary tools for sound analysis’, tools 
that are, however, in need of contemporary reassessment.56 For Augoyard and Torgue, both 
‘tools’ bare a number of problems that prohibit them from meeting the requirements of 
sound analysis, description and study. While the sound object is often criticized according 
to its use in a phenomenological search for the essence of sound—as is the basis of 
Schafer’s critique of this term—for that which is particular to sound and sound alone, 
Augoyard and Torgue are quick to point out that this is in many instances of contemporary 
practice, particularly with the use of digital tools, a near ubiquitous mode of engagement 
with the sonorous across an expansive field of compositional practice.57 The manipulation 
of sound in ‘abstraction’, removed from legible causality, according to aesthetic and 
broadly phenomenological and aesthetic concerns is commonplace, attesting both to a 
certain amount of foresight and an exquisite attention to detail, to the particular potentials 
or malleability of the acousmatic, on Schaeffer’s part. Schafer’s soundscape project 
approaches sound in opposition to Schaeffer’s object orientated phenomenology. The 
soundscape project sought to describe, classify and preserve sonic environments, an 
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approach that required a contextually dependent and often causally legible ‘event’ of study. 
Schafer’s approach, while orientated around the strictly audible, posited a soundscape as 
being inseparable from a wider environment, as context dependent and concrete rather than 
concrète and abstract. Echoing critiques of acoustic ecology’s traditionally puritanical 
naturalism Augoyard and Torgue point out that ‘criteria of clarity and precision discredits a 
number of everyday urban situations impregnated with blurred and hazy (not to say 
uproarious) sound environments, which would then belong to the “lo-fi” category’.58 Noisy, 
complex or confused signals are thus considered as lacking fidelity towards the purity of 
signal discretion—a position that can be traced back to the harmonic structuration of the 
music of the spheres. The lo-fi category marks a proximity to noise that is all too easily 
classified as proximity to impurity, a prejudice privileging the simple tone over the 
complexity of noise. Beyond the broader participative and productive concerns of Schafer’s 
soundscape project, acoustic ecology in general has tended to concern itself with the 
problems of noise pollution, a problem warranting due care and attention in the 
preservation of certain environmental conditions, prevention of the pathological 
consequences of inescapable sound and the curbing of unchallenged industrial expansions 
which often constitute the cause of noise’s perception as negativity.  This latter point could 
be considered a key concern of the soundscape project, where it not for the limitation of its 
particular ideological constraints, oriented as they are towards the purity of silence, 
necessitating the retrieval of noise from the negativity in which it has been positioned. As 
Augoyard and Torgue point out, the scope of the soundscape project would prove too 
limited, simplistic in its orientation towards signals and crippled by a lack of internal or self 
criticism of its idealized natural purity.59 
 Addressing the respective deficiencies of the soundscape and sound object, 
Augoyard and Torgue propose the use of a third term which seeks to avoid their 
shortcomings by way of an enhanced inclusivity, an openness to the noises of urban 
environments, the complex signals of the post-industrial world, and a stronger 
interdisciplinary focus. Through the use of their proposed term the ‘sonic effect’, Augoyard 
and Torgue hope to avoid the perceived shortcomings of the soundscape and sound object 
as means of description and design. Importantly, the sonic effect can be understood as 
seeking to retain a certain objectivity without eradicating context; the specificity of sound 
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and its particular affectivity is taken as being contextually dependent, as contingent, relying 
upon its surrounding environment, whether ‘natural’, urban or biological, for its shaping 
and definition. The sound effect is posited as existing ‘halfway between the universal and 
singular, simultaneously model and guide, it allows a general discourse about sounds, but 
cannot dispense with examples’.60 Augoyard and Torgue suggest that ‘the sonic effect 
should not be understood as a full “concept”’, in order to avoid the disenchantment that 
followed the over use and unchallenged naiveté of the soundscape, yet we should, 
nonetheless, question the necessity and success of this attempt at bridging the particularity 
of acousmatic objects and the generality of soundscapes.61 For Augoyard and Torgue, the 
sonic effect, posited between the ‘universal and singular’, maintains a distance from causal 
events, frictions and disturbances, appropriate to its strictly perceptual orientation; the sonic 
effect does not bare likeness to its causal objective interactions or event but appears 
residually and by way of active reception: ‘any perception implies some effect, that is to 
say a minimal work of interpretation’.62  Sound, both as sonic effect and as that which is 
capable of triggering emotional effect, is treated in a sense that can perhaps be summarized 
by way of analogy to an impulse response, a catalytic event which is not itself of particular 
interest, but used to trigger response or reaction from the body excited by this sonic event. 
Sonic effects, residual, affective and contextually determined, are to be understood as 
events and actions in progress. Where Augoyard and Torgue’s sonic effect is most useful is 
in its interdisciplinary extension, facilitating discourse and understandings of the sonic 
across the fields of musical aesthetics, literature and media, psychology and physiology of 
perception, acoustics, architecture and sociology. The notion of the sonic effect serves to 
bridge problems of scale and context between the object and soundscape, yet beyond its 
discursive facilitation, the limitation of sound to the effect would appear to undermine 
some of the potential to be found in the productive disjunction of the object and event. 
 Adding welcome depth and specificity to the definition of the Schaferian 
soundscape,  Augoyard and Torgue state that a ‘soundscape does not simply refer to a 
“sound environment”; more specifically, it refers to what is perceptible as an aesthetic unit 
in a sound milieu’.63 Augoyard and Torgue here bring the soundscape and sound object into 
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closer relation through the identification and clarification of a Schaferian ‘aesthetic unit’, 
yet I would argue that such a unit finds better expression in Schafer’s own notion of the 
sound event. Schafer’s event as ‘aesthetic unit’ remains distinct from the units of 
Schaefferian object orientated phenomenology which considers ‘sound itself’ as the 
abstract concrète, yet it is in the discordance of the two that we find a particularly 
productive disjunction. Taking onboard the criticisms of the soundscape project, aimed at 
its inherent sense of purity and idealization of natural order, there remain, as will be shown 
below, a number of approaches to the audible environment that can be retrieved from the 
internal contradictions and naiveté of the soundscape. Maintaining the context of Schafer’s 
participative praxis, yet removed from the background of idealized naturalism, the event 
would appear to cater for many, although not all, of the qualities that lead Augoyard and 
Torgue to posit the sound effect as an analytical tool. While the sonic effect serves to 
advance the scope of auditory awareness and discourse, there remains, in its appeal to a 
unified and harmonious audition, the spectre of Schaferian idealism and a diminution of the 
object and event’s particular intensities. The potential for this diminutive consequence can 
be discerned in the appeal made to common sense: ‘the sonic effect produces a common 
sense because it gathers together into unified and harmonious listening what other 
disciplinary knowledge divides. It also gives everyday listening a pragmatic value’.64 To be 
clear, it is the interdisciplinary and quotidian orientation of Augoyard and Torgue’s project 
that constitutes its principal significance, yet the focus upon ‘unified and harmonious 
listening’ invokes something of the naiveté located and criticized within Schafer’s 
soundscape project. Division, disciplinary or otherwise, considered to ground a potentially 
discordant audition, division according to difference, accounts for a certain power in 
specificity and the critical function of a given faculty or sense. There is a power in that 
which can only be heard, felt, seen, thought, etc., to pose a problem to common sense, a 
problematic power that diminishes under the generality and assumptions of common sense. 
We might identify as a danger of interdisciplinarity the normalization of difference 
according to requirements of common sense. The problems and ideals of a harmonic and 
unified listening, drawn from an orientation towards common sense, to the determination of 
a centre ground or normalization, can be drawn out in Augoyard and Torgue’s claim that 
‘the unification of sound phenomena must happen through a rediscovery of the pre-
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categorical approach to listening. A listening practice that starts with a return to the 
consciousness of early listening […] concerns sound specialists as much as urban 
environment planners and educators’.65 We can interpret this ‘return’ or ‘re-discovery’ of 
an ‘early’ and ‘pre-categorical’ listening in a number of ways. This pre-categorical 
approach can be considered as a continuation or extension of Schafer’s concern for ear 
cleaning, for a pedagogical audition that extends its influence into the realm of 
individualization, exercising a subjective influence in the context of an ecological praxis. 
Cleaning and clarification does not refer only to a removal of wax, dust and debris, but a 
renewed attention to the audible and a reconsideration of audible qualities, incidental or 
otherwise, a transgression of habitual listening practices. In this sense we can take this 
‘rediscovery of the pre-categorical approach to listening’ as a challenge to the classification 
and resultant marginalization of noise. Such a reading would also be concomitant with 
Augoyard and Torgue’s wider project. It is, however, the sense of an ‘early’ listening that 
must also be questioned, as it is this which posits the most significant retroactivity. 
Whether we consider this early listening as that of the child, listening before certain 
assumptions have lead to a habitual stagnation of listening and the negatively 
unproblematic caterogization of noise, or that of the early or pre-industrial human, which 
pulls Schafer’s ideal audition back towards an idealized purity of the listening subjects of 
the past, both posit a similar naïve romanticism which Augoyard and Torgue identify and 
criticize in Schafer’s soundscape project. Counter to this retroactive gesture which plays 
into the hands of atemporal purities and essentialized audition, in opposition to appeals to 
an ‘early’ listening, attention will be given to the differences in and between listening and 
hearing, an orientation that appeals to an act or agency anterior to listening and therefore 
bearing something of a structural similarity to ‘early’ listening, insofar as both suggest a 
before and beyond of that which simply appears as given according to habitual listening 
practice. Yet in placing a focus upon differences between the acts of hearing and listening it 
is hoped that an auditory sense ‘anterior’ to listening might be evoked and investigated 
without falling pray to the romanticism and purity evoked by an early listening. 
 Disaffection regarding the notion of the sonic effect, outside of its discursive 
facilitation, is engendered by a sense that its attempt to occupy a middle ground undoes and 
disempowers the productive disjunctions and confusions not between the sound object and 
                                                
65 Augoyard and Torgue, Sonic Experience, 13. 
 51 
soundscape, but the sound object and sound event. The question, as I wish to pose it,  is not 
one of the inadequacies of scale and reference regarding the sound object and soundscape, 
but rather one of the difference between the Schaefferian sound object and the Schaferian 
event; Augoyard and Torgue’s bridging of the soundscape and object is here replaced with 
the maintenance of a certain discordance between the more comparative units of object and 
event. From Schaeffer’s sound object—an attempt at identifying a phenomenological 
essence of the audible—we retain the potential for perception and manipulation of sound 
‘itself’, sound taken as the abstract concrète beyond common sense, yet therefore retaining 
something of its particular catalytic productivity. From the notion of the object, a certain 
agency of matter is retained, an agency and affectivity beyond personal perception, a 
temporality of objects, durations of temporal matters that give to the perceptible as much as 
their definition in perception. From the event we retain the sense of an occurrence or 
appearance in context, a relational event expressing a specific situation. Yet it is in the 
insufficiency of these terms and the potential for a resultant confusion that I believe their 
particular power resides, for a confusion of objects and events. Such confusion is of 
importance where one considers appearance within a given context, the sound event as 
simply given, appearing according to well grounded, habitual listening, in contrast with the 
impact of an objective alterity that forces context by way of novelty and disturbance, an 
appearance out of context, out of common sense, yet one which forces a recontextualisation 
in perception by way of ‘a minimal work of interpretation’.66 Here we begin to get a sense 
of an object that need not be so objectionable, an object that is described according to the 
temporality that inheres in sound and discordance with the event, the event being the other 
side of the object. With regard to both context and spatial operations, that of a broad 
territoriality, we can refer to two modalities of the sound object: objective displacement—
that which is behind its abstract characterization—and evental emplacement—the 
(re)contextualized or territorialized object that adheres to Schafer’s relational concerns. 
Sound-as-object appeals to a ‘pure perception’, to a perception ahead of recollection and 
outside the context of the given, sound as event appeals to a more common mode of 
perception as inseparable from recollection, perception bound to memory and sound as 
given in context.67 In the latter, the objectivity of sound remains pure potential, a carrier 
discarded by and before a recognition indistinguishable from recollection. In the former the 
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sensible is forced ahead of perception, a clamorous arrival around which occurs the frantic 
assembly of identification, the self forced to take place in response to objective 
displacement. 
What we require here, in support of this productive disjunction and confusion of the 
sound object and event is, in the words of Gilles Deleuze, ‘not only a temporal but also a 
qualitative conception of the object, to the extent that sounds and colours are flexible and 
taken in modulation. The object here is manneristic, not essentializing: it becomes an 
event’.68 This objectivity becomes, against Schaeffer by way of confusion with the event, 
not one of phenomenological essence but of contingency and inflection. This conception of 
the object points us towards both its own rhythms and durations, but also those qualities 
revealed and determined in perception. Sound objects are objects in flux, objects becoming 
events. The particular meaning and status of the event for Deleuze, and others, will be 
returned to later; this particular passage is presently taken within the context of the 
Schaferian event, that of a relational, audible appearance in a degree of extension, and 
therefore used somewhat opportunistically as a means of addressing the differing 
contingencies of an object-event coupling towards a maintenance of the powers of 
displacement and emplacement found in both concepts of object and event. 
Setting out from notion of the sound event, as a means of maintaining the important 
work done by Schafer while stripping away prevailing romanticism and idealizations, we 
might also draw upon Schafer’s summary of the soundscape in terms of a ‘field of 
interactions’—a notion that is of central importance to the present argument— or a ‘field 
situation’ concerned with the interactions of bodies both audible and inaudible, organic and 
inorganic, interactions not necessarily centred around the body but anybody.69 The affective 
‘field situation’ that Schafer identifies as the locus of his ecological praxis, the site of 
sonorous and somatic interactions, begins to identify a site of sonorous individuations that 
can be loosely taken as framing the approach taken herein. It is a desire to trace the impacts, 
impressions and influence of sound upon the constitution, confusion and perception of 
bodies or personal territories—the affectivity of sound—that drives the present argument. 
In his description of the soundscape as a ‘field of interactions’, Schafer identifies a 
common interest, that of the impact of sound in an expanded field; it is, nonetheless, with 
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the conclusions Schafer draws from this problematic site of sound that we are radically 
opposed: while Schafer grounds sonority with reference to a pure silence, the trajectory 
mapped out here is to be grounded in a notion of noise inclusive of that which we call 
silence. It is Schafer’s concern for the issue of a rising level of background noise that is, 
particularly from a praxical perspective, behind his positing of a pure sonority within 
transcendent silence. The purity of silent sound marks the perfect audition of eternal 
subjects, an audile technique particular to the spirits, while the inherent impurity of audible 
phenomena, the productions of frictions, agitations and distortions, marks the limit of 
‘imperfect’ and finite earthly individuals. We find such a tendency towards silence running 
throughout The Soundscape. Schafer’s silence occupies the paradoxical position of being 
synonymous with an eternal sound, yet this is an ‘unstruck’ sound, a sound that persists in 
eternity and is considered apart from the world of causal impacts, frictions, collisions and 
other distorting impurities; Schafer’s silence is the inaudible sounding of a bell that need 
not be rung: 
Distortion results the moment a sound is produced, for the sounding 
object first has to overcome its own inertia to be set in motion, and in 
doing this little imperfections creep into the transmitted sound […] 
All the sounds we hear are imperfect. For a sound to be totally free 
of onset distortion, it would have to have been initiated before our 
lifetime. If it were also continued after our death so that we knew no 
interruption in it, then we could comprehend it as being perfect. But 
a sound initiated before our birth, continued unabated and 
unchanging throughout our lifetime and extended beyond our death, 
would be perceived by us as—silence […] Can Silence be heard? 
Yes, if we could extend our consciousness outward to the universe 
and to eternity.70 
For Schafer there is purity to be found in that which persists, in that which persists in 
silence. In this excerpt, where Schafer’s project is seen to be furthest from my own, we can 
still nonetheless identify a number of productive convergences that are worth drawing out: 
for Schafer, all sound bares an inescapable impurity, a distortion, a fundamental 
contingency, characteristics that  impinge upon one’s access to a universal tonal centre or 
purity. The difference to be asserted here is that the fundamental impurity identified in 
sound—ascribed according to the agitations and interactions that bring it into being—are 
taken not as being negatively problematic—as is the case in Schafer’s argument—but as a 
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positive impurity and larval anti-essentialism that are taken as an ontological necessity. 
Central to both positions is an inaudible object or event, from one perspective this 
imperceptible flux is understood to reside within a transcendent and eternal purity, from the 
other it marks a fundamental contingency, an essential ontological impurity; such are the 
consequences of a ground located in, on the one hand, a silent and perfect tonality and, on 
the other, an inaudible noise. The position which is to be presented here suggests that this 
initial dualism is wholly unnecessary and that this impassable parallax gap between 
differing notions of ground can be dissolved where the notion of pure silence is sacrificed 
to that of a fundamentally impure noise, where silence is taken in a sense akin to its Cagean 
use, as identifying a state of ‘ambient’ or background noise that persists between the 
distinct signals of musical organization. Silence—along with that of immateriality—is 
asserted according to the persistence of certain thresholds of perception, attention or 
cognition that delimit degrees of engagement with the complexity of material events. As a 
defence against the confusing complexity of such events, silence guards the pure and 
eternal from the noisy interactions of matter in which generative potential resides. The 
identification of such potential in noise is immediately evident in Jacob Kirkegaard’s 
Eldfjall in which a series of ‘field recordings’  made just below the surface of the earth are 
given the names of earth goddesses from various polytheistic religions.71 These recordings 
present a subterranean chaos,  the rumblings of geysers, noises that attests to the creative 
potentials of the earth. Yet it is the ambiguous potentials of such noises that is asserted 
through references to a number of goddesses associated with both fertility and death, chaos, 
creation and regeneration. In these matriarchs of the fertile earth reside various 
embodiments of the potential for a vital emergence and formal dissolution; this is the noise 
of a creative potential that simultaneously threatens ultimate destruction, it is the medium 
of a chaotic ground that presides over the oscillations of existence. Kirkegaard presents a 
fundamental and necessary disquiet that resides beneath the surface appearance of quietude; 
within plutonic murmurs reside the various frictions and agitations that inform the 
productive potentials of sound. The ground to which Kirkegaard places his ear is one of a 
fundamental chaotic impurity productive of an anti-essentialism that is found to reside 
within the flux of material interactions rather than the eternal formal stasis of the heavens. 
Where attention is directed beyond those thresholds of perception which are immediately 
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evident or simply given, one finds an infinite field of noise constitutive of signal potentials. 
It is this probing intrigue and microphonic extension of attention and perception that 
dissolves the simplistic, stabilizing image of silence that acts as a protective buffer to the 
consistency of listening subjects and determined form. 
What we find is that, insofar as silence is considered to be delimited according to 
thresholds of perception and attention, Schafer’s notion of silence is indissociable from 
what we might also choose to call background noise, the noise that passes by unnoticed, 
that which is so common as to become imperceptible. This aspect of background noise is 
identified by Schafer in the virtually ubiquitous hum of electrical currents that has 
imprinted itself deep within the minds of the subjects of the industrialized world; Schafer 
notes how Europeans, when asked to hum a note—picked ‘randomly’—will often choose  
something approximate to 50Hz., or one of its harmonic multiples. Likewise, North 
American’s will often do the same with a tone around 60 Hz.: 
It is, however, only in the electronic age that international tonal 
centre have been achieved; in countries operating on an alternating 
current of 60 cycles, it is this sound which now provides the resonant 
frequency, for it will be heard (together with its harmonics) in the 
operation of all electrical devices […] during meditation exercises, 
after the whole body has relaxed and students are asked to sing a 
tone of “prime unity”—the tone which seems to arise naturally from 
the center of their being—B natural is more frequent than any 
other.72 
These frequencies, omnipresent to the point of imperceptibility, often pass by unnoticed, 
rendered silent through their own persistence, a persistence which wards off attention. 
These tones constitute, for Schafer, a ‘tonal center’ that resides not in immaterial purity but 
within the scope of ‘impure’ audition, quite literally the noise of the ground. This murmur 
or background noise permeates much of the urbanized world, a murmur which through the 
insistence of a fundamental municipal frequency carries out an individuating operation 
while marking a silence that attests merely to the absence of attention. It is towards a 
complex of such ‘tonal centres’ that Christina Kubisch’s Electrical Walks direct our 
attention. Through the use of headphones designed to reveal electromagnetic emissions 
from street lights, cash machines and other electrical objects within the city, an opening is 
made to allow audition to enter what is an otherwise silent domain. Kubisch’s work 
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exposes the virtually omnipresent and ordinarily inaudible noise of electrical currents and 
electromagnetic fields that permeate urban life.73 Such tonal centers of ‘prime unity’ exists 
in contrast to that silent fundamental occupying a central position in Schafer’s thought. 
Therein lies the notion of an eternal and inaudible purity, the silent music of the spheres 
which appeals to an immortal ear and an immutable audition. In stating that the silent sound 
identified by Schafer is synonymous with a notion of background noise an alternative 
framework is proposed that does not look to the eternal and universal for its consistency but 
to the fundamental inconsistency and contingency of a ground located in noise, an often 
imperceptible background noise that identifies the generative site of material interactions, 
mutable and transformative matter that is opposed to an eternal and pure form. 
 
The Idea of North 
 
Where Schafer tends towards silence the present argument seeks a more thorough or 
nuanced immersion in, and considered proximity to, noise. A consideration of noise is put 
forward that does not focus so heavily upon the signal-to-noise ratios that are of such 
central importance to Schafer, but rather upon the perception and imperceptibility of noise, 
upon an investigation of the interactions it expresses and emergent forms to which it 
provides a protean background. Noise is, however, not to be taken naively as simply a 
‘positive’ and productive force, but as the fundamentally ambiguous ground of periodicity, 
fundamentally problematic, that from which signal content emerges and into which it 
dissolves. Having addressed the equation of noise and difference, we should also address 
the all too simple equation of noise with machines which constitutes a particular limit of 
Schaferian ecological practice, as is evident in the claim that: 
such instruments are destroying the “idea of North” that has shaped 
the temperament of all northern people and has germinated a 
substantial mythology of the world […] it was pure, temptationless 
and silent. The technocrats of progress do not realize that by cracking 
into the North with their machinery, they are chipping into the 
integrity of their own minds.74 
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Schafer’s valid concerns for the impact of combustion engines upon an environment and 
the naivety of technocracy withstanding, an inverse reading reveals that within this critique 
lies an opening onto an expanded field of practice, a more thorough ecological engagement 
and productive—as opposed to descriptive and archival—acoustic ecology: this locus 
identifies the intersection of subject, site and sound. This opening onto an expanded field of 
practice and influence is, however, closed by Schafer as soon as it is recognized; the 
present task is to look towards practices that identify and invite the potential that such an 
opening offers. The ‘idea of North’ identified by Schafer is also the ideal purity of silence 
and, of course, solitude, the autonomy of the self grounded in silence, wandering amidst a 
frozen landscape, set apart from a somewhat pacified environment.75 In the idea of North 
we can identify the naming of a field of transcendental conditions. In its delimitation, 
however, Schafer’s idea of North fails to scratch beneath the surface or venture beyond 
given perceptual thresholds, it appears as an idea of North that could not be more different 
from that produced by Kirkegaard’s recordings of Iceland’s geysers and subterranean 
rumblings. Kirkegaard’s North taps into mythologies that are far from being temptationless 
and silent, but that negotiate the ambiguous murmur of a fundamental noise. The noise to 
which Kirkegaard listens expresses a potential which, to the contrary, drives intrigue and 
temptation towards that which lies just beyond the boundaries of the perceptible and given. 
We could, to a certain extent, associate Kirkegaard with those ‘technocrats’ who are 
‘cracking in to the North with their machinery’; Kirkegaard’s instruments—the 
accelerometers used to pick up the otherwise inaudible trembling of the earth—indeed 
destroy the idea of North, yet it is the grounding of the North in silence that is destroyed. In 
this destruction of a pure and silent North, Kirkegaard’s probing creates an opening that 
invites these geological noises to challenge the integrity of the mind according to an influx 
of chaotic influences; the North is revealed not as an atemporal landscape of purity but one 
of change, difference, flux, of durational variability grounded in noise. What Schafer fails 
to acknowledge is that the threats against the integrity of the self are posed not only by 
‘invading machines’, but by the wind, the trees, the sea-shore, the creak of a door or floor-
board, the crying of gulls, the noise of a waterfall or the openings onto the earth’s 
subterranean disquiet. What Schafer pinpoints in the above excerpt, and then immediately 
shies away from, is that the self is distinctly permeable and that it is not only machines that 
                                                
75 See Glenn Gould’s Solitude Trilogy: Three Sound Documentaries (Cbc Records: PSCD 2003-3, 1992). 
 58 
penetrate its membrane and threaten its apparent consistency. These noises, constituent 
parts of an expansive environment, perform the synchronous invasion and definition of the 
self, a self that is contingent, determined in participation with an environment that provides 
its support and threatens its dissolution. 
In Schafer’s argument we find an opening onto ‘environmental’ relations through a 
confusion of subjective boundaries. It is to a certain extent the integrity of minds that 
maintains a distinction from matter, from the broader field of interactions with which 
Schafer is concerned. In identifying the threat of machinery to both earth and mind Schafer 
identifies a material relation, the agency of matter in mind, both are conceived as open and 
capable of confusion. If ‘cracking into the North’ entails a praxical challenge to the 
integrity of minds, this gesture must be understood as one which opens up potential for a 
more complex entanglement of matter and mind, of human and inhuman, an opening of 
thought onto the greater depths constituting the noise of the world. This chipping and 
cracking, far from being the preserve of ‘technocrats’, describes a perennial history of 
instrumentation and media taken in the broadest possible sense. Where the spade is capable 
of revealing only a limited depth, of allowing the constituents of a particular strata to 
provide new material for thought, the core sample or ultrasonic range finder allow a deeper 
probing of the earth, and therefore a more thorough complication of mind and matter 
through openings onto a plutonic field of interactions. While Schafer’s concerns for 
unchecked pollution and the plundering of resources are, of course, of great importance, 
there is a potential that becomes closed of insofar as the idea of North asserts a puritanical 
divide and poses a limit to the field of interactions with which he is particularly 
concerned.76 
 
A Necessary Schizophonia 
 
There is a particular power to be identified in the Schaferian soundscape that can be 
recognized in its considerations of the auditory aspects of an environment in a degree of 
abstraction from its other empirical renderings, thus enabling the particular force of the 
auditory to be appreciated beyond its constraint within common sense wherein an 
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environment is perceived as a whole. The particular power of the soundscape that realizes 
its potential in abstraction, wherein it is unbound from common sense, becomes possible 
only after the ‘intoxicating’, ‘fracturing’ and ‘imperialistic’ instruments that Schafer is 
particularly critical of, comprising not only automotive assemblages but the manipulative 
forces of the loudspeakers, microphones and recording devices that afford an increasingly 
mobile abstraction of sound. The sense in which a soundscape comes after such machines is 
to be understood according to the impact of recording technologies upon thought and 
listening practice, according to which the potential dislocation of sound from its original 
site, of abstracted and repeated listening, and the potential for a more detailed and probing 
audition revealing to the ear an abstract concrète, is dramatically increased.77 To a certain 
extent we can say that in every ear there now resides a phonograph, or the potential 
listening practices that this invention inserted into the evolution of audition, as if the organ 
excised from a cadaver in the production of Bell and Blake’s ear phonautograph had 
reinserted itself—now inseparable from its modern technical assemblages and 
descendents—back into the body.78 It is, specifically, a listening practice that comes after 
phonography, after the written sound and the infinite potential for its manipulation, storage 
and reproduction. It is listening that, as a perceptual act apparently inseparable from 
memory and recollection—an inseparability brought to our attention most explicitly by 
Bergson—must now occur after the mutability of both memory and perception that 
techniques of recording and reproduction have brought to the foreground and inscribed in 
cultural listening practices. In a similar manner, echoing the concerns of the anthropologist 
Tim Ingold, we can argue that the concept of soundscape is only possible in the 
‘schizophonic’ world that Schafer is critical of, as to think of the soundscape as a distinct 
plane of environmental experience requires the possibility of a degree of abstraction, the 
possibility of thinking the particular difference that it posses from the notion of a landscape 
as a whole, the sensory force gained wherein it is taken apart.79 To think of the 
particularities of a soundscape requires an initial distinction, severance or degree of 
abstraction, it casts the sound of the environment as distinct and separated out from the 
broader complex of intersensorial events that structure our perception of an environment as 
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a whole. Through his concept of the event, Schafer ties sound to site, emphasizing original 
context and enforcing representational potential, yet despite such emphasis the study of 
soundscapes remains built upon a necessary abstraction, making possible the perception of 
an environment along lines of sensory distinction and particularity, a possibility facilitated 
by schizophonic practice.  
The Schaferian criticism of schizophonia resides atop an altogether more 
problematic assumption. While a degree of abstraction or sensory particularity can be 
considered necessary for the conception of the soundscape as a distinct topological 
component of the world, to ascribe this split or distinction, constitutive of both the 
possibility of a distinctive soundscape and a schizophonic audition, to the invention of the 
phonograph is to entertain undue technological determinism. To locate the emergence of 
this split within that of the reproducibility of sound is to underestimate the complexity and 
ambiguity of audition and the sensory information of subjectivity before the historical 
emergence of the phonograph. Such underestimations are symptomatic of a number of 
assumptions active within Schaferian ideology, as pinpointed by Jonathan Sterne. 
Assumed, prior to the technological reproducibility of sound, is a primacy of face-to-face 
communication, a direct and unproblematic acoustic communication that is damaged and 
disorientated in reproduction and telecommunication. More fundamental is the assumption 
that the pre-industrial subject existed in a state of unproblematic harmony, somatic and 
sentient coherence, the subject of a unified and peaceful existence, always ‘at home’ in the 
world. As an example of historical relational vicissitudes between subject, soma and terra 
firma to which such assumptions remain ignorant, Sterne refers to an identifiable medieval 
sensibility according to which the body was ‘a filthy container for the soul, something to be 
transcended and overcome’.80 The schizophonic split, disorientation and displacement is 
something that cannot be wholly reduced to the event of mechanical reproduction, being 
better considered as that which inheres in the ambiguities of perception and the opacities of 
material interrelations. Far from its reliance upon technological reproductions, a certain  
potential for schizophonic displacement can be considered to inhere within the objective 
status of sound, within sounds which confuse and appear out of place. 
A similar phonographic scission is identified by Steven Connor in considering the 
place of phonography within the emergence of the self, an emergence that is considered in 
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terms of a transition from noise to organized sound, from sound unbound to its containment 
and control. Connor charts an analogous relation between the musical organization and 
technical containment of sound, and historical psychoanalytical accounts wherein a certain 
consolidation of selfhood is attained through the structuration of an otherwise chaotic 
situation, a transition from noise to signal and sign. In accounting for a modern sense of the 
self in relation to the world, sensation and audition, considered within the specific context 
of a conjunction between psychoanalysis, musical organisation and phonography, Connor 
notes that ‘it is in the passage from one to the other [from noise to its containment or 
organisation] that the self is formed’.81 Through a process of structuration and containment 
the self is made consistent, a site of minimal resistance to the noise of the world. It is where 
Connor refers to Attali that subjection through organization is considered analogous with 
the possibility of phonographic containment. Through the means of capture and 
reproduction the phonograph acquired the noises of the world in a manner concomitant 
with the efficacy of representation or, more specifically, Attalian repetition, a notion bound 
up with mechanical reproduction, silencing and normalization, the means of a cancellation 
of radical difference.82 Attali’s orientation is more towards the societal and broadly cultural, 
yet this containment of noise and the normalization of difference constitutes a basic schema 
concomitant with notions of subjective consistency as a limitation of noisy confusion, a 
subtractive synthesis and organized resistance. That the means for the containment and 
organization of societal noise—a gesture taken as concomitant with a more individualistic 
psychical structuration—should hinge upon and find its most efficient execution in the 
apparatus of mechanical reproduction leads Connor to assert, as a consequence of Attalian 
repetition, that ‘before the development of the phonograph, the auditory realm was wholly 
transient, immaterial and temporal. The opening of the self to and by the auditory was an 
experience both of rapturous expansion and of dangerous disintegration’.83 The 
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phonograph, through its reproducible ordering and containment of sound, is, in part at least, 
considered to have assailed the threat of unorganized noise. We readily find examples of 
this in the use of portable media players, wherein prerecorded music constituting a portable 
and personal acoustic space is often used to set oneself out apart from the noise of the 
crowd and the cramped conditions of a commuter train or inner-city bus ride. Yet we 
cannot wholly ascribe this to the possibility of mechanical reproduction, as it is in a more 
general sense of repetition and simple melodic influence that we may also find this 
organizing principle at work. Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the refrain, for example, 
finds its simplest expression in the repetitive humming or whistling of a tune, a means of 
reassurance and comfort that establishes a degree of distinction from the unordered noise of 
the world, a personal territoriality established according to repetitive melodic expressions.84 
It is according to a more general sense of repetition and rehearsal that the noise of the world 
is rendered less threatening to the well grounded consistency of the self, rendered less 
capable of shock through its containment, organization and reproducibility. It is in this 
transition from noise to organized sound that we identify the emergence of the self as a 
listening subject, an audile individuation according to a kind of subtractive synthesis, 
performed according to the limitation, channeling and containment of noise as signal and 
resonance. Addressing the technological specificity of the Attalian assertion whereby 
repetition is bound to reproduction in its execution of a territorial organization, we should 
ask to what extent the ‘opening of the self to and by the auditory’ may have been forever 
sealed off by the closure of phonographic somatisation, sealing the opening onto the 
disintegrative temporalities of a ‘raw’ audition. Insofar as listening ‘after’ the phonograph 
marks a containment and organization, it would nonetheless appear that this closure has not 
been absolute, with the qualities of the prephonographic auditory realm Connor describes 
remaining commonplace in the discussion of audible matters.85 There remains something of 
the ear beyond any reduction to a reproductive technicity, something in hearing that is not 
entirely subjugated to mnemonic function and audile contractions. It is this which exists in 
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somehow absent from tympanic function. Phonography’s impact upon signal transience perhaps constitutes 
more of a pause or resistance to its temporal decomposition, shifting the duration according to which it slips 
into imperceptibility on to that of the degradation of a different material substrate, whether that of shellac or 
hard-disc. 
84 I return to the notion of the refrain at length in chapter three. 
85 For an example of such an account of the auditory experience see the introduction to Salomé Voegelin’s 
Listening to Noise and Silence. 
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the event of listening or the qualities of an audible realm ‘before’ the phonograph, anterior 
to the refined audile technique wherein (tele-)phonographic mutability takes effect, a 
perception anterior to recollection and representation. This notion of hearing as listening 
‘before’ the phonograph is not to be taken as positing a timeless and unchanging perception 
in the sense of an idealized ‘early listening’ or pre-industrial sensibility, but rather as the 
perceptive order of sensations and a protean being. 
Having located the qualities of the ‘postphonographic’ realm in a more general 
notion of repetition, however, these assertions persist in placing too strong an emphasis 
upon the importance of mechanical reproduction. It is rather a difference which persists 
apart from the phonograph which is of primary importance, a difference within audition 
itself. Connor settles upon a notion of the auditory self characterized according to qualities 
of ‘openness, complexity and interpenetration’, qualities which can be thought to persist 
despite phonographic inscription and ‘closure’, attesting to the disparate and confused more 
than the organized and discrete, qualities adhering to Connor’s description of a 
prephonographic auditory realm.86 In taking such a state to be distinct, less according to a 
technological scission than a difference within audition, requires that a difference between 
hearing and listening be observed in order to account for the entry of difference into the 
listening subject, the perception of background noise within the individual that nonetheless 
exceeds its signal definition in the rarefactions of audile technique. It is through this 
difference within audition—that persists despite the phonograph and anterior to an audile 
technique—that the noise of the world slips in as such, the agent of a subtle influence. 
Connor’s auditory self persists in part before the phonograph, not in the sense of ahistorical 
transcendence but according to its exceeding of inscriptions and discretions, with the 
closure and containment effected by phonography and compounded with audile technique 
having not been absolute. In opposition to a singular technological scission within 
subjective audition, Connor contrasts the closure of phonographic inscription and discretion 
with the ‘openness’ of telephonic dispersal and broadcast, marking the malleability of 
subjective auditory information according to the medium of capture and dissemination. Yet 
this difference can also be considered to persist within audition itself; to properly account 
for this we require not a unitary sense of the auditory subject but a conception that is more 
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dyadic in its containment of an individual that hears and a listening, audile subject, modes 
of audition remaining open to difference while nonetheless capable of analytical precision. 
The difference acknowledged within audition should be complemented with the 
identification of an ambiguity in sound, according to which its reception through 
sympathetic resonance is not reduced to an unproblematic, unmediated and totalizing 
experience of a pure flux that connects one with the world, but rather taken as that which 
makes a difference at the point of its reception, provoking a disjunctive synthesis according 
to its capacity to excite, from a position of excess, the particular force of the auditory that 
functions beyond its subsumption to common sense. This identification of an agitative 
ambiguity within the conditions of sonority has consequences for the depiction of an 
auditory self or subject and the nature of its ecological relation to the world. The ambiguity 
in sonority is initially identified as such insofar as sound-itself is thought to reside beyond 
itself, as qualitative expression, in the agitations of matter. These agitative and restless 
origins of sonority are also discussed by Connor who suggests that ‘sound is both process 
and object of pathos. Sound is produced by pathos—suffering, agitation […] as though 
sound were both the assaulted body of the world and the cry of pain it emits’.87 Engaging 
with Connor’s rhetoric in accordance with the noises under consideration, particularly those 
brought to the surface in the work of Jacob Kirkegaard and identified by Jonathan Sterne in 
his discussion of mediate auscultation, of listening to the noises of the invisible organism, 
these noises are of a body—planetary, human or otherwise—‘assaulting’ itself, the 
constitutive interactions and noises that attest to its own generative potential. Connor goes 
on to draw a contrast, of importance to our present ecological concerns, between this 
positing of a generative agitation and a certain cultural understanding of sound and 
listening practices; despite the necessarily abrasive conditions of sonorous vibrations, 
‘hearing has the reputation of being more passive than seeing […] This has sometimes 
impelled claims that a culture based more around sound and hearing than around sight 
might be gentler, more participative, less dominative culture. The strong association 
between cultural acoustics and ecology would seem to offer further evidence of this irenic 
dimension of the ear’.88 The ‘ecological’ position that Connor identifies here would appear 
concomitant with most romanticized ideals of the Schaferian tradition. An attempt has been 
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made herein, however, to draw attention to a particularly participative and agitative notion 
of acoustic ecology, the fragments of which can be identified in Schafer’s own text and 
gain complexity and contemporary relevance through the work of the artists already 
mentioned, their own noises amidst those of the world in the production of environments 
and territories. It is by way of referral to a principle of openness that we can discern a more 
nuanced notion of ecological audition within Connor’s work, an audition which opens the 
self onto the world:  
the idea of the auditory self provides a way of positing and beginning 
to experience a subjectivity organized around the principles of 
openness, responsiveness and acknowledgment of the world rather 
than violent alienation from it. The auditory self discovers itself in 
the midst of the world and the manner of its inherence in it, not least 
because the act of hearing seems to take place in and through the 
body. The auditory self is attentive rather than an investigatory self, 
which takes place in the world rather than taking aim at it.89 
While this excerpt would appear to adhere to the romantic ideals of audition according to 
which the ear and auditory complex is stripped of its critical function—this being ascribed 
to the eye which supposedly sets us apart from the world in accordance with the ideology of 
an ‘ocular tyranny’—this characterization can be understood as accounting for only one 
side of audition, that of the active receptivity of hearing as the anterior conditions of reified 
listening practice or audile technique. The auditory self here described by Connor is that 
defined by the capacities of individual audition remaining open and receptive to the world, 
as opposed to the analytical audile technique of the listening subject.90 Connor’s auditory 
self is here positioned around an openness or opening onto its immanent, individuating 
field, an opening onto the noise of the world. This image of an auditory self locates its 
particular emphasis ahead of other sensory influences, most notably, as is almost customary 
within sound specific studies, that of sight. The privileging of senses describes a self that is 
in a sense fragmented, pulled in different directions according to its formative sensory 
influences, drawn towards its diffuse and diverse objective attractors identified through 
sight, smell or audition. Customary is the assertion that vision fixes, determines fact, makes 
consistent the identity and origins of an event; audition, on the other hand, is diffuse, 
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ambiguous, unreliable and often in need of ratification, its ephemerality and overt 
contingency leaving it subject to doubt and suspicion. To place one sense ahead of another 
in the perception of the world and one’s relation to it suggests a self formed not according 
to the holistic influence of the world, in harmony and according to relations of an equal 
temperament, but according to a degree of disjunction, according to a world that articulates 
its influence divergently, according to particular capacities and specialisms, sensory 
components being reconstructed towards the appearance of a consistent and identifiable 
image. Drawn from this competition of the senses is the notion that the self is in fact not 
simply one; to talk of an auditory self as Connor does—and therefore, presumably, also an 
olfactory, haptic and visual self, amongst others—posits the self as not one but many, the 
self as multiplicity, as a sensory ensemble that in a sense pulls itself—as one—apart. The 
openness of an auditory self that Connor discuses is one that posits the self as being many 
and in doing so opens itself up to differences between the senses, a difference that poses a 
problem to the stability of selves. Such an openness characterizes the listening subjects of a 
participative acoustic ecology, tuning into the various sounds of the world, not as the 
unified subjects of an authentic, holistic and direct experience but as a particular rendering 
of individual confusions. 
The image of ecological audition that Connor critiques—structured around the 
irenic ear in concordance with the Schaferian tradition—is set apart from Connor’s more 
generalized notion of an auditory self, in the sense that, in order to be characterized as 
irenic, the ear must be considered to be distinct from the abrasive nature and conditions of 
sound, maintaining a minimal distance from the world supportive of its apparent purity. To 
approach the self in a manner consistent with the unstable, dissipative or disjunctive view 
that Connor can be seen to take of it, rather than as given consistency, we require 
something of the process of individuation discussed by Connor wherein the production of a 
consistent self image is considered to occur in alongside a transition from noise to 
organized sound, a transition that occurs only with the act of directed listening. Emerging 
from this transition, the auditory self becomes figured as a self that listens, engaging in the 
critical exercise of the ear. Where Connor talks of a self that finds itself in the world it is, 
insofar as it listens, already one. Yet, insofar as the auditory self is, for Connor, not an 
‘investigatory’ self, a self that is perhaps in someway predisposed to disinterested 
appreciation, this notion of the auditory self is somehow insufficient insofar as it appears to 
neglect its own defining gesture, that of an attentive and decisive listening that is 
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nonetheless investigatory. It is here that we arrive at a contradiction within the constitution 
of the auditory self insofar as it is characterized by Connor according to a certain uncritical 
openness while paradoxically emerging through the binding of sound into signal content in 
the critical act of listening. The notion of an auditory self, insofar as its constitutive gesture 
is that of an active, attentive and conscious perception, should, therefore, not be too quickly 
aligned with the receptivity of hearing in which we can, as we shall see, locate something 
of a constant challenge to the consistency of the listening subject. This investigatory, 
auditory self is, as is evident in the work of Kirkegaard, capable of critical audition, of 
identifying openings into the earth, a gesture that, as Connor notes, does not engender its 
abstraction or alienation from it but rather its confusion amongst it. A limitation in 
Connor’s argument can therefore be identified where difference is not explicitly recognized 
within audition, specifically the difference between hearing and listening described by 
Jonathan Sterne, a difference that must be thought to extend into the constitution of the 
auditory self.91 
 As we shall see, with reference to Sterne’s account of auscultation and 
Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis, probing investigations of acoustic substrata reveal noises 
beneath the flesh.92 Revealed in each case is a subterranean  murmur that challenges the self 
and the constitution of well grounded and recognizable periodicity—alongside of which the 
listening subject emerges. In these critical acts of opening listening up to difference, a 
degree of violence is acknowledged, not as alienating event but rather as effecting a forced 
‘inclusivity’ or, more specifically, individuation according to the violence of a listening 
practice that creates an opening beneath the earth or beneath the flesh, an ungrounding of 
that which was grounded, opening it out onto difference. It is the investigatory auditory 
self, such as those subjects of audile technique identified by Sterne, that themselves identify 
the insufficiencies in a self taken as given, closed off from its own transcendent 
ungrounding, from that which supports the self yet is not one. In acknowledging a 
difference within the self according to which it is not one but many, we might say that there 
is something of the self that listens and something in the self that hears, a difference 
between the acts of listening and hearing, between an active investigation or directed 
attention and a so-called ‘passivity’ in receptive synthesis. The auditory self is therefore 
conceived as a confused and contradictory figure insofar as it is both receptive and 
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investigatory. It is that which we may identify in the self which is not one that opens it out 
onto the receptivity located in its own transcendent conditions. 
In opposition to notions of hearing and the self left mutually unchallenged, we shall 
posit hearing in relation to the potentials of the somatic-complex, as an act that is 
inseparably linked yet nonetheless distinct from listening, and listening as the activity of 
the subject proper, of the I that in saying “I hear …” listens. What we might ascribe to a 
notion of hearing is a receptivity to the world that does not set itself, or a self, out against it, 
an understanding of hearing as the constitution of a sonic unconscious or auditory 
background that contrasts with a notion of listening as effecting a certain distinction from 
the world in its organization into discrete periodicities. 
Having established a difference within audition, we can return to a critique of the 
soundscape and the perceptual event that sets it apart from the visual, haptic, olfactory and 
other sensory expressions of a landscape considered in its entirety and in excess of its 
perception. Ingold is particularly critical of the concept of soundscapes insofar as it entails 
an abstracted appreciation of a landscape at large, an appreciation of the environment 
broken apart along the lines of distinct sensory registers. In opposition, Ingold appeals to  
environmental perception according to common sense, a landscape not appreciated 
according to distinct registers of perception but taken, in a sense, holistically, not according 
to the ‘schizophonic’ listening practices that enable a thinking of sound-itself, but 
according to a common sense that perceives the landscape as intersensorial complex. 
Counter to Ingold’s objections concerning segregation and perceptual stratification, we 
might take further the potential for a critical listening that both the soundscape and 
schizophonia presents us with, in order to adequately address the potentials for listening 
practice developed by Schafer’s soundscape project that are nonetheless indicative of its 
own internal conceptual irresolution or discordance. While ‘normal experience’ is thought 
according to a common sense ‘not tied to any specific sensory register’, there is a particular 
sonic potential identified in the soundscape and its internal contradictions, a potential that is 
eradicated when subject to commonsensical critique.93 Ingold’s critique according to 
divergence from ‘normal experience’ poses an erasure of difference more banal than that 
presented within the most conservative corners of acoustic ecology. The potentials 
presented by this necessary abstraction exists in openings onto the particular transcendent 
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conditions of a sense and onto that which can only be heard, that which appears only to a 
particular sense and in doing so ‘confuses’ common sense along with the coherence of the 
environment as a whole. There is a particular force to that which makes itself available only 
by means of audition, a force felt only insofar as the particular qualities or affective 
capacities of the audible are permitted to operate according to their abstract specialism, a 
force precisely identified in Francisco López’s abstract environmental audition. It is 
according to a certain sensory confusion or, perhaps more appropriately, productive 
disjunction that a generative difference is revealed and put to work in thought. While 
Schafer posits a somewhat contradictory sense of the soundscape as a whole, as a unified 
event—contradictory insofar as it is a particular sensory reduction of a larger environment 
to which it pertains—that exists as a concept only by virtue of schizophonic potentials, it is 
this internal contradiction that gives rise to its potential influence beyond romantic 
idealization, a potential that is quashed where common sense is asserted. The schizophonia 
that enables the conception of the soundscape as such reveals certain depths within 
audition, exposing sound-spaces and events that otherwise remain inaudible when subject 
to common sense, details that slip below a threshold of perceptibility where the ear is 
subject or forced to make reference to, the eye or nose; it is the extent to which the practice 
of acoustic ecology and soundscape studies reveals matters to the ear that can only be heard 
that enforces its power and particular relevance, yet the abstract concrète that such practices 
disclose should be recognized as such in moving beyond romanticized notions of the earth 
and emplacement in the development of extended listening techniques which pose 
productive challenges to the integrity of self and mind. Far from proposing an autonomy of 
soundscapes it is rather its overt contingency that I wish to place a focus on, an 
understanding of the soundscape as being in-itself nothing, yet nonetheless evocative of a 
particular difference that opens onto a field of difference that cannot be taken in entirety or 
grasped my means of a commonsensical approach. It is in the assertion of such contingency 
upon material affectivity and interactions, yet also upon listening as material and culturally 
contingent practice, that identifies a soundscape as in itself nothing yet nonetheless 
particularly efficacious, a position that seeks the dissolution of a romanticism that grounds 
the soundscape according to a romanticized silence and idealized purity. 
 The expansion of acoustic ecology according to the implication of noise, catalytic of 
a flight from romanticism within the broadening field of environmental recording can be 
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heard in Russell Haswell’s Wild Tracks.94 Haswell’s acoustic documents exemplify an 
approach to environmental recordings that wholly discard the romanticized earth and 
idealistic naturalization that the term might immediately engender. The environments 
documented and catalogued are set apart from any puritanical naturalism; inclusive of the 
noises that mark participation within an environment, the notion of an objective audition 
and transparent observer are jettisoned in favour of an audible engagement. In a recording 
that documents a situation evocative of the pastimes of bored suburban teenagers, we hear 
Haswell repeatedly missing and occasionally hitting an empty beer can with a pellet gun. 
Certain field situations common to the nature documentary, such as the inside of an ant 
colony, are frequently interrupted by the noise of passing military aircraft, noises that attest 
to a variety of spatial contestations as well as the malleability and ambiguity of ‘natural’ 
environments. This same ant colony has also been subjected to the violence of Haswell’s 
hydrophone placements: the sound we hear is possibly that of ants, according to Haswell’s 
liner notes, rebuilding the disturbed area of their colony into which the hydrophone has 
been forced. Again, we come across a practice in which recording equipment is used to 
scratch beneath the surface of the earth to reveal the noise which resides therein. Such 
sounds are the result of an inaudible collision and disruption, Haswell’s intrusive presence 
in each environment mirrored by the noises and interruptions of machinery found littered 
throughout his recordings. Agitations and intrusions of one body into another depict the 
constitutive disquiet of an infinite field of interactions that resides within Haswell’s 
environments; in a recording in which ‘A Horde of Files Feast upon a Rotting Pheasant 
Carcass’, Haswell repeats the move made by Watson to focus minds upon the grotesque 
and seemingly brutal aspects of any given environment, cycles of death and decay that 
accompany or await the sounds of life and creation. Where this particular document may be 
perceived as lacking in the attention to detail and saturated aural matters that Watson 
presents to listeners in his recording of a zebra carcass, it is the stripping away of any 
exoticism that is notable in this instance, a move which orientates listeners towards the 
somewhat banal and quotidian nature of this grotesque event. Such a centralized disquiet 
can be heard in Haswell’s recordings of waterfalls which draw attention to the raw and 
threatening power of such sites rather their gentrified representation amidst the production 
of idyllic scenes. Such sites force an auditory experience close to that of white noise, and it 
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is the potential power contained within such sonorities—as is made evident in techniques of 
subtractive synthesis—which is brought to the fore through its abstraction rather than 
subsumed beneath idealized depiction and common sense. 
 Haswell’s recordings bear an all too common sense of the authenticity of the raw and 
‘untreated’ document as well as a somewhat uncritical engagement with the broader 
consequences of pollution, yet this is nonetheless an engagement with the notion of 
pollution that performs a critical function, a position that challenges the notion of purity 
and essentialism from a position amidst a field of given interferences. Such auditory field 
situations detail, by means of an abstracted audition, the particular power of the quotidian 
and often mundane. It is in many cases the banality of the documented situations that is 
striking, sound-spaces located somewhere between boredom and the anticipation of an 
event. In many cases these recordings document aspects of ‘noise pollution’ that would 
ordinarily be removed from an ‘environmental recording’ yet such noises are, for Haswell, 
constituent parts of such an environment insofar as it is not treated as abstract and separate 
from the bodies and actions occupying it. It is precisely such a continuum of actions, 
agitations and the intrusions of occupying bodies into each other’s territories that constitute 
what we identify as an acoustic environment. These are documents which detail the effect 
of human noise within an environment, in the creation, constitutive distortion and 
manipulation of environments rather than the effect of such events upon a romanticized 
notion of ‘the environment’ separated  from our own ontological status and boundaries. For 
all their drabness and banality, these recordings document a participatory engagement with 
the practice of acoustic ecology; ecology, in this sense, is taken as a broadly inclusive term 
which describes the interrelation and reciprocal determination of bodies, human, organic 
and otherwise. 
 
Inverting Acoustic Ecology 
  
The necessary movement away from reductive ecologies of the strictly ‘natural’ and 
typically ‘environmental’ must open itself onto an ecological complex that is inclusive of 
the subjective, political, scientific, and creative, an ecology that does not shun noise or 
difference but locates such concepts centrally to its understanding of nature and ecology. 
This ecological model is clearly present in the work of Félix Guattari, yet before turning to 
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his more generalized notion of  ecological praxis we should consider the extent to which 
the necessary means for this reorientation can be found within the practice of acoustic 
ecology itself. While the means of an internal inversion of acoustic ecology can be 
identified within Schafer’s soundscape, we find them more clearly and consistently 
identified in the work of Barry Truax. 
We should begin with Truax’s post-Schaferian participative ecology, wherein the 
listening subject is embedded within the world, taken not as a solely receptive individual 
but one whose engagement with a larger environment is ‘balanced’ in the establishment of 
a reciprocity. Within this ecological model the listening subject is posited as a constituent 
in a common environment, a core component of ecological ideology that is clearly evident 
in Truax’s claim that ‘one of the lessons of ecology is that when we see ourselves as 
“different” from nature, and not as an integral part of it, we are more likely to violate its 
balance’.95 The organization of this relationship to nature is an essential point for Truax in 
establishing or reinforcing a participative and responsible ecological practice, yet the full 
potential of this charge is not quite lived up to insofar as the nature of the difference he 
identifies is never fully engaged with. The importance of Truax’s lesson lies in its 
positioning of humans and our actions within a broad natural order or register, contributing 
to an ontological leveling: the hierarchical elevation or exclusion of humanity from nature, 
allowing for the establishment of a position where noise is understood solely as the 
negative effect of human actions upon the natural order of things, is here addressed in an 
understanding of nature as the totality of an environment in which humans are one 
particular but nonetheless entangled community. In accordance with a participative 
ecological praxis, Truax would like for us to position ourselves firmly within, as 
constituents of, an idea of nature, a positioning of the listening subject as an active agent 
amongst inhuman others, themselves agents in a process of ecological determination. Yet, 
despite such intentions, Truax’s position is weakened insofar as the difference he seeks to 
rectify remains restricted to divergence. Limited in this way to divergence, difference is 
itself set apart from nature, a distinction that contributes to the constrained dynamics of 
acoustic ecology’s ideology of holistic equilibrium. Initially this may seem a somewhat 
tedious or pedantic point within the broader scope of Truax’s project, yet the nature of its 
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relationship with difference remains at the centre of many critiques of the acoustic ecology 
project and its own limitations. 
Nature, for Truax, tends towards an equilibrium, a balance that marks the ideal 
order of things and a dissolution of the hierarchical elevation of the human. This idea of 
nature as equilibrium occupies a position of central importance to acoustic ecology, yet is 
often undermined from within by a limited conception of noise as mere negative effect, as 
the disturbing effect of human technological progress upon the natural order of things, a 
position which serves to support the hierarchical structure Truax is keen to critique. Here 
we must centralize another ‘equilibrium’, that already mentioned between noise and 
difference, the consequence of which is an understanding of noise as not simply a negative 
interference in a pure order of universal signal components, but rather noise as all signals 
appearing as distinct as well as their conditions of appearance. The characterization of 
difference as divergence can be seen to be symptomatic of the manner in which the acoustic 
ecology project maintains a certain atemporal purity at the heart of its conceptualization of 
nature, with its most reductive ideological position identifying such purity in a pre-
industrial global order against which difference as divergence is measured. The criticism of 
difference or divergence from nature tends to maintain nature as a selfsame unity and 
perfect equilibrium in its limitation of difference to divergence. In order to avoid the 
trappings of purity into which the arguments of the acoustic ecology movement often fall 
we must, far from negating the category of divergence, maintain a certain difference from 
nature or the natural by maintaining difference in the idea of nature through the idea of 
nature as difference in itself. This is the problem or ultimate limitation of acoustic ecology, 
insofar as it lacks a fundamental concept of difference, so when Truax calls for us to not 
consider ourselves as different from nature, the response must be that this conception of 
difference as divergence is insufficient, and to consider nature as fundamentally different, 
as being comprised of beings that differ from each other in infinite degree. The 
consequence of this reciprocal implication of difference in nature is that everything appears 
as different from nature insofar as Nature is taken, in a manner consistent with the ideology 
of acoustic ecology, holistically, as the naming of All, and that All—everything together all 
at once—is possibly the simplest expression of noise, of a Noise that is pure insofar as it 
marks the utter dissolution of distinction or the possible appearance of things as distinct. 
This simple mereological position can be clarified in saying that a body, object or event is, 
insofar as it is not everything, nor nothing, and therefore something different from nature 
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without attaining autonomy from it. This position, I believe, brings us closer in line with 
Truax’s central concerns while allowing us to address the importance of a 
reconceptualization of difference, and therefore noise, within acoustic ecology. In 
maintaining difference within environmental considerations and the idea of nature, from the 
perspective of acoustic ecology, it will be necessary to rebuild acoustic ecology around the 
central problematic of noise as opposed to the site of a sacred silence that places the audible 
interactions of the world’s constituent elements under erasure, the initial groundwork for 
which can be found in Truax’s own work. 
Truax presents an exceptional conception of noise that presents an opportunity to 
restructure much of his own argument, but also for a productive ungrounding of acoustic 
ecology that escapes an otherwise pervasive and puritanical romanticism. This  exceptional 
conception, however, remains isolated within his text, preventing its possibility for 
contamination. Before focusing on the opening that this conception of noise creates, 
allowing for a flight from romantic naturalism, we should address the more typical and 
pervasive understanding of noise expressed in his writing, which can be taken as 
emblematic of  the acoustic ecology project in general. This position is most clear when 
Truax states that ‘noise is the enemy of the acoustic community’, falling back upon the 
default position of the acoustic ecologist which reduces noise to negative interference.96 
Noise as negative interference is here posited as the enemy of ‘the acoustic community’, 
which is immediately intriguing insofar as this ‘community’ refers to ‘any soundscape in 
which acoustic information plays a pervasive role in the lives of the inhabitants’, and more 
broadly to ‘any system in which acoustic information is exchanged’.97 It is this latter and 
more expansive definition that we should adopt as it is the definition most consistent with 
Truax’s concerns for an ontological leveling which grounds humans within the idea of 
nature and amidst its other countless occupants. In accordance with this definition we can 
say that an acoustic community is established wherever any collection of objects or bodies 
exist that are capable of response to, or the active reception of, contractions and rarefactions 
in mediums such as air, water or earth. Such an expansive notion can be seen to reflect the 
practices of the Acoustic Ecology Institute, who’s work has a strong focus upon marine life 
and therefore the acoustic communities of whales, fish, dolphins and so on. Such inhuman 
acoustic communities are also brought to our attention in the work of Jana Winderen, 
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whose The Noisiest Guys on the Planet presents recordings of the characteristic crackling 
noises or underwater soundscapes created by decapods such as crayfish prawns and shrimp, 
as part of ongoing research into the audible expressions and orientational use of sound by 
aquatic creatures.98 Following Truax’s lead, the notion of an acoustic community is clearly 
not to be restricted to the bandwidth of human audition, but considered as extending out 
into a larger vibrational continuum, a field that must be defined according to the potential 
for the rendering audible of any informative vibration. Where matter, membranes and 
tissues vibrate according to a sympathetic resonance an ‘acoustic community’ is 
established. An acoustic community is in this sense the vibrational relation of bodies and 
objects set in sympathetic motion, a territory delimited according to an expansive field of 
vibrations, comprised of any body capable of registering the effects and affects of 
vibrations: a community comprised of birds, grain silos, bees, iron girders, glass bottles, 
swimming pools, humans, steel pipes and so on, the kind of acoustic community 
exemplified in Bill Fontana’s Objective Sound. This expansive and inclusive definition 
strengthens the orientation of acoustic ecology beyond the purely audible, creating an 
opening onto the inaudible conditions of sound. 
Having adopted the broad definition of the acoustic community provided by Truax, 
we must necessarily consider the extent to which noise can be considered its enemy. Noise 
is in this sense considered negatively, as interference within the consistency of the 
community’s relations through a blurring of periodicity leading to the indiscretion of its 
signs and signals. Insofar as noise remains the enemy of the acoustic community, its task is 
the eradication of such interference. What we are referring to as the acoustic community 
constitutes a certain territoriality when we consider the necessary space or environment it 
occupies influences and informs. The offensive on noise as interference  waged by such a 
community can be understood as concomitant with the maintenance of its territorial 
consistency, a consistency which is defined according to the clear and discrete transmission 
and reception of its constitutive vibrations. In the eradication of noise a community erases 
all which falls or arises between its own signals, between those transmissions between the 
objects and bodies with which it establishes relations. This is not to imply that humans only 
listen to humans and silence all else, as we regularly enter in communal relationships with 
dogs, cats, trees and trumpets, but in a community comprised of humans, apes, food and 
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computers, all other signals must be silenced towards the maintenance of this state of 
affairs, or particular territory. Where the eradication of noise becomes its default position, 
the ideals and practice of acoustic ecology become articulated towards and grounded in the 
ideals of silence. From this position silence is equated with a state of equilibrium, the base 
line or ground of the practice, the ideal against which it measures the noise of the world. 
Such orientation revolves around the notion of a pure communicability, the transmission of 
meaning and information through a wholly transparent and ineffectual medium, a medium 
which in the passage of signal content produces no distortion, permitting no noise. Such a 
medium remains, of course, impossible, with noise both constituting and permeating all 
signal. Within such a saturated and unequal medium, signal is rendered differently at each 
point of its reception, a reception that must include not only human audition but the 
affective capacities of every element that aids and impairs the transmission of vibrations 
between bodies, objects and membranes. Silence marks only an absence of attention; 
insofar as acoustic ecology grounds its signals in silence, signals rendered consistent 
against a silent ground and ineffectual medium, it delimits a field of interactions and 
vibrations to which it cannot, or cannot bare to, listen, a grounding in silence that leads to 
the maintenance of ideals of purity, as are evident in Schafer’s Soundscape, which 
concludes upon the perfect silence of a universal or Cosmic tonality.99 Truax, however, 
offers a way out of the deadlock of a grounding of signals in silence through his 
exceptional considerations of noise, considerations that are in many ways the inverse of his 
predominant position. Where Truax names noise as the enemy of the acoustic community, 
we must reorientate this assertion as we did his relation to difference, positioning noise as 
both the possibility  and central problematic of an acoustic community. Noise, in this sense, 
is not simply a nuisance, nor an ‘enemy of the acoustic community’, but is rather 
constitutive of that community and a necessary expression of its territoriality. The 
problematic is here taken in a sense that is not negative, but rather as signifying a complex 
field of interactions, a collection of objects and events that pose a problem to which one 
must respond and in doing so define signal content.100 Noise is taken as naming a 
problematic site of interacting bodies and objects from which signal content is drawn, an 
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understanding of noise that is identified by Truax in the more nuanced considerations of 
noise brought about by his consideration of urban space: 
Noise, in the sense of information that is unpatterned and unordered 
by the brain, is the only source of new information […] People often 
use the word “noise” in a non pejorative sense to mean any 
undefined or unrecognized sound that is potentially meaningful […] 
noise as the source of new information is open-ended and offers the 
promise of all that we may possibly experience.101 
It is from this position, oriented around a consideration of noise as the conditions of sound 
and the potentials of experience that Truax opens, from within, the possibility for an 
ecological practice grounded not in silence but constantly ungrounded in noise understood 
positively as a generative site just beyond the given thresholds of perception. It is on the 
basis of these assumptions that we should use Truax against himself, positioning noise not 
as the enemy of the acoustic community but rather the possibility of its existence through a 
productive ungrounding of ecological practice. Truax occasionally carries out this 
reorientation himself, recognizing noise as an ambiguous generative and problematic site,  
as in his terminological expositions wherein ‘signals […] are heard over the “ground” of 
the keynote sounds (e.g., boat horns against the sound of waves in a port)’.102 The ‘keynote 
sound’ identified here being the noise of the sea, a site that embodies high bandwidth noise 
in its undulations and the crashing of waves, a natural site of near white noise forming the 
background or, more generally, ground of signal events against which Schaferian 
soundmarks emerge. The task at hand becomes the maintenance of an acoustic ecology that 
is in this way grounded in noise. 
Towards the maintenance of difference as something other than negative divergence, 
we require a sense of acoustic ecology reorganized around an understanding of noise as the 
protean ground of experience and audibility, an understanding that, although somewhat 
marginal, is nonetheless present in Truax’s work. This process of an internal restructuration 
is carried out, as to simply avoid engagement with acoustic ecology on the grounds of its 
privileging of purity, its idealization of the natural and the haunting spectre of a sacred 
silence, is to overlook the depth with which research has been carried out within this field 
into sonic spatial productions and sonorous relations. As we will see, much effort has been 
put into such a reconceptualization of acoustic ecology and auditory environmentalism, yet 
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largely and most notably from artists working in a far broader and less stratified practice of 
environmental sound recording. It is in this repositioning and rethinking of both noise and 
difference noise is then granted a certain ontological status, as a matter of being as much as 
perception. Further, as an affective matter, noise is both heard and understood by Truax as 
being influential within human adaptation, the affective matter of sonorous individuations, 
and while this capacity is cast in a somewhat negative light, we can nonetheless take 
Truax’s observations as being of greater importance than he identifies: ‘when feedback is 
amplified instead of being counter-checked, the result is an instability of the system […] 
such a situation occurs when noise leads to human adaptation’.103 The consequence of noise 
and feedback being grounded in negativity leads Truax towards a critical stance on 
adaptation, a position  which would seem to call for the maintenance of a fixed model of 
humanity within a greater natural order, recognizable in the extent to which instability or, 
rather, metastability is cast as the negative result of interference rather than the possibility 
or potential of change and adaptation. Where this position is maintained it severely 
undermines the scope of acoustic ecology, insofar as feedback constitutes the reciprocal 
determination of environmental agents, a core concept of ecological thought, identifying 
the ‘natural’ as that which tends towards stasis rather than a dynamic and changing 
environment. Such a position, more specifically, undermines the extent to which sound is 
understood to creatively contribute to environmental determination and is capable of 
genuinely affective influence. What we can selectively preserve from Truax’s statement is 
the extent to which feedback, reciprocal determination, affective relation and adaptation are 
ascribed to noise, as it is precisely such a concept, noise understood as generative rather 
than strictly negative interference, that we are trying to establish at the centre of acoustic 
ecology. 
Identified with feedback, noise names the site of a generative matter and the potential 
for change within individuals, crowds and populations. Such is the ambiguity of noise: 
Truax intends to warn of a desensitization to noise which typically reduces the will to listen 
as discrete signal content is lost, dissolved as background noise rises to the surface—a 
warning that is of course heard and recognized as being of great importance—yet noise is 
in the same gesture identified as an agent of change, as a generative matter capable of 
producing difference. This latter point is clearest in Truax’s description of an open-ended 
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field of noise, noise as a source of newness as well at a threat to signal discretion. 
Instability is taken here, in a reversal of Truax’s position, as a necessary state of being, as a 
capacity for change; likewise, the ‘functional equilibrium’ that Truax is keen to maintain 
through ecological practice is problematized in light of his own  considerations of noise, 
which posits, although shies away from, the notion of a metastable equilibrium as the 
(un)grounding of nature. This reorientation does not, of course, seek to evoke a kind of 
Futuristic flooding of the earth with noise through a state of ‘unchecked amplification’, but 
rather an openness to change and difference. In a similar manner the profusion of feedback 
need not be taken in the negative sense originally given as an increase only in amplitude; in 
rereading Truax we can interpret the productive role of feedback as an increase in intensity 
as opposed to global amplitude, an increase in the potential for change, for a greater 
opening onto and engagement with the informal difference of noise. Intensity, taken in this 
sense as a marking the productivity of difference, production through tension and the 
interaction of elements, asserts a proximity to ground, to noise, both an active listening and 
reception discerning new signal content and opening the self up to individuations and 
individualizations in response to the noise of the world.  
Should we limit our understandings of noise and feedback, as in Truax’s specific 
concerns, with a general or global increase in amplitude, this leads to what he, using 
Schaferian terminology, refers to as a ‘lo-fi’ environment: an environment flooded with or 
dominated by noise, problematizing the discernment of signal. In our reconfigurations we 
identify such an environment as the state from which signal is drawn, the ‘lo-fi’ continuum 
in which little or nothing is identifiable but from which anything can be drawn. What we 
call sound is one such thing, a divination of signal, a bandwidth reduced from a greater and 
in a sense anterior ‘lo-fi’ environment. In this sense the ‘lo-fi’ environment is ascribed the 
same ambiguity as Truax’s open-ended noise, a field of both generative potential and  the 
dissolution of periodicity. In equating the lo-fi environment with noise and therefore the 
ground of the soundscape or acoustic community it is posited as both a central problematic 
and anterior generative principle from which signals defining the consistency of both are 
discerned. Such assertions, however, initially appear incompatible with Truax’s 
observations wherein ‘the lo-fi environment […] seems to encourage feelings of being cut 
off or separated from the environment. The person’s attention is directed inward, and 
interaction with others is discouraged by the effort to “break through” that is required. 
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Feelings of alienation and isolation can result’.104 For Truax it is a loss of discretion, 
distinction or alterity, caused by the blurring effects of the lo-fi environment that is the 
cause of a sense of detachment and separation; where a minimal distance is not easily 
defined, resulting in a proxemic confusion through the proximity of background noise to 
surface signals, one feels ‘cut off’. It is in this sense that isolation appears paradoxical 
insofar as the intensity of both noise and signal indicates a certain proximity to the 
unfolding of events, a proximity to the generative site of noise. We get a sense of this in 
common phrases such as being ‘in the thick of it’, amidst the ‘hustle and bustle’, phrases 
that convey a sense of being ‘where the action is’, in close relation to the defining or 
determining events of one’s environment. The lo-fi environment, rather than posing a threat 
through a sense of isolation appears as such through the possibility of too much connection, 
of being too close to noise, a situation wherein one’s alterity becomes threatened through 
indistinction, a situation in which ‘I can’t hear myself think’. Excessive proximity with 
one’s environment and its determining interactions, wherein the fragility and mutability of 
thresholds of personal space, the boundaries marking a minimal distance and individual 
territoriality, leads to overwhelming connectivity.105 While a degree of personal isolation is 
in this way posited as necessary rather than simply a negative problem, the extent to which 
it may become amplified through overwhelming connectivity should be taken into account, 
forcing a turn ‘inwards’, away from the noise of others, through the proxemic bolstering of 
a site of self preservation.106 
 
Ungrounding Noise 
 
In moving towards an ungrounded ecological praxis we have sought a reorientation around 
noise and an engagement with the ambiguity of affective capacities and forces of 
individuation. We find the beginnings of such a notion of ecological praxis mapped out in 
the work of Félix Guattari; where Schaferian ecology shies away from the extended and 
individuating consequences of its own observations, Guattari proposes an understanding of 
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ecology that actively follows the radical potentials presented by such trajectories. Schafer 
can be seen to have identified the individuating potentials in sound yet was too quick to 
limit them within the bounds of a romantic naturalism, favouring a preservation of the 
natural or ‘normal’ order of things over the temporality of matters and a protean being. For 
Guattari, on the other hand, ‘ecological praxes strive to scout out the potential vectors of 
subjectification at each partial existential locus. They generally seek something that runs 
counter to the ‘normal’ order of things, a counter-repetition, an intensive given which 
invokes other intensities to form new existential configurations’.107 Presented here is the 
larval form of an ecological praxis open to challenges posed to the integrity of minds that 
Schafer was so fearful of, a praxis that seeks out affective matters opening onto processes 
of individuation and subjective reconfigurations. Such a notion of ecology opens the mind 
onto a world which is grounded in difference rather than purity, onto the complex and 
constituent interactions of its diverse components. Within Guattari’s ecological model we 
may be able to identify an idea of North—the existence of a particular transcendental 
condition—yet it is the North uncovered by the likes of Kirkegaard, who create openings in 
its surface to enable couplings with the noise residing within. From amidst Guattari’s 
broader concerns, presently taken to be most salient is the notion of ‘opening-out’, the 
function of an ecological praxis that opens territoriality onto the implications of 
environmental interaction that lead Schafer to fear for the integrity of his mind. This 
opening-out moves towards individuating forces and potentials to be found amidst the 
components of a field situation. 
Ecological fields of influence are, in Guattari’s work, considered according to a 
complex situation of reciprocal determinations. For Guattari there are three primary 
‘situations’ or ecologies corresponding to the territories of mind, society and environment, 
relational territories marked by differences that nonetheless do not constitute their 
autonomy or absolute discretion. Too clean a distinction facilitates the hierarchical relation 
of individual and world, society and subject, nature and culture. Addressing present 
concerns for audible environmental relations, along the lines of division or distinction with 
which we have characterized the abstraction of the soundscape we might say that too 
zealous a distinction may result in the perceived autonomy of a soundscape from its 
inaudible conditions and extensions, a distinction that leads in the direction of 
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phenomenological essence. Yet, in pacifying difference according to the distributions of a 
common sense we lose the particular force of the audible. Our concern lies with a 
difference and distinction that does not exclude interrelations and reciprocal 
determinations, an ecological confusion that does not dissolve the force of the particular or 
disempower difference. 
Here we take on the form of Guattari’s ecological praxis, mapping his territorial 
concerns onto those of the earth, (inter)personal architectonics and the individual. More 
important, however, is the process of opening-out that characterizes Guattari’s sense of 
ecological productions: 
The principle common to the three ecologies is this: each of the 
existential Territories with which they confront us is […] capable of 
bifurcating into stratified and deathly repetitions or of opening up 
processually from a praxis that enables it to be made ‘habitable’ by a 
human project. It is this praxic opening-out which constitutes the 
essence of ‘eco’-art.108 
Here we are presented with the ambiguity of an ecological confusion, the oscillations 
between stratifying consolidations and opening-out. Within each component of Guattari’s 
ecological schema resides the potential for a repetition by which its autonomy is perceived; 
Guattari’s ‘‘eco’-art’ entails the production of openings, the making available of the 
components of distinct territories for the production of diverse assemblages, ‘habitable’ 
environments and occupations. Opening-out onto the noise of a particular environment, an 
opening on to the ground of recognizable and contracted periodic events, leads one to the 
site embodying both the dissolution and production of forms, an ambiguous site which, 
where such openings become audible, provokes potentials for new listening practices and 
therefore new ‘vectors of subjectification’ while at the same time threatening existing 
audile techniques and subjective consistencies. Guattari’s schema furnishes us with an 
expansive notion of ecological praxis. Such a framework is supportive of the continuum of 
differences I wish to establish in this argument, a continuum stretching from the geological, 
through the architectural and the personal. These three territories while not discrete 
nonetheless embody degrees of difference, with Guattari foregrounding reciprocal influence 
between territories without dissolving differences. Ecology is then accordingly considered 
to operate according to a degree of confusion as much as preservation. Where the 
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ecological schema presented by Guattari is taken as a means of restructuring the ideological 
framework of acoustic ecology, the necessity of such an operation finds its audible 
expression most clearly in works such as Audible Geography, a collection of recordings 
expressing locational contingencies and mutabilities, a document comprising ecological 
praxes inclusive of the natural, technical, cultural and political.109 Rendered audible are not 
simply environmental representations but rather a series of ecological confusions, wherein 
an environment abstracted from its holistic image in passing through the assemblage of the 
artist, the microphone, the means of its documentation and manipulation. In Audible 
Geographies we hear the confusion of site and intervention, not simply an environmental 
strata considered pure in its autonomy but a complicated set of audibly expressive objects 
not ascribing a privilege to the apparently natural or organic. Ubiquitous is the presence of 
a certain background noise, diverging is the degree of proximity to it in each recording; 
from a persistent murmur in recordings made by Stephen Vitiello, Toshiya Tsunoda and 
Francisco López, to the instances where the background rises to swallow and confuse the 
constitution of a foreground in Eric La Casa, Asher and Marc Behrens. Background noise is 
herein not considered the enemy of the ‘acoustic community’ but the persistent and 
constitutive expression of its possibility, a determinant of the space it occupies and to which 
it lends definition. In these recordings we hear he necessary problematization of acoustic-
ecological practice, a foregrounding of that which is stifled where this rubric is left to its 
traditional romanticization. 
The ecological praxis we can draw from Guattari’s work is one of openings and 
interactions, openings onto difference and ecological ungroundings. It its with the 
consequences of these openings, the resulting impacts and impressions of that which is let 
in that primary concern lies, with the catalytic and individuating functions of a territory 
opened to noise. Such openings can be thought to entail a territorial deformation rather than 
total obliteration, provoking a spatial production in relation to which the individual is 
defined and delimited. With regard to our concerns for sonority, these openings are 
movements beyond the determined significance of sound, a problematization of the 
Schaferian event and the consistency of its emplacements according to symbolic relations, 
towards openings that welcome inside the abstract concrète, an objective displacement and 
territorial deformation. Welcomed within, around such objects the individual may come to 
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take place, establishing the initial objective displacement as a new ‘tonal centre’ through its 
gradual emplacement and recognition as event. This trajectory from objective displacement 
to emplacement finds expression in the terms of individuation amidst Guattari’s ecological 
project, described as that which: 
initiates the production of a partial subjectivity […] a proto-
subjectivity. The Freudians had already detected the existence of 
vectors of subjectification that elude the mastery of the Self; partial 
subjectivity, complexual, taking shape around objects in the rupture 
of meaning […] but these objects [breasts, faeces, genitals], the 
generators of a breakaway or ‘dissident’ subjectivity, were conceived 
by Freudians as residing essentially adjacent to the instinctual urges 
and to a corporealized imaginary. Other institutional objects, be they 
architectural, economic, or Cosmic, have an equal right to contribute 
to the functioning of existential production.110 
Here we find a more detailed elaboration of the operations of ecological openings  and 
corresponding territorial confusions. The event of the objective displacement, the 
introduction of an object around which a partial subjectivity takes place, knocks the 
listening subject off course according to the objective ‘generator’ of a subjective and 
territorial distortion, an opening onto the field situation of a ‘proto-subjectivity’ that names 
the intensive field of the individual. Objective displacements force the self towards that 
which is other, towards the unidentifiable or unidentified, towards the void that nonetheless 
influences the consistency of the self in constituting the conditions of its selective territorial 
definition. In emplacement we find ritualized response to the objects revealed. Repetition, 
sustained attention and a refocusing of perception after objective displacement performs a 
subjective orientation, a congealing of identity around the selected signals emerging from 
an opening onto noise, a tuning into specific frequencies and timbres, consolidation 
according to a subtractive synthesis. Where psychoanalytical thought posits a list of partial 
objects containing breasts, faeces, (imaginary) phallus and so on, we presently posit an 
entirely different and expanded list of influential objectivities. Guattari’s expanded list 
includes architectural, economic and cosmic objects; extending these institutional objects 
we identify displacement operative at a different order to the personal and the self: an 
affectivity of the real. From this list we are to retain only the architectural for our present 
needs while adding sound and technical objects in order to consider their subjective 
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impressions, specifically the status of sound as an evental-objectivity around which 
individuals take place. 
 Guattari’s schema opens up ecological practice from its naturalistic constraints, 
mapping pathways out of limited understandings of the environmental into the 
architectonic, individual and interpersonal domains. Adopting this framework as a 
necessary step in discussing the expanded and de-romanticized acoustic ecology already at 
work in the likes of Toshiya Tsunoda, Andrea Polli and Russell Haswell, Guattari’s model 
must nonetheless be subject to further ungrounding if we are to identify the ontological 
status of the noise onto which it opens. Beneath the ecological connectivity of subject, 
bodies and objects, agents human and otherwise, rumbles the noise of a fundamental and 
generative difference. 
 At the ideological core of acoustic ecology the natural signifies only those well 
defined and grounded signals, signals determined to represent an image of nature; in 
expanding the scope of the ecological praxis we seek to unground this distinction, to open it 
up to new determinations and consequent groundings through its ungrounding, its excision 
from determined symbolic operations. The ungrounding we seek is two fold: that of the 
nature of acoustic ecology and that of the individuals who populate it, enabling an entrance 
onto field situations and an openness to the individuating potentials of sonority foreclosed 
in Schaferian acoustic ecology. It is through reference to Guattari and the unbinding of 
noises marginalized within acoustic ecology that we find an initial model of ecological 
praxis which itself operates according to openings-out onto diverse fields of material others 
and vibrational agents. The apparent stability of the environment around which acoustic 
ecology has consolidated itself is supplanted with that of a metastability, the productivity of 
a problematized periodicity, through its ungrounding in noise. In operating according to a 
praxical opening-out a practice is recursively ungrounded in difference rather than 
grounded according to purity and the ideals of natural order. There is a necessity to this 
ungrounding insofar as we wish to disturb the orderly stability of natural signals, 
determined as such within a traditional model of acoustic ecology, opening it onto 
expanded fields of sonority through resonance rather than referral and representation. 
That which appears as well grounded appears on the side of representation as ‘to 
ground is always to ground representation’, to fix in place and to determine in accordance 
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with the ideological practice of a given domain or territory.111 Insofar as, through this 
productive ungrounding we come to concern ourselves with a subterranean transcendence, 
we take as our field of study the interactive determination of domains, domains which 
themselves constitute the objective and empirical events central to disciplinary territoriality. 
In the determination of audible domains we can identify the interactions of the inaudible 
and of events that exceed the thresholds of perception. Insofar as we orientate ourselves 
towards the processes by which audibility is determined as such, we reorientate the 
transcendental conditions of acoustic ecology from those of Schafer to the ‘fractured’ North 
presented by Kirkegaard, whose work forces to the surface a plutonic noise—that which 
subsists beneath both the surface of the earth and, as we shall see, the flesh—an audible 
energy that attests not to the autonomy of sound itself but to an energy in general, to the 
inaudible and transcendent conditions of sonority: ‘energy in general or intensive quantity 
is the spatium, the theatre of all metamorphosis or difference in itself […] In this sense, 
energy or intensive quantity is a transcendental principle’.112 In his ungrounding of the 
silent heart of acoustic ecology—as performed in Eldfjall—Kirkegaard renders audible the 
rumbling theatre of geomorphology and addresses noise as the transcendent conditions of 
the natural. As a disciplinary territoriality, the empirical domain around which acoustic 
ecology orientates itself is that of sonorous events. Being concerned with a generative 
subterranean transcendence that conditions this domain of auditory events means that one 
takes as a field of study those interactions which may remain inaudible and confused, those 
fields of noise which present the potentials of audibility while remaining in excess of the 
perceptible. This relation of the empirical and transcendent can be further clarified with 
reference to Deleuze: 
In terms of the distinction between empirical and transcendental 
principles, an empirical principle is the instance which governs a 
particular domain […] The transcendental principle does not govern 
any domain but gives the domain to be governed to a given empirical 
principle; it accounts for the subjection of a domain to a principle. 
The domain is created by difference of intensity, and given by this 
difference to an empirical principle according to which and in which 
the difference itself is cancelled.113 
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The transcendental here names the noise of those interactions which constitute potential 
audibility while themselves remaining, at least in part, inaudible, subsisting beyond the 
domain of the empirical and the means of their perception. Insofar as what we hear is 
sound-itself or sound as symbolic operation, brought to the mind is not the body from 
which the empirical event arose but rather the phenomenon itself and its significant 
extension; it is in this sense that difference—the body of noisy, heterogeneous and 
subtarranean interactions—is cancelled in the qualitative perception and becoming 
symbolic of the audible events and discrete sonorities to which it constitutes the conditions. 
It is where the sound object is taken hold of within phenomenological and symbolic 
sufficiency that the difference from which it emerged is truly cancelled or effaced in its 
appearance as qualitative essence or sign, the external expressions of those processes 
constituting its internal differences and transcendent conditions. 
It is from the position wherein acoustic ecology is grounded and grounds signals 
according to its naturalistic taxonomy that noise is represented as negativity and limited to 
the operations of divergence. In our equation of noise with difference and the groundless as 
a field of difference unbound, the site of a ceaseless generativity is identified; it is this 
generative status that is lost in the limitation of difference to divergence and the 
representation of noise as negativity, operations illuminating what Deleuze referred to as 
‘the ultimate external illusion of representation’, wherein it is thought ‘that groundlessness 
should lack differences, when in fact it swarms with them’.114 It is this illusion which is put 
to work where noise is limited to interference, as that which is solely detrimental and 
withdrawn from catalysis. These differences, the ‘swarming’ of which is heard in the 
confused murmur of noise as both saturating and interstitial informality, comprise the 
productive conditions of a deformation, a productivity of noise that is disclosed to the 
listening subject as audile technique descends through the earth’s depths, as attention is 
directed beyond the perceptual thresholds of the simply given. This ungrounding noise 
attests to the generative potentials of material interactions, to the emergence of signal from 
noise and to the ‘opening up of things to the turbulence beneath them’.115 Beneath the 
patterned organization of signals we find the rumbling of deformations and 
(de)compositions, contingencies and constitutive interactions. It is such a transcendental 
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rumbling that the audile techniques demonstrated in the work of Kirkegaard open onto, ears 
directed through openings in the earth in order to discern something of the inaudible, 
plutonic noise that rumbles beneath, a re-grounding of the sounds of nature and the objects 
of an acoustic ecology according to a fecund and transcendent noise that otherwise subsists 
inaudibly.  
In the durations of the audible object—manifest in its transience—we find the arc of 
the apparent event which leads back towards the groundless and imperceptible, states 
discussed here not in accordance with a puerile celebration of noise but as a means of 
identifying capacities for change and their audible excitation, an identification of noise as a 
field of individuating potentials. As ungrounded audile object and event, noise finds its 
equation with difference, which as the imperceptible population of a groundless field of 
interactions finds resonance with the process and potentials of individuation; it is the 
groundless which is characterized by Deleuze in the terms of a ‘depth or spatium in which 
intensities are organized […] the fields of individuation that they outline […] internal 
resonances and forced movements […] the constitution of passive selves and larval subjects 
[…] the formation of pure spatio-temporal dynamisms’.116 According to its being populated 
by differences the groundless is equated with a field of noise that, through this synonymity, 
is recognised as the site of individuations—observed in this instance to operate primarily 
according to sonority, by way of ‘internal resonances and forced movements’ that impact 
upon the definition of individuality and the delimitation of subjective territories. It is this 
list of characteristics that is to be claimed for noise insofar as it is to be understood as 
generative potential rather than homogenizing negativity, as a saturated space entering into 
a system of resonances and forced movements with the constitutive bodies of an 
environment, the interactions of which being understood as the dynamics driving 
individuations and the state of a protean being. 
 
Originary Audition 
 
Through the opening out of acoustic ecology heard in Audible Geography—a disciplinary 
and territorial expansion concomitant with Guattari’s ecological schema—and its 
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ungrounding according to the noise posited as the subsistence of subterranean transcendent 
conditions beneath the ideal image of the natural, we are better positioned for a return to the 
originary site of Schaferian ecological practice. Kirkegaard’s Eldfjall has been taken as an 
exemplar of the directing of auditory attention beyond the given thresholds of perception, 
towards the dynamics that persist both beyond and within the apparent, yet we also find a 
fundamental and generative noise posited as originary (un)ground(ing) within Schafer’s 
Soundscape. In the noise of the sea Schafer identifies a fundamental sonic archetype, a 
primary and original murmur  posited at the intersection of being an obliteration: ‘what was 
the first sound heard? It was the caress of the waters […] The roads of man all lead to 
water. It is the fundamental of the original soundscape and sound which above all other 
gives us the most delight in its myriad transformations’.117 It is from the noise of the 
seashore that Schafer sets out on his trajectory towards an ideal and cosmic audition. In this 
identification of a speculative and primary auditory event, Schafer’s soundscape ungrounds 
itself in noise, in the sounds of the sea and the near white noise of the crashing of waves. In 
our reconsideration of acoustic ecology, in identifying openings onto its own productive 
ungrounding, it becomes necessary to retain or recover this noise, plotting not a linear 
trajectory towards cosmic audition but a vacillation around the central problematic of 
nature’s noise—noise is not simply a problem of men and women but necessary to an 
understanding of generative difference. To this end we can refer to an alternative account of 
originary noise that does not make recourse to the heavens but whose ontological trajectory 
is one of an oscillations always passing through the zero point of oblivion. 
This alternative model, setting out from a common ground, can be found in the work 
of Michel Serres, who, on the noise of the sea, states that: 
There, precisely, is the origin […] We never hear what we call 
background noise as well as we do at the seaside. That placid or 
vehement uproar seems established there for all eternity. In the strict 
horizontal of it all, stable, unstable cascades are endlessly trading. 
Space is assailed, as a whole, by the murmur; we are utterly taken 
over by this same murmuring. This restlessness is within hearing, 
just shy of definite signals, just shy of silence. The silence of the sea 
is mere appearance. Background noise may well be the ground of our 
being. It may be that our being is not at rest, it may be that it is not in 
motion, it may be that our being is disturbed.118 
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For Serres, as for Schafer, in the noise of the sea resides an originary ground, the 
background noise that permeates our protean being. As the background to ontological 
distinction, noise is thought to permeate being, as that which lingers within that which 
makes itself distinct, an originary trace that nonetheless persists. Beyond the seashore it is 
the ‘lapping’ of a larger vibrational ‘continuum inhabited by unnamable waves and 
unfindable particles’ that constitutes the noise to which the subject is opened, constituting a 
less romanticized image of the site or environment of an originary murmur.119 To be taken 
over by noise is to be opened up to processes of individuation that persist beneath the 
appearance of stability, to enter into confusion and composition with a background noise 
approaching zero, approaching a ratio of 1:1 with identifiable signal, the ultimate and 
originary ‘lo-fi soundscape’. Being grounded in background noise locates a centralized 
‘restlessness’ constituting a fundamental anti-essentialism, the field of an absolute 
contingency. The contingency of sound constantly refers itself elsewhere, to both its 
extensions and conditions. It is in this sense that sound ‘in-itself’ is nothing or rather no-
thing, in-itself it is always other, a sound that in itself remains inaudible multiplicity in its 
objective persistence beyond the thresholds of perception. Subject to attention, noise yields 
signal through a subtractive and selective audile technique, the quality of its expression 
defined in the interaction of object, event and ear in accordance with the vibrational 
potentials of the object or body set in motion and the conditions of the receptive auditory 
complex—both culturally and physiologically conditioned. In both qualitative extension 
and symbolic action the transcendent conditions of the sound object become obscure, with 
the former supporting phenomenological autonomy and the latter submitting sonority to 
sign in both symbolic and mnemonic referral. Noise in a sense haunts perception, always 
just out of ear shot, an element that resists or rather remains in excess of its perception, 
consistent image and sign, drawn out of itself in becoming periodic and significant. Michel 
Serres defines an ontology of noise similarly: 
Noise cannot be a phenomenon; every phenomenon is separated 
from it, a silhouette on a backdrop, like a beacon against the fog […] 
every signal must be separated from the hubbub that occupies 
silence, in order to be, to be perceived, to be known, to be 
exchanged. As soon as a phenomenon appears, it leaves the noise. So 
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noise is not a matter of phenomenology, so it is a matter of being 
itself.120 
The problem of noise is less one of phenomenology than ontology. Noise as background, 
evading perception, constitutes the transcendental ungrounding of the grounded, the 
withering and waning of the periodic, the faint or overwhelming blurring at the edges of 
representation. Insofar as this noise is, for Serres, not a matter of phenomenology, neither is 
it strictly one of empiricism. The noise that Serres talks of is noise in it’s ‘pure’ sense, noise 
in the sense of a pure and transcendent difference, pure insofar as it constitutes a 
fundamental impurity and recursive contingency. Where the empirical names that which is 
given to be sensed, the field of objects and events that may possibly be sensed, the 
transcendental names the conditions of this domain. Diversity exists between determined 
objects, between the empirically grounded, difference is that which remains particular to 
the transcendent, that constitutes the transcendental conditions and ungrounding of the 
diverse. The thing given to be considered as a phenomenon appears grounded atop its 
ungrounding, the appearance of periodicity set against the background noise from which it 
is drawn, a background constituting that which persists just out of earshot. This background 
noise names the state of productive interactions, a metastability or ‘inequality’, an 
inequality naming an imbalance, an imperfection whose movements create the disturbances 
and agitative conditions of sonority, the distortions that plagued Schafer’s access to 
universal and silent tonality. This distortion occupies the periphery of the periodic, the hiss 
and crackle at the edge of audibility that betrays its indiscretions, its catalytic collisions and 
subtractive determination. Inequality is the imperfect oscillation that gives diverse signal 
events to the domain of the empirical and audible: ‘every phenomenon refers to an 
inequality by which it is conditioned. Every diversity and every change refers to a 
difference which is its sufficient reason. Everything which happens and everything which 
appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, 
tension, potential, difference of intensity’.121 Such fields of difference are the influential 
matters of being constituting a particular horizon of perception. It is towards a more 
specific consideration of the individual populations of these fields that we will turn shortly 
in addressing the subject matters of an expanded acoustic ecology, a praxis that extends 
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from the impersonal noise of the world to its containment, resistance and domestication in 
architectonic space. 
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2. Architectonic Noise 
Tracing lines of auditory determination, we proceed by way of a spatial contraction from 
the noise of the world—or more specifically, the environmental expanse at the heart of 
acoustic ecology—to its spatial containment, organization and isolation within the 
architectonic, to a space set apart from the world. Considered in terms of its individual and 
subjective impressions, the architectural territory is considered in terms of both protection 
and differenciation, an agent in both the maintenance and determination of self and identity, 
a determinant in the affirmation of alterity. Posited by Luis Fernández-Galiano—after 
Vitruvius—as the primeval gesture of such distinctions, that between the space in here and 
the world out there, is fire, a fire which sets a space apart. Distinct from organization 
according to the intersection of lines—territorial delimitations according to the geometries 
of visual space—is Fernández-Galiano’s notion of energetic architectonics wherein the 
invisible and thermic is considered equal to the visible within architectural 
determinations.122 This identification of an invisible, thermic architectonics draws us 
towards the transient mutability of space, to its environmental contingencies, towards an 
understanding of spatial determination appropriate to the broader notion of auditory space. 
This notion of auditory space is derived from the work of Marshall McLuhan, for whom 
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auditory space constitutes ‘a field of simultaneous relations without center or periphery’.123 
Where McLuhan’s auditory space provides valuable descriptions of omni-directional 
spatial perception and relations beyond the linearity of line of sight, we find in Fernández-
Galiano’s invisible architectonics a discussion of the production of such spaces beyond that 
of apparent simultaneity or the instantaneous. The linearity of ‘visual space’ forces 
everything to relate to the eye, to the position of the centralized observer, whereas 
McLuhan’s conception of auditory space is radically decentralized whereby every thing 
relates not to the position of a centralized observer but to everything  else according to a 
kind of scale free network. Visual space is, for McLuhan, sequential or discrete, having 
become well defined according to print culture which through the discrete characters of 
movable type would come to impress itself upon perception. In contrast, although by now 
predictably, we find auditory space defined according to continuity and a degree of 
confusion in both perception and spatial relations. For McLuhan, the emergence of print 
culture is indissociable from that of a concept of privacy; the strict accuracy of this 
historical assertion put aside, what is important is that this discrete organization of space is 
contrasted with an ideal communality according to which auditory space is conceived as a 
continuum between one and all. Despite the decentralized, continuous and confused 
conception of the auditory put forward by McLuhan, he nonetheless maintains a sense of 
private or individual territoriality within the auditory or ‘organic’ organization of space, 
identifying the use of radios in the production of auditory private space, a space whereby 
the auditor is set apart from the whole, from the environment at large by means of a 
localized irradiation.124 Auditory space problematizes linear organization, readily exceeding 
visual boundaries, permeating and confusing territories along the contours of its incessant 
vibrations. While McLuhan states that ‘no architect can afford to be ignorant of auditory 
space’ many remain so insofar as ‘architectural design is entrusted now with a major task of 
sustaining traditional values achieved by print culture. How to breathe new life into the 
lineal forms of the past five centuries while admitting the relevance of the new organic 
forms of social organization […] is this not the task of the architect at present?’125 
McLuhan calls for an architecture opened up to the ‘distorting’ influence of auditory space, 
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not an obliteration of the linear or visual but its decentred reorganization and its bearing of 
a temporal mutability. We will shortly turn to the work of architects who are responding to 
the problematics of specifically auditory space, yet it is with the richly analogous 
architectonics in Fernández-Galiano’s account of thermic spatial production that we must 
temporarily remain, insofar as his account of invisible architectures is more sustained than 
many other accounts from within the discipline. 
 Fernández-Galiano defines architecture broadly in terms of energetic regulation, 
through the containment and exploitation of energies that maintain the building-as-process 
rather than static or petrified form. Forcing a principal analogy, this definition of the 
architectonic is comparable with the containment, regulation and organization of noise that, 
with reference to Steven Connor’s discussion of a modern auditory subject, is characteristic 
of the emergence and maintenance of self in the transition from or binding of a chaotic 
substrate, through its subtractive selection to the structuration of its organized, formal 
appearance. This is not, of course, to suggest that the individuation of buildings and 
individuals are one and the same, but that both Fernández-Galiano’s understanding of 
architectonic production and the modern auditory subject described by Connor can be 
understood to respond to a similar problem in the form of noise or chaotic, energetic matter 
and its regulation towards the production of consistent yet nonetheless mutable form. This 
analogy is of importance insofar as the individuation of both space and subject is to be 
thought as in some way reciprocal or enmeshed, one embedded within the other. Insofar as 
the fire defining a dwelling is understood as the energetic expression of combustible 
matters, we take noise similarly as an expressive materiality, a generative matter of 
‘combustion’ more than construction and regulation. In both fire and noise space is 
determined through an exploitation of materials according to their intensive and expressive 
potentials, at least as much as their regulation; in these intensive, productive forces we can 
identify an architectonics of irradiation, maintaining an intensive, differential interaction, 
an energetic noise whose emissions constitute its potential organization. For Fernández-
Galiano it is the maintenance of  thermic noise or chaos towards an architecture of invisible 
dynamics that sustains the building-as-process against the homogenization of spatio-
temporal dynamics; with this concern for spatial energetics being taken as applicable more 
widely to energy in general, it is according to the sustenance of a minimal provision of 
noise that saves architecture from its expression as ‘petrified silence’ or acoustic 
homogeneity. 
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 It is according to such energetics or spatio-temporal dynamics that an understanding 
of architectonic space is to be mapped out that does not reduce it to ‘the art of petrified 
silence’, as Juhani Pallasmaa has put it, but a site of intensive and individuating 
interactions.126 Pallasmaa’s text is notable insofar as it considers a broad, multi-sensory and 
invisible architectonics, including discussion of the auditory experience of space, of events 
wherein the ear perceives a volume that the eye does not. Yet the observations made remain 
limited to the usual affirmations of auditory intimacy, immediacy and the binary opposition 
of exteriority and interiority respective to the eye and ear.127 Pallasmaa is most provocative 
in asserting that the power of architecture is to silence—the political consequences of 
which Pallasmaa neglects despite his criticism of visual surveillance and panoptic control—
the consequences of which will be addressed in some depth with reference to the work of 
Emily Thompson wherein architectural silencing receives more adequate attention. A 
summary expression of Thompson’s  more thorough work on acoustical space is found in 
Steen Eiler Rasmussen’s earlier Experiencing Architecture, wherein both the experience 
and instrumental use of acoustic space—sound as marker, expression and excitation of 
place—is taken into account. Here positioned against Pallasmaa’s architecture of silence, 
we find in Rasmussen’s brief account an understanding of architecture as instrument of 
transmission and broadcast rather than silence, containment and solitude, an appeal for the 
maintenance of acoustical-energetic dynamisms against their homogenization.128 It is in this 
sense that Rasmussen maintains a certain ‘combustible’ rather than regulatory notion of 
auditory space, placing an emphasis upon the generative potentials of the sonorous. 
 Perhaps the most exemplary account of auditory spatial production from within the  
architectural discipline is to be found in Peter Zumthor’s atmospheric architectonics, 
wherein form is expressed as the residual product of material engagements, a kind of 
artisanal interaction wherein material potentials determine the possibilities of expression.129 
There is a kind of rare confidence in Zumthor’s consideration of the auditory within an 
instrumental notion of architecture; Zumthor’s architecture operates according to a selective 
accumulation of things and their interactive regulation, channeling and organization, rather 
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than their depiction as the passive receivers of form. Matter is, for Zumthor, considered in 
terms of a coupling of experience and potential according to objective expressions, 
impressions and the ‘affordances’ they constitute. Constituent amidst these material things 
are sounds, productive objectivities channeled, organized and exploited in accordance with 
their generative potentials towards the production of space.130 Zumthor’s engagement with 
auditory space constitutes a confusion of visual discretion and a openness to the radiant 
excess of the apparently solid, providing one answer to McLuhan’s question of ‘how to 
breathe new life into the[se] linear forms’.131 Perhaps more fundamentally, Zumthor 
harbours a distinctly resonant or harmonic understanding of the architectural edifice: 
‘imagine extracting all foreign sound from a building, and if we try to imagine what that 
would sound like: with nothing left […] The question arises: does the building still have a 
sound? […] I think each one emits a kind of tone’.132 This tonality that Zumthor identifies, 
remaining despite reduction, is perhaps the building’s resonant capacity or potential, its 
walls delimiting a wavelength, the edifice as harmonic structure. Resonance operates here 
as a means of capture more than relation, a capacity in waiting. It is the emphasis Zumthor 
places upon experience that is particularly interesting, his assumed position as both subject 
and executor of space. Zumthor is ‘moved’ by the elements of architecture, by the ‘things 
themselves, the people, the air, noises, sound’, things that we may describe as influential 
matters, objects forcing movement through their qualitative expressions and affective 
capacities.133 In the consideration of such forced movements this argument enters into 
proximity with what Paula Young Lee has called the ‘ideology of influence’.134 
  For Lee, the ideology of influence is synonymous with unilateral determinism, 
specifically that of individuals according to what we might broadly refer to as a larger or 
greater order, whether that be cosmic, biological or architectural. It is into the ideology of 
influence that this argument inserts itself, insofar as this position names not the totality of a 
situation but its background. Lee’s criticism is, rightfully, aimed at the epistemologies 
wherein this position becomes all encompassing, where individuals are simply the product 
of an environment, where they simply emerge but do not, nor cannot, choose to diverge. 
The point that I wish to maintain herein is that these environments, constituting a 
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‘background’, nonetheless exert influence and while this does not account for the totality of 
a situation its impacts and impressions are to be taken into account. Here there is perhaps a 
danger of all too simply stating a clean cut distinction between a background and 
foreground, that of a discrete or autonomous material base and a social or subjective 
superstructure, where in fact we should acknowledge the reciprocal action of one upon the 
other. While this reciprocity is acknowledged, I wish to maintain an emphasis upon the 
order of background events, upon the ideology of influence, insofar as this position does 
not limit itself to that which falls discretely within the perceptible or given but orientates 
itself towards their conditions and, therefore, the problem of determination. The reason for 
this emphasis is also an ontological one, insofar as it assumes that there is more to the 
world, more to matter and its interactions, than we perceive, know or can know of it, that 
the complexity of material interactions exceeds our ability to speak of it while persisting to 
exert its influence upon us. This orientation towards the background does not strictly 
address that which simply lies behind or beneath, but more a notion of background as 
excess, that  which, in part, persists within empirical events—despite its imperceptibility—
and within which empirical events occur. 
 The ideology of influence is therefore assumed after Lee’s critique; while 
environments are taken as broadly influential, as having diverse deterministic impacts upon 
occupying and constitutive bodies, these bodies are not to be conceived as lacking agency 
or the solely passive subjects of a greater order which, whether it be astrological or 
architectural, promises to comfort, pacify and cleanse their ills. While an emphasis upon 
background and excess is assumed it should not be thought to be at expense of subjective 
agency, manifest in diverse tendencies to challenge, revolt and reappropriate. Yet neither 
must the source of this influence be thought as lacking agency; an influential environment 
comprises many non-human agents, affective materialities and objects that assert a 
particular influence and must be acknowledged. The human subjects of influence constitute 
one set of bodies amongst many, a set which includes the organic and inorganic as 
constitutive objects of influence. 
 It is perhaps not surprising—considering the extent to which acoustical space 
remains, within architecture, primarily a ‘found object’, a residual excess insofar as it 
manages to escape cancellation—that the most notable considerations of architectonic 
sounds have come from outside of the architectural discipline, from accounts of the ‘users’ 
of the spaces it designs. We get another sense of architecture’s ideological assertions in 
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Brandon LaBelle’s account of architectural influence, considered from the point of use, 
occupation and appropriation, wherein it is considered insofar as it can be thought a 
condition of the subjective, an influential component in the determination and assertion of 
identity. LaBelle’s work has much to say on this point, and places a particular emphasis on 
the audible aspects and relational affects of space. Before attending to his particular 
considerations of the audible, his more general thoughts on architecture are particularly 
relevant in laying out an initial position regarding an ideology of influence. Here LaBelle 
considers architecture primarily from the point of view of use and experience as a 
component in a larger field of subjective, cultural and semantic tension: 
architecture should be understood not so much as a single building, 
or act of design, but as a symbolic system that profoundly 
contributes to the formation of individual experience […] like 
language, we can view architecture as forming the basis for an 
understanding of the development of personal identity: against 
architecture subjectivity is brought forward, for architecture fixes 
one into a certain ordering that goes beyond physical spatiality—or 
rather, it complicates such spatiality by rendering it symbolic and 
culturally coded. In other words, architecture functions within the 
larger sphere of social values by partially representing a given bias. 
Such representation occurs through the physical contours of spatial 
design, where the body is held within architecture and partially 
determined by its design: it literally dictates one’s movements as a 
cultural and social body. In turn, architecture liberates the individual 
[…] Like language, architecture operates as a system that lends 
definition to the individual by allowing a conscious exertion of will 
[…] and by confining it to a set of values. Architecture frees the 
individual and traps him or her in the same moment.135 
Where LaBelle here places an emphasis upon architecture as a symbolic system, my own is 
with regard to its affective influence and determination. Here LaBelle highlights the 
physical while foregrounding the social and symbolic. The concern for the definition of the 
individual within architecturally determined space is shared, yet my own position is less 
concerned with representational efficacy than affective extimacy, with the confusion and 
conditions of the individual which feeds into and problematizes the definition of the 
personal. Insofar as consideration of architecture as determinant tend towards is coding, we 
move further from auditory space, in the sense put forward by McLuhan. Insofar as it 
constitutes a component of a larger symbolic network, architecture facilitates a certain 
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exchange or discourse; it is in this sense that LaBelle conceives of the freedom offered by 
architecture, ‘allowing a conscious exertion of will’. Counterpoint to this position is the 
emphasis placed herein in upon an ‘unconscious’ influence or order of background events. 
Here architecture’s ideological function is acknowledged, yet it is precisely this function 
that allows for the assertion of subjectivity against architecture. The manner in which this is 
an assertion against architecture is to be taken as twofold; subjective assertion may take the 
form of a destructive gesture against architectural determination in the manner of Gordon 
Matta-Clark’s anti-architectural or ‘anarchitectural’ practice—a gesture that finds sonic 
extension in the work of Mark Bain.136 This destructive—or at least distorting—gesture 
nonetheless occurs against the backdrop of architecture, a backdrop that nonetheless 
remains as the ground against which these assertions are made. It is in this latter sense that 
we can conceive of architectures role in subjective determinations; subjective assertion 
against architecture is not necessarily oppositionally orientated, insofar as the subject 
appears against an architectural background that nonetheless persists, such is the ambiguity 
of the subjective assertion. Architecture is broadly considered in terms of its being a 
subjective determinant, as influential in the formation of identity, yet itself subject to the 
agency of the bodies that occupy and constitute it. Adopted herein is an understanding of 
architecture as that which is not only designed but produced, one that sees the category of 
user insufficient in comparision to the agency of producer.  
 Where we are concerned with an opening of architectonic space onto the noise of a 
broader field of interactions, architecture appears as determined as much as determinant. It 
is the ‘undoing’ of architecture that opens determined space or a given domain up to 
determining difference, to the noise that exists beyond its boundaries. The praxical 
relationship with architectural determination that LaBelle expresses draws on the work of 
Jane Rendell, in particular upon her concerns for the undoing of architecture. The ‘undoing’ 
of architecture, as Rendell puts it, ‘is a spatial practice which signifies an act of resistance, 
which attempts to establish identity by celebrating difference’.137 This ‘celebration of 
difference’, constitutes the opening of a crack in architecture as given, the redetermination 
of architectures deterministic influence and therefore a kind of vicarious and yet auto-
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deterministic assertion. Insofar as architecture is inhabited and lends definition to the 
individual, to open architecture up to difference through its undoing is to invite difference 
into the self. The counterpoint to this is, of course, that through the personalization of 
architecture, its ‘closing-up’ insofar as it becomes increasingly distinct from the world, 
maintains the consistency of the self and the personal territory through an exclusion of 
difference considered to be the confused murmur of the world at large. Where undoing as 
opening is allowed to run its course unhindered it leads only to obliteration. Necessary is 
the maintenance of a minimum of ‘doing’, support or consistency, or a constant oscillation 
between doing and undoing, an opening and closure, between the self-same and its opening 
up to difference. Despite his offensives, Matta-Clark’s buildings remained standing. The 
undoing of architecture is treated as synonymous with its opening-up, a gesture which need 
not be cataclysmic but may proceed according more subtle or sober gestures. Where this 
opening up is considered as an opening onto difference taken as synonymous with noise, 
we find one such subtle gesture in Henri Lefebvre’s opening of a window. 
 
Sitting, Listening 
 
Sometime during the mid 1980s in a Parisian flat along rue Rambuteau, Henri Lefebvre 
was sitting on a balcony, outside of a window, listening to the noises of Paris. Noises were 
rising up from the street below, an audible field of vibrations, or fluxes as he called them, 
passing in through the window, and in through the ear. The noises, fluxes, or vibrations 
were the objects of Lefebvre’s rhythm-analytical approach, their durations and 
temporalities taken as a provocative and problematic site engendered by the ‘life’ and 
rhythms of the city, these sounds ‘kicked up’, distorted, disturbed by the movements and 
stillness of occupying bodies, the city’s aural residue. Sitting, listening, Lefebvre considers 
this particular site of sound, the place in which one must be situated in order to be affected 
and influenced by the becoming audible of the city’s constituent agitations: ‘in order to 
hold this fleeting object, which is not exactly an object, one must be at the same time both 
inside and out. A balcony is perfect’.138 The ‘fleeting object’, out to which Lefebvre is 
reaching, is the ephemerality of a periodic wave, the briefest of rhythms and undulations, 
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the distinct sound object always already fading into the background.  Why is it that this is 
not ‘exactly an object’? Here we perhaps find Lefebvre caught between Schafer’s 
taxonomical discordance, the sonorous as object or event, as abstract ‘laboratory specimen’ 
or contextually grounded signal, respectively. That which is ‘not quite an object’ is perhaps 
that which is not quite distinct, its possibility of autonomy refuted in its audible rendering, 
in being drawn out of its inaudible in-itself in the event of perception. Nonetheless a certain 
‘objectivity’ remains for Lefebvre, an objectivity that leaves it caught between an 
imperceptible ‘autonomy’ of objects and contextually grounded events. Sat at the window 
listening, Lefebvre notes how ‘noises are distinguishable, fluxes separate themselves, 
rhythms answer each other’; although rendered sonic only by the ear, there nonetheless 
seems to remain an agency in these fleeting objects, insofar as Lefebvre is concerned to 
speak of fluxes ‘themselves’. Out of the hustle and bustle below the balcony, layers of 
noise emerge and rise up, Noise appears as yet another ephemeral, somatic residue 
comprised of fleeting objects whose existence is irresolvably contingent. Contingency 
withstanding, Lefebvre is inclined to speak of fluxes themselves, fluxes that make 
themselves distinct and in so doing interact with others; such is the agency of objects, 
however fleeting. In separating themselves from the micro-vibrational world of everything 
else, fluxes come to be according to what is perhaps best thought of as a subtractive 
emergence, drawn out and appearing as distinct by means of collision and abrasion, their 
interactions performing the determination of their respective alterity. For Lefebvre there 
remains an agency of objects, of fluxes themselves, free of intent, in their brute and base 
affectivity. It is such fluxes, complexes of noise and rhythms, that pose a certain 
problematic challenge to the stability of self, entering into it and making a difference, as 
well as to their own discrete identity. For Lefebvre such discretion, or rather unitary 
appearance, is just that, a multiplicity of rhythms, objects and events only appearing as one: 
Up to a point this simultaneity is only apparent; surface and 
spectacle. Go deeper, dig below the surface, listen closely instead of 
simply looking, reflecting the effects of a mirror. You then discern 
that each plant, each tree has its rhythms, made of several […] each 
has its own time […] Instead of a collection of congealed things, you 
will follow each being, each body, as having above all, its time. Each 
therefore having its place.139 
Lefebvre turns his ear towards a subterranean noise, to the noise of an ungrounding by 
                                                
139 Lefebvre, ‘Seen from the Window’, 222-3. 
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which the appearance of one is dissolved through attention to the noise it covers, 
enveloping according to its constituent durations. A tree houses a multiplicity of rhythms, 
periodicities in their own right, the ear, turned towards it, tuned into it, reveals a certain 
depth underlying its surface appearance and perception according to recollection.140 Here, 
against Kant, time is a property of objects in which inhere durations. Durations are given up 
to listening subjects, posed as problems, as temporal problematics and the potential of 
durational information. For Lefebvre, however, such objectivity is not all: ‘Objectivity? 
Yes, but spilling over the narrow framework of objectivity by bringing to it the multiplicity 
of the senses’.141  Here we uncover that to which Lefebvre is sat listening, that which is ‘not 
exactly an object’; the fleeting object brings its own temporality to the listening subject 
who imposes upon it the rhythms which comprise them. An additive synthesis insofar as 
rhythms and fluxes are, in their perception, a collective sum; their addition distorting form, 
modifying amplitudes, frequencies and phase. As such this addition does not simply lead to 
an increase, the addition of one flux or waveform having equal potential to detract from the 
power of the other, drawing peaks towards zero and embodying the potential for phase 
cancellations. The ‘not exactly an object’, for Lefebvre, spills over objectivity in 
experience, exceeds ‘objectivity’ in that which is brought to it, the problematic coupling of 
rhythms which take from the object and confuse it’s ‘objectivity’ within the sensory 
somatic complex. These are in a sense excessive objects embodying more than is apparent. 
To hold this fleeting object, to stay with it for as long as possible, to analyze and be 
informed by the rhythms and durations it yields, requires that one ‘be at the same time both 
inside and out’. What are we to make of this extimacy that is apparently required in order to 
hold the object, to be informed by it? We might conceive that where Lefebvre suggests one 
be ‘outside’ implies a certain subjective subtraction, that the self as one be extended beyond 
its unitary experience to the constituent complex that at the same time problematizes the 
limits of this constituency. Lefebvre, for example, is sitting listening, certainly positioned 
within the boundaries of his domain along rue Rambuteau, yet he is nevertheless outside, 
upon the balcony. Such an observation is hopefully not a banal as it sounds if we take into 
consideration understandings of the home as ‘the one place that is considered to be truly 
personal […] a vessel for the identity of its occupant(s), a container for, and mirror of, the 
                                                
140 The most obvious contemporary reference here is to Alex Metcalf’s Tree Listening, see: 
http://www.alexmetcalf.co.uk/AlexMetcalf/Tree_Listening.html 
141 Lefebvre, ‘Seen from the Window’, 223. 
 104 
self’.142 In stepping outside one stops ‘reflecting the effects of a mirror’ in moving beyond 
the ‘inviolable vessel’.143 Sat at the blurred and blurring thresholds of his home, inside or 
out, at the point at which its consistency and sovereignty begins to dissolve into the noise of 
the city, Lefebvre takes a step beyond himself, or at least his reinforcing vessel through an 
opening in the wall, allowing himself to be captured and informed. Here we are well 
positioned to consider the way in which ‘for Lefebvre, it was not the home but the city, 
which expressed and symbolized a person’s being and consciousness’.144 Beyond the 
supposed stability of the home—the  most obvious architectural reinforcement of identity—
being in the city is diffuse, complex, confused, constantly challenged; it is towards such a 
space that Lefebvre positions himself, a space just beyond, a step beyond the well defined 
territory of the self and identity, but not too far. In stepping outside through the window, 
Lefebvre begins to ‘let go […] but not completely’.145 It is this movement to the boundary, 
inside or out, a site of confusion, that lets the noises in, bears their problematic challenges 
in an analysis and contemplation, engendering information. 
 Sat listening at the questionable boundaries of his home, at the point where it is 
opened to the world, to the environment at large, in the problematic space that is certainly a 
private territory but one becoming diffuse, Lefebvre opens a window onto the noise of the 
world. In a passage that exemplifies attention to the rising of an ungrounding diffusion, 
attention to an ecology of noise, we find Lefebvre providing an account of not only the 
generative potential in noise but its impacts and point of impression by way of audition: 
Noise. Noises. Murmurs. When rhythms are lived and blend into 
another, they are difficult to make out. Noise, when chaotic, has no 
rhythm. Yet, the alert ear begins to separate, to identify sources, 
bringing them together, perceiving interactions. If we don’t listen to 
sounds and noises and instead listen to our body (whose importance 
cannot be overvalued) usually we do not understand (hear) the 
rhythms and associations which none the less comprise us. It is only 
in suffering that a particular rhythm separates itself out, altered by 
illness […] To understand and analyse rhythms, one has to let go, 
through illness or technique, but not completely […] to capture a 
                                                
142 Jonathan Hill, Immaterial Architecture (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 8. 
143 Lefebvre, ‘Seen from the Window’, 222. 
144 Eleonore Kofman & Elizabeth Lebas, ‘Lost in Transposition—Time, Space and the City’ in Henri 
Lefebvre, Writings on Cities trans. Elonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
1996), 8. 
145 Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, 219. Emphasis added. 
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rhythm one needs to have been captured by it. One has to let go, give 
and abandon oneself to its duration.146 
Here we set out once again from the dissolution of periodicity in noise, noise taken as the 
potential of all signal content. Through a concrescence of interactions between objects 
‘themselves’ as well as the ear, signal emerges and sound events are discerned. Here we 
also find Lefebvre giving consideration to the noises heard in the turn away from the world, 
those of the interiority of the body. Such noises, as Lefebvre points out, pass by in 
imperceptibility insofar as their operations are perfect and the oscillations balanced. It is 
only through interruption, as skipped heart beat or borborygmus, or through 
reorganization—the stopping up of the ears with wax—that such sounds are brought to the 
surface. Their identification is not, however, limited to malfunction but may be discerned 
through the development of audile technique. While such technique describes a practice of 
focused listening, that of the critical and analytical ear, a conscious searching for signal 
content, the determining site of such individualizing listening practice is, according to 
Lefebvre, reached by way of an opening, a ‘letting go’. Through such an opening, an open 
window in conscious perception, noise is permitted to enter and confuse as a necessary 
stage of ungrounding in the definition of novel periodicities. An abandoning of the self to a 
complex of durations, periodicities, signals, permits an alteration of the self—an alteration 
which Truax fears—individuations and individualizations along vibrational lines. The 
means of opening and abandon is, for Lefebvre, a means of understanding and at the same 
time an apparatus of capture; to grasp the potential offered by noise one must risk the 
relaxation of the subject’s territorial delimitations, to become overrun with noise and the 
confusion of competing signals. Such openings enable the potential restructuration of the 
listening subject, a confusion between the periodic appearance of discretion. 
 Through such openings, noise is permitted to flow into architectonic space, into the 
home and therefore the territories of the self and the personal. From the noise of the world 
as a system of energy in general we move into its containment in form. Lefebvre’s opening 
is, however, one performed after, in a sense against, much of the efforts of architecture. 
                                                
146 Lefebvre, ‘Seen from the Window’, 219. This translation has been slightly modified; ‘Murmurs’ replaces 
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the Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore translation of this same article, as it appears in Henri Lefebvre, Rhythm 
Analysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 27-37. ‘Murmurs’ is 
taken as the preferential term in this instance as it seems to appeal more generally to sound in general and 
therefore as being better suited to Lefebvre’s discussion of noise, as well as my own topic and adopted 
terminology, of course. 
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Containment, encapsulation, isolation; such terms are most easily associated with the 
predominant practices in architectural acoustics—outside of the concert hall. Dealing with 
noise typically leads to its cancellation at the hands of an architectural praxis that tends 
towards silence in much the same way as the practice of acoustic ecology, where 
communication is all too easily taken as synonymous with clarity, discretion and 
distinction, an obsession with content maintained at the expense of an understanding of a 
medium as itself information. At the heart of such practice noise is other, the noise of 
others, the neighbors, the street, the city outside, a source of interference. Such others 
impinge upon the personal and private and are accordingly shut out, guarding integrity and 
delimiting territory. 
 
The Silencing of Space and the Contracting of the Self 
 
Here we set out from an opening-up of architectonic space. It becomes necessary, therefore, 
to delimit that which is considered to be in some way closed, that space which asserts itself 
as anterior to this gesture of opening and reopening. Here we require architectural discourse 
that remains critical of the monumental, critical of that which sets itself out against the 
world according to a formal autonomy. Such criticisms are well rehearsed and will not be 
the primary focus of the argument which is to follow; it is the extent to which these critical 
discourses allow for a consideration of the architectonic in relation to noise and sonority 
that is of primary concern. In beginning to delimit the situation whereby an opening out of 
architectonic space becomes necessary, referral can be made to the work of the Situationist 
International, a movement that held similar concerns for urban space as those exemplified 
in the work of Lefebvre. This association is, however, drawn out primarily due to the work 
of Brandon LaBelle, an association that grants us access to LaBelle’s thinking on an 
‘Architecture of Noise’: 
The SI [Situationist International] aimed to embrace the fluidity of 
modern life, not the imagined fluidity of free movement but the 
actual fluidity in which all the chaotic agitations of reality unfold-the 
body as it brushes against and is bruised by its surroundings […] the 
SI structured their architecture on a theory of noise, dissonance, one 
which is inherent to the natural conditions of urban life. The 
harmony of modern urban design is based upon the idea of fixing the 
body as a site in itself—the modular man as the happy medium of 
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possible experiences and events. From here it would remain to 
construct a architecture in relation to this average of subjectivity, to 
support the medium through forms of comfort […] This theory, 
though setting out to support human action, to raise the state of 
modern living, in turn imposes a reduction of subjectivity—it levels 
off the extremity of individual sensibility and imagination, averages 
out the unexpected spontaneity of possible events […] to speak of 
the SI in terms of a theory of noise is to suggest that the SI in 
considering architecture aimed to magnify difference, to multiply 
human experience by supporting the inherent dissonance of the body 
and its psychological and emotional forces […] freedom is not 
something devoid of tension or free conflict, but rather it only 
amplifies conflict. In turn, architecture in setting out to embrace 
freedom, should create spaces for these tensions and conflicts to 
unfold in all their expressivity.147 
This passage is quoted at length as it outlines a productive and agitative stance on 
architectonics, the necessity of a tension and a minimal degree of disturbance; in this way 
LaBelle outlines an architecture of noise in aligning its catalytic disturbances with the 
conditions of not only sound but subjective assertion. Identified accordingly is a field of 
interactions or, to use Schafer’s term, a ‘field situation’, conceived in terms of an agitative 
site, a ‘soundscape’, the physicality of which is not limited to its audible components but 
conceived as extending into its inaudible conditions. Such agitations are the causal events 
of noise, which is in turn considered in terms of a generative potential rather than strictly a 
negatively problematic phenomenon. 
 This account of an architecture of noise can be read as an engagement with the 
ideology of influence, seeking out the edges and influential objects that lend themselves to 
subjective determination and the organization of movement. To brush up against a wall, a 
surface, an object, engenders a certain awareness of its existence, affordances and 
constraints, an attention to the limits of a situation as a critical engagement with its 
ideological function.  Accordingly, smooth passage is equated with the imperceptibility of 
one’s determinants and influences, the invisibility, inaudibility and imperceptibility of 
ideological influence perfected. In this way LaBelle talks of a hampering or reduction of 
subjectivity insofar as the individual knows not what to assert itself against. To adopt a 
particularly critical stance, at its most vicious, support for smooth and unhindered 
movement operates according to a law of averages and normalization, effecting the 
                                                
147 Brandon LaBelle, ‘Architecture of Noise’ in The Site of Sound: Of Architecture and the Ear, Brandon 
LaBelle and Steve Roden (eds.) (Los Angeles: Errant Bodies Press. 1999), 50-1. 
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constraint of difference and the movement of that which differs. In audible terms, we can 
characterize this as a cancellation of noise, not simply that of the pneumatic drill entering 
one’s living room from across the road, but the sound of all that is not consistent signal or 
communicative content, along with the sound of space itself, the auditory ‘signatures’ and 
impressions of the built environment as a resonant capacity, emphasizing and dampening 
particular sounds and signals according the definition and delimitation of its volumes.  
Cancelled or contained are those incidental sound events, taken in the Schaferian sense 
wherein they are expressive of a context, of a space and place, events silenced towards the 
smooth and unhindered passage of the voice and more meaningful or instructive 
communication. The silencing of space and the incidental event often serves the primary 
purpose of efficient communication so that labor may progress unhindered, as is discussed 
at length by Emily Thompson. In its silencing of the incidental and the noise of the world, 
architectural acoustic determination serves to reinforce the selectivity of listening, its 
capacity for tuning in to specific signals and a tuning out of others. Yet the over exertion of 
this support through an acoustical homogenization—executed through the installation of 
dampening materials, acoustic tiles and baffles, often as an afterthought to design wherein 
emphasis resides with the discretion and organization of visual space—also constitutes a 
dampening of listening, of quotidian audile technique, through lack of challenge and 
exercise. Through the silencing of space listening grows lazy and accordingly we can think 
of Schafer’s call for ear cleaning as entailing aural exercise, an effort to allow for the 
development of audile technique towards a more refined and analytical engagement with 
noise, a practice not bound strictly to the ear but rather as something which can be 
exercised or effected vicariously through a practice of acoustical design opposed to the 
silencing of space. Through the maintenance of a minimal degree of noise understood in 
accordance with the incidental as well as the auditory expressions and impressions of the 
built environment, the ear is exercised, forced to audition. To silence is to constrict 
imaginative and generative potential, to eradicate influence, preserving stasis, the pure and 
static state of things through the cancellation of difference. 
 Despite this position, we again find noise cast most readily as divergent negativity in 
the history of ‘urban soundscapes’. It is particularly where this history is considered 
primarily in relation to the home, the site of an ideal quietude, as a site of self definition, 
distinction and protection that noise becomes understood primarily according to divergence 
and its influence becomes one of a hollowing out or wearing down of identity. From the 
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perspective of the home, noise is ‘out there’, and if it is ‘in here’ it is alien, annoyance and 
agitator to be eradicated. When noise becomes increasingly equated with the outside, the 
interior steps ever closer to an ideal silence, within which difference is cast out as 
divergence, as increasingly invasive rather than that which inheres within and might 
otherwise facilitate the exercise of audition. Silenced, noise looses its generative potential 
and space loses its audible expression. Such practice binds noise to negativity in order to 
preserve a harmonic mean. The isolation of noise to the exterior of the personal and private 
in many ways ignores the existence of an inescapable problematic, falling ignorant of 
Truax’s assertion that ‘the soundscape and the phenomenon of noise are not things that are 
“out there”, apart from ourselves. They are inextricably related to us’.148 Here we must take 
Truax’s point further; noise and the soundscape are, in addition to not being ‘apart from 
ourselves’, not apart from ‘themselves’, from each other, but inextricably linked, the latter 
being an identification of signals within the former through an agile and exercised audition. 
Truax’s confusion of sound and self, if taken in fidelity, is asserted towards the 
establishment of an equilibrium or a restorative balance; here this confusion is adopted 
towards a productive although more ambiguous metastability, the inherence of difference 
within the self, a difference which nonetheless persists both inside and out as the other 
within, the extimacy of noise. Noise, and therefore the soundscape, persists in its alterity, 
remaining “out there” while persisting “in here”, according to its excessive being. Truax’s 
assertion should then be altered accordingly to express the extent to which the soundscape 
and the phenomenon of noise are things “out there”, yet they nonetheless constitute a part 
of us wherein they become apparent. They are inextricably related to us yet not reducible to 
this relation, persisting in excess and inaudibility. Their ambiguity resides in the extent to 
which they pose a threat and nonetheless populate the interiority of the somatic or 
architectonic. Noise persists in constituting the dirt which belongs outside yet continually 
trespasses within, the uninvited visitor and the source of base distractions. Such a 
classification of noise is the prerogative of an identity that perceives itself to be under 
threat.  
 The history of auditory space reveals as a common response to this threat a 
fortification of one’s defenses, the construction of a more solid, private space to guard the 
consistency of that which resides within the home and the proxemic boundaries of personal 
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space. The practice of constructing an acoustic buffer against the noise without serves to 
maintain self-definition through the enhanced distinction of signals indicative of identity. 
Where these distinctions have ramifications for class division such spaces, as John Picker 
describes, provide ‘a spatial reinforcement to vocational identity’.149 Indeed, as both Emily 
Thompson and Jonathan Sterne have also shown, quietude and silence would—with 
developments in both the technologies of architecture and sound reproduction—become a 
commodity, a certain bourgeois privilege, set apart from sites of noise, as well as the noise 
of the proletarian workplace whether the factory, the kitchen or the street.150 Picker details 
the threat posed to Victorian professional identities by the noise of the street, that interstitial 
site of contestation occupied by buskers and entertainers, protesters, pickpockets and 
salesmen active amongst the movements of a population at large. Being occupied by such 
individuals, the street was defined by a noise that threatened to overwhelm the boundaries 
of the home and professional workplace, being set apart from yet nonetheless in proximity 
to the street. Picker’s focus on those individuals whose professional identity was defined 
within their home conflates the domestic with the professional in the construction of a 
particular bourgeois identity, an identity that perceived itself to be under threat from the 
noise without. The emphasis placed upon class, a historically specific situation and 
subjectivity does not serve to limit the scope of Picker’s argument but rather more broadly 
defines the perennial ideal of home as a site of self-definition and territorial subjectivity. 
Beyond the specificity of Picker’s study, it is the delimitation of personal space or territory 
beyond that manifested and represented in the home that is of particular interest, as such 
territory extends beyond the domestic into a more broadly social praxis through the cultural 
observation of invisible and ephemeral territories or auditory proxemics. Picker himself 
goes on to show how, within the specific historical context of his study, the notion and 
boundaries of the personal and private can be seen to have expanded beyond the confines of 
the home. For Picker, however, this was most clearly manifest in an extension of the home 
as the central model and form of bourgeois personal space, rather than its problematization 
or mobilization: as bourgeois identity sought to strengthen and expand its blockade against 
the imposition of an alien noise, the streets would be silenced through ‘a professional 
seizure of urban space, and an architectural tactic by which to expel the threat of the noisy 
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rabble and thereby preserve an authorial career’.151 Through its procurement the once 
public would be rendered private in order to maintain the discretion of its occupying 
bodies. Noise abatement would silence the clamor of the streets in order to better define and 
extend the quietude of a void through which the personal could move unchallenged and 
unperturbed, comfortable within the auditory manifestation of the ideological framework 
produced towards the maintenance of its own self image. Initially more important, 
however, than the tactics employed in defense is the power that Picker identifies as having 
been at work in the acoustic matters resisted, contained, organized and silenced: ‘noise 
began in this period to alter the agents, subjects and conditions of artistic and intellectual 
occupations’, the street would come to move in from outside, into the home, into the 
workplace and into the mind; noise would become more broadly understood as a vacillating 
and spectral medium active in the (de)formation and delimitation of the personal and the 
professional. The audible irradiation of the street would, through a confusion of 
architectural boundaries, compromise well defined subjective territories, contaminating the 
vessel of the self. The bourgeois response would eventually become the entrepreneurial 
commodification of silence. Picker’s account of the contestation of the domestic, 
professional and pedestrian, around the acquisition of architecturally determined quietude 
provides background to an understanding of the ambiguous relation between sound and 
self, with the former providing both support to and subversion of the latter. It is through its 
consideration according to an auditory territoriality and architectonics that this relation of 
sound and self is considered not according to the determination of an atemporal and eternal 
soul but a contingent, situated and confused subject, a relation of sound and bodies that 
matter. From the class and historical specificity of Picker’s statement regarding the 
influence of noise, a more general understanding of auditory determination is to be derived, 
one which understands the sonic as both a fortifying and invasive spatio-temporal 
materiality, that which may contribute to the delimitation of personal territory as well as its 
confusion and dissolution. Faced with the ambiguities and complexities of such a 
problematic matter, its silencing would become the most obvious architectural tactic to be 
employed in the organization, containment and control of this residual and spectral 
influence, the means of which would lend both definition and desirability to the 
architectural and specifically domestic. 
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 The commodification of silence within architecture would not become possible until 
the early decades of the twentieth century, when substantial research and industrial 
investment was made following the pioneering work of the physicist Wallace Sabine. 
Sabine, who between 1895 and 1897 undertook a sustained period of experimentation in 
order to rectify ‘acoustical difficulties in the lecture-room of the Fogg Art Museum’, 
founded what would come to be known as the science of architectural acoustics.152 The 
application of materials possessing differing absorption coefficients to an otherwise 
reflective surface would allow for the sculpting of internal acoustics and the retention of 
harmonic complexity characterizing distinct signals and the possibility of their recognition. 
Of particular interest, however, is an experiment carried out by Sabine some years after this 
catalytic period, detailing a certain architectural contingency and the potentials of auditory 
spatial determination. In an effort to better understand the propagation and resulting 
alteration of a sound source within architectural confines, Sabine, in 1910, mapped the 
distribution of sound intensity within the Constant Temperature Room of the Jefferson 
Physical Laboratory at Harvard University. A constant sound source, in this instance an 
electrically driven tuning fork, was placed in the Constant Temperature Room and 
monitored by a telephone receiver mechanically driven in a continuous spiral motion 
around the room at a fixed height, allowing Sabine to chart localized regions of greater and 
lesser intensity.  
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Figure 2 : Wallace Sabine's mapping of the auditory excitation of the Constant Temperature Room at the 
Jefferson Physical Laboratory, Harvard University. 
 
The image produced by Sabine shows the contours and distribution of sound intensity 
within the room’s confines, an aural topography of a very localized and regulated 
soundscape. As a two dimensional reduction of a more complex spatio-temporal dynamic 
or propagation, this experiment reveals something of the depth of Sabine’s interest in 
auditory spatial relations,  not only concerned with quietude and the silencing of space—as 
would become prevalent with the commercialization and industrialization of his findings, 
measures which made possible the commodification of silence and the production of a 
hushed homogeneity—but with sound as a material component in the construction, 
perception and morphology of the architectonic. Were this experiment to have been 
repeated at differing heights and the various results consolidated in the production of a 
three-dimensional image, pockets or bubbles of differing intensity would be shown filling 
the room. While it has been suggested that Sabine was not entirely comfortable with the 
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map or the means by which it was produced, it nevertheless serves as clear example of his 
thinking of sound in spatial terms. Of further interest is the analogy made by Sabine 
relating this acoustical map with those produced by the geodetic surveys.153 Where geodesy 
is concerned with the mapping and representation of the earth as variable environment in 
constant although mostly imperceptible flux, through the monitoring of crustal motion, 
tides and polar motion for example, Sabine’s mapping of sound intensity distribution 
represents architectural space as a morphological environment. The peaks and troughs of 
Sabine’s diagram show the contours of a physical environment in flux, rendered stable, 
quantifiable and consistent only through graphical representation afforded by the constancy 
of the laboratory environment. We find in Sabine’s work the beginnings of a focused 
awareness of auditory dynamics and the morphology of architectonic space, of a sound that 
sets space in motion. Here the geometrical concerns of architectural design are set in 
motion according to the unfolding of material temporalities, vibrations and waveforms. We 
see an understanding of the spatial propagation of sound as constituting peaks and troughs, 
zones of intensity and their dissipation, a physical environment that at once produces space 
through its displacements and distortion while being interwoven and reliant upon its 
architectural host. 
 The contours of a sound-space rendered visible in Sabine’s mappings reveal a 
morphological and otherwise invisible topology that is ordinarily neglected and, if 
considered at all, identified only according to negative problematics. What Sabine revealed 
was an invisible and shifting field of influence within architectonic space, one which 
impacts upon communication, spatial perception and a broad bandwidth of behaviour 
falling under the influence of spatio-temporal determinations. These catalytic engagements 
with the problematics of auditory space would be subject to extensive reduction and 
normalization in their industrial application, an application that would lead to a prevailing 
acoustic homogeneity within urban developments through the silencing of space.154 Signal 
would become grounded in silence—as it would within the acoustic ecology of later 
years—as discretion, clarity and the efficiency of communication became the primary 
concerns for a given domain. 
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 Throughout the early twentieth century increases in urban occupancy, high-rise 
structures and densely packed populations, together with a culture increasingly concerned 
with efficiency, engendered a desire for quietude through acoustic isolation. This would be 
realized in the architectural embedding of insulated and therefore isolated environments 
within the city. The implications of this practice of spatial silencing are developed in the 
history of acoustic engineering developed at length by Emily Thompson. Throughout the 
1920s, developments in architectural acoustics initiated the construction of a ‘modern 
sound’ that existed in stark contrast to that being developed simultaneously in what would 
become canonical artistic practice: this ‘modern sound’ was one of incremental silencing. 
Increased desire for the efficient transmission of sound throughout both the home and 
professional workplace required the ever-greater suppression of environmental noise. This 
entailed not only the noise without, that of the street, construction, weather and so on, but 
also that supplementary noise that occurred within the built environment, the sound of 
space itself. The identification and eradication of reverbs through the use of specifically 
designed sound-absorbing materials performed an erasure of the auditory impressions of 
space, the reverberations constituting an auditory site specificity and determination. The 
efficient and clear proliferation of speech within the home and workplace was attained at 
the cost of incidental environmental noise and the possible perception of audible 
architectural determination. If, as was noted in relation to LaBelle’s ‘Architecture of 
Noise’, the perception and engagement with the means of determination through a certain 
abrasive participation or interaction can be understood to allow a degree of ideological 
critique and awareness, the silencing of space entails the becoming imperceptible of its 
determinations and influence, an imperceptibility that marks the efficiency of an ideological 
edifice through its apparent transparency or neutrality. Driving this erasure and influential 
imperceptibility were the requirements of efficient communication and the eradication of 
distractions from the workplace. Insofar as space was heard to impinge upon the signifier, 
the voice and instruction, or to hinder the dedication of attention, the attainment of an ever 
more efficient acoustic communication would require that the connection between sound 
and space be severed: 
In a culture preoccupied with noise and efficiency, reverberation 
became just another form of noise, an unnecessary sound that was 
inefficient and best eliminated [...] When reverberation was 
reconceived as noise, it lost its traditional meaning as the acoustic 
signature of a space, and the age-old connection between sound and 
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space—a connection as old as architecture itself—was severed. 
Reverberation connected sound and space through the element of 
time, and its loss was just one element in a larger cultural matrix of 
modernity dedicated to the destruction of traditional time-space 
relationships.155 
Thompson’s account of the silencing of space sets out from the position of a sound-space 
relationship that within a third of a century would be severed, a severance that would be 
made complete and irreconcilable through the synthesis of space made possible by electro-
acoustic installations—the apparatus of ‘schizophonia’. Yet what we find in Thompson’s 
text is a trajectory towards the dissolution of unified and legible sound-space relations, 
rather than that of sound-space relations per se. With the introduction of electro-acoustic 
installations and, by the same token, the potential for the synthetic production of sound-
space it is the necessity of legibility and linear causality that is severed in making space for 
the production of auditory illusions, connections, subtractions and spatial reconfigurations 
that do not find equivalence between the eye and the ear. The necessary correlation of 
auditory space and architectural delimitation would cease to be so closely bound, 
permitting auditory experience to operate in excess of visual delimitation, forcing a 
disjunction of the senses, a problematization of common sense and the particular exercise 
of audition. It is under such circumstances that sound becomes most influential, operating 
as a distorter through disjunction, sound-itself exciting a particular more than a common 
sense. Yet, prior to electroacoustic scission, can we not identify within the experience of 
architecture a further disjunction between sound-space relations, particularly that of the 
concordance and legibility between the auditory and visual. While reverberation may 
function as the auditory signature or impression of a space and its material conditions, its 
may also operate as the agent of a spatial distortion of, rather, disjunction through the 
perception of a space heard to be in excess of or divergent from that which is seen. Most 
common perhaps is the perception of a space whose auditory expression appears to extend 
‘beyond’ or in excess of visual delimitation due to the intensity of a space’s reverberations. 
156 A space may also appear to the ear as too small when compared to what is perceived by 
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commonsense. See Matteo Melioli, ‘Inhabiting Soundscape’ in Colin Ripley, Marco Polo and Arthur 
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the eye, again forcing a disjunction within spatial perception wherein the space heard 
appears apart from that which is seen. Within a large and reverberant space, a particular 
spot beneath an arch or dome may yield reflections and reverb times more commonly 
experienced in small rooms, creating an auditory perception of intimacy that is in 
discordance with what is seen. Rather than unified spatial perception according to common 
sense, defined as such through the concordance of the senses, we can identify in sound and 
these exceptional appearances the potential for a deformation or distortion of spatial 
perception through the exercise of a particular sense disjunct from another. Prior to 
electroacoustic synthesis and scission we can identify in certain and usually exceptional 
instances of the architectonic—cathedrals, caves, archways, entrance halls and more subtle 
and peculiar divergences from the domestic or professional norm—an instrument forcing a 
disjunction within spatial perception that rather than severing the relation between sound 
and space amplifies a difference between the senses. Anterior to electroacoustic 
schizophonia we can identify the sonorous distortion or disjunction of spatial coherence 
within the architectonic, an ambiguity or confusion that precedes a scission. Such 
differences within spatial perception are nonetheless distinct from the erasure of spatial 
conditions and contingencies towards its apparent transparency or neutrality, insofar as this 
difference and discordance brings the perception of architectonic determination to the fore, 
revealing its otherwise subtle influence. Such disjunctions contrast with the imperceptible 
influence of modernity’s anti-spaces and non-places comprising an architectonic apparatus 
of efficiency. 
 The ‘silent anti-space’ of modern architecture would isolate the individual from the 
noise without and eventually the difference within, increasingly closing them off from the 
auditory environment and the activity of which it is comprised.157 Where the noise of the 
world could not be suppressed and became unbearable, modern architecture could offer 
quiet sanctuary within the confines of private property; the self would come to be 
increasingly individualized in silence, in an embedded auditory space or silent spatial insert. 
This focus on maximizing efficiency by canceling out all unnecessary noise led to what 
Thompson has identified as the acoustic homogenization of architectural space or what she 
refers to as the ‘soundscape of modernity’, a historical process that finds parallels in the 
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thermodynamic history of architecture detailed by Fernández-Galiano. Yet here I wish to 
draw out comparison with another critical history of auditory space that is concerned with 
an overlapping time frame: the interrelated histories of audile technique and individualized 
sound-space put forward by Jonathan Sterne. 
 Concerned with the period between 1900 and 1933, Thompson’s account is one of a 
progressive silencing and erasure of auditory space towards homogeneous discretion—the 
latter being, in McLuhan’s terms, characteristic of ‘visual’ space—that charts a trajectory of 
architectural production and the compartmentalization of private space according to spatial 
ideologies espoused by capitalist logics of efficiency. Through the silencing of space the 
mutable, confused, continuous and decentred would become subject to the discrete, to that 
which was visually set apart and centred around the singular, linear perspective of the 
observer; architecture would increasingly become a visually dominated art. This charting of 
the eradication of acoustic signatures from private space is both enabled and bound by 
practices of, on the one hand, manipulating construction materials in support of efficient 
communication and, on the other, the electro-acoustic synthesis of space enabled by the 
mechanisms of reproduction and transmission. Thompson, therefore, sets out from the 
noise of the world, from the notion of acoustic space as a problematic, enveloping 
assemblage, and charts a trajectory towards a notion of private space that tends towards 
silent discretion. This tendency towards silence is, as has already been said, driven by a 
capitalistic logic of efficiency that locates ideal, bureaucratic productivity in a practice of 
‘silent running’. Jonathan Sterne, on the other hand, assumes what at first appears to be a 
different set of prerequisites in providing a model for the production of private acoustic 
space and its relation to a more collective and clamorous audition. Where Thompson sets 
out from a position of spatial considerations prior to technical reproduction, from a 
historical situation which was responding to the problematic noise of world and city at 
large, Sterne’s detailing of auditory privatization, built upon a history of sound 
reproduction, is necessarily bound to the synthetic production of auditory space, a position 
that, as we shall see, assumes a prior isolation from the noise of the world. In focusing on 
techniques and technologies of telecommunication, reproduction and consumption, the 
auditory spaces Sterne considers—most notably built around differing models of 
headphonic space—are necessarily set out from the romanticized immanence and 
authenticity of an overly naturalized acoustic ecology. Where Thompson, initially at least, 
sets out from a consideration of the noise of the world, with what has traditionally been 
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referred to as the ‘soundscape’, Sterne begins with its patiently listening subjects, the 
subjects of the ‘schizophonic’ world. It is in Sterne’s discussion of the development of 
audile technique that notions of the private come most clearly to the fore. Audile technique, 
as a trained and focused listening is of great importance to Sterne’s argument, a refined 
practice that constitutes both a technique of listening and a process of individuation,  
shaping and refashioning subjective perception and the information of identity. Sterne sets 
audile technique apart from listening and, in particular, hearing as inherent capacities. 
Referring to a trained or developed listening practice, audile technique is largely the reserve 
of those for whom listening technique is applied as labor; Sterne identifies the telegraph 
operator and medical doctor as such practitioners, but we can also add musicians, sound 
engineers, music critics, musicologists and many others to a wider field of auditory 
workers. We should also add to this list those for whom listening does not inform 
professional identity but a more specifically social, individualized identity: the audiophile 
for whom listening is an active process in the construction of self identity, the ‘discerning’ 
listener or musical consumer for whom the identification of sonic details constitutes an 
individualizing event, setting them apart from less attentive others. Audile technique is the 
informative listening practice of subjects of the analytical ear. Sterne describes the 
development of audile technique across a period of approximately 170 years, between 1760 
and 1930, a history that follows developments in both medical listening practices and sound 
reproduction technologies. It is in dealing with a period stretching from 1810 to around 
1925 that Sterne provides a history of the production of what we can refer to as headphonic 
space, an auditory space characterized as particularly individualized and personal. This 
history sets out by focusing in particular upon technique that developed alongside the 
introduction of the stethoscope in to medical listening practice and details how the 
headphonic space it produces stretches into the twentieth century through the development 
of the hi-fi headset, and so it will be according to an apparent anachronism that we will 
come to assert that the headphonic space described by Sterne in many ways assumes the 
quiet ‘soundscape of modernity’ that Thompson provides an account of. This anachronism 
is resolved, however, through referring once again to Picker’s study of the Victorian era, in 
which the production of private and personal territories through the architectural tactics of 
auditory spatial contestation details the soundscape of an earlier period in modernity, 
preceding that discussed by Thompson and contributing to its cultural conditions.  
 Where audile technique would, through the use of the stethoscope, be developed to 
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suit the professional requirements of medical practitioners, so to the professional identity of 
the listening subject is shaped in relation to their objects of interest; techniques of listening 
beneath the skin develop the perceptual apparatus and the information of the self; the noise 
of organs brought into proximity with the ear creates an intimate space that nonetheless 
spans bodies, an acoustic continuum stretching between the bodies of patient and doctor. 
Brought to the fore through the use of the stethoscope, such inter-somatic acoustic spaces 
are revealed within the individualized confines of headphonic space, a space that is both 
alien and intimate, and in most cases unattainable to the patient. In the decoding or binding 
of bodily noises a professional identity is defined, the patient looks to the medical 
practitioner for meaning, for the meaning of their own body’s noises, to the medium by 
which the sound becomes sign. Drawn from noisy obscurity, auditory information is 
offered to the listening subject within the boundaries of highly personalized and 
individualizing headphonic space. The impact of such listening techniques, as well as the 
auditory spaces they construct, upon perception can be discerned from Sterne’s account of 
mediate auscultation—a discussion that gives shape to the listening practices of medical 
professionals—which as the following excerpt shows revealed an affective acoustic terrain 
allowing new subjective impressions and streams of individuating events: 
Mediate auscultation refers to the practice of listening to movements 
inside the body with the aid of an instrument. [Auscultation] picked 
up specifically medical connotations at the turn of the nineteenth 
century as the activity of listening to sound of movements of organs, 
air, and fluid in the chest. In fact, auscultation already involved a 
notion of listening as active (vs. passive) hearing […] later writings 
would simply use auscultation to refer to listening to the body 
through a stethoscope—mediation was always assumed.158 
The acquisition of listening techniques reveals not only otherwise imperceptible signal 
content but the terrain of an expanded individuating environment, it contributes to the 
shaping of a space in which listening practices influence an emergent field of events 
contributing to the conditioning of personal identities. A technique that individuates the 
listener, in this case the medical practitioner, as such, occurs in a space inclusive of the 
body of another, a space which reaches inside the body of the patient as object of attention 
and extends into that of the auditor. Rather than necessarily constituting a unified or holistic 
auditory space between patient and doctor, that produced through auscultation reveals a 
                                                
158 Sterne, Audible Past, 99-100. 
 121 
body set apart from itself, regions isolated and revealed only to the ear of the auditor, a 
continuum established between the auditor and the patient body, a body that is set apart 
from the patient through the critical function of audile technique which renders the ear as 
capable of scission as the eye. The noise of the body’s interior is transmitted into that of the 
listener, a listening practice that determines the relational continuum established between 
bodies as an individuating auditory space. Where Thompson’s account of architectonic 
silencing describes a process of increasing individualization in silence through architectural 
and acoustic conditioning, Sterne’s focus on the technologies of sound reproduction details 
individualization according to private audition and consumption of informative sound, and 
therefore an individual located amidst signal and noise, tuning to the subtle noises of distant 
transmissions, organic or otherwise, as a means of divining signal content. Set apart from 
the noise of the world according to the architectural tactics constitutive of a bourgeois 
modern soundscape, the listening subject informed by audile technique goes in search of 
new bodies of noise, generative sites of confusion capable of reinstating the productive 
displacements of sound unbound. The positioning of the listening subject within 
headphonic territory to a certain extent assumes the prior cancellation of the ‘immanent’ 
noise of the world—through both architectural and electro-acoustic isolation in 
headphones—allowing the listening subject to set about the construction of another.159 The 
spaces constructed through headphonic listening considered by Sterne assume a prior state 
of isolation that is detailed by Thompson, the silencing envelope of domestic, professional 
and personalized spaces in which the refined listening practices associated with audile 
technique can take place. It is within the hushed confines of architectonic bodies 
constructed around the bourgeois ideals of professionalism that such a listening practice can 
start to take shape. In both Sterne and Thompson’s accounts we find descriptions of a 
process whereby sound-space is rendered abstract, set out from the world only as it appears, 
of sound-spaces cut out from that which is, in a hopelessly romanticized model, present to 
the unindustrialized ear. In a passage that would seem to echo the spatial concerns 
expressed by Thompson, Sterne states that ‘space occupied by sound becomes something to 
be formed, molded, oriented, and made useful for the purposes of listening techniques. It 
can be segmented, made cellular, cut into pieces, and reassembled’—descriptions that add 
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depth to the potential for privatization that necessarily complicates McLuhan’s notion of 
auditory space.160 Here sound contributes to the plasticity of space otherwise considered 
abstract or empty according to visual perception and static in its given form. Sound is 
described as deforming space in time, complicating a perceived homogeneity according to 
the contours of its unfolding envelopes. Auditory space embodies a certain plasticity which, 
with suitably nurtured audile technique, can be given shape as much as it creates it, and 
from which one can come to discern meaning; such plasticity, it would seem, also reveals 
an innate capacity for synthesis and composition, a dynamic flexibility that, as with any 
matter, lies openly susceptible to commodification whereby ‘acoustic space becomes a kind 
of bourgeois private space’.161 Such vicissitudes of sound-space, being subject to 
mechanisms of segmentation and reproduction, continuity and scission, concern both 
Thompson and Sterne, the former with an architectonic silencing and compartmentalization 
that forms a prerequisite, ‘prior, private’ for the reproductions, transmissions and 
consequent consumptions that concern the latter. The differing theoretical trajectories 
towards individualized sound-space and notions of the private put forward by Thompson 
and Sterne are of particular interest due to their positioning of the subjects of sound-space. 
In addition to the complementary resonances I have attempted to outline above, concerned 
as we are with uncovering something of the theoretical ground or pre-requisite assumptions 
necessary for the consistency of these models of individuation and individualization in 
sound-space, is Sterne’s assertion that ‘collectivity is entered through this prior, private 
auditory space’.162 Such a position asserts a ‘prior, private’ space as given, yet it is the 
conditions of the given that we have so far been concerned with addressing, whereby sound 
and space are understood as produced as opposed to given, and so it is to both the 
conditions and consequences of this assertion that we should turn. 
 Taken as a prerequisite of collectivity is a cultural notion of private space that 
prefigures collective experience—that asserted by or constructed within the soundscape of 
modernity. This assumption poses a problem to the theory of individuation I have been 
outlining thus far, which has focused on the primacy of the conditions of such 
individualized, personal space as opposed to the primacy of such space in itself. Such an 
approach poses a prior collectivity in the form of diverse material assemblages and  a 
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model of sonic articulation that addresses a complex of individuals ahead of personalized 
privatism. In addition, rather than taking perception as given, assuming a model of 
subjective empiricism as the means by which to grasp a wider ‘collective’ acoustic field, 
the approach taken has been to consider the conditions of such things, what we might in 
reference to Sterne’s assumption of a prior, private subjectivity, call an approach to that by 
which the given is given as such. This approach is necessitated by practices so far and yet 
to be considered, practices that function according to the assumption of a resonant capacity 
and physicality anterior to act of listening. Through reference to such practices, the 
emphasis placed on the material impact of sound in relation to its subjective influence 
necessitates that we take the notion of a personalized, ‘prior, private’ space as secondary—
yet nonetheless real as opposed to simply passive or superficial—to such matters of 
influence, as a subtractive binding of an anterior continuum or connectivity. Sterne’s 
argument, setting out from the position of the already individualized subject is proximal 
with a certain primacy of the conscious self that my own approach seeks to move beyond 
through recourse to different matters of individuation and modalities of interpellation. That 
one must be always already individualized in order to enter into the collective experience of 
sound is at odds with the notion that such individualized experience arises from a prior 
complex or impersonal collectivity determined as such through resonant capacities, that 
sound phenomena addresses bodies, any body, ahead of the self and ahead of listening. Yet 
to be done with Sterne’s argument at this stage and on these grounds would be to overlook 
the intricacies and importance of his argument. In turning to the conditions of Sterne’s 
asserted ‘prior, private’ space, anterior to collectivity, we find that this notion is 
necessitated by Sterne’s focus on the cultural conditions of sound reproduction and 
dissemination as opposed to a theory of sonorous individuation per se. This ‘prior, private’ 
state is, as Sterne points out, a prerequisite of technicity and technique engendered and 
controlled by capitalist modes of production and consumption, it is essential for the 
successful commodification of sound. As Sterne puts it:  
It is true that people often listened together to sound recordings and, 
later, to radio shows. Yet even these collective modes of listening 
already assumed a preexisting “privatized” acoustic space that could 
be brought back to a collective realm […] the construction of 
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acoustic space as private space is in fact a precondition for the 
commodification of sound.163 
It is the construction of private acoustic space that is described in the histories provided by 
Thompson and Picker, accounts of personal struggle against the noise of the world, that 
constitute the preconditions of the individualizations discussed by Sterne. The territories 
claimed through architectural tactics construct the conditions of a personal proxemics 
defined according to a minimal degree of quietude setting apart a space for thought, 
constituting the conditions of individualizing processes, the spaces in which the audile 
techniques described by Sterne can be practiced and take effect. It is within such spaces and 
through the acquisition of such techniques that listening practices are described as giving 
shape to self and a particularly bourgeois identity. It is this process, this chain of events that 
is mapped out here as a coupling of sound-space and listening techniques that constitutes an 
individuating environment. It is where listening techniques are considered in a similar 
fashion that Sterne’s argument is of particular interest: ‘Beyond its privileging of sonic 
details, audile technique is based on the individuation of the listener. The auditory field 
produced through technicized listening […] becomes a kind of personal space’.164 A 
personal, individuating territory is established in the coupling and resulting tensions 
between architectural conditions and listening practices, a territory that shifts with changes 
in conditions and developments in practice, ongoing developments that attest to 
individuation as an process rather than a singular event of subject formation. Of obvious 
importance to the current argument is Sterne’s account of individuating sound-space for the 
contribution it makes to a broader theory of sonorous individuation and the detail with 
which it attends to the conditions and impressions of headphonic space with regard to its 
listening subjects; yet what we find in the above passage is an example of a certain 
confusion between notions of individuation and individualization that I would like to 
subject to some scrutiny. In Sterne’s text we find numerous accounts of the privatization 
and personalization of auditory space, spatial productions that are driven by audile 
techniques performing a critical function through modes of isolated and abstracted 
listening. Such descriptions—Sterne’s discussion of the impacts of mediate auscultation for 
example—provide invaluable accounts of individualized spaces, the personal spaces of 
professional and listening subjects, spaces active in interpersonal distinction according to 
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class, professionalism and identity. In Sterne’s examples we see how such spaces are 
brought into being only by the possibility of their mediation, through the development of 
technical objects that make possible certain relations, between ear and organ or 
geographically distant people. Yet in creating the possibility of such relations the further 
individualization of the related subjects, objects or organs is also brought about. Sticking 
with Sterne’s example of mediate auscultation we can discern the way in which the 
invention of a means of informative relation and mediation is implicated in changes in 
listening practices and professional identities. Let us take as an example the trainee medical 
professional embarking on the necessary acquisition of audile technique enabled through 
the invention of the stethoscope. Gilbert Simondon describes concisely how such a process 
of learning can be taken as synonymous with a process of individualization: ‘Because in an 
apprenticeship a man forms habits, gestures, and ways of doing things, which enable him to 
use the many and various tools demanded by the whole of an operation, his apprenticeship 
leads him to technical self-individualization. He becomes the associated milieu of different 
tools he uses’.165 To learn to listen is to enter into a process of individualization and self 
definition. The relational space established between, in the case of auscultation, listener and 
organ constitutes a space in which the individualization of the listener is performed, the 
individuated subject undergoing a ‘restructuration’ which, as a process of individualization, 
enables the emergence of its professional and symbolic identity.                            
 Sterne places an emphasis throughout his work upon the cultural conditions and 
impacts of sound reproduction, upon the circuit of reciprocal determination engendered 
between listening subject and media. The contemporary practices with which we will come 
to concern ourselves more thoroughly—and to which the work of Sterne, Thompson and 
Picker provide a historical framework against which their difference is asserted—takes as 
its primary site of influence that of a physical affectivity and somatic resonant capacity. 
The influence and impact that such practices assert assumes a primary somatic capture or 
reduction ahead of its psychical and subjective restructuration as well as its culturally 
negotiated meaning. The way into the subject is not considered to be primarily semantic but 
rather considered as passage through the opening of an affective and resonant capacity that 
persists in excess and as a point of confusion of that which comes to be determined 
according to the operations of symbolic efficacy. As was stated at the beginning of this text, 
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the work considered herein, especially that of Bain, Lucier and Kirkegaard, articulates itself 
through and takes aim not only at the affective sonorities that function ahead of their 
semantic reduction and extension but at the conditions of sound itself. Such orientations 
concern themselves with the spatial productions wherein sonorous individualization 
becomes possible, with the necessary conditions of an informative audile technique; as such 
they express a more particular notion of sonorous individuation as opposed to audile 
individualization, taking aim at the conditions of both sound and listening ahead of the 
further complexity brought into play by both. What we find in Sterne’s account of an 
individuated personal space, is rather the individuation of the individuated, in being a 
function of the personal this individualizing spatial production determines a certain 
professionally identity according to a refined audile technique and the instruments of 
auscultation. The refinement of listening constitutes a restructuration of hearing towards the 
production of identity. As we are concerned with the extent to which sound is productive of 
individuating spaces, not only spaces in which sound is active in individualizations—a 
notion which positions space as an often neutral or empty backdrop—we require an 
approach to sound that accounts for the production of the impersonal potentials of sound-
space, the productive and influential background noise against which individualizing 
auditory practices can be performed in the production of personal space—this latter stage in 
subjectification being well described by Sterne. By focusing on sonic practices inclusive of 
the conditions of sound, practices that address the potentials of both hearing and listening, 
we require a concept of individuation that also addresses such conditions, a concept that 
addresses the transcendent conditions of auditory spaces rendered as such within the 
complex act of audition. It is for this reason that, in clarifying the differences between the 
arguments concerned with the influence of sound-space put forward by Sterne and 
Thompson from my own, a distinction must be made between the closely related and 
overlapping notions of individuation and individualization. Where this argument is 
concerned with individuation, if too close an association is made between this and the 
notion of individualization, then the scope of this argument would have to be limited to that 
of perception and empiricism. An understanding of sound as influential at an impersonal 
and even inaudible level, as being influential in the states of bodies in the broadest sense, 
requires a theory of individuation that addresses not only the formation of identity and 
personal perceptions but their conditions. To this end we can turn to the work of Gilbert 
Simondon who makes this distinction most clearly. 
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 Simondon identifies two stages of individuation, the first of which accounts for the 
individuation of individuals—understood as that which exceeds, underpins or is otherwise 
not wholly enveloped by the self or I—or the production of bodies. It is this stage of 
production that addresses what I have been referring to as the impersonal and allows for the 
development of a theory of sonorous individuation that understands sound as being 
influential within the conditions of identity. Coupled to this is a ‘second stage’ that 
accounts for personalization or individualization, the individuation of the individuated—a 
notion that I believe can be more closely aligned with Sterne’s argument. To a certain 
extent we can think of these two stages as accounting for the production of bodies and the 
production of selves respectively yet without discretion, interactive influences at the levels 
of a background and foreground. Yet asserting too clean a distinction at this point brings 
this argument into proximity with a reductive dualism. While a distinction is nonetheless 
made, these stages are not conceived of as separate but interrelated, coupled and 
complementary, rather than being discrete and superimposed. These two stages are, as 
Steve Shaviro has pointed out, equivalent to the Kantian a priori transcendental subject and 
the a posteriori empirical subject, respectively.166 We must, however, take this equivalence 
as being in a sense after Deleuze and therefore as referring to a notion of the transcendental 
that defines the conditions of being as opposed to atemporal, immutable ideality. 
Individuation, therefore, defines the processual production of bodies, individuals, somatic 
complexes, of being in intensity; individualization is taken as referring to a mode of 
personalzation, selfhood,  the ‘I’ that exists in accordance with a necessary interpersonal 
alterity. Here it is perhaps necessary to state once again that we are dealing with processes, 
in the former the constant development and deformation of bodies, and in the later an 
ongoing restructuration of the self according to the potentials of it material conditions. This 
interrelation can be made clearer with reference to Simondon’s consideration of psychic 
operations:  
psychic individuation is rather an individualization than an 
individuation […] [Individualization] needs the support of the living 
being already individuated to develop psychic operations that are not 
separate from vital operations but rather, after the initial 
individuation which provides a living being its origin, there can be 
within the unity of this individual being two different functions, that 
are not superimposed, but one (functionally) connected with the 
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other as the individual is connected with an associated milieu […] 
the physiological and the psychic are like the individual and the 
complement of the individual at the time a system is individuated. 
Individualization, which is the individuation of individuated being, 
resulting from an individuation, creates a new structuration within 
the individual […] thought is like the individual of the individual, 
while the body is the associated milieu complementary to thought 
[…] Psychosomatic unity is, before individualization, homogeneous 
unity; after individualization, it becomes a functional and relational 
unity.167 
This notion of thought that for Simondon is ‘like the individual of the individual’ is taken 
as being equivalent with a personalized thought. This is to be taken as contrasting with the 
much broader notion of thought as an ‘elemental consciousness’ constitutive of being that 
we find in Deleuze, a concept that sees thought extended beyond the I into a broader field 
of material relations. Insofar as the appearance of conscious thought is, in the above 
excerpt, not something but of something is it associated with a ‘second stage’ of 
individuation—individualization—whereby the self identifies itself as being a body, a 
named and identifiable subject. A distinction is made between the notions of the individual 
and the person, the latter being described as the complement of the individual or the 
individuation of the individuated. Here we once again delimit a notion of dyadic 
individuality, or ‘bisubstantialism’ to use Simondon’s broader term, that is described in the 
difference between individuation and individualization, or the individual and the personal, 
encapsulated within functional and relational psychosomatic unity. As there is a 
dependence between the interrelated stages of individuation and individualization, there is 
also a dependence between these constitutive modes of psychosomatic being and what 
Simondon refers to as its ‘associated milieu’, the ‘background’ of the individual 
constituting its ‘virtual’ conditions. We can formulate these interrelations more concisely 
as:  
(associated milieu-(individuation-individualization)) 
 
Appearing both against and amidst a background or environment—what Simondon refers 
to as an associated milieu—is the individual who’s unity is understood as being comprised 
of two reciprocally determining functions: individuation and individualization. On the 
subject of the individualization of technical objects Simondon provides a clear description 
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of what is meant by the term associated milieu: ‘Such individualization is possible because 
of the recurrence of causality in the environment which the technical being creates around 
itself, an environment which it influences and by which it is influenced. This environment, 
which is as the same time natural and technical, can be called the associated milieu’.168 The 
notion of an interactive influence is seen to be essential to the associated milieu and its 
interrelation with the differing modes of individuation and individualization in instigating a 
reciprocity that avoids this model being reduced to one of linear determinism; the 
environment which surrounds the individual is not conceived in a reductively deterministic 
manner but in terms of a necessary interaction through a more complex engagement with 
the ideology of influence. This environment is not simply given but produced around and in 
part by the individual. While the individuating environment is comprised of matters and 
events in excess of the individual they give shape to and influence the individual as they 
pass through, impress themselves upon and are contracted within it. The presence of the 
individual in turn gives shape to its individuating environment by complicating the flow of 
matter and the occurrence of events within this environment, therefore complicating the 
potentials of its own individuation. Where an individual stakes a claim over an 
environment, defining a territory around a body through its expressions and appendages, a 
territory which constitutes its associated milieu, we find at the edge of this territory, defined 
along blurred, confused, ambiguous and transient lines, the somatic complexes defining 
other individuals and territorial assemblages. 
 Being primarily concerned with a concept of sonorous individuation distinct from 
individualization, attention is given primarily to the affectivity of a background noise, 
considered as a primary state of confusion anterior to the ‘prior, private’ auditory space 
through which interpersonal, collective audition is entered into in Sterne’s account of 
auditory spatial production and the cultural conditions of listening practice. This notion of 
background noise posits an impersonal collectivity and confusion anterior to the 
architectonically supported privacy or personal territoriality defined through quietude or a 
minimal degree of auditory control and organization, a confusion within which the 
individual who hears is embedded yet from which the listening subject distances itself. 
While this notion of background noise suggests a subtle influence by way of auditory 
capacities, these informative and influential sonorous matters are not necessarily assigned 
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to the background of experience according to their amplitude or ambience, but rather 
according to their being articulated towards, or ‘interpellation’ of, individual receptivity, to 
the body as membrane and primary site of sensory filtration or subtraction that constitutes 
the base conditions of audile technique and the determination of the objects of a personal 
proxemics. It is in this way that sonorous individuation is thought to operate according to 
the determinations of background noise and the structuration of a primary collective and 
impersonal confusion. Background noise defines an impersonal continuity of auditory 
space, as such it constitutes the potential conditions of auditory proxemics, that which must 
subsist anterior to the definition of personal space. Background noise subsists in excess of 
proxemic determination, insofar as this is understood in a manner concomitant with Hall’s 
definition of proxemics as ‘the use of space as a specialized elaboration of culture’, the 
determination of a mutable territorial sensibility through interpersonal interaction and 
according to distinctly cultural conditions.169 Proxemic determination as the activity of 
personal territorial delimitation is—insofar as we are primarily concerned with auditory 
space—taken to be an operation of the critical and analytical ear, of the ear which aids 
distinction and distanciation, in setting the self apart from others. Background noise is that 
against which proxemic space is asserted, it is that within which the personal sets its self 
apart or ‘hollows’ out a territory through organization, containment and contraction, 
through the establishment of thresholds of perception that maintain or reinforce a minimal 
distance. As the immanent conditions of such distinctions and territorial determinations, 
background noise is that which persists despite the establishment of perceptual and spatial 
thresholds, that which allows for their determination or assertion as such as well as their 
confusion and dissolution. It is this potential that is played upon in works that take aim at 
an inescapable audition, works that are articulated through the excitation of inherent 
resonant capacities ahead of their cultural coding and proxemic determination. Such 
approaches do not efface nor negate the importance of the symbolic, semantic, and broad 
cultural conditions of personal space described by the theory of proxemics, but rather 
address that which subsists in excess of these interpersonal determinations and 
delimitations, taking the mutability acknowledged in proxemic research as opening beyond 
the symbolic, as an indication that the strictly interpersonal—taken to be the limitation of 
the notion of culture to the strictly human—need not be considered all. Background noise 
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names an inescapable immanence that is assailed in proxemic assertion, according to the 
necessary delimitation of minimal threshold supportive of alterity, yet that which 
nonetheless persists in the determination of an individual confusion. 
 Insofar as proxemics describes the cultural determination of personal space, the 
spatial considerations undertaken herein seek to expand the range of proxemic investigation 
through consideration of the individual as distinct yet inseparable from the personal, and a 
notion of culture not restricted to that of humans. On this latter point, in establishing that 
cultural territorial thresholds are not only set by human bodies but other objects, by 
anybody, we can once again refer to Truax’s definition of the acoustic community as ‘any 
system in which acoustic information is exchanged’, an understanding which extends the 
scope of ecological praxis well beyond the domain of humanity.170 In a similar gesture, 
what is considered to constitute the cultural conditions of personal space must be expanded 
in order to include a wider field of objective determination and territorial influence, taking 
into account the impact of the impersonal and inhuman within the delimitation of the 
personal. Where we count the auditory among such objects as a matter of spatial 
determination, where we are concerned with the impact of sonority upon space, place and 
territory, this expansion must be allowed to continue through an opening of the audible 
event onto its inaudible conditions, those objects and events that populate the larger 
complex of its ‘associated milieu’, the field of inaudible noise that is engaged with in an 
expanded and inverted acoustic ecology attending to both the human and inhuman 
populations of affective and individuating field situations. 
 The ecological approach outlined in chapter one is here confused with Hall’s 
cultural proxemics in the outlining of an expanded field situation that takes into account a 
complex of bodies and objects, inclusive of the sound object, that contribute to the 
conditioning of personal and impersonal space, therefore constituting a certain architectonic 
agency through their irradiating spatial productions and deformations. 
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The Semblance of Immateriality 
 
In considering an expanding field of architectonic objects and materiality through 
consideration of the spatial determinations of sonority, we encroach upon a territory in 
which spatial production is not the reserve of the architect, nor, for that matter, that of the 
human; the agents of spatial production are more readily found to reside in the air and 
earth, within the temporality of matter. Many matters that can be considered dynamic or 
subject to temporal determination in their spatial productions can be found listed and 
alphabetized within Jonathan Hill’s ‘Index of Immaterial Architecture’.171 Hill intends for 
this text to be more of an introduction than a manifesto in its provision of a broad 
contextual outline to what is a complex subject, so it could perhaps be considered 
overzealous to linger on the peculiarities of Hill’s argument. Nonetheless, at the core of the 
text is an appreciation of matters so close to the heart of the current argument that to 
overlook their inclusion within an inventory of immaterial matters would be something of 
an oversight. The subject matters of Hill’s text exist in intimate proximity with those 
considered herein, but where their theoretical elaboration is concerned our two positions are 
nothing less than polarized. It is because of the distinction that such intimate opposition 
enables that I wish to consider it in some detail here. 
  The materials constituting Hill’s index are in many cases perceivably dynamic 
under empirical observation, unstable and subject to continuous change, contrasting with 
the appearance of stability, security and stasis that architecture is typically seen to express. 
These materials of spatial production are dynamic insofar as they are themselves active in 
the construction, unfolding, contraction and morphology of space. The consideration given 
to sound amongst such a list of materials is interesting for its acknowledgement of sound’s 
role in spatial productions. Yet sound sits at the threshold of Hill’s material and immaterial 
taxonomy: ‘[s]ound is immaterial in that it cannot be seen except through its consequences, 
such as vibrations on a surface. Sound is material, however, in that it can be heard’.172 To 
take invisibility, or more generally imperceptibility, as a condition of immateriality is a 
weak distinction, insofar as there is material affectivity beyond perception and sensation in 
excess of causal linearity or legibility; these immaterialities merely identify the dynamisms 
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of matters beyond perception. Hill’s is an ocularcentric taxonomy, a consequence of which 
is that the classification of immateriality according to consequential effects and observation 
neglects the residual nature of sound, its status as an inseparable product of material 
interactions constituting its acknowledged materiality via the sensation of hearing. The 
problem of the materiality and immateriality of sound is in many ways a false and 
unproductive one that underestimates the complexity and ambiguity of broader material 
interactions; the complex materiality of sound is made clear in its contingency and reliance 
upon such interactions. The internal contradictions of Immaterial Architecture are to a 
certain extent acknowledged in Hill’s admission that text focuses upon on matter; this 
brings into question the importance and reasons for investment in an imposition of 
immateriality upon various matters. For Hill, the condition of immateriality is grounded in 
perception: ‘The immaterial architecture I propose is less the absence of matter than the 
perceived absence of matter. Whether architecture is immaterial is dependent on 
perception’.173 Insofar as the ontological status of matter remains determined according to 
the given thresholds of perception we remain behind the veil lifted by the physicalisation, 
materialisation or actualization of sound, amongst other transient matters, carried out in the 
nineteenth century by the likes of Helmholtz, a gesture which—although without total 
success—began the retrieval of sound from the domain of the spirits. Hill’s category of 
immateriality simply refers to imperceptibility, to temporalities and durations operative in 
excess of the given thresholds of perception, an imperceptibility that remains real and 
nonetheless matters. 
Of importance is the necessity for and consequences of Hill’s suggested 
perceptually determined interpretation of matter as immaterial. Hill refers to an architecture 
‘caught between the immaterial idea and the material object’, a distinction that engenders a 
string of binary qualities that sees the material equated with the solid, static, stable and 
objective, and the immaterial with the ephemeral, inconsistent, fluid, porous and subjective, 
binary distinctions that betray an impoverished understanding of material dynamisms.174 
The conditions of immateriality are developed to the point of an intimate proximity to 
transcendent spiritualism—which can be traced through Hill’s work to Yves Klein’s desire 
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for liberation from ‘the bad dream of differentiated material existence’.175 Klein locates the 
site of such liberation in the air, cast as a realm of unmediated openness.176 Yet this 
openness onto immateriality is the result of a failure to address that which subsists in excess 
of the thresholds of perception and to grasp the objective multiplicity of air, comprised of 
its various atmospheric gasses and particles. This is, as Steven Connor points out, ‘a refusal 
to allow air the status of an object […] [a] myth of universal diffusion, which means the 
approach to absolute uniformity’.177 It is the failure to grasp the complex and invisible 
materiality of air—as well as its perturbations rendered audible by the ear—that maintains 
its Kleinian immaterial categorization. This taxonomy is established at the expense of 
invisible materiality or matters beyond sight; that which is not seen to maintain a stable, 
consistent image, that which functions invisibly, is deemed immaterial due to its 
imperceptible fluctuations and interactions. In Hill’s taxonomy, even that which is seen to 
be unstable is dematerialized, yet the root of this dematerialization can nonetheless be 
located in invisibility and the insufficiencies of occularcentrism. What unfolds is a desire to 
elevate certain materials, those that might otherwise be relegated to the realm of hair, mud 
and dirt, materials that are ‘worthless and base’, to a position of greater dignity; such efforts 
betray a neo-platonism that observes a categorization of actualities according to a fidelity or 
subjection to, pure forms, characters or Ideas.178 While the desire to dignify matter, to grant 
due attention to its dynamic role in spatial production is significant, the failure to question 
the classical, hierarchical relation of form and matter neglects the impact that comes from a 
critical reconceptualization of the Idea that challenges its immaterial and atemporal 
transcendence. It would seem that there is a desire to pull matter away from itself, to 
dignify it with the realm of Ideas, to make it worthy of spirit and pure, formal 
considerations. The category of immateriality amidst the matters of spatial production is 
therefore read as a trajectory towards ideality, a category that is only required when matter 
is perceived, along neo-platonic lines, as that which is trivial, base and without form or in 
excess of empirical observation and the thresholds of perception. 
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In considering the spatial productions and determinations of sound, amidst a 
broader field of invisible and imperceptible matters, a more nuanced approach to the 
ambiguity of matter is required in place of spurious references to the immaterial. While 
Hill’s description of the role of immaterial-materials in the dynamic production of space 
provides a valuable contribution towards discourse on dynamic, and ephemeral spatial 
productions, the classification of immateriality appears to serve only the submission of 
matter to the hierarchy of idealism, as is made perfectly clear in Hill’s statement that ‘to be 
associated with the world of ideas a material object must be considered immaterial’.179 In 
response we need not do away with the importance of ideas but addresses their proximity to 
and involvement in material objects without need of recourse to a transcendent 
immateriality. In problematizing the notion of the idea we are provided with an alternative 
to this distinction that negates the categorical necessity of immateriality in spatial 
production, eschewing its trajectory towards both spiritualism and idealism. 
 
A Spectrum of Infinite Potential: Ideas, Problems and Multiplicities 
 
In constructing a critique of Hill’s ideal hierarchy, in which matter subsists beneath the 
authority of the immaterial, an ungrounding of the idea is required, in which its hierarchical 
and neo-platonic elevation is challenged and displaced. It is in Deleuze’s Difference and 
Repetition that we find a particularly relevant and problematic notion of the Idea that while 
naming a certain transcendence remains nonetheless immanent with regards to the objects 
in which it is implicated. The immediate importance of the Deleuzian Idea is that matter’s 
association with it does not require a dematerialization or the a sacrifice of its materiality in 
order for its elevation to ‘the world of ideas’; the Idea persists in both immanence and 
excess of the apparent or perceptual rendering of the material objects in which it is 
influentially implicated—the Idea subsists within the material. Far from being a solely 
conceptual construct encapsulated within the mind of the thinker, ‘the Idea as concrete 
universal stands opposed to concepts of the understanding’, it is something which persists 
in excess of the instance of its being thought—or its differenciation—exceeding the 
individual. In an inversion of the commonsensical notion of the idea as that occurring 
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within the individual’s mind, as the instance of a pure creative impulse, it is the individual 
that appears as differenciated within the Idea, the individual being engendered as such 
through the complex and concrete interactions that constitute the Idea as a kind of network 
of influential, informative elements and events. In this sense the Idea is less a concept, 
produced ex nihilo according to the originality of an individual, or a formal essence than 
what Deleuze calls a virtual multiplicity, a generative confusion of objects, elements and 
events. 
 The concept of the Idea to which I refer is decidedly problematic, insofar as the 
problematic is taken as referring not a negativity or lack as in common usage but a complex 
collection of things that exert influence and constitute the potentials of a situation, the 
conditions within which the critical and creative subject is free to choose that are 
nonetheless not of their choosing. A problem is that to which one responds in thought, in 
movement or in sound. It is this problematic understanding of Ideas that is of specific 
importance insofar as a generative materialism is being laid out in relation to a particular 
ideology of influence. The importance of this problematic formulation and displacement of 
ideas becomes clear where Deleuze states that ‘problematic Ideas are precisely the ultimate 
elements of nature and the subliminal objects of little perceptions’.180 Here problematic 
Ideas are aligned with what was referred to above as the background of experience, a field 
of subtle influence that in auditory terms affects hearing ahead of its organization in 
listening. Problematic Ideas, in this sense, describe fields of individuation, affective 
complexes that influence and inform the individuals that populate them. These individuals 
remain distinct from the self or the I, insofar as the latter names the subject of a distinction 
and representation, whose symbolic determination marks a certain closure to difference in 
the maintenance of a distinct set of signals. The individual distinct from the I—the subject 
of Steven Connor’s ‘disintegrative principle’—is for Deleuze a larval subject:  
It is true that every Idea turns us into larvae, having put aside the 
identity of the I along with the resemblance of the self. This is badly 
described as a matter of regression, fixation or arrestation of 
development, for we are never fixed at a moment or in a given state 
but […] always fixed in a movement that is underway […] larvae 
bear Ideas in their flesh, while we do not go beyond the 
representations of the concepts.181 
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Where the Idea borne in the flesh is that of sound or noise, the individual remaining open to 
its information, anterior to the cancellation of its intensive influence in representation or 
indexical mnemonic operation, is that which corresponds to the receptivity of hearing rather 
than the subject of an audile technique, removed or having become distinct from 
background noise according to the development of an auditory proxemics or a sound-space 
set apart. Understood as being comprised of the elements of nature, Ideas—taken 
problematically—are further dissociated from the strictly conceptual and immaterial. As 
subliminal objects, Ideas can be thought to influence the individual anterior to the 
recognition and representation of the influential objectivity. These little perceptions are 
those that occur in response to a subtle influence more than the conscious act of  directing 
attention or interpolation, those perceptual events more readily associated with audile 
technique. The Idea as subliminal object in this sense constitutes the anterior and excessive 
potentials of an auditory proxemics, that by which distinction is asserted yet that which 
problematizes distinction in remaining immanent. It is according to its association with a 
background and subliminal status, anterior to recognition or recollection that the Idea can 
be thought to constitute a kind of noise, that which is confused and obscure from the point 
of view of its perception or the instance of its periodic rendering or expression, yet that 
which remains in-itself determined according to the network or collection of elements, 
object and events that in their relational tension, interactions and abrasions constitute the 
conditioning structure of an Idea. It is in this sense that we can think of Ideas as that which 
persists as noise. 
 The Idea as noise gives a good sense of its immanent excess, of that which inheres 
within yet persists beyond an instance of its perception. Noise can be considered to 
constitute the potentials of audibility, the body of frequencies that can possibly be heard. 
While sound as object or perceived event is distinct from noise in the instance of its 
audition or audible rendering in the ear, that sound itself remains immanent to noise, to the 
larger field of potentially audible vibrations that in their confusion constitute noise; it is in 
the instance of audition that a minimal distance from this confusion is asserted in the 
discernment of a distinct signal from an otherwise confused body, a body that remains 
immanent despite its distinction in perception. It is where they are considered to be the 
Ideas or conditions of perceivable qualities that Ideas are, for Deleuze, to be equated with 
noise: ‘the Idea of colour, for example, is like white light which perplicates in itself the 
genetic elements and relations of all colours, but is actualized in the diverse colours with 
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their respective spaces; or the Idea of sound, which is also like white noise’.182 White noise 
constitutes the Idea or virtual conditions of sound, a spectrum of infinite potential, the 
embodiment of all possible tonalities that are rendered as such in distinct instances of 
audition or actualization, tonalities that in their simultaneity obliterate identifiable 
periodicity. White noise presents an undifferentiated yet determinable collection of all 
possible frequencies, a problematic complex that when engaged by the ear or membrane 
yields audible and distinct tonalities, qualities or sound objects, a subtractive synthesis that 
renders an audible instance of an inaudible Idea, that which persists in the background and 
in excess of the audible. It is in this sense that the Idea of sound constitutes a problem to 
which the ear responds as a solution as the eye does to light: ‘an organism is nothing if not 
the solution to a problem, as are each of its differenciated organs, such as the eye which 
solves the light “problem”; but nothing within the organism, no organ, would be 
differenciated without the internal milieu endowed with a general effectivity or integrating 
power of regulation’.183 It is according to the power of regulation that the actualized 
organism or thing is considered to be efficacious itself, and not simply the passive receptor 
of stimulus, but rather a complex complicator or integrator. The ear conceived as solution is 
that which draws upon and renders actually audible the potentials embodied by the Idea of 
sound, potentials that inform the individual in accordance with its own powers of regulation 
and selection.  
 It is through Deleuze that we get a sense of the extent to which an Idea is not to be 
thought of as strictly transcendental, but rather ‘at once transcendent and immanent’, that 
which persists in excess, and is structured by events, elements, objects and their 
relations.184 More importantly for present concerns is the extent to which Deleuze’s Idea 
bears relation to both noise and individuation. While the Idea in its complex problematic 
form can be encapsulated within the perhaps more familiar concept of multiplicities it is 
only through tracing Deleuze’s post-platonic reconfiguration or displacement of Ideas that 
we can understand how recourse to multiplicities provides a critique of ideal immaterial 
essences, as that to which matter must pertain in the acquisition of form by means of 
external impression. 
 The Idea, as Deleuze conceives of it, is strongly related to the concept of 
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multiplicities, as is evident in Deleuze’s statement that ‘Ideas are pure multiplicities’.185 In 
Deleuzian ontology, every thing is a multiplicity, insofar as each thing considered a unit or 
object is in fact a concrescence of other elements and their interactions—as is most easily 
exemplified in the microbiological understanding of the body in which it is not simply one 
but a collection of organs, cells, microbes, viruses, bacterias and their interactions. This can 
of course be taken more generally as applying to anybody, such as that of air or water; 
multiplicity describes any body as being particular rather than unitary, engendered 
according to a set of conditions and the interactions between objects, as opposed to the 
impression of form upon the otherwise inanimate. A multiplicity is to be considered as 
substantive, rather than a thing that has been broken apart or fractured, as such a position 
would assume a prior unity or pure formal essence from which the thing as multiplicity has 
diverged, constituting a distorted and somewhat inferior image. In this latter formulation 
multiplicity comes after a prior unity or whole which assumes ontological priority. The 
multiplicity as substantive thing is therefore not considered as the fragmentation of a prior 
whole but rather as sufficient in itself, engendered as such not through a shattering of form 
but according to the relations and interactions of the differences it embodies. The 
substantive status of a multiplicity accounts for the unity of its appearance, its consistent 
image, as being residually or relationally determined; the multiplicity is, or appears as, one 
for another while in itself being confused. 
 The purity Deleuze ascribes to the Idea as multiplicity is indicative of its virtual 
status, of its persistence apart from the apparent and recognizable. The virtual multiplicity 
consists of an imperceptible set or network of influences structured in the same way as the 
Idea discussed above, it is that which constitutes the conditions of the apparent and 
recognizable while remaining obscure from the position of that to which it in part gives rise 
or constitutes the conditions of. This purity does not suggest essence but rather a state of 
change, of constant movement that persists in excess of that which is identifiable or 
empirically given; its purity is ascribed according to its not being recognizably of a thing—
as in the sense of a multiple or jigsaw—and therefore always subject to representation, but 
its protean being as a state of change, that which constitutes the potentials of productive 
deformations. This distinction from the essential is made clear where Deleuze states that: 
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the subject of representation still determines the object as really 
conforming to the concept, as an essence […] The Idea makes a 
virtue of quite different characteristics. The virtuality of the Idea has 
nothing to do with possibility. Multiplicity tolerates no dependence 
on the identical in the subject or in the object. The events and 
singularities of the Idea do not allow any positing of an essence as 
“what the thing is”. No doubt, if one insists, the word “essence” 
might be preserved, but only on the condition of saying that the 
essence is precisely the accident, the event, the sense.186 
The possible is here considered to be already actual insofar as it is imaginable, one option 
amongst many that are all possible, whereas it is potential which is specific to the Idea, the 
virtual and the multiplicity, insofar as potentials are understood as that which remain 
imperceptible and therefore confused from the point of view of recognition or 
representation, potentials are considered to be capable of making a difference where the 
possible is rather a reconfiguration of that which is already actual. It is this absence of 
essence that grounds the virtual condition of a thing in difference, therefore accounting for 
its mutability, its openness to change. The virtual is in this sense thought as being distinctly 
temporal, dynamic or durational, that which constitutes an openness to change in every 
thing despite the actual appearance of consistency. As a set of potentials we can think of the 
virtual in terms of potential frequencies, frequencies that remain real and persist outside of 
their being rendered as audible, actual qualities or sound objects, a virtual multiplicity 
would in this sense constitute a set of frequencies, of audible potentials that remain in 
themselves inaudible. It is where multiplicities are brought together—as in the sense of a 
problematic or dialectical set of Ideas—that these potentials may become actualized 
through the interactions of differing potentials and capacities; it is in this sense that the 
actual is conceived as a qualitative expression or perceptible rendering, a concrescence, 
contraction of snapshot of the virtual conditions that persist in excess of the apparently 
actual. The sound object, according to this schema, appears as an actual event insofar as it 
is the audible and qualitative rendering of conditions that remain in themselves inaudible, 
an event that is nonetheless considered as a multiplicity insofar as it is comprised of diverse 
elementary interactions, perturbations of the air and auditory apparatus, themselves 
multiplicities which collectively exploit the unactualized set of virtual audible potentials 
constituting the Idea of sound. As with the Idea, a virtual multiplicity may be thought as 
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existing in excess of its actualisations or localized, qualitative renderings, it is, again, that 
within which or in relation to which the individual or object appears more than something 
encapsulated within the individual. 
 The importance of the virtual and actual states of multiplicities is their co-implication, 
constituting two unequal halves present in every thing, accounting for external appearance 
and expression as well as continuous if imperceptible deformation and composition, two 
unequal halves creating the necessary imbalance or metastability that puts being in motion: 
‘every object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another, 
one being a virtual image and the other an actual image. They are unequal odd halves’.187 It 
is the imbalance of the virtual and actual that is thought to account for the immanent 
propensity for change within an object, its internal generativity as opposed to its being 
inanimate and in need of hylomorphic subjection for its formal organization. The virtual is 
in this sense not to be considered as the sole agent of change, as such sufficiency posits 
actual beings as merely the passive products of an environment. Virtual potentials may 
remain unactualized, dormant, insofar as they are not drawn upon in the transition from 
virtual potential to actual being, a transition that is described in the concept of intensity 
which brings into play the reciprocal interactions and influence of virtual and actual, of 
potential and perceptible. 
We call intensity, after Deleuze, the manner in which virtual conditions are 
actualized, yet this passage between virtual and actual should not be thought as strictly 
linear, as moving from virtual structure to actualized instance, but rather as an oscillation or 
reciprocal influence insofar as intensity also accounts for a process of deactualization: the 
(de)composition of a thing or its trajectory towards imperceptibility. Intensity is a state 
between, it is unstable, transitory, en route; it remains imperceptible insofar as perception 
remains anchored to the actual, to the stability of the given. In extension to the 
identification of white noise as the Idea, the virtual conditions, of sound, we can take the 
wind as an example of an intensive state rendering sonic actualities. As Steven Connor—
amongst others—points out: ‘we do not actually hear the wind, but rather hear and see 
objects as they are affected by the wind, such as the wind in our ears […] the wind through 
the leaves of a tree […] the indefinite process whereby air becomes itself by being made 
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exterior to itself’.188 Connor here describes a process of actualization by which the wind is 
heard and recognized as such; in being made exterior to itself it becomes identifiable, we 
hear it as wind and see its effects upon the objects around us, never apprehending it directly 
in itself. Wind can almost be considered a trope of Deleuzian intensity, of the processual 
actualization of virtual conditions; existing only where there is difference in pressure, its 
purely differential ground is comprised of the tendencies and potentials for change between 
low and high pressures. Characterized as the movement of things, air and other atmospheric 
gasses, between differing zones of pressure, it is in itself no-thing, without formal essence, 
existing only between states and the interactions of objects. It is only through its 
actualization in the movement of trees, its buffeting and whistling through the cracks in 
windows that we identify wind in extensity, in its becoming qualitatively apparent, 
perceptible and exterior to itself. It is the concept of intensity that gives an account of the 
becoming perceptible of the imperceptible, and where this process of actualisation is made 
evident within contemporary sound works we can discern an opening of sound and its 
audition onto the inaudible and virtual field  of its conditions. This intensive process as an 
opening onto the conditions of the audible is evident in Francisco López’s field recording 
entitled Wind (Patagonia), as Christoph Cox has pointed out: 
The piece as a whole focuses on the very medium of sonic 
transport—air—and highlights the fact that sound is simply the 
result of pressure changes in that medium. Its subject matter—
wind—is the most elemental of all phenomena and the most primeval 
sonic stuff. Wind is powerful, invisible and ever-changing. To focus 
on it is to transcend the limits of our ordinary ontology, composed as 
it is of relatively stable visible objects.189 
The transcendence Cox draws attention to here is one of an opening onto intensity, onto the 
immanent transcendence of those conditions that subsist within the apparent. It is the 
ontological implications of this orientation around the dynamics of sonorous actualization 
that is particularly interesting. The ‘ordinary ontology’ referred to here is that which belies 
a certain occularcentrism, or rather that which determines material existence according to 
the given thresholds of perception that pertain to the maintenance of a common sense; this 
‘ordinary ontology’ characterizes that according to which Hill locates the ephemeral and 
invisible within the category of the immaterial. The unordinary or anomalous ontology to 
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which an auditory attendance to intensive conditions directs us understands matter not only 
in terms of static identities but as being inseparable from a temporal deformation that 
inheres within it. In López’s recording, sound is heard to be the product of an intensive 
state (wind) that actualizes virtual conditions or differences (in pressure)—a presentation of 
the processual determination of sound that would seem to violate López’s professed 
Schaefferianism in foregrounding the impurity of sound and the means of its production. 
Despite the actualized status of the sounds of wind, evident in the ephemerality and 
continuous mutability of this material phenomenon is the immanence of virtual conditions 
remaining in themselves imperceptible, the unfolding differences that subject matter to 
continuous change. The actuality of sound appears as a fleeting moment amidst intensive 
vibrational states that are drawn from, and in their dissolution contribute too, virtual 
conditions of difference. The stability and consistency of recognizable form is considered 
apart from ontogenetic and intensive processes, the generative principles of both 
composition and deformation. In sonorous actualizations, however, we remain arguably 
closer to the process of intensive production by virtue of a clearly expressed inherent 
temporality, a proximity that is facilitated by the ambiguity of the audible which is itself 
aided by what is often referred to as the subordinate position of the auditory within the 
perceptual hierarchy of common sense.  
The problematized hierarchy of the Idea—its immanent transcendence, its relation 
to both noise and individuation—leads to the positioning of sound and other instable, 
inconsistent and fluid phenomena, less at a threshold of materiality and immateriality than 
that between virtuality and actuality, at the site of intensive, processual determination 
wherein virtual conditions are rendered actual. The spectral and transient—which through 
an underestimation of material complexity might be considered immaterial—remain firmly 
positioned within reality insofar as these ‘immaterial’ temporalities and ontological 
inconsistencies are considered immanent with regard to material actuality, in other words, 
mutability is considered to be part and parcel of materiality.  
This shift towards an anomalous ontology of matter yields an expanded field of 
matters retaining their materiality, their mutability and intensity. Through the immanent 
transcendence of the Idea within the concrete we are better equipped to consider such 
matters in terms of their potential for spatial productions within practices that challenge the 
hierarchy of the line and hylomorphic assertions; such a move allows for a detailed 
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consideration of sonorous spatial productions as well as the scope of their subjective 
impressions through their implication within processes of individuation. 
 
Architecture’s Void 
  
The spatial concerns brought to the fore through a consideration of the architectonic 
implications of sound cannot be thought apart from their individual impacts or 
individuations, insofar as space is to be thought apart from its Bergsonian limitation to 
extensity—its confinement to the purely geometrical or that which is capable of division 
without change in kind—and considered according to its intensive confusion with the 
temporal. This orientation draws attention towards a field of invisible influences, to a 
vibrational continuum that impacts upon spatial perception, territorial delimitations and 
behaviour therein. Sound, until quite recently, has received little attention within 
architectural concerns, its residual ontological status also describing its relation to design, 
to the extent that one can more easily talk of architectural acoustics as found objects, as the 
industrialization of the field has lead largely to the desire for an erasure of acoustic space 
through the commodification of silence, as described most eloquently by Thompson. The 
primary concern of this thesis is with the affectivity of matters that remain invisible, that 
operate within, without and against the well defined limits of architectonic space 
considered purely in terms of its visual delimitations. In addressing these concerns it 
becomes necessary to consider the role of other matters, events and phenomena that are in 
excess of the line, events that set the geometrical in time. Analogical support is sought in 
approaches that have considered the ephemeral, invisible and imperceptible within the 
context of built environments, not only for their consideration of the impressions of 
temporal matters but also because such considerations add depth to the notion of a 
transcendent ungrounding of sound in the noise of material interactions; in appealing to 
considerations of a larger vibrational continuum an emphasis is placed upon the 
fundamental contingencies of sound events. The temporal matertialities to which I would 
like to direct attention populate what we might call architecture’s void, they are those 
events which are most problematic to the grandeur of architectural ideology, built upon 
stability, atemporalities and the purity of form. A similar position is maintained by Jeremy 
Till, for whom: ‘architectural space, in the purity of its formal and conceptual genesis, is 
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emptied of all considerations of time and is seen as a formal and aesthetic object. Time is 
frozen out or, rather, time is frozen […] Freeze life, freeze time, control time. It is a control 
which attempts to banish those elements of time that present a challenge to the immutable 
authority of architecture’.190 Till here addresses what he finds to be the ideological kernel 
of architecture. Till’s position is one which seeks to open architecture up to temporal 
deformation and contingency in the broadest sense, concerns that are echoed herein. While 
being primarily concerned with a more specific subject matter, the consideration of sound 
herein is also open to those matters and events which might constitute its conditions, and 
therefore does not exclude that which remains inaudible. Where the temporality of matter 
and form, its decay, deformation and weathering can be considered to constitute 
architecture’s void, that which persists in excess of all desire for stability and atemporal 
infallibility, it is to architectonic practices turning to this void for their subject matter that I 
wish to now turn, to those which claim that: 
The void, more than the solid, is the subject of architecture. The 
invisible more than the visible is the very matter of space. The 
history of architecture is possibly based on a misunderstanding, on a 
history of the solid […] because the means for measuring the void 
were virtually non-existent until the 19th century, up until the 
moment when new measuring instruments made it possible to 
describe this void in physical, chemical, biological and 
electromagnetic terms.191 
Here Philippe Rahm identifies architecture’s void, that which largely escapes or is avoided 
by architectural practice: the realm of the invisible. There are, of course, a number of 
notable exceptions who are considered herein, but their approach remains the exception.192 
The invisible void around which architecture orientates itself should not, as immediate 
interpretations might suggest, be taken as referring to an absence of matter, an absence of 
everything. Rather, as Rahm points out, the void more aptly describes the invisible matter 
of space; the void, for Rahm, is spatium rather than vacuum. Architecture’s void teems with 
the activity and interactions of the invisible, of material elements and objectivities that 
reside outside of the visual, but also beyond the thresholds of the empirical and perceptible. 
As the groundless swarms with differences—against the ‘external illusion of 
                                                
190 Jeremy Till, ‘Thick Time: Architecture and the Traces of Time’, in Iain Borden and Jane Rendell (eds,) 
InterSections: Architectural Histories and Critical Theories (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 285. 
191 Philippe Rahm, Distortions (Orléans: Editions HYX, 2005), not paginated. 
192 For example: Philippe Rahm, Peter Zumthor, David Leatherbarrow,  Mohsen Mostafavi, Bernard Tschumi, 
Juhani Pallasmaa, Steen Eiler Rasmussen. 
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representation’—so to does the void with the infinite interactions of matter.193 In this 
excerpt Rahm goes someway to identifying some of the key assumptions of architecture 
that I am keen to examine herein. We here find Rahm referring to the solid in the most 
obvious of ways and in much the same way as it appeared—orientated around an 
immaterial void in which only the spirit resided—in the work of Jonathan Hill, as the name 
for the consistency and stability of matters according, primarily, to vision. It is this 
assumption of stability and consistency in the visibly solid that limits access to the 
complexity of matter, to material interactions and excessive affectivity. Concern for solidity 
would, towards such an understanding of an expanded field of architectonic matters, be 
better directed towards the broader notion of the physical, which caters for an inventory of 
materials considered in terms of spatial productivity by Hill, Rahm, Zumthor, Pallasmaa, 
Rasmussen, Fernández-Galiano and Tschumi, amongst others. It is this focus upon solidity 
that, according to Rahm, lead to the history of architecture being ‘based upon a 
misunderstanding’, a misunderstanding caused by over reliance upon the visual, and in 
particular upon the visibly stable and solid. 
 Rahm identifies a turn towards the void in the nineteenth century.194 In this period a 
mapping of the void was undertaken according to a plethora of new instruments capable of 
revealing the agency of the invisible to consciousness. By way of such instruments the void 
came to be mapped according to its physicality or materiality. No longer would the void be 
solely the realm of the immaterial, the realm of the spirits, guarded by the given limitations 
of empiricism and perception. This is not to say that there was no contest in the matter, that 
there was an instantaneous eradication of the mystical and spiritual from the void according 
to instrumental intervention. We find accounts to the contrary in the writings of Babbage 
and Tesla for whom the void remained a site of contestation between the mystical and 
physical. Nonetheless, ascribing immateriality according to the semblance of visible 
solidity leaves thought lingering before this turn into the void, abandoning matter, events 
and physical phenomena to the spirits that once occupied it. 
 We turn now the those practitioners for whom, along with Rahm, the void as 
spatium constitutes the subject matter of the architectonic. Where Rahm stands out as a 
                                                
193 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 347. 
194 A claim, it can be argued, concomitant with the observations of Jonathan Crary. See Jonathan Crary 
Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture (Cambridge and London: The MIT 
Press, 2001).  
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perhaps extreme example in his orientation towards the invisible, there are many others 
who have directed attention towards the invisible, ephemeral and broadly sensorial within 
their wider architectonic concerns. Such practices, in engaging the physicality and 
affectivity of the invisible in their spatial productions, contribute to a mapping of the void, 
rather than its abandon to immateriality. 
 
The Figure of Decay 
 
Auditory spatial production can be considered to be marked by the figure of decay as much 
as resonance, the latter being considered in terms of capture as much as connection. The 
body which resonates lies in waiting, a trap or resonant capacity, a patient subject awaiting 
an activating movement in the air. The resonant entails an irradiation impressing itself back 
upon the medium of its excitation, extending its influence and territorial determination 
beyond the limits of its visible body. Resonance is a means of capture insofar as to irradiate 
is also occupy, to extend, a move outwards simultaneous with internal agitation and 
vacillation. It is according to the simultaneity of internal and external excitements that 
resonance is considered relational, a proportional movement of bodies contributing to the 
perturbation of a medium of common excitation. The figure of decay is borne strongly 
insofar as those matters of expression which determine auditory spatial production fulfill 
their trajectory from radiant in/(de)formality towards the undifferenciated void quicker than 
most. The vector of decay nonetheless marks a productive process, a deformation 
implicated in further compositions; here we adopt only the most general and basic sense of 
Reza Negarestani’s use of decay in stating that ‘differential or germinal derivatives […] 
constitute the positive building vector of decay which extends outwardly’.195 These 
germinal derivatives mark a residual productivity, those elements and events in flight from 
one body and absorbed into another, passing towards imperceptibility yet nonetheless the 
agents of a subtle or subliminal influence. The arc of decay nonetheless maintains 
architectonic positivity in its expressions, insofar as ‘decay is a building process’ 
engendering ‘new states of extensity’, entering into further compositions.196 Where this 
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Collapse, 4 (January 2010), 387. 
196 Ibid., 386. 
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trajectory marks a transition from the well defined and consistent to its particular 
(de)composition it is according to an ever increasing resolution that sonority bears site 
specific relation to the place of decay. 
Abandonment can be thought of as an inaugural event of ruination; ruin is the 
building embedded within and left to time, marking a disintegration of architecture, a 
descent into ground and into dust. Such trajectories are often set in motion through the 
absence or retraction of superstructural support that would locate value in the output and 
existence of these infrastructural sites. Yet, as Tim Edensor has shown, there is vastly more 
to these sites than the ghosts of economic failure and abandonment.197 In ruins and material 
decay we find openings onto a  material ontology that is critical of illusory permanence and 
an idealized notion of progression manifest—at the outset at least—in crystalline form.198 
The ruin presents matter in motion, a motion only possible in the absence of maintenance 
and material replenishment. Within the ruin energy flows, not into maintaining facades and 
internal atmospheric homogeneity, but into the air and ground, a particular motion, a 
movement through dust. This movement charts the weathering of form, the expression of 
impurities and contingencies through dirt, decay and susceptibilities laid bare, that which 
Mostafavia and Leatherbarrow refer to as the life of buildings in time: 
Is not this return of matter to its source, as a coherent body, already 
implied in its constitution, insofar as every physical thing carries 
within its deepest layers a tendency towards its own destruction […] 
The value, then, of works that suffer stains and abrasions is the 
revelation of the eventuality of this final justice. This is the actual 
assimilation of an art work back into its location, the place from 
which it was first taken. In the time after construction, buildings take 
on the qualities of the place wherein they are sited, their colors and 
surface textures being modified and in turn modifying those of the 
surrounding landscape.199 
Temporal deformation renders the site specificity of that which is built, inserted, and 
installed, the reciprocal determination of environment and form, of the background and that 
which is drawn to the fore. Matter becomes subject to temperature, humidity, vibration: the 
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agents of time, the saboteurs of solidity, permanence and the eternal. To these forces of 
deformation we add that bandwidth of vibrations we hear as sound; background noise, 
artefacts of space-in-use and actions in space. As marks, stains, the various effects of 
weathering, make of space a specific place, traces that display established environmental 
relations, so to do sounds, expressing the use of a site and the interacting bodies which 
define and constitute it. As expressions of actions in space, sounds contribute shape, 
definition, and character to space, yet there is an essential reciprocity to be acknowledged, 
the specific shaping of these sounds and ephemeral forces by that which is always already 
built around them. The site of the ruin lays such processual relations bare, the reabsorption 
of the building into the world and the effects of the building upon that world. 
The abandoned site, left to ruin, is a space left open for reappropriation and 
occupation. In the occupation, reuse and abuse of space we witness spatial practices more 
often in accordance with the particular spatio-temporal trajectories of the ruin. In the 
absence of the means or interest in economic investment, rather than setting space out 
against time through maintaining the appearance of permanence, transient occupations and 
visitations of the abandoned and disused embody a certain ephemerality concomitant with 
the spatio-temporal trajectories of decay; the abuse of abandoned sites only quickens their 
already initiated dissolution, and their occupation is in most instances fleeting, as those who 
occupy may always be en route, momentarily taking shelter. Yet where such occupation is a 
technique of political resistance there may also be resistance to the decay of the occupied 
site through temporary, ad hoc improvements, minimal repair and maintenance that 
amounts to a more explicit ‘pause’ along matter’s diverse and inevitable durations. It is 
such temporary occupations, being in accordance with or coupled to material durations, 
temporalities enforced by speeds of decay, weathering and collapse, that are of primary 
interest here. Such occupations can also be said to characterize the manner in which the 
actions constituting the Tuned City festival—which positioned itself ‘between sound and 
space speculation’—inhabited a number of derelict and crumbling sites around Berlin in the 
summer of 2008, spaces that were visibly slipping into a continuum of undifferenciated 
matter.200 
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 Rather than an explicit aestheticisation of dereliction or overt economic criticism, it 
is the foregrounding of material temporalities that establishes the strongest links between 
the site specific locations of Tuned City and its subject matter. Beyond its clear interest in 
sites of acoustic interest, the often decaying structures which housed events revealed matter 
as subject to time, transient and ephemeral, implicated within durations of varying 
congruence with human bandwidths of perception. These sites in which formal intent is 
seen, smelt and heard to be slipping into imperceptibility draw out and reveal a complex 
and often invisible material ontology that accounts for the invisible materiality of sound. 
Such an ontology conceives of matter, and by extension that which constitutes the built 
environment, as matter in motion, in flux and subject to spatio-temporal variation. Such 
sites engender a proximal sensitivity to invisible materialities, in particular that of sound, its 
transient and radiating forms appearing as contractions and dissipations of the air before 
being absorbed into an imperceptible ground. 
 In focusing on the relations of sound and space the latter is explicitly—and 
reciprocally—positioned in time. To direct attention to such relations amidst ruin and decay 
directs thought to temporally subject matters. These actions encourage an understanding of 
all that is perceived to be concrete as being in flux, malleable, and mutable, an 
understanding of matter that in its breadth opens thought onto more distinctly ephemeral 
matters including, of course, that of sound. This expanded notion of matter in the built 
environment is evident in the work of sound artist and architect Raviv Ganchrow, but more 
interesting is the impact such an expanded notion of materiality has upon both the 
conception and perception of matter; this is not just an expanding inventory of materials to 
be applied in design but an increasingly complex ontology of matter, a process put into 
action when matter is thought and perceived in time: 
Generally, architecture is envisioned as the final product in a design 
process. What happens, if you expand the time span of that process 
and start to consider the factors that interact with the formal result? 
At that point, the definition of “finished” and “unfinished” is 
reversed: you end up with an incomplete—or infinite—form that is 
completed with every progressing moment anew. You no longer 
understand the building to be a solitary thing “out there” but rather as 
a relational system that extends beyond the visible.201 
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It is this notion of an infinite form that understands the architectonic according to a 
particular ontology and the positive figure of decay, insofar as this is conceived as an 
ongoing extension and deformation that is necessarily temporal. The architectonic as a 
relational system extending into the invisible, into the void, maintains an opening onto the 
matters of present and particular interest, onto the materiality of sound and affective spatial 
productions. It is the immanent spatial productivity of the sonorous that Ganchrow directs 
attention to, its operation according to a productive displacement and its ontological status 
as a matter of spatio-temporal expression: 
To materialise sound is to make corporeal artefacts from durational 
flux. Constituting any materiality from within vibrational transience 
will simultaneously construct a corresponding space within which 
certain aspects of sound are seen to operate. In other words, every 
materialisation of sound is already spatialised within the limits of its 
own comprehension.202 
Betrayed in this excerpt is the spectre of architectural ideology, as identified by Till and 
evident in Hill, according to which sound is primarily considered immaterial due to 
ontologically constitutive thresholds of perception, becoming material through the work of 
the architect or artist. Inherent in the necessity of materialization is the ideological position 
according to which the invisible and ephemeral lacks materiality and that the temporal 
exists as some kind of pure and autonomous flux awaiting material embodiment as opposed 
to being active within matter itself. It is perhaps surprising to find the persistence of this 
position within the discourse of artists working with the physicality and often hapticity of 
sound, such as Ganchrow and Mark Bain, yet it is certainly more than coincidence that both 
should have a background in architectural practice, and therefore maintain something of its 
ideological legacy in their own discourse, despite any contradiction this might pose with 
regard to their own practice and sonorous productions.  
While the residue of this position persists, Ganchrow’s considerations of space and 
its sonorous unfolding are of particular interest and should not be overshadowed by these 
ideological criticisms. In seeking to rectify this issue we might reposition this notion of 
materialization, the drawing out or contraction of ‘durational flux’, in terms of a process of 
actualization: the process by which something becomes recognizable as such, a transition 
between two states—between the virtual and actual—that are nonetheless real. Ganchrow’s 
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materialization repositioned as actualization marks a necessary ontological shift whereby 
the physicality of the invisible attains equal ontological status with visually confirmed 
objectivities. Through actualization an object is perceived as such, in subsuming what 
Ganchrow refers to as materialization within actualization it is important to point out that 
this process does not infer the making-matter of the immaterial, but rather the process by 
which something comes to be a perceivable and empirically knowable materiality. That 
which was spectral and evanescent becomes the object of refocused attention; beneath a 
once mysterious guise lies the matter that always was. This actualization draws from a 
field, an imperceptible groundlessness, that is nonetheless real; its material identity, 
however, is only established by virtue of accommodating shifts in ontology and culturally 
determined perception. Yet here we rehearse an old argument, the actualization of transient 
material states and vibrational phenomena having received significant attention in the mid 
and late nineteenth century, most notably perhaps—with specific reference to our auditory 
concerns—in the work of Hermann von Helmholtz. Helmholtz’s ‘vibration microscope’, in 
a manner consistent with cymatic revelations, traced the otherwise invisible and radiating 
forms of matter set in periodic motion. More important than the visualizations produced via 
such means is the impact of such actualizations on the broader perception of the material 
world; while the transcription of vibrations refines and consolidates their formal identity 
with diagrammatic precision, this foregrounding of that which is in flux, the drawing out or 
rendering of the invisible, can be seen to contribute to both a confusion and complication of 
objective reality. In contrast to the discrete precision with which vibrational phenomena are 
transcribed, this uncovering of a vibrational substrata contributes to the corroding 
semblance of material solidity in aesthetics and perception through creating awareness of 
imperceptible oscillations, movements and inconsistencies. This trajectory towards a 
transient material ontology can be seen in aesthetic developments roughly 
contemporaneous with the work of Helmholtz, wherein the visual depiction of the world 
would become, in Jonathan Crary’s words, ‘more evanescent, its substantiality irrevocably 
discredited’.203 Again, this excerpt must necessarily be subject herein to the ideological 
critique outlined above, according to which this substantial refutal would be repositioned in 
terms of a confusion according to an uncovering of substantial complexity, wherein it is 
more stability and consistency that is discredited than substance per se. For Crary,  this 
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degree of confusion is evident in Manet’s aesthetic developments, wherein objects became 
ill defined, their edges blurred and bleeding from one to the next. These distorted 
objectivities represent a material world in motion or at least of questionable solidity and 
stability. Such aesthetic developments accompany a wider cultural shift where material 
ontology is taken ‘outside of a stable circuit of visuality to an arrangement in which neither 
eye nor objects in the world can be understood in terms of fixed positions and identities’.204 
Both object and observation become events in time, positions assumed in relation to blurred 
distinctions and a material world in flux. In this confusion of boundaries the temporally 
determined attains increasingly significant ontological status and spatial influence as object 
and event. That which appeared solid is set into time at the expense of its being discrete. 
Attesting to the materiality of the transient amounts to continuing expansion in cultural 
thresholds of perception; in expanding understandings of material our perception of 
material changes. This does not amount to a shift in the physicality of things per se but 
rather the uncovering of such physicality that constitutes an epistemological shift and by 
extension a shift in the cultural conditions and practices of perception. In attending to the 
complication of perception and the status of materiality we begin to uncover what Deleuze 
refers to as a: 
new object we call objectile […] it refers neither to the beginnings of 
the industrial era nor to the idea of the standard that still upheld a 
semblance of essence and imposed a law of constancy […] but to our 
current state of things, where fluctuation of the norm replaces the 
permanence of a law; where the object assumes a place in a 
continuum by variation […] The new status of the object no longer 
refers its condition to a spatial mold—in other words, to a relation of 
form-matter—but to a temporal modulation that implies as much the 
beginnings of a continuous variation of matter as a continuous 
development of form.205 
Doubt, ambiguity, speculation and probability take the place or certitude; the object 
perceived constitutes only the semblance of reality taken as stable and consistent. The 
‘current state of things’ names the uncovered complexity and ambiguity of objects 
considered stable in appearance only, a ‘snapshot’ drawn from a more complex matter in 
motion, that which is asserted according to the given thresholds of perception and common 
sense. The object conceived according to temporal modulation is defined in terms of 
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frequency and a mutability of form, as Deleuze states in the above excerpt, ‘the continuous 
variation of matter as a continuous development of form’. The objectile sets the object in 
motion, referring to its implicit variation rather than its apparent stability. The object as 
objectile is the object as event, a vibrational and temporal objectivity. This particular status 
of the object, confused with the event, describes without provocation that of the sound 
object, the object considered not as static form but as morphological waveform. Where the 
sound object as an embodiment of objectility fails is where morphology is reduced to 
purely sonic taxonomical quality and essences are enforced instead of particular affects and 
conditions. Deleuze’s objectile is not, of course, directly intended to refer to sound—
despite the ease with which it does so after Schaeffer. The object as objectile has the 
particular impact of conceiving of materiality primarily in terms of spatio-temporality, 
easing a conception of the ephemeral, invisible and imperceptible in terms of the material, 
should resistance be met. Where the object is taken to mark a critical distance, the objectile 
problematizes such distinctions and discretions through never being exactly there, 
definitively localized, but always going elsewhere and becoming other. Distinct identity 
relies upon this minimal distance, a spatialization marking alteritous discretion. Yet it is 
precisely this distinction, this being discrete, that objectile sonority problematizes. While 
we conceive of a sound’s origins as residing ‘over there’ in the vibrations and agitations of 
another object, sound permeates individual boundaries and is often felt to exist ‘in here’ as 
much as ‘out there’. The unfolding of a sonorous material ontology constitutes a set of 
decidedly blurry objectivities and negotiable boundaries. Spatial productions in sound 
appear as relational, the appearance of one object both in and against another, trajectories 
through objects whose boundaries shift with the contractions and dissipations of a space 
defined and produced through vibrational events. 
 Ganchrow’s considerations orientate spatial productions beyond the visible, 
encouraging an opening of perception onto audible determinations. While this constitutes a 
valuable contribution to a notion of auditory spatial productions, articulating the extent to 
which such productions can be said to remain open to the conditions of sound requires that 
our attention be allowed to extend further, up to the limits of perception and its 
imperceptible conditions. In giving attention to such conditions one considers the void, the 
void taken as saturated spatium, that which is populated with everything that is not the 
thing under consideration yet nonetheless remains a constituent, ‘supportive’ or unrelated 
element. It is in attending to the void that a particular materialism has come into favour, 
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opposed or at least anterior to the counting of assemblages or collective identities as one. It 
is in focusing upon particular abstractions, the point of confusion at which indexical quality 
breaks down and unitary appearance subsides according to the surfacing of a finer 
resolution, that particularity leads through imperceptibility to the void. The ambiguity and 
confusion of temporal matters brings us to a particularity that is not necessarily 
‘pointillistic’ insofar as it lacks certain specificity in becoming indiscernible, in its 
trajectory or oscillations around thresholds of perception. Insofar as a point is localizable 
according to coordinates, the particular is considered here more in terms of frequency than 
position; across the threshold that defines the semblance of solidity as such, the stability of 
a thing is found in motion, as the collective oscillations of finer individuals. The sound 
object, molecule or element, insofar as it is necessarily in motion and in-between—being a 
question of where it goes and what it does more than where it is—is primarily a 
problematic complex of ‘relations of speed and slowness between particles’.206 
An increase in resolution reveals a (de)composition or deformation, both the agency 
and durations of particular matters in motion, frequencies, movements and oscillations that 
constitute a morphogenesis levied by a ‘becoming imperceptible’—such is the ‘life’ of 
buildings according to Leatherbarrow and Mostafavi, and an ontology determined, as in 
both Christoph Cox and Jonathan Crary’s work, ‘outside of the stable circuit of 
visuality’.207 It is the challenge put to ontologies of the stable, consistent and unitary that is 
of particular interest, a challenge brought to discrete ontologies by a particular materialism. 
It is precisely the question of the extent to which the particular can be considered to take 
given perception to its limit that drives the current interest in a dynamic or ‘vibrant’ 
materialism. The frequency or temporality of the particular, of the unitary set in time and 
motion, exposed as processual multiplicity covered or cloaked by the semblance of 
stability, draws perception away from what is given to the means by which it is given. This 
can be said in two senses insofar as what is given is the appearance of bodies set apart from 
their subterranean and constitutive murmur, but also the given limits of perception and 
sensibility, perception as the function of a common sense subsumed by the requirements of 
recollection and representation. It is in the excitation of the limits of perception that sensory 
specificity is foregrounded, the particular and efficacious intensity of the senses, yet 
primarily of a sense in particular. In the particularity or ‘becoming particular’ of matter, the 
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deformation and (de)composition of bodies in motion makes possible an excitation of 
limits, the body apart and in particular, considered not as unified concrescence but 
according to the movements and frequencies of a constitutive multiplicity, its particular 
elements made available not to a common sense but to senses in particular. The objects of 
perception taken according to given conditions subjects the object to the normalizing force 
of a common sense understood as both the expression of an unquestioned ideology and 
according to a mean function of the senses that cancels particular intensity. Challenging the 
cultural conditions of perception that constitute a common sensical determination of 
sensible possibility outlines a field of experimentation, an understanding of perception as 
mutable and contingent. It is through a particular understanding of matter that this 
challenge is put to perception at its limits, problematizing the ontological assertions carried 
out according to its given thresholds. Away from the solidity and stability of matter, 
emphasis is placed upon its movements, movements that elude or exist in excess of the 
appearance of that which moves: ‘perception can grasp movement only as the displacement 
of a moving body or the development of a form. Movements, becomings, in other words, 
pure relations of speed and slowness, pure affects, are below and above the threshold of 
perception’.208 Deleuzian purity locates movement elsewhere, at a certain or particular 
distance from the identity of the moving or displaced object; it is this distance that locates 
more than what is perceived in the object, an objectivity or objective agency beyond the 
given thresholds of perception. The distance of movement itself from the identity of that 
which moves does not, for Deleuze and Guattari, posit an absolute transcendence, 
according to which movement cannot be known nor perceived: ‘we are obliged to make an 
immediate correction: movement also “must” be perceived. It cannot but be perceived, the 
imperceptible is also the percipiendum […] If movement is imperceptible by nature, it is so 
always in relation to a given threshold of perception’.209 It is precisely from the perspective 
of the given, according to the thresholds of perception determined by common sense, that 
the imperceptible is considered as such. The imperceptible remains that which escapes, 
exceeds or is otherwise left out of representation, beyond that which we choose to identify 
as the characteristics of a thing. The perception of the imperceptible is the particular 
problem of a ‘superior empiricism’, an empiricism active beyond the given thresholds of 
perception, those thresholds asserted according to common sense and concerned with the 
                                                
208 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 309. 
209Ibid., 310. Emphasis added. 
 157 
identification of the known and knowable. A ‘superior’ or ‘transcendental’ empiricism 
bears engagement with that by which the given is given as such, with the particular 
conditions and conditioning potentials of perception. It is through the directing of attention 
towards particular matters that perception encounters the otherwise imperceptible, that it is 
redirected from macro or molar appearances to ‘molecules to particles, and so on to the 
imperceptible […] Into the void’.210 
A particular sensibility uncovers a subterranean noise, that which lies beneath 
appearances and beyond the given thresholds of perception, populating the void. Perception 
put to work beyond given thresholds uncovers a certain objective sonority, yet one which is 
not limited to its appearance, nor determined as such according to a universal perception; 
here we refer to the ontological excess of a sound object becoming ‘progressively more 
molecular in a kind of cosmic lapping through which the inaudible makes itself heard and 
the imperceptible appears as such: no  longer the songbird, but the sound molecule’.211 This 
‘sound molecule’ considered, in a ‘pure’ sense, not as the sound of something but as sound 
in-itself, nonetheless bears something of a resemblance to the Schaefferian sound object: 
sound considered in-itself, apart from causality, representation or its indexical function. In 
both considerations of sound we encounter a defamiliarized sonority considered not as the 
sound of a thing but sound as thing, sound in-itself. In both there is a praxical notion of an 
abstract appearance of the real, of an ‘abstract concrete’, the exposure or uncovering of a 
concrete reality of the sonorous through its original abstraction.212 It is according to such 
abstraction that the referential or representational value of the sound is jettisoned—or at 
least taken as of secondary importance—in foregrounding its particular affectivity. The 
similarity between notions of sound objects and molecules is clear in the sense that both 
attempt at defining an elementary sonority that remains ‘abstract in this sense even though 
they are perfectly real’.213 Here we encounter a reality that remains apart from or in excess 
of its appearances, a notion that there is a degree to which reality is withheld from its 
representation and perception. The nature of this particular reality is one of becoming 
before being, being considered as primarily protean and mutable rather than according to 
formal essences and stability: ‘what is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, 
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not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes’.214 Reality is, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, considered as such according to the movements and interactions of 
its constituent elements, not according to a count or appearance constituting identified 
bodies, nor the terms of their representation and juxtaposition. It is in light of such an 
understanding of the nature of reality that a particular difference between the objective and 
molecular status of sound comes to the fore in the claim that elementary sound molecules 
‘are not atoms, in other words, finite elements still endowed with form. Nor are they 
indefinitely divisible. They are infinitely small, ultimate parts of an actual infinity, laid out 
on the same plane’.215 That the elementary particle, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is 
infinitely small yet not indefinitely divisible is a consequence of the ontological position 
according to which everything is a multiplicity, and that a multiplicity is not ‘in-itself’ 
divisible without becoming another, or a number of other multiplicities: a multiplicity ‘is 
not divisible, it cannot lose or gain a dimension without changing its nature’.216 A further 
and perhaps finer difference to be asserted here is that, in contrast to Schaeffer’s object, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s sound molecule does not describe a phenomenological essence; 
more than specific sonorous qualities it is the particular affectivity of the sonorous that is of 
concern, the impact of sound, the movements and interactions it engenders: 
We are not at all arguing for an aesthetics of qualities, as if the pure 
quality (color, sound, etc.) held the secret of a becoming without 
measure […] Pure qualities seem to us to be punctual systems […] A 
functionalist conception on the other hand, only considers the 
function a quality fulfills in a specific assemblage, or in passing from 
one assemblage to another.217 
This functionalist conception can perhaps be described, if not according to an aesthetics of 
qualities, nor the strictly inaesthetic, then as an infraesthetics, concerning itself with affects 
before qualities, with the conditions and potentials of aesthetic experience and 
perception.218 Rather than the specific qualities or identity of an essential in-itself, it is that 
which is in-itself nothing, relative to given thresholds of perception, that populates the void 
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and constitutes the imperceptible; sound in-itself is imperceptible from the perspective of a 
mnemonic or representational audition—according to which it is always the sound the 
sound of the wind, or a sound like a fox—and is in-itself nothing from the point of view of 
purely sonic qualities. What remains is a particular affectivity of sound encountered at the 
limits of perception, a limit which defines a ‘pure’ rather than mnemonic or 
representational perception. Perceiving the imperceptible, hearing the inaudible, entails a 
non-representational or counter-mnemonic audition, the self caught out through hearing 
without recognition. That which is excluded from perception in recollection, is assigning 
phenomena to identity, remains imperceptible from the point of view of a conscious 
recollection and recognition; it is that which is discarded in the maintenance of discrete 
identities, avoiding an over-saturation that draws attention to the impersonal, which is 
perceived in particular. The perception of the imperceptible entails a saturation of 
perception bringing to the fore that which is excluded in guaranteeing the efficacy of 
representation and recognition, the appearance of a reality that includes too much, that 
challenges discretion and distorts the phantasmatic frame. The perception of the 
imperceptible involves a rendering sensible of the transparent, the becoming apparent of the 
conditions and conditioning of the perceived. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari’s 
functionalist perspective appears to lack a certain resolution; while this praxical, influential 
or interactional perspective accounts for a primacy of infraesthetic affectivity, there is a 
sense in which functionalism remains a descriptor of that which is given, and that, 
therefore, Philippe Rahm’s ‘infrafunctionalism’ serves as a more appropriate term for this 
very particular orientation. It is to the consideration of  Rahm’s spatial practice, as an 
example of an affective architectonics in-between, that I will shortly turn. In preparing the 
ground for such considerations, as a means of gaining further insight into both invisible and 
imperceptible spatial productions that add depth to the affectivity of sound-space while 
constituting constituent conditions, attention must be given to architectonic discourse that 
concerns itself with such particular matters. 
 
Intensive Architectures 
 
By positing thermodynamics at the origins of architectural production Fernández-Galiano 
depicts its constructs as morphological, subject to a historical continuum and infested with 
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the energies they both house and draw upon in the maintenance and production of form. 
Buildings and spatial constructions in general are understood as always in the process of 
becoming, as opposed to existing as static, fixed forms. They undergo constant 
development, maintenance or decay, bound and subject to environmental determinations in 
the broadest possible sense. For Fernández-Galiano the idea of architecture is built around a 
‘fire that builds the dwelling’ around the dynamic unfolding of energetic space, architecture 
regulates, supports and conducts the flow of this energy while remaining subject to it.219 
The contiguity of fire or, more precisely, thermodynamics and architecture that Fernández-
Galiano describes at length energizes the image of spatial organization, locating its 
(un)ground(ing) in disequilibrium and difference. It describes the production of 
architectural space as constantly in flux, bringing the practice in line with more broadly 
environmental and ecological concerns, according to the contingencies this position 
necessitates. In this way the organization and production of space is tied up with energetic 
phenomenon that are the result of movements, friction, collisions and so on—spatial 
productions according to interactions, connections and openings. Architectural practice is 
seen to emerge between combustion and construction, at the site of a question regarding 
material as either an energy source or a potential framework for the support and regulation 
of energy. It is the interaction between these two interpretations of matter, the fact that the 
question is never fully answered that leaves architecture open to a productive disorder, to a 
deformative noise that is the result of material interactions; architecture ‘needs a flow of 
entropy in order to subsist’.220 
Of particular importance is the point at which Fernández-Galiano renders the link 
between fire, thermodynamics and architecture sonorous; in the dynamic thermic space of 
the open fire, in the crackles and pops that accompany its energetic productions and 
exploitations, Fernández-Galiano hears the echo of an originary combustion, the presence 
of an ‘archaic voice’ and the ‘fragments of an obscure and remote discourse’.221 Where 
Fernández-Galiano hears a voice emanating from the flames, we should perhaps take this to 
be an interpolation of noise that evokes the archetypal origins of home and hearth. The roar 
of the open fire is in this gesture equated with noise, with an intensive and productive 
difference constituting the ontogenetic potentials of Fernández-Galiano’s historical 
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continuum. Orientated around this site of an originary energetic exploitation and material 
displacement, spatial production is positioned within and against a state of disequilibrium, 
appearing through the introduction and maintenance of an identifiable tension that is 
situated amid and against the noise of matter in action. Noise, for Fernández-Galiano, can 
be seen to constitute a generative potential, expressing a site of environmental interactions 
that sits between solar organization and the crackle of a more localized combustion. The 
noise of spatial production, a space emerging in-between imperceptible conditions and 
apparent form, engenders an intensive site. This coupling of terms requires some 
explanation; site is a notion that, concomitant with that of site-specific practice, eludes to 
processual determination and a state of incompletion. It is a space that is to be built upon, 
that is occupied, that houses productive development and activity, it is a space that is in 
continual development or transformation. Site, as opposed to place or location suggests that 
its identity is not yet fixed, that it is either undergoing development or is being redeveloped. 
A building site, for example, ceases to exist once the building is completed, it then becomes 
a place, a location, a home or monument; it is only within the process of its determination 
or under the appearance of a particular temporality that the occupied space is considered a 
site. This particular mode of spatiality suits an elaboration of the impact of audible spatial 
characteristics as it suggests a degree of productive instability concomitant with the 
ephemerality of audible space. Rather than a construction of place, the interactive 
conditions of the audible constitute a mode of spatial production according to displacement, 
less a delimitation of figures than an equally productive deformation, decay or 
(de)composition—form in continuous variation, ‘a continuous variation of matter as a 
continuous development of form’.222 The stability and necessity of identity in the 
production and maintenance of place is replaced by the more spurious or ambiguous 
unfolding of a site by displacement. Any such doubts are, in a sense, the product of a 
specific ideological grounding of perception, a grounding which grants primacy and a sense 
of stability or certitude to ocular appearance, a grounding which is ungrounded where noise 
takes on a particular ontological significance. Where our ontological assertions are made 
according to a protean being or ‘reality of becoming’ as opposed to that of the stable, given 
and apparently consistent, doubt and willful skepticism is to be directed towards 
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appearance in general rather than simply the invisible.223 Where ontological spatiality is 
considered in terms of site as opposed to place, it is becoming, deformation and the efficacy 
of  the imperceptible rather than the consistency of the apparent that takes precedence. In 
this sense both perception and the perceived are taken according to an ephemerality and 
transience, no modality of perception being granted privileged access to the truth of things 
in themselves; the seen, heard and smelt all attesting to the ambiguities of objectility.  
What we might refer to as the site of sound refers to a process of spatial production 
or unfolding according to a continuous spatio-temporal deformation. The particularity of 
the site locating spatial concerns in flux as opposed to definition according to given and 
consistent identities. Despite the position I am attempting to set out with regards to a 
particularity of site, one continually redefined according to  complex deformations, this 
centralized notion of a displacement at the heart of sound’s function within the definition of 
space can be found ‘undone’ within the notion of site specificity. The latter, insofar as it is 
concerned with the specific identity of a locale, has more in common with emplacement 
than a particularity which functions according to continuous displacement. It is in this way 
that the specific embodies a potential for fixity that the particular does not. Yet, before a 
position is borne too strongly, we may consider such assertions as identifying two sides of a 
site—sides analogous to an oscillatory (de)territorialization: the potentials its particular 
instabilities offer up to wider deformations and the determination of relational yet distinct 
identities that its specifics  afford. The site in particular can be taken as referring to what we 
might call its internal or intensive differences, both its material conditions and it potentials 
for change, whereas the site specific is taken as being concerned with the potentials for 
‘external’ or extensive relations, or relations according to the definition of identities. 
Particular concerns lie with the productive conditions of or internal to a domain whereas the 
specific details relations with the domain as given; within the notion of the site lies the 
potential for both. 
Regarding the site of sound, we must acknowledge both the potential for 
displacement and emplacement afforded by the notions of the particular and the specific. 
While sound can be understood as occurring through displacement, such occurrence 
constitutes the potentials of emplacement, a potential that is made evident in the Schaferian 
notion of the soundmark. As is the case with the more familiar notion of a landmark, the 
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soundmark contributes to the identity of a location, to the production of a certain specificity 
of place. Its monumental function acting according to a certain socio-cultural and historical 
punctuation, lending definition and distinction. The spatio-temporal punctuation performed 
by the soundmark contributes to the consistency and identity of social space and locale; 
recurrence and repetition contribute to the status of the soundmark while contributing to the 
stability of a localized identity. This stability is attained and maintained according to a 
certain frequency, according to the repetitions of that which is particular to the soundmark 
and, through this repetition, constitute it as such. The frequency which accords the status of 
the soundmark is a frequency or repetition which facilitates contribution to the appearance 
of permanence, to a state of place rather than the state as site. The duration constituting the 
soundmark as such  marks a socio-economic, industrial and broadly cultural state, its 
permanence being reliant upon the stability of a given state of things and their recurrent 
interactions.  
The figure of decay determines the appearance of permanence, solidity determined 
as such according to frequency, durations and thresholds of perception. It is at the 
constitutive frequency of the soundmark or according to its durations and repetitions that 
the audible can be heard to participate in the production of place most clearly; the site of 
sound operates according to repetitions remaining obscure or barely perceptible, its being 
always in passing without promise of return. The frequencies, durations and repetitions 
appropriate to the soundmark render the site of sound specific, marking the consistency of a 
state of being and the stability of the given; the primary concerns of this argument, 
however, lie with operations and interactions at more obscure frequencies, their repetitions 
bearing proximity to the imperceptible. The frequency of such repetitions are proximate 
with the imperceptible in two senses, firstly, their frequency does not allow for its 
perception as the repetition of a thing but as the repetitions in a thing which as such are 
typically imperceptible, being in a sense covered over by the appearance of a thing as such. 
The repetition of a thing, its recurrent appearance, whether it be the six o’clock train, the 
flight of a blackbird across a garden while feeding its young or the postman, marks a 
‘slowness’ or molar repetition, a frequency that allows for the auditory identification of the 
six o’clock train, the blackbird or the postman as such, this ‘slowness’ allows for both the 
sense in which it is the same thing returning and the consistent appearance of that thing as 
such. Repetitions in a thing, the repetitions and frequencies constitutive of that thing, lie 
hidden insofar as what we take to be perceptible is only the thing as it is given, appearing as 
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a matter of expression. Such frequencies and repetitions constitute the ‘internal’ operations 
of a thing, frequencies to be associated with its necessary conditions more than its 
appearance. Insofar as we remain focused upon the frequency of a thing we are only able to 
know the recurrence of its appearance, the repetition of its given form. It is where we 
become concerned with the repetitions in a thing that we approach its imperceptible 
conditions, the movements of its organs or constituent particles, its progressive 
deformation. Perhaps the clearest example of these two orders of deterministic frequencies 
is found in the ringing of a bell, being characterized according to external or metric 
frequencies of recurrence as well as the ‘internal’ or intensive frequencies marking its 
particular sonority. The bell is marked by two orders of frequency or repetition, that which 
determines its sounding every fifteen, thirty or sixty minutes, and those that determine its 
audible qualities and spectral quantities. It is ‘internal’ frequencies and oscillations that 
constitute a higher and often imperceptible bandwidth, what we might call constitutive as 
opposed to apparent frequency. Here we can make a further sonorous example: once a 
frequency passes below around fifteen hertz, we being to hear and feel a sound more as a 
series of discrete impulses than a continuous waveform, at twenty hertz and above we have 
little difficulty perceiving a waveform as such and repetitions remain ‘internal’ to the thing 
being perceived; what we hear, what we identify through listening is a tone, a frequency, an 
audible quality and not necessarily the constant repetitions that constitute the conditions of 
an individuated frequency. In this sense, just as ‘a degree of heat is a perfectly individuated 
warmth distinct from the substance or the subject that receives it’, a frequency is yet 
another perfectly individuated vibration rendered distinct if not autonomous from its 
substantial reception and support.224 The second sense in which frequencies may be 
considered proximate to the imperceptible is with regard to the periodicity of appearance, 
what we might call a random recurrence or noise. If we are to conceive of dirt as matter out 
of place, we may in a similar fashion conceive of noise as sound out of anticipated space 
and time, in excess of metric recurrence. This is not solely to be thought in terms of an 
excess of conscious anticipation but one of capacity, a capacity for the perception of 
periodicity beyond which lies confusion and noise. Confusion marks the tardy appearance 
of the thing out of place, but also the thing which exceeds our capacity for perceiving it as 
such. Where we are concerned with a reality particular to becoming it is this state of 
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confusion as an apparent spatio-temporal distortion that defines the particular nature of a 
thing and grounds it in noise, in that which appears as groundless, homogeneous and 
‘imperceptible’ from the point of view of recognition, recollection and representation. 
Confusion, as appearance out of place and the contrary nature of site, marks a greater 
proximity to what we might call a nature of reality as becoming than that of the regularity 
and periodicity of a thing. It is onto such a state of confusion that the site, taken in 
particular, opens, while in its openness constituting the conditions of consequent 
emplacement and regulation. 
The site is considered in terms of a space in between, a space taken according to its 
movements between states rather than the states being moved between, it is taken herein as 
the ambiguity of a space displaced by sonority and vibration. Such spaces are to be 
characterized according to the intensity constituting their generative and deformational 
potential, as opposed to their geometric orientation which relies upon the fixity and stability 
of constitutive elements as a set of points for its identity. It is according to this notion of a 
space in-between that such a spatial orientation is to be described as an intensive site. The 
notion of the intensive site of sound is intended to place a particular as opposed to strictly 
specific focus upon our spatial concerns in order to better account for the role of a ‘dynamic 
materiality’ in a broad spectrum of individuations. Here we make use of the term intensity 
as we find it developed in the work of Gilles Deleuze, as referring to an intensive process, 
to a movement between states of stability. It is in conceiving of space according to an 
intensive site that it is thought of more in terms of spatio-temporal dynamics than static 
form, a conception particularly suited to the ephemerality of acoustic space. It is an interest 
or concern for a particular determinism that can be found at the heart of the present desire 
for a coupling of intensity and site. Intensive processes are to be considered as describing a 
reality particular to becoming as opposed to appearances, and therefore describing spaces 
set in motion, space encountered as dynamic as opposed to static and unchanging. 
Here we determine a relation to the site that moves away from its actuality not in the 
direction of further extensity in the form of its socio-symbolic extensions or associations by 
which it is represented—as is the case in Seth Kim-Cohen’s study of sonic extensions—but 
towards its intensity, towards that which inheres within it yet tends towards the 
imperceptible. This is, of course, not to say that the site is devoid of such extensions, 
themselves being efficacious in their determination of that which is given by intensity, but 
rather that such extensions, built upon given actuality, cannot be considered wholly 
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sufficient in its determination. An understanding of the site is required that accounts not 
solely for the specific but for energetics in general or the intensity of the particular.225 The 
site we are here attempting to delimit is one that resides within and determines a point of 
confusion not found within the discretion of ‘visual space’, a confusion that identifies the 
influence of the intensive within individual determinations amidst a broader ideology of 
influence. 
 In directing attention to the intensity of the site in particular we do not discard its 
actuality, as that which grounds further symbolic extensions, but rather take into 
considerations its conditions: that which persists in excess of the actually apparent. It is this 
state of apparent excess that describes the generativity of intensity: 
Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is 
intensity which dramatises. It is intensity which is immediately 
expressed in the basic spatio-temporal dynamisms and determines an 
“indistinct” differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a 
distinct quality and a distinguished extensity […] intensity creates 
the qualities and extensities in which it explicates itself.226 
Intensity is that which, insofar as it appears, appears confused from the position of 
recognition, constituting the deterministic processes by which the actual is engendered as 
such in its appearance as clear and distinct objects, signals and events that are recognized as 
such according to their perceptible qualities. Intensity names those interactions that persist 
within the imperceptible ‘background’ of experience, a background that is not entirely 
distinct insofar as it remains the immanent and ‘internal conditions’ of an object, its 
constitutive interactions; processual intensity, summarized under the rubric of 
dramatization, names the transition from pure or virtual potentials to actualized qualities, 
from that which is indistinct, continuous or confused to that which is qualitatively distinct 
or apparently discrete. The immediate expression of intensity in spatio-temporal 
dynamisms—fluctuating environmental determinants such as light, heat or sound—
                                                
225 Here I refer to the idea that ‘energy in general or intensive quantity is the spatium, the theatre of all 
metamorphosis or difference in itself […] energy or intensive quantity is a transcendental principle, not a 
scientific concept’. See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 301. 
The importance of the site and the vicissitudes of its actuality within artistic practice is outlined in Miwon 
Kwon’s ‘Genealogy of Site Specificity’, see One Place after Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational 
Identity (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2004), 10-31, especially 11-12 wherein the actuality in 
relation to which emergent site-specific practice would initially define itself is described according to the 
qualities of ‘a tangible reality, its identity composed of a unique combination of physical elements: length, 
depth, height, texture, and [the] shape of walls and rooms […] existing conditions of lighting, ventilation, 
traffic patterns; distinctive topographical features, and so forth’. 
226 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 306-7. 
 167 
describes the immanent experience of a difference that remains obscure from the 
perspective of its recognition, this immediacy is that which is experienced in a transition, a 
change between dynamic states that is felt before it is known, recognized or quantified, it is 
a state in which something is different while the thing remains obscure. In getting a sense 
of this immediate expression we can think of the changes in ambient light, noise or heat, 
changes that are immediately felt or experienced ahead of their recognition or qualitative 
rendering in distinct spatial experience, the agents of a subtle or subliminal influence. This 
immediate expression is that of a change in space or a change of space, that felt within the 
transition from one qualitatively distinct state to another. The immediate expressions of 
intensity are taken to be the expressions of complex and particular interactions forced into 
relation through the interaction of environmental determinants and spatio-temporal 
dynamics. Concerning ourselves with two reductive examples, heat can be thought to 
constitute the expressive frictions between the particular conditions of a space forced into 
relation, just as sound can be considered an expression of the particular contractions and 
rarefactions of matter in motion. While sound is most easily thought as qualitative 
appearance, being the product of material interactions, actualised according to the ear and 
the cultural conditions of its organization, it is nonetheless capable of intensive functions, 
of being considered according to the differences it makes and not only the qualities by 
which it is perceived. It is the sense of transition or difference that is key to the definition of 
intensity, the sensation of change in the rendering of distinct temperatures, sonorities or 
luminosity. Here quality remains a kind of punctuation which constitutes the ground of an 
appreciation of aesthetic qualities rather than the ‘functionalist’ perspective by which one is 
orientated towards an infraesthetics of intensity.  
 Intensity as the generative process that yields qualitative actuality is considered to 
be the motion that persists behind the appearance of stasis and stability, appearances 
determined according to thresholds of perception that occlude the process behind 
production. It is through actualisation or the process of a qualitative rendering that intensity 
is subjugated to recognizable identities in support of symbolic efficacy. It is through the 
actualisation and extensive explication of intensive spatio-temporal determinants that space 
is set apart from the continuity of the background noise constituting its Idea or indistinct 
multiplicity in the determination of its ‘visual’ discretion, a process of extensive explication 
that facilitates the homogenization necessary for its divisibility and modular repeatability. 
In making concrete this definition of an intensive site, thought as different from its actuality 
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in a manner opposed to its symbolic extension, as the generative ungrounding of actual or 
specific qualities that are determined as such through their actualisation or differenciation, 
we should once again turn to Deleuze for a concise explanation of the interrelation between 
actuality and its intensive determination: 
Intensity creates the extensities and the qualities in which it is 
explicated; these extensities and qualities are differenciated. 
Extensities are formally distinct from one another, and comprise 
within themselves the distinctions between parts corresponding to 
the distinctive points. Qualities are materially distinct, and comprise 
the distinctions corresponding to the variations of relations. Creation 
is always the production of lines and figures of differenciation. It is 
nevertheless true that intensity is explicated only in being cancelled 
in this differenciated system that it creates.227 
Where the specific is taken as naming a ‘differenciated system’ of distinct qualitative 
extensities, it is to a definition of the site understood according to the intensity of its 
particular interactions that we should turn in seeking an account of the continuity or point 
of confusion wherein it is precisely the individual who is subject to the affective influence 
of spatio-temporal dynamics, as it is the individual more than the I that is the subject of 
intensity: ‘the individual is distinguished from the I and the self just as the intense order of 
implications is distinguished from extensive and qualitative order of explication’.228 Where 
the I or the self is thought to be the correlate of qualitative and symbolic explication—the 
subject of an audile technique—it is the individual which exists at a point of confusion with 
the noise of the world, defined if not distinct in a position that proves problematic for 
spatial delimitation according to interiority and exteriority, the point of an excessive 
interactivity and a proxemic confusion.  
 
Extimate Architectures 
 
In maintaining a fire at the heart of architectural practice, Fernández-Galiano keeps 
architecture open to the dialectical and reciprocal problematic of environmental 
conditioning. His resistance to the compartmentalization of intensity—a process that 
constitutes its cancellation in being constrained within discrete units that through their 
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extensive explication become both repeatable and divisible—leaves architecture open to 
more broadly environmental or ecological determinations, through refusing to reduce it to 
the purely extensive or reduced spatiality of the line, to the discretion which characterizes 
McLuhan’s ‘visual space’. The intensive determination of the architectonic described in 
Fernández-Galiano’s speculative history depicts an architecture open to intensive durations 
and temporal deformation, a spatial production positioned between authorial intent and 
material mutability, a spatial production that is marked by the figure of decay as much as 
formal imposition. This account of a dynamic and intensive spatiality, however, neglects its 
influence upon those individuals populating it, insofar as it remains subject to one of 
Fernández-Galiano’s opening distinctions: that architecture be ‘thought of as an exosomatic 
artifact of man’.229 To take account of such influences and architectonic individuations, we 
must conceive of architecture in excess of this limitation. While this is, for Fernández-
Galiano, mainly a pragmatic distinction that focuses his study upon purely architectural 
objects, it nonetheless highlights the boundary that the practices and experiences we are 
concerned with herein render problematic, that of the limit between the exosomatic and 
endosomatic. This line which, in Fernández-Galiano’s work, separates the body and its 
functions from architecture, its energetic codetermination and regulation, inhibits the 
understanding of its intensive influence; this distinction limits the affective scope of 
architecture and its energetic implications, the extended field of which can be felt more 
than seen in practices engaging primarily with architecture’s void, as is most clearly evident 
in the simultaneously environmentally and physiologically orientated work of Philippe 
Rahm.  
  Philippe Rahm’s architectural practice locates itself within a point of confusion, 
residing within an endo/exosomatic continuum as opposed to a divide. His work has been 
variously described as environmental, meteorological and invisible architecture; in addition 
to this list, I would like to refer to it as intensive architecture, as a practice that is concerned 
with the production of intensive space more than the construction and maintenance of 
extensive form. The clearest example of this intensive practice and its somatic confusion is 
to be found in Rahm’s Hormonorium, conceived as the production of a physiologically 
oriented environment that is ‘based on the disappearance of the physical boundaries 
between space and the organism’: 
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The Hormonorium is an “im-mediate” space, no longer resorting to 
semantic, cultural or plastic media for the making of architecture 
[…] the aim is to act in advance of form, at a subformal level, by 
modifying the very information that gives rise to form, to behavior, 
to thought […] The Hormonorium is an alpine-like climate, but it is 
also an assemblage of physiological devices acting on the endocrine 
and neurovegetative systems. It can be viewed as a sort of 
physiological representation of an alpine environment, to be 
ingested.230 
Through the projection of UV light and the manipulation of oxygen levels in a space,  the 
Hormonorium stimulates melatonin levels in the body and increases its physical 
capabilities. These architectural projections are of course subject to the conditions of the 
host site they occupy, yet they distort and eat away at the definition of these extensive 
frameworks, temporarily usurping their spatial hierarchy and imposing their own. This 
usurping could refer to either the space of the body or the strictly extensive, architectural 
surround; it should of course be taken as referring to both, pinpointing the transgression of 
Fernández-Galiano‘s endo/exosomatic divide and the establishment of an intensive 
continuum between the somatic and architectonic through Rahm's ‘infrafunctionalist’ 
approach. 
The invisible dimension of architecture in which Rahm’s practice is situated finds 
itself lodged in the opacity of the body, articulating itself more towards the connections and 
continuity of the individual than the distinction and alterity defining the subject. Contrary 
to the trend towards transparency that through the glass façade conjures the appearance of a 
continuity between the within and the without while maintaining an internal homogeneity 
through the control of the differential and dynamic, Rahm’s invisible architecture 
accentuates the intensity of matter, it manifests an extended and excessive interiority 
without clear divide, often carrying with it the fear, claustrophobia and paranoia that is 
bound to that which gets under the skin.231 The accentuated materiality implicated within 
Rahm’s practice frequently remains invisible or at the thresholds of perception; 
architecture’s subject matter is here broadly delimited according to a territorial physicality 
more than a solidity or stability. 
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Within Rahm’s work the individual is interpellated by way of its complex 
physicality, addressed according to physiological dependencies expressive of 
environmental reciporicity. Rahm’s infrafunctionalism constitutes a particular determinism, 
yet a determinism that is not absolute. The individual body is taken as the site of an 
intensive mutability, an environmentally contingent multiplicity. A prevailing and praxical 
determinism is perhaps most evident in the claim that the Hormonorium affects the 
‘information that gives rise to form, to behaviour, to thought’.232 The question we should 
then ask in determining the nature of this determinism is that of the relation between form 
and information. Opposed to a kind of conservative, biologically deterministic theory 
wherein information is treated as being synonymous with genes and genetic sufficiency, 
Rahm’s infrafunctionalism, due to its opening onto a broader field of environmental 
determination is perhaps better thought as being roughly inline with Susan Oyama’s 
‘constructivist interactionism’ wherein contingency is asserted at every stage of a distinctly 
processual or interactive individuation, and information is considered to be inseparable 
from the environment or system that it determines and in which it is determined.233 Where 
Rahm’s infrafunctionalist practice is orientated towards information posited anterior to 
form, this anteriority is posited with regards to formal appearance and the aesthetic more 
than form per se, or the form of that which in-itself remains imperceptible. The 
physiological imperative that is evident in Rahm’s work should not be thought to cast the 
biological or genetic as absolute and autonomous sites of information, but rather as the 
particular territory of a determinable determinant, necessary components in a broader 
understanding of what constitutes a culture of reciprocal determination.  
Rahm’s foregrounding of the invisible conditioning of space opens onto the 
otherwise imperceptible matters of architectural ideology, the most effective manifestation 
of which resides somewhere between invisibility and transparency; the invisible 
nonetheless maintaining the sense of a certain spatial thickness, the saturated physicality of 
a spatium, while the transparent more readily alludes to the freedom of a smooth and 
harmonic space. The infrafunctionalist approach inserts itself into the expressive matters of 
a particular spatial ideology, investigating their influence upon thought and their potential 
for subjective determination; through their physical interpellation of individual matters the 
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manifest territories perform experimental individuations. The impact of an otherwise 
extensive environment is examined at a level of intimacy that conceives of architecture as 
determining not only the coordinates in which movement is possible but, through metabolic 
infiltration, as influencing the potentials of expressive movement, sensory perception and 
spatial experience. 
 This experimental approach to individuation by way of architectonic productions 
nullifies Fernández-Galiano’s characterization of architecture as exosomatic artifact in the 
constitution of an extimate spatial practice whereby physical interiority is treated as open, 
accessible and responsive to a dynamic and equally physical exteriority. In taking Rahm’s 
practice as a critique and development of the informal and invisible spatial dynamics 
underpinning Fernández-Galiano’s speculations, an extimate and individuating 
architectonic practice is outlined. The spatial impressions and determinations of 
thermodynamics that Fernández-Galiano treats as the theoretical underpinning of 
architectural practice, through its more general elaboration of a dynamic and specifically 
energetic production of space, analogically prepares the ground for a more thorough 
discussion of sonorous spatial-productions. Yet such spatial dynamisms cannot be limited 
to the exosomatic if we are to account for the individuating influences of architectonic 
space; Rahm’s focus upon the physical and physiological, a practice that, by means of 
atmospheric distortions, takes individuals as enmeshed within the act of spatial production 
conceives of an adequately extimate architecture. Rahm and Fernández-Galiano focus upon 
a broad range of physical and invisible spatial determinants that influence their occupying 
subjects by means of a variety of architectural installations including air conditioning, 
heating and the infra- and ulta- bandwidths of lighting.234 To the list of installations that 
contribute to environmental and atmospheric regulation or determination within 
architectonic space I would suggest we add those considered by Thompson in her account 
of architectural acoustics: the reflective, absorbent and otherwise broadly influential 
matters that determine auditory space, including the electro-acoustic means of ‘synthetic’ 
auditory spatial production. Rather than a fire that builds a dwelling, our primary concern 
now lies with a sound that delimits territory.  
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Sound, Space, Events 
 
Emily Thompson’s history of architectural acoustics details the regulation of auditory space 
by way of design and electroacoustic installation, providing an account of the gradual 
erasure of the auditory signature of space—carried out during the first third of the twentieth 
century—as is heard in its characteristic reverberations. Thompson’s account considers the 
cultural and subjective conditions of a practice of spatial silencing that catered for an 
enhanced communicability, a dampening of distracting noise detrimental to the efficiency 
of labor and the discretion of identity and personal territories through acoustic isolation and 
electroacoustic regulation. Thompson’s work provides a critical account of such practices, 
as has already been discussed; the field of acoustical design and auditory spatial 
determination initially opened by Sabine and others—as discussed in detail by 
Thompson—is taken as the site of a critical experimental practice in the work of a number 
of more contemporary artists. The emphasis placed upon acoustic design towards the 
regulation of space in Thompson’s historical account is here displaced towards a 
consideration of artistic practices foregrounding auditory spatial production. In such work it 
is often the excitation, manipulation, distortion or destruction of a given space, rather than 
the design and construction of a spatial complex ex nihilo that takes precedence—for 
reasons that are not only economical.235 Here the work of Alvin Lucier is, of course, 
exemplary. In the performance of Vespers simple clicks draw out the impressions of space, 
allowing echolocation within and the navigation of a given space, sound is used as a 
catalyst, an impulse to which the response yields the volumes and dimensions of space that 
shape and distort the signal excitation. What we find in much of Lucier’s work is a practice 
exemplary of, while not strictly reducible to, the functionalist or infraesthetic approach 
outlined above. Put to work is a kind of sonic functionalism where sonority is considered 
primarily from the perspective of the ‘function a quality fulfills in a specific assemblage, or 
in passing from one assemblage to another’, more than the specific details of the auditory 
quality itself.236 The aesthetic qualities of Vespers are of little importance and somewhat 
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banal if dwelled upon, the piece being more concerned with a performance of ‘acoustic 
orientation by means of echolocation, for players with hand-held echolocation devices’.237 
Orientation is made possible by means of an impulse response; the hand-held echolocation 
devices emit a simple click which is used to excite the performance space and relay 
information about its dimensions and volumes to the performers. The impulse itself is of 
little importance and is in a sense discarded, expendable, its function being of primary 
importance in relational interaction with a larger assemblage, establishing connections 
between architectonic space and occupying bodies through sonority. Here it is not the 
qualities of the audible but the functional affectivity of the sonorous and vibrational that is 
of primary importance. 
While the specific quality of a sound may not be of primary concern, the particular 
affectivity of the sonorous is. The sonic gesture as impulse, whether click or utterance, is in 
a sense sacrificed to the excitation of an assemblage that extends into the inaudible and 
imperceptible. In the now canonical I Am Sitting in a Room, the voice is both of central 
importance and in a sense expendable, given up as impulse and offering, it has the function 
of a material excitation of spatial determination, drawing out that which is particular to its 
otherwise imperceptible auditory influence. The specific importance of the voice in this 
piece should not, as Brandon LaBelle has pointed out, be played down, it being of 
particular importance to Lucier; the voice’s submission to architectonic determination has 
the function of smoothing out the ‘irregularities’, stutters and stammers in Lucier’s voice. 
Yet what remains of the voice is precisely its rhythmical content, its words, meaning and 
specific qualities having been stripped away by tape and architecture. There is a particular 
dissolution of the voice as it enters into (de)composition with a larger assemblage 
comprised of tape recorders, a room—different from the one you are in now—and the 
patient movements of Lucier’s performance. Here the voice becomes a line, a simple 
rhythmical impression upon a waveform that would otherwise remain pure potential, no 
longer a collection of discrete phonetic units but a waveform ‘freed’ from its signifying 
punctuations and occlusions in a shift from ‘the “pulsed time” of a formal and functional 
music based on values’ to the ‘“nonpulsed time” of a floating music, both floating and 
machinic, which has nothing but speeds or differences in dynamic’.238 A spectral voice 
remains as a series of accents, impulses which attain linearity through their entering into 
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composition with the resonances of the room, resonances which, as Lucier intended, 
smooth out punctuating irregularities, joining one accent to the next with a resonant thread, 
a shared, sympathetic element drawn out of the voice through its gradual dissolution. It is 
through this linearity and (de)composition that the voice becomes imperceptible as such. 
Lucier’s practice is exemplary of sonorous interactions within larger spatial assemblages, 
yet I wish to place more of an emphasis upon what is a less canonical practice. Insofar as 
we are concerned with the topic of sonorous individuations, clear expression of the 
extimate influence of sound within a similar context can be heard, felt and sought out in the 
work of Mark Bain. 
Bain’s work establishes a critical link between architecture and the body through 
common resonant capacities or what he has called ‘relational frequencies’, his work 
performing the transformation of a static structure or space into a developmental or 
deformational site inclusive of the vibrational, auditory environment being produced, the 
architecture which it occupies and the bodies which both envelop.239 Through its sonorous 
excitation, architecture becomes site set in motion through the use of synthetic infrasonics 
or mechanical oscillators directly vibrating the buildings themselves in the rendering of 
architecture as instrument; space is saturated with haptic, infrasonic vibrations. Architecture 
set in motion comes to occupy a pervasive acoustic territory, the body of which lays claim 
to a confused audition blurring the clearly cochlear with the more generally somatic—
listening can be said to find a particular limit in Bain’s work as the body is made a 
membrane through its confusion. More than the clearly architectural approach to the design 
and delimitation of space according to the discretion of lines, Bain frequently performs a 
manipulation or distortion of a given environment; rather than architectural construction, 
Bain’s is a practice of spatial production against many of the prevalent ideologies of 
architecture. In some cases Bain’s work constitutes an attack on architecture, literally 
cracking the buildings upon which the work depends, in others opposition is more subtle or 
complex, seeking to temporally distort space through an excessive vibrational presence. 
Such practice constitutes action against architecture that must nonetheless remain; seeking 
to destroy an architectural instance or perform a critical and distorting occupation, this 
positioning against architecture maintains a dependency, either in the sense of an 
‘anarchitecture’—after Matta-Clark—or that of a necessary background against which it 
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becomes possible to appear, a background from which each piece distinguishes itself while 
remaining inescapably related to its architectural conditions. 
 While Bain’s work takes a somewhat aggressive approach to architectural 
determination, it can nonetheless be understood to expresses a certain architectural vitalism 
in its desire to ‘activate’ space through sonorous imposition, vibrations bringing space to 
life. Bain’s identification of relational frequencies or resonant capacities between the 
organic and architectonic ‘can be thought of as a kind of divining, a search for a living 
entity within that which is normally considered static and dead: architecture, structures and 
sites’.240 This vibrational vitalism arises from a critical approach to a number or issues 
concerning architectural ideologies that Bain works against yet nonetheless bears; 
architecture conceived as static and stable becomes equated with a certain ‘lifelessness’ in 
its temporal defiance through the illusion of permanence and apparent solidity. Being set in 
motion such space is thought to be ‘activated’ or ‘brought to life’ through being forced to 
bear vibrations, an ‘injection’ of temporality or durational vitality allowing for an 
understanding and experience of architecture beyond its limitation to purely extensive 
geometries. A similar vitalism is found where attention is directed towards the diverse 
durations and temporalities of architectural matters, to the materials and movements of built 
space rather than its formal delimitation.241 Mostafavi and Leatherbarrow’s study of 
weathering, for example, looks to the temporal deformation of matters necessarily exposed 
to the elements, meteorological determination or what we might more broadly refer to as 
spatio-temporal dynamisms, an understanding of the architectonic according to 
morphogenesis rather than according to solid and static forms. Such studies consider an 
architecture opened-up to the agency of matter, spatial production being subject to both 
material deformation and design. Such vitalistic concerns are often brought to the fore 
where primary focus is given over to a broader sensory experience of space, where 
architecture and the urban is considered according to its thermal, auditory and olfactory 
constituents. Such ephemeral matters of expression do not allow for a suspension of 
temporal deformation towards the illusions of permanence upheld by a certain threshold of 
perception, but rather force a consideration of the inherent temporality of the material 
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through their transience. Such a vital sensibility can be recognized as prevalent in texts 
such as Sense of the City, in which the ‘alternate approach to urbanism’ is one of a multi-
sensory empiricism that sidelines the predominance of the visual.242 The result is a 
conception of urban space as a dynamic environment comprised of ephemeral materialities, 
noises, gasses and the ambiguity of dust. The transience of such amorphous assemblages, 
through a forcing of temporal considerations, draws out a particular vitalism residing at the 
margins of perception, within those events which are not so easily identified or pinned 
down according to the requirements of a visually dominated ontology. The ‘life’ of the city 
that such events draw attention to is more a foregrounding of impersonal or inhuman 
agencies and complex inconsistencies than a panpsychism. A similar vitalistic materialism 
finds expression in Bain’s activation of the architectonic and the confusion of its 
boundaries. As much as Bain’s work sets matter in motion, foregrounding a fluctuation of 
the built and ordinarily stable, this technique can be said to bring to the fore a state of 
matters that exists nonetheless, with or without Bain’s ‘activations’—although ordinarily 
beyond the bandwidths of perception. The materials of the built environment are always 
already in motion, interacting with one another, yet often imperceptibly so. Bain’s action 
against architecture could, in this case, be said to seek out the distortion and destruction of 
architectural ideologies more than architectonic matters, revealing the semblance of solidity 
and permanence, as well as illusions of autonomy, positions ungrounded by use and abuse, 
through the praxical ‘undoing’ of architecture as itself an act of spatial production.243 
In considering approaches to the architectonic primarily concerned with the 
physicality of the invisible as a means of foregrounding the extimate affectivity of 
architecture—its influence and determinations beyond any endo/exosomatic divide—Bain’s 
work is exemplary for its exploitation of common resonant capacities between the organic 
and architectonic. This common ground is often established through infrasonic 
connectivity, through both the haptic and residual aural events to which it gives rise. The 
vibration and excitation of the building itself through the use of mechanical oscillators 
engenders infrasonic activity, transforming the structure upon and within which this 
parasitic site subsists throughout its sonorous occupation. This sound excites both 
architectural matter and that of the organic bodies enveloped and permeated in 
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performance, establishing relations through sympathetic resonances; fluctuations in 
waveforms periodically excite bodily tissues and muscle groups in an imposed unison with 
the resonating walls, floor and ceiling of a host site. Bain has referred to the resonant 
imposition of this sonorous interconnection as site magnification: ‘I was interested in how a 
certain site magnification can invade a space both physically and acoustically […] With 
this magnification of the site an attempt is made to create a stage of destabilization, a 
reactive zone or interface between the spectator and the architecture’.244 While Bain here 
rehearses the ideological position already addressed below, wherein the auditory is 
conceived within architectural ideology in terms of immateriality, as is made evident in 
Bain’s contrasting of the acoustical and physical, the notion of site magnification resonates 
particularly strongly with the site conceived in terms of intensity, as outlined above, its 
‘destabilization’ establishing the metastability that constitutes the background conditions of 
sonorous individuations. Through this process of site magnification, through the 
uncovering and excitation of its intensive magnitudes and determination we find an 
understanding of structures, previously described by Bain as ‘static’ or ‘dead’, reconceived 
as ‘neither immaterial essences nor formal invariants but rather as the pre-individual 
grounds of individuation’, structures imbued with a generative or catalytic potential more 
than that of an extensive delimitation.245 Here the processual and generative instability of 
the site—as opposed to the identification of place or location—is of particular importance: 
the magnification of the site’s intensity engenders a state of confusion necessary for 
ongoing developments and the continuous determinations of both organic and non-organic 
bodies. Bain’s site magnification works according to an increased confusion through the 
amplified intensity of ‘a proximity, an indiscernibility that extracts a shared element’, that 
element being the resonant capacity that allows for the excitation of relational 
frequencies.246 Enforced in such situations is the proximity of an extimate waveform, 
known without and felt within as personal territories enter a point of confusion with the 
impersonal. Bain’s infrasonic connections perform a proxemic distortion through the 
intensity of the magnified site, leveling the thresholds of personal space through the 
common extimacy of an infrasonic continuum; the production of an architectonic and 
vibrational assemblage establishing a plane of confusion through a composition of 
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particular elements. Thresholds are commonly confused according to a particular intensity, 
the thresholds of personal space normalized to a point beyond that of the personal, given 
and visible. It is in relation to a sonorous distortion of proxemic delimitations that Bain’s 
interest in vibrational affectivity most clearly approaches a notion of sonorous 
individuation: ‘when boundaries are pushed, new awakenings in the self can be located’, 
leading to a reconfiguration of social interactions and identities.247 This manipulation of 
boundaries is most easily thought according to the sonorous distortion of personal 
proxemics already discussed; wherein this territoriality becomes confused, that which 
determines and delimits the self is brought into question as it finds itself located amidst the 
metastability of the ‘magnified’ site opened up to intensity. Awakened within the self is 
that which persists in excess of the consistent self image, an extended field of 
interconnections, confusions and contingencies that function beyond the minimal distances 
of interpersonal territorialities; within the magnified or intensive site, social interactions 
may be thought to operate according to an increasingly prevalent affectivity  destabilizing 
the priority assumed by the strictly symbolic. It is at this point of confusion that identity is 
opened up, preparing the ground for its potential restructuration. Excited within this 
confusion or generalized somatic complex is a ‘shared element’, a particular capacity 
comprised of both sonorous objectility and sympathetic potential in the establishment of a 
common resonance. 
The establishment of a pervasive vibrational interface between architecture and 
body, the destabilized, receptive and reactive site that exists between its constituent 
elements takes effect and resides both within and in excess of the individuals populating it. 
Subjection to intensity within Bain’s magnified sites has a similar physiological orientation 
to that evident in Rahm’s work: infrasonically infested, the muscles, lungs and other organs 
are stimulated, drawing attention to the contingencies of somatic matters; within a body so 
affected phenomena such as nausea, vertigo, coughing and gag reflexes have been induced. 
While Bain refrains from subjecting visitors to such states of physical repulsion he 
nonetheless addresses such phenomena and their potential role within systematic control 
through an induced extimate and essentially embodied aurality established in a relational 
continuum between body and architecture, issues that are addressed with reference to a 
broader technological infrastructure and affective bandwidth within Steve Goodman’s 
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survey of Sonic Warfare.248 The binding of this physiological orientation to an active 
interest in methods of surveillance and control is evident in Bain’s BUG installation which 
allows building users and passers-by to listen in on the sounds of a Berlin apartment block. 
A number of headphone sockets, some of which are accessible at street level, are connected 
to seismological sensors embedded within the building. This allows listeners to hear the 
audible effects of the forces impacting upon the building, whether that be the U-Bahn 
passing beneath it, winds against its walls or the movements and muffled conversations of 
those that occupy it. While these sockets give access to the audible information of the 
building and its immediate surroundings, the ambiguity of these expressions and sonorous 
interrelations is also addressed insofar as it presents an understanding of resonance that 
applies itself equally across connectivity, capture and the potential for control.  
In Bain’s performances and installations one is subject to the intensity of the site of 
sound being produced. The instability of the sonically induced site confuses architecture 
and organism in an extended sensibility, it performs a questioning of boundaries, territory 
and the interrelations of a population. Such a point of confusion unfolded within Mark 
Bain’s 2008 performance in the basement of Brunnenstraße 9, the construction site that 
would later become the location of his permanent BUG installation. What unfolded within 
this performance which filled the then incomplete basement with sound and infrasound was 
a vibrational field of increasing complexity and density. Amidst an undulating haptic and 
auditory field, nodes, dips and cancellations between waves provided momentary relief 
from the intensive sonic and infrasonic intrusions, yet such calm sites of intensive 
cancellation were short lived as frequencies constantly shifted. People moved throughout 
the lower level, often sealing off their ears from the noise—the majority of which occupied 
a register that resonates with organs other than the ear—following the trajectories of 
waveforms and the space inbetween. Nodes, points of cancellation, intensification and 
distortion acted as particular attractors, singular events lending invisible definition to the 
site performed as a multiplicity, an invisible and undulating topography occupying a site of 
dormant architectural intention and economic neglect. Bain was pressed up against a wall in 
performance, a body caught between waveform and concrete, occupying the interval or 
continuum between sound and architecture that his work engenders. This positioning 
identifies the locus of Bain’s infrasonic practice: a line drawn, a trajectory sounded, 
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between two bodies set in motion by common excitation. This space between identifies the 
embryonic site of our present argument, a site saturated by and activated in sound. Here we 
are driven to consider sound in the terms of a spatio-temporal event, a determined 
determinant. The space that we are concerned with is one of manifold complexity; the 
problematic complex of spatial discourse, as it expands beyond the purely geometric into 
the social, conceptual, architectural and individual, is discussed in detail within Lefebvre’s 
The Production of Space. Needless to say that where we are concerned with sound, its 
perception and reception, we cannot talk of one space without also implicating another; the 
traces and impressions of sound pass through all manner of physical, architectural, 
individual and social spaces, each of which determines the other. Here we do not need to 
rehearse the historical trajectory of this discourse already mapped out by Lefebvre, but 
simply to state that our focus on sound necessitates that this space be one primarily 
comprised of materials, a space determined in both the first and last instance by physical 
attributes. While this is the case, it is in the space which unfolds between these particular 
instances that our discussion takes place.249 
As sound relies upon matter so this argument is based upon the assumption of 
similar dependencies, upon matter as the ground of the subject under consideration. Yet the 
simple cataloguing and description of material properties cannot be allowed to define the 
totality of space if we wish to talk of social, political or ‘head’ space. While we require that 
our definition of space be built upon material characteristics, these qualities and 
characteristics cannot be considered all. Sound, understood as an event within and 
productive of space, serves as an example of this requirement. The nature of such an event 
is that of an agitation, friction, an interaction of material elements; only in the coming 
together, the collision of bodies, do we have the production of vibrations which can be 
rendered by the ear as sound. Sound appears as a residue of such material interactions yet 
cannot be reduced to or described according to an inventory of material components which 
constitute only a set of potentials.  As Steven Connor puts it, sound is ‘literally contingent’, 
that which we hear is under the influence of everything surrounding, preceding and 
receiving it: the properties of the colliding bodies that produced the initial vibration, the 
density of the medium through which it passes and the peculiarities of each auditory system 
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that perceives such vibrations as sound.250 This material contingency renders the 
consideration of sound as an event in space inadequate: a sound event cannot be adequately 
considered as such apart from the space in which it occurs, despite its mechanical and now 
digital reproducibility. To complement this statement and assert reciprocity necessary for a 
theory of sonorous spatial productions, we should recall Tschumi’s relentless assertion that 
‘there is no space without event’; space determines the (sound)-event determines space.251 
This reciprocity of event-space forces us to consider sound as always being of space and, 
perhaps more importantly, as space; insofar as there is the possibility of audibility, the 
production of space is marked by the spectral event of sound. 
 The notion of the event takes many shapes, and so we must define the event and its 
appearance here in order to express its reciprocal relation with space. In describing a sound 
as an event it must be thought of as an event amongst events, one enveloping and absorbing 
another forming sound-events of varying complexity, a conjunctive evental synthesis. In 
this sense an event does not appear in autonomy, as immaculate or irreducible appearance. 
Events thus defined do not appear ‘from nowhere’ but, rather, as being context dependent, 
conditioned by the environment within which they emerge and in doing so distort along the 
lines of the displacements they affect or according to the complex figure of decay. The 
importance of making such distinctions is realized in the resulting definition of an event 
that is distanced from the architecture of the spectacle; as we are concerned with the role of 
sound in the structuring of sites and processes of individuation we are driven to consider 
the status of a subject interpellated by sound. Rather than the subject of a voice, the subject 
is cast as being informed by and appearing amongst asignifying sonorities. The appearance 
of the subject is as a node amongst a set of nodal events: the event is localized in such a 
way that the subject appears alongside, atop or within an event amongst events. 
 In a passage that adds distinction to these overarching concerns, Deleuze renders the 
event audible: ‘the event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such 
as an audible wave’.252 Building on Leibniz’s definition of the event, Deleuze identifies a 
series of components that define an event and the way in which it may be figured as a 
vibration. We can broadly summarize these components as follows: an event is defined by, 
and therefore also defines through, extension; by grouping many elements under a 
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dominant and unifying elementary quality the event becomes distinct while confusing those 
elements which it claims as its components. It is the sound event, thought to operate 
according to extension that again identifies the status of resonance as a gesture of both 
connection, relation and capture. Here we can identify the power of a fundamental 
frequency in the identity of a waveform, a dominant vibration that defines a complex of 
other partials or harmonic vibrations. We can also think of the particles that a vibration 
subsumes and displaces in its transmission, particles which are regrouped under the identity 
of an extending waveform. The form that this vibrational event can take is influenced by 
the intrinsic material properties of the environment from which it emerges, exerting a 
determining effect over the actualities that the event yields such as the timbre of a sound 
and the resonant frequencies that are both drawn from it and excited by it. 
 As the event itself subsumes elements that serve its own extensions and 
propagations, for Deleuze, ‘the individual is a ‘concrescence’ of elements’.253 As such, the 
individual is implicated in and subject to a series of events. It is in this way that we are able 
to speak simultaneously of the event as both the appearance of sonic phenomena and as 
affective agent in the conditioning of individuals. In this way the event both yields and 
relies upon individuals and their constituent elements for its emergence; the event appears 
‘behind’ or beyond the delimited territory of the individual, as a determining and 
conditioning agent, as the source of a subjective impression. Events perform a determining 
influence on an individual, contributing to and shaping a process that yields identifiable 
form and actualities. While we can easily state that an event is understood to have an 
impact upon the conditioning of an individual, our focus on sound as event requires that we 
address the conditions of the event if it is not to be posited as simply ‘given’. The event is 
produced through interactions, anticipations and apprehensions, apprehensions that may 
occur between material elements as much as sentient beings. This refers specifically to the 
inherent material properties of the elements that comprise the potentials of an event. While 
being made up of elements, an event is, again, not entirely reducible to those elements; the 
event is a contraction of ‘prehensions’, or reliances and dependencies that are negotiated in 
interactive determination, shaped by the impact that elements have upon each other in 
constituting an individual or being subsumed within an event. Collisions and frictions 
constitute the conditions of a vibration which is the conditioning force of contractions and 
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rarefactions that are rendered audible in the ear. Such material interactions constitute the 
prehensions, contingencies, reliances, influences and interdependencies that move, 
according to Deleuze, ‘from the world to the subject’ establishing the field of 
environmental interactions and reciprocal determinations that are the ungrounding, 
metastable ground of the individual.254 What is particularly important about this latter 
component of the event is the way in which it weaves the individual into the 
aforementioned event-space reciprocity; in the interactions of event and space the 
individual appears as a component, a conception that, where sound is conceived in the 
terms of an event, is vital to the theory of sonorous individuation that this thesis aims to 
elaborate. 
Of immediate importance is the manner in which we conceive of the sound-event in 
relation to spatial productions or the definition of space. Such definition can be understood 
to occur in the extensions that are characteristic of the event-as-vibration, the way in which 
an event subsumes elements in a gesture of spatial production. In considering the site of 
sound as a site of individuation we must take into account the environmental 
determinations that influence the emergence of such sites. Frequently the production of 
such sites is subject to, while being active in the distortion of, architectonic space. Sound 
events appear within and against architectures, against in the sense of the properties of the 
often built environment that they rely upon and appear against the backdrop of, as well as 
against in the sense that they present a disruption of these spaces in their agitative processes 
of production. The appearance of sound against architecture is that of a function whereby 
phenomena distance themselves from a background that does not distance itself from the 
phenomena; the appearance of sound against architectonic space in the production of space 
anew nonetheless retains an inherent connection to properties of the ground from which it 
emerged; it appears as distinct from a background that constitutes its conditions and 
comprises its vital support.  
Bernard Tschumi has described how the body, as a source of movements not 
necessarily contained within the architectural vision, ‘disturbs the purity of architectural 
order’.255 Geometrical form, the originary lines demarcating space, are distorted by the 
presence of forms, figures and functions that appear within space yet from outside the 
authorial vision. The movements of bodies trace new lines throughout space, demarcating 
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new zones and territories. This distortion, caused by the movements of bodies, articulates at 
a macro level the dynamic state of the built environment when observed at a micro level, as 
artefacts in flux, subject to historical trajectories of spatio-temporal deformation. Contrary 
to the stability, consistency and solidity that architectonic space is ordinarily assumed to 
provide, such perceptions appear atop perennial developments and degradations in the 
material environment: the flow of glass, the progressive curvature of a step, the smoothing 
of stone by the wind. Just as the body is understood to distort architectonic space so to does 
any body, so long as we are not to inhibit the breadth of this argument; the presence of a 
body of water or a body of air brings with it implications for both intensive and extensive 
spatial properties, changing both the form and function of a space. The impacts, agitations 
and vibrations of bodies in space perform altercations and modifications of space, in short, 
distortions synonymous with spatial productions. To distort space, to enact modifications is 
to produce space anew through the reorganization of its constitutive material interactions. 
Such spatial distortions are observed in the process by which an impact is the cause 
of a vibration which is manifest in the contractions and rarefactions perceived as sound 
waves by the auditory system; this vibration which propagates through the displacement of 
materials is active in the distortion and production of space. In the reorganization of 
materials, however ephemeral such action might be, the characteristics of space are altered, 
producing space anew amidst a broader field of continuous deformations. Connections are 
established between objects set in sympathetic vibration, set into motion by a common 
wave which establishes connective lines and groupings constitutive of a site or territoriality; 
these sympathetic vibrations express material relations between objects set in motion, 
objects that are both subject to and the components of a sound-event. The establishment of 
these vibrational continuums leads us to address sound in terms of a sonorous-event-space, 
expressing the reciprocal determinations invoked in sound as spatial event. It is this 
amalgamation of co-determining forces that forms the ground or the conditions for the 
production of sonorous individuations. 
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3. The Site of Sonorous Individuation 
 
An expectant crowd occupies the basement of Brunnenstraße 9, Berlin, a building yet to be 
built, a site more than a place, awaiting Mark Bain’s performance. All that surrounds is 
foundation and embryonic structure. The development of this building is underway yet it 
has barely got off the ground, it is the most basic of architectonic shells. This space is 
defined by the blank faced intimidation and overbearing presence of concrete, this 
homogeneous material bearing stains, the marks of an outside leaking in. This is a space 
comprised of two floors. The upper level lies adjunct with the street, the presence of 
temporary construction fencing defines a crooked and weathered border. In the absence of a 
façade or external walls the boundaries of this site are defined by those of two other 
buildings that mark its extremities; such gaps puncture the density of the city, a pause in 
architectural development that bares the signs of stalled construction. Such hesitations 
afford a rare stream of elementary forces, appearing outside the regular channeling they are 
subject to in the streets and alleyways. If anything defines this upper level it is its openness 
to the world; a site demarcated by a patch of concrete and the protrusion of iron rods, no 
doors or walls to define entry points or condition the flow of bodies. 
 A non-descript circular hole lying off centre towards the far corner of this patch of 
concrete and a temporary staircase grant access to the lower level. Despite the barren 
appearance of the surroundings this lower level is teeming with activity, it is saturated with 
waves that oscillate around the threshold of audibility. Those waves which set the ear in 
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motion force the sensation of an intimate proximity; standing waves saturate the space in a 
gesture that both expresses the dimensions of this space while annihilating its identifiable 
acoustic signature. This lower level is defined by a vibrational density that iteratively 
pinpoints relations between organic tissue and architectonic foundation. As an individual 
amongst the crowd I witness the immanence with which the sound without excites and 
becomes the vibration within; waveforms define lines passing effortlessly through the 
body, making explicit the manner in which it is stitched and enfolded within its surrounds. 
A sound—barely a sound—knocks the wind out of me; the waveform enters my body, sets 
a lung involuntarily in motion and in response my body coughs, I cough. Just as a relational 
continuum is established between organic tissues and architectural materials, in this 
instance an interval between body and self resounds with the intrusion of waveforms that 
address and affect the organism before the soul. Here individuals are defined as those 
confused subjects enmeshed within volatile surroundings; intruding waves express relations 
between complex sets of materials constituting a body that extends beyond yet includes that 
which we would ordinarily call our own, that which can be seen to define our personal 
territory. Expressed is a tension between the complexity of the site, the material conditions 
of the events unfolding, and its expression in the reception, perception and actions of its 
subjects. These intrusive yet connective gestures, these sound events instigating relational 
matters, simultaneously invoke alterity; a forced cough constituting a loss of control forces 
me to appear momentarily, after the fact, at a distance from myself, from the body that 
coughed. In this moment, sedentary boundaries are disturbed as subjective topologies are 
rendered problematic. 
Here we arrive at the site of sonorous individuation, the problematic of sound and 
self. An account of sonorous individuation requires that we address the way in which 
sound, in its always already impure form, distinct from speech or music, addresses subjects, 
individuals, bodies in general. Our position here is on the side of sound in asking how it 
addresses its embodied subjects ahead its perception. In so doing we seek out the entry 
points whence vibrations affect the subject, the impact site of sound on self. Surveying 
potential entry points necessitates a certain set of distinctions in the above list of subjective 
associations in sound, questions regarding the synonymity of subject, individual and body. 
To suggest that we understand sound as addressing the body before the self is not to 
reintroduce a duality between mind and body per se. In positing a primacy of embodied 
reception we assume the neo-Bergsonian notion that ‘the body is like a continuous emission 
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of an infinite matter whose particles constitute the terms of choice offered to the mind’; the 
body constitutes the site of a forced rarefaction that in its diversion and filtration of matters 
enfolds the conditions of their being considered.256 The relation of subject and sound is not 
to be primarily considered from the point of view of an apriori consciousness, from the 
position of a self that executes free choice amidst its perceptions, but rather from the 
position of an ‘un-free’ receptivity, passive synthesis or the forced choices of a subtractive 
material embodiment; in other words, we set out not from a position of apriori conscious 
perception but forced prehension, from the contingencies of embodiment as the material 
prerequisite of mutable thought. This position which amounts to asserting a ‘primacy of the 
base’ does not set about to dislocate and diminish the subjective agency of which it 
constitutes the conditions, as said in one and the same sense of a constitutional embodiment 
is the capacity for thought as an agent in the determination of such conditions. In talking of 
bodies we have not begun to consider consciousness and yet, at the same time, we cannot 
avoid such considerations as the assumed model states that implicated in the constitution of 
bodies is the perplication of consciousness. Simultaneous with and indissociable from the 
constitution of organisms and material organization is the capacity for elementary thought. 
There is, however, a distinction to be made: not between mind and body but between 
subject and individual, as in the individual we identify a reciprocity between a body and an 
elementary consciousness as a site comprising the formation of, as opposed to preformed, 
identity. Such a notion of (impersonal) individuality is, for Deleuze, being per se; insofar as 
being is thought in a protean sense, taken as becoming. As a process of intensive 
differenciation, individuality is a state of intensive being, or—in terms more expressly 
related to our immediate concerns—the ‘being of the sensible’. The individual, the being of 
the sensible, is inseparable from and enmeshed in an ‘intense world of differences, in which 
we find the reason behind qualities and the being of the sensible, [that] is precisely the 
object of a superior empiricism’.257 Deleuze’s ‘superior empiricism’ confronts sensibility in 
the site of its ontogenesis, in the ‘intense world’ anterior to its own identification as the 
sense of some thing. We therefore claim the individual to be synonymous with a body, a 
body that in its being constitutes an elementary consciousness. The consequences of this are 
that in stating that sound primarily addresses bodies, its impressions—by virtue of the 
reciprocity I am at pains to address—contribute to an influence or particular shaping of 
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thought. Once again it becomes necessary to bolster the assertion that a body is not 
necessarily the body, that to talk of bodies is to talk of any body. Insofar as it is taken that 
the constitution of a body implies the perplication of conscious capacity one recognizes the 
near ubiquitous distribution of an elementary thought: ‘every body, every thing thinks and 
is a thought insofar as, reduced to its intensive reasons, it expresses an Idea whose 
actualization it determines’.258 Conceived as intensity we find enfolded within being matter 
and thought, a sense that foregrounds, as Ray Brassier has put it, ‘how profoundly 
difference and repetition, ideality and materiality are reciprocally enveloped’.259 Such a 
conception of the body possesses not a duality but a dyadic individuality; the latter is 
invoked in opposition to the former insofar as it posits a double, or rather a difference 
without ontological dualism, two parts that due to their interdependence cannot be 
considered discrete. In detailing this dyadic individuality we must address its components 
in order to grasp their interrelation. 
 In claiming that individuality comprises two inseparable components we identify a 
body that constitutes a consciousness that is a body. This inseparability is made clear by 
Deleuze when he states that ‘it is not enough to say that consciousness is consciousness of 
something; it is the double of this something and each thing is consciousness because it 
possesses a double’.260 A thing in actuality is doubled and it is this doubling, a break with 
all which is otherwise univocal, that constitutes its actuality, its distancing from an 
otherwise undifferenciated material continuum. The process of actualization constitutive of 
being entails a breaking away from an originary ground and in this moment being as such is 
doubled. The actualization of a particular being can be thought of as an expression of an 
Idea—taken in the sense of a material complex, a set of structuring elements, as outlined 
above. Summarizing Deleuze, Brassier gives a concise summary of expression as the 
modality of being-double or dyadic individuality in stating that ‘each thing is at once the 
expression of an Idea and the thought through which that Idea is expressed’.261 That which 
we call an individual, a thing, is synonymous with the expression of an Idea. Thus while a 
particular expression can be considered to make itself distinct from the Idea constituting its 
ground, the Idea does not distinguish itself from its expressions, which in its tenacity 
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comprises a double. Intensive being is therefore characterized as the coupling of active 
expressing thought and expressed conditioning Idea or, in other words, concrete complex 
and particular responses to it at the point of confusion or encounter. While it is claimed that 
actualization marks a split with the univocal, this is a bifurcation that does not engender an 
elevated, atemporal transcendence but rather the immanence of the transcendent insofar as 
intensive being and Ideal ground are necessarily inseparable. 
 
 
Figure 3 : Dyadic Individuality 
 
Here we arrive at a notion of the transcendent conceived not as that which floats atop a 
material substrata or exists in a state of eternal purity, but rather that which constitutes the 
principle of a ground or rather an ungrounding. It is that which constitutes a larger, 
predominantly imperceptible material continuum beyond the individual that is nonetheless 
immanent to it, the material constituents that constitute and compromise its embodiment 
while originating and extending beyond the individual. It is in this sense that the Idea, as 
concrete continuum from which embodied thought is drawn, can be considered to comprise 
the conditions of individuality, the collection of events or ‘singularities’ from which 
individuality distinguishes itself in expression. What Deleuze calls ‘an individual is 
established first of all around a certain number of local singularities, which are its ‘primary 
predicates’ […] That is the real definition of the individual: concentration, accumulation, 
coincidence of a certain number of converging preindividual singularities’.262 The Idea, as 
a grouping of ‘singularities’ or events, constitutes the immanent transcendent principle of 
individuation, that which is beyond or anterior to the individual yet nonetheless 
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encapsulated in it. It is that which constitutes the ground or genetic principle of the 
individual that nonetheless remains immanent or internal to it. What we find here is a 
gesture necessarily coupled to that performed by Deleuze in his critique of the Idea—
reformulating Ideas as genetic principles rather than mental concepts—Deleuze redresses 
the notion of the transcendent by swinging it around the individual—the individual 
conceived as being enmeshed within and inseparable from a world—displacing the 
transcendental from its normative, ‘elevated’ or ideal position with regard to the subject. As 
with the Idea, the transcendental is shifted from the position of telos to that of a genetic 
principle—it is stripped of its association with immaterial immutability and reconceived as 
the generative ungrounding ground of the individual. Where we are concerned with 
identifying the impact of sound on self, with the identification of sound as influential 
materiality, this seemingly paradoxical notion of an immanent material transcendence 
provides a productive framework for addressing the affectivity of sound. Acoustic space, a 
necessarily contingent complex of events that extends beyond sonority, constitutes an 
affective locus of singularities, an influential set of events that impact upon the individual 
from a position anterior to it. Yet the possibility of this anteriority requires that we conceive 
of the individual according to a certain temporality, as a thing, far from being immutable or 
eternal, for which being is necessarily in time. In doing so we adhere to ‘an ontology 
wherein being is understood as temporal differentiation’.263 Such temporal ontology is 
required if we are to conceive of sound events as appearing anterior to the self, as the self 
must be conceived as always being under the influence of events, as contextually 
determined and necessarily contingent; only such a conception permits the opening out of 
subjectivity, as a self conditioned by events is open to influence as each new event 
commences. 
In adopting the gesture performed by Deleuze in rethinking the transcendent we 
might momentarily find the individual parenthetically positioned, bounded on each side by 
differing notions of the transcendental: on one side we have that which characterizes the 
ideal domain of subjectivity, and on the other—after Deleuze—the transcendent as 
immanent genetic principle, as ground. If we accept this transcendental revolution as a 
means of negating eternal and immutable form, we should make preparations for the 
criticism of deterministic thought that should be expected to attack any philosophy 
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accounting for the production of individuals at the expense of individual productions, with 
these defenses in place, we must account for the displaced subject, the I which lingers in the 
place where its traditional, transcendent territory once stood. 
 Just as we have sought the dissolution of the guise of immateriality so that we might 
open out onto the greater complexity of materiality—a movement towards the infinite 
resolution of matter carried out through the dissolution of normalizing, culturally 
conditioned thresholds of perception that lead to perceived immaterialities—we require the 
redress of durations and temporalities that hold the subject aloft its transient material 
substrata. In order to do so the subject must be conceived not as that which persists in time 
but as the subject of time. Yet we must take this further, as this duration should not be 
thought of as a single arch from conception to death. We are here in search of a generative 
and granular subjectivity of infinite resolution; overlapping, granular subjectivities, one 
duration after another, a complex and confusion of elementary thought. 
 In providing background to these assertions we should situate and better specify the 
consequences of Deleuze’s transcendental revolution with regard to the constitution of 
subjects. To grasp the temporalities of subjectivity that arise from this regrounding of the 
transcendental we need to clarify the structure of this ground if we are to trace the events 
and singularities which through their structuring of the transcendent determine the rhythms 
and temporalities of individuation. Prior to an exposition of subjective constitution there 
must, in accordance with a dyadic individuality, be an account of the production of 
individuals; in accounting for this productive ground Deleuze states that: 
A consciousness is nothing without a synthesis of unification, but 
there is no synthesis of unification of consciousness without the form 
of the I, or the point of view of the Self. What is neither individual 
nor personal are, on the contrary, emissions of singularities […] 
Singularities are the true transcendental events […] Far from being 
individual or personal, singularities preside over the genesis of 
individuals and persons; they are distributed in a “potential” which 
admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them by actualizing or 
realizing itself, although the figures of this actualization do not 
resemble the realized potential. Only a theory of singular points is 
capable of transcending the synthesis of the person and the analysis 
of the individual as these are (or are made) in consciousness.264 
                                                
264 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 118. 
 193 
Here we see that to transcend the self is to arrive, not at a higher plane of consciousness but 
the conditions of its production. In this passage Deleuze refers to two stages or strata of 
individuation, that of the individual and the personal. It is the first stage of individuation, 
leading to the production of individuals, that is dealt with in the biological, socio-cultural 
and political sciences, through the study of groupings of singularities that comprise the 
conditions for the  production of individuals: the interaction of genetic, nutritional, 
economic, psychological and even meteorological tendencies, determinants or singularities 
that influence the production of individuality.265 This overview of influences is of course 
incredibly crude yet necessarily so, as the complexity of individuating influences in even a 
single instance vastly exceeds the scope of this text and, for that matter, that of my own life 
time. For example, we might also refer to the vastness of cultural and familial histories, 
more complex environmental and geological relations, and of more particular concern to 
this text, the influence of architectonic space and vibrational phenomena. Viewed in this 
way, these groups of transcendental singularities are seen, despite their interactions, as 
disparate sets of influences that constitute the grounds of as yet undifferenciated 
individuals. It is in what Deleuze refers to as the second stage of individuation that we 
witness the emergence of personality and subjectivity which through the making possible 
of identity performs the unification of these disparate determining factors under the 
appearance of a self asserted against its background influence. The relations of these two 
stages of individuation are expressed clearly and concisely by Levi Bryant who, 
summarizing Deleuze, begins with: 
a transcendental field out of which the individual is eventually 
actualized. At the second level, the level of persons, we have 
synthetic predicates […] It is true that at the first level the individual 
body envelops singularities upon the transcendental field, but it does 
not necessarily synthesize them. At the second level, the predicates 
are synthesized forming a unity or identity […] But this identity, in 
turn, is only rendered possible on the basis of an alterity.266 
It is at this point that my argument leaves itself most open to criticisms of overly linear or 
simple determinism, of positing an unchallenged primacy of the transcendental base as the 
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trajectory of this argument so far passes only from world to subject. If we are to avoid 
becoming stuck in a deterministic rut we must account for the space of subjective influence 
upon the world, the role of subjects in influencing the principles of their own 
determination. In a passage from Difference and Repetition Deleuze lays out the key stages 
of his theory of individuation while  addressing the critical reciprocity  that is required if we 
are to avoid an over simplified and reductively deterministic account of individuation: 
these systems are not defined only by the heterogeneous series which 
border them, nor by the coupling, the resonance and the forced 
movement which constitute their dimensions, but also by the subjects 
that populate them and the dynamisms which fill them, and finally 
by the qualities and extensities which develop the basis of such 
dynamisms.267 
Here we find the interactive structural components of Deleuze’s theory of individuation: the 
‘heterogeneous series’ synonymous with Ideas and virtual multiplicities, their ‘coupling’ 
which is constitutive of dialectical or problematic-Ideas, the ‘forced movement’ which in 
‘constituting dimensions’ performs the carving out of space characteristic of intensive 
processes and therefore spatio-temporal dynamisms, and finally the qualities and extensities 
that constitute the forms, identifiable phenomena, bodies and objects that these processes 
actualize. More importantly, however, is the assertion that these systems of individuation 
are not only defined by the former three stages most readily associated with the 
transcendent base but also by the subjects, extensities, actualities and therefore identities 
that a theory of individuation accounts for. It is this latter point that is essential in avoiding 
a reductively deterministic philosophy by accounting for subjective agency in the 
determination of the genetic principles of individuality and subjectivity, in other words, 
acknowledging the reciprocity of virtual  conditions and actual identities. Subjectivity is not 
stripped of importance or agency but rather positioned as one agent amongst others within 
complex systems of determination. We arrive at a subject that is necessarily in-between, 
that appears and reappears between events. 
 
Noise and the Extimacy of the (Im)personal 
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Having moved from the site of architectonic extension to the intimacy or extimacy of the 
individual, a similar contraction of auditory space should be considered in addressing the 
particular individual, impersonal and subjective impacts of a more localized and intimate 
sound space. This argument has been following a course of what we might refer to as 
spatial contractions, from the expansive noises of the sea, of nature, of an environment 
considered as a confused whole, to the environment considered according to architectonic 
determination and distinctions, to the urban or built environment. Where both of these latter 
expansive spaces or spatialities conceive, one way or another, of collective and social 
spaces, we now turn to a sound space that is often considered in terms of solipsism, 
individualism and isolation, to the proxemic thresholds constituting headphonic or 
headspace, to the portable and personal sound spaces constructed through the use of mobile 
media players of all kinds. Of ongoing interest is the production of space for the ears and 
the specificity of those spaces which appear to cut them from the world by synthetic or 
electroacoustic means. Of particular interest is not only the production of a synthetic space 
through headphonic means, but the way in which the headphonic can be thought to 
construct or direct audition towards a space not for but between the ears. As discussed 
earlier, Emily Thompson has given an extensive account of the manner in which physical 
and specifically architectural acoustics came to be broadly undercut by the possibilities of 
electroacoustic spatial synthesis, the way in which sound systems as yet another 
architectural installation were capable—in theory at least—of producing any space 
imaginable through the application or synthetic production of reverbs, through the placing 
of loudspeakers so as to create an otherwise impossible intimacy between orator and 
audience. The negative problematics of a given, physical space could be solved through the 
installation of electroacoustic systems capable of synthesizing an altogether more agreeable 
and intimate space. With the development of portable sound systems such possibilities 
would be taken to the streets; one can be pressed against the bodies of multiple others on 
any city’s bus, train or underground network, close enough to smell their breath, feel the 
heat being emitted from their bodies, see the dandruff on their shoulders or the remnants of 
their breakfasts in their beards, yet one can be immersed in expansive and cavernous 
reverberations, or drawn out of the banality of the situation by the recording of a truly 
exceptional musical performance. Audition can be directed elsewhere through the 
imagination, and one can listen within a space that through the reverberant means of a 
portable spatial synthesis extends well beyond confines of a train carriage, bus or dinner 
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queue, placing under auditory erasure the noise of the otherwise problematic intimacy of 
others. Where public congestion and the uncomfortable intimacy of our largest cities began 
to overwhelm its occupants, portable media would—amidst the ‘thickness’ and opacity of 
overcrowded locations, in which each and every sound or smell produced by those forced 
into unwelcome intimacy would become both un-ignorable and intolerable—create a 
proxemic buffer zone, a space of synthetic relief through the ‘virtual’ creation of an 
elsewhere, either through portable headphonic listening or visual media such as books, 
magazines, newspapers and the ever expanding array of portable computers and other 
multimedia devices. It is into this problematic confusion that headphonic listening inserts 
itself most readily, as a response to what acoustic ecology has traditionally called the ‘lo-fi’ 
environment, most easily thought in terms of the noise of the city. concomitant with the 
need to turn away from or ‘tune out’ of the city’s noise, from the nondescript and confused 
noise of others,  is the prevalence of personal soundscapes and private acoustic spaces 
made possible and portable through headphones, mobile protection against the 
overwhelming noise of the world. Yet where headphones are concerned, this is not strictly a 
turn inwards, a turn towards inner peace and quietude, but rather a synthesis or deferral of 
space, a synthetic sonorous envelope, a spectral shield or membrane that maintains the 
perception of a minimal, proxemic distance between oneself and others. To shut out the 
noise of the world one might stop up the ears with wax or earplugs, yet to do so brings 
another space, another site of noise, one which is all too close: that of the body’s interior, 
bringing the sounds of the jaw bone, tinnitus, each step upon the concrete which resonates 
through the skeleton and, perhaps most disturbingly, ones own heartbeat, the sound of both 
life and a countdown to death, too far into the foreground. Such a space, the space of an 
internal, distanceless and claustrophobic audition is found to be equally as threatening as 
that of the ‘lo-fi’ environment. What headphones provide is the maintenance—however 
illusory—of a minimal distance from both the noise of the world and that of one’s own 
body and finitude. Under threat from the lo-fi environment, the listening subject may seek 
solace and affirmative individualization within headphonic space; Truax summarizes this 
mobile listening practice nicely, this turn away from the noise of a given environment as 
the ‘“embedding” of an environment within another through use of portable, lightweight 
headphones’, yet for the traditional acoustic ecologist this is a practice reinforcing the 
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‘schizophonic split between electroacoustic and natural environments’.268 The portability of 
electroacoustic or ‘synthetic’ sound-space provides the listening subject with the choice to 
partially leave an overwhelming environment, to enter another more concomitant with the 
delimitations of a personal territory, to make space and maintain a distance: 
The choice of audio environment has the attraction for the listener of 
being entirely one’s own […] self isolation can occur anywhere and 
at will […] The audio advertiser’s exhortation to “shut out the city” 
with their stereo products is now being answered by the walk-
person’s logical response, “shut out everybody”. It becomes the 
electroacoustic answer to noise pollution, as well as a psychological 
listening habit made profitable.269 
The increased noise of urban environments is answered with an increased individualization 
according to portable and synthetic sound spaces, isolated sound-spaces determined 
according to the listening habits of individually orientated listeners. It is precisely such a 
turning away from the problematic noises of the world that acoustic ecology claims set 
itself against, yet it too turns away from noise—the reversal of which is made possible 
‘internally’ by Truax’s considerations of noise—moving away from the world and towards 
an idealized silence which maintains and protects the stability and discrete consistency of 
identities in manner similar to the conservative function provided by headphones. 
Admittedly, this ‘conservative function’ remains too simplistic insofar as headphone use is 
often as much a means of personal manipulation—a spatial and emotional insert bringing 
difference to an overwhelming or over familiar environment—as it is one of protection, yet 
this latter function nevertheless remains and appears as the primary target of Truax’s 
critique. Such portable, headphonic sound-space becomes almost a necessary defence 
against the noise of the city which often threatens to overwhelm; it is in this instance that 
the Schaferian critique of headphones is at its strongest, where it is not a critique of 
headphones per se, but rather directed towards the occlusion of the noise of the world in 
place of a critical listening practice, a blockage which has the effect of allowing this noise 
to proliferate unchallenged. Such a turn inwards, a turn into portable and embedded 
environments promising escape, quietude or resistance, is a turn towards self definition and 
subjective consistency amidst a chaos of ill defined signals, signals swamped by the rising 
background noise. The response to the lo-fi environment, this turn inwards, is  not only to 
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‘shut out the city’, nor to ‘shut out everybody’, but to shut it all out and gather yourself, 
produce a space in which you can get yourself together through listening, composure and 
composition. 
Such auditory spatial productions mark the emergence of a distinctly personal 
territory, a space in which one takes place. From an ontological perspective such practices, 
through their maintenance of a minimal distance, pose a particularly subtractive model of 
individualization: through selection and subtraction, through the removal of oneself from 
the noise of a given environment the consistency of self image and the delimitation of 
personal space is maintained. Too much noise or an excessive proximity or intimacy and 
the self becomes confused. Response often comes in an auditory turn away or within—but 
not too far—to a space of quietude or consistency and stability. In the somewhat 
paradoxical ‘feeling of being cut off’ that Truax mentions it is the distinction or discretion 
of the self which is threatened as periodicity becomes blurred amidst rising background 
noise. Discretion is lost as the noise of the world threatens confusion on one side, while that 
of the body as inescapable and claustrophobic sound space waits on the other, between 
which the embedded auditory environment or sound-space insert provides relief. 
  To a certain extent this merely states the obvious insofar as such experiences are near 
ubiquitous around the globe. Nonetheless, much has been said to challenge the most 
obvious positions and received wisdom on such listening practices, accounts which deserve 
consideration; such accounts are, of course, of concern as they directly address modes of 
individualization according to audile techniques. It is to accounts and practices that engage 
directly with the complex problematics and proxemics of this portable spatiality that I wish 
to turn. A brief overview of practices concerned with the production and investigation of 
such portable, individualized and individualizing spaces will lead to a consideration of 
works that seeks to engage more critically with precisely the spatial aspects of related 
audile techniques, in challenging the personal and individualized spaces that such 
techniques and technologies produce. These critical practices to which I will eventually 
turn are considered due to their opening out of such personalized spaces considered 
characteristic of headphonic listening, creating openings from the individualized that lead 
in two apparently very different directions: firstly, back out into the world, and secondly, 
deeper into the question of what we consider an individual and individual space to be, into 
the impersonal conditions of the personalized, and the opacity of the somatic complex. It is 
this latter point that remains focused upon the individual yet one which does not distinguish 
 199 
itself from the world it inhabits and the spaces it occupies. 
 For Schafer, headphones constitute a symptom of unchecked noise pollution and 
ubiquitous schizophonia, with listeners walking around divorced from their surroundings, 
isolated within their own, individualized synthetic spaces, set apart from the wider acoustic 
community: ‘In the head-space of earphone listening, the sounds not only circulate around 
the listener, they literally seem to emanate from points in the cranium itself, as if the 
archetypes of the unconscious were in conversation […] when sound is conducted directly 
through the skull of the headphone listener, he is no longer regarding events on the acoustic 
horizon; no longer is he surrounded by a sphere of moving elements. He is the sphere. He is 
the universe’.270 While Schafer’s observations will be familiar to most city dwellers, there 
is a sense in which these observations remain too simplistic, limiting elementary movement 
to an overly naturalized image of the external acoustic horizon, remaining unaware and 
unable to appreciate the subtleties and headphonic listening practices, the almost necessary 
function they provide for many users and the complex quotidian praxes and urban 
engagements they are bound up within. A more problematic objection comes in response to 
the assumption that Schafer’s assertions are based upon, namely a prior unity or authentic 
and unperturbed experience of the world, a position which neglects the necessity of a 
minimal distance, disconnection or distinction of the alteritous foundations of subjective 
consistency that are supported or reinforced through headphonic schizophonia where 
connectivity overwhelms. Further insufficiencies and undue simplifications put forward in 
Schafer’s view of headphonic listening are pinpointed by Steven Connor: 
The walkman has the reputation of bringing about a solipsistic and 
antisocial withdrawal of its user from his or her environment. But it 
is better understood as a way of translating the experience of the city 
in auditory terms. Unlike fixed hi-fi headphones, the Walkman does 
not remove its user from his or her environment; rather, its 
portability deepens the experience of the body as it moves through an 
urban scene transformed by the cadences and colorations of the inner 
sound-track. The Walkman offers the pleasures of a mastery 
exercised over an otherwise potentially over-mastering saturation by 
auditory stimulus in the city, but it does so not by switching the 
attention of its user from an outer to an inner experience, but by 
making available a different (auditory) kind of attention to the non-
auditory aspects of the city […] the Walkman auditizes the urban.271 
                                                
270 Schafer, The Soundscape, 119. 
271 Steven Connor, ‘Sound and the Self’, 60. 
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In contrast to Schafer’s isolating and solipsistic view of headphones, headphonic listening 
practices are here recast by Connor as productive of complex individualizing spaces and, 
where portability is taken into consideration, alternate, augmentative interfaces to the wider 
environment; their use allows the self to make new connections to, and experiences of, the 
surrounding environment enabling progressive individualizations along the relational lines 
established between listening praxis and its associated environment. The inaudible is 
‘auditized’, peculiar synchronicities arise as the world bleeds back into headphonic space, 
as a pause in the music creates the smallest of openings onto an over heard conversation or 
the crunch of grit and gravel under foot. The stream of visual and otherwise inaudible 
events silenced by the choice to ‘plug in’ while en route acquires a rhythm that would 
otherwise have slipped through the cracks and distractions that punctuate attentive 
durations. The world without takes on a rhythmic and harmonic structuration according to 
the sounds heard within. Events contracted, unified in perception, structured according to 
the rhythms of a portable sound-space, contribute to the terrain being crossed; one’s 
internal sound-space will bring to the fore details otherwise neglected, framed differently 
according to abstract soundtracks brought into it by those who pass through. New routes are 
taken, paces altered, spaces differently perceived according to the intrusion and confusion 
of sounds brought out into the world within portable headphonic space. While headphonic 
listening in any instance constitutes the potential for alternative engagements with the 
environment, this potential has received considerable attention in the work of Janet Cardiff. 
Cardiff’s sound walks involve listeners wearing headphones and listening to prerecorded 
pieces that, through a combination of field recordings, narrative, superimposed sound 
events and instructions, direct them along a predefined route. The sounds heard are taken 
from the space in which the walk takes place—an overlaying or enfolding of the place 
within itself that short-circuits schizophonia—often overlaid with additional sound effects 
and details. Cardiff presents listeners with the sounds of her walking, the sound of her own 
footsteps upon the earth on which they now stand, following the same route they 
themselves undertake; one walks her walk. Through the use of binaural techniques the 
listener is also presented with the sound of Cardiff listening; one listens to her listening, 
according to the specific dimensions and resonances of her cranium. Cardiff’s work tests 
the extent to which such listening practice and sound-space can be said to construct new 
connections with an environment. Cardiff develops an uncanny relational proximity to the 
site of a sound walk, binaural on-site recordings construct the most intimate of hi-fidelity 
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fabrications, a subtle distortion of site supports her superimposed narratives, a distortion  
that is itself productive of site as ongoing spatial production. Listeners are presented with a 
minimal margin of mediation, to listen to a recording of the site in which one stands 
situates one at the edge of auditory simulacra, a superimposition of ‘soundscape’ as 
uncanny auditory object against the background noise of the occupied site that nonetheless 
persists, a perceptual distanciation. 
 Cardiff presents us with a particular tension between listening practices, her work 
applies many approaches used within acoustic ecology: field recording, sound walking, 
cartography and so on, yet her nuanced manipulation of headphonic space within the field, 
the production of fields within fields presents the most intimate of listening spaces atop and 
within that which is expansive and open; headphonic space is reintroduced into intimate 
proximity and interrelation with the noise of the world, a juxtaposition and cross 
contamination of sound-spaces that suitably complicates the narrative and structure of 
auditory space outlined above. Such practices add necessary complication to a trajectory 
that, moving from the geological and geographical to the architectonic to headphonic space 
presents an all too straight forward and linear spatial hierarchy. Where headphonic is space 
is opened out onto the world, a gesture expressed most concisely—although not 
exclusively—in Cardiff’s work, within the structure of auditory influence an opening is 
forced that delimits that of the listening subject as agent in the determination of auditory 
conditions. The act of listening performs a structuration and restructuration of sound-space. 
 Despite such openings and extensions, portable headphonic spaces, as individualizing 
spaces, nonetheless constitute a certain personal buffer through which events are filtered 
and interpreted, an ambiguously extended and increasingly complex personal proxemics or 
subjective territoriality. Such listening practices, despite their confusions, complexity and 
uncanny embedding of auditory environments, nonetheless maintain a certain consistency 
of the individualized self image; this is not to say that such consistency is static or 
immutable within such listening situations, but that while headphonic listening cannot be 
reductively characterized in its entirety as a solipsistic practice—in part at least due to the 
portability mentioned by Connor—the means by which it addresses its listening subjects 
maintains individualized modes of consumption and models of audile subjectivity. 
 While such individualized auditory space generally characterizes headphonic space, 
we can find an exception in the work of Andreas Avelas whose Earphones constitutes an 
exploded headphonic space opened up to a more collective mode of sonic experience. 
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Hundreds of pairs of headphones laid out on a gallery floor constitute the input and output 
nodes of a feedback network. The content of this system is the filtering of architectonic 
space through the limiting bandwidths and reproducible frequencies of headphonic space. 
The acoustic space of the gallery constitutes an associated and supporting structure for the 
occupying sonic field that Avelas’ Earphones assembles. Avelas’ Earphones invoke the 
potential for his subject matter to be both speaker and microphone, to be 
anthropomorphically somatised as being simultaneously mouth and ear. Earphones sets 
itself apart from the surrounding gallery space by producing a distinct and relatively static 
sonic field and bandwidth, a parasitic auditory occupation. Yet, as with any feedback 
system, its infrastructural supports, electronic, physical, architectonic and so on, being 
indissociable from its existence, are implicated and enmeshed within and as the technical 
system that subsumes its existence; the sound produced is an expression of the system’s 
physicality and extensive connectivity. The piercing body of sound produced by the 
electroacoustic network and its associated architectonic milieu is an expression of relational 
interior acoustics that cuts through trends in acoustic design that seek to create the sound of 
any space and simultaneously no-space through its auditory erasure. Where headphonic 
space is interpreted solipsistically as a space in isolation, divorced from its surrounds, 
Avelas excites the potential for this confinement to be refigured, rewired and folded out 
into the wider architectonic world. The technical infrastructures of headphonic space are 
reconceived in terms of a potential for modular interconnectivity, as being capable of 
defining a wider, collective territory.272 Headphonic space is opened out into an expansive 
field of indiscriminate broadcast, the allusions of intimacy and the sense of a space of one’s 
own that headphonic listening often invokes are deconstructed, with the possibilities of 
headphonic space, its bandwidth of potential frequencies, being reconceived in terms of a 
potential for collective occupation and interaction. 
 While Avelas’ Earphones perform a restructuration of headphonic space according to 
a schema that sees the protective, proxemic buffer that such space normally constitutes 
opened out into a wider field of influence through its occupation of architectonic space, it is 
beyond the common technical infrastructures constitutive of headphonic space—the 
                                                
272 This of course brings to mind the ‘flash mobbing’ trend which saw London Victoria station, amongst 
others, occupied by large crowds dancing to individual sound tracks played on personal stereos during rush 
hour. Such events display a form of collective individualism that while interesting maintains the sorts of 
divisions and personalized spaces that the work I am primarily interested in is more critical of. 
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stethoscope, headset and earphones—that we find the most intimate identification and 
exploration of headphonic space. In constructing an account of individuating sound-spaces 
a trajectory has been followed from the noise of the world taken as the originary impulse 
and subject matter of acoustic ecology practice, through the resonances of the architectonic 
body to the personalized and individualizing space of headphonic listening. Yet this latter 
stage, what we might refer to as the sounding of a certain ‘head space’ is taken further, 
someway beyond the space of the listening subject, by Jacob Kirkegaard. Kirkegaard’s 
Labyrinthitis cuts through personalized headphonic space to the individual operations of 
hearing, passing through the minimal proxemic territory of individualized listening that is 
supported against the threatening noise of the world without within headphonic listening, to 
the inescapable intimacy of somatic noise that ordinarily constitutes a turn within taken too 
far. 
 Ahead of the listening subject, sound, in Labyrinthitis, is articulated towards an a 
priori concrete individual. Ahead of the contractions of memory, association, or 
representation, Kirkegaard addresses the ear as a contraction of vibrations, a contraction of 
the possibility of hearing and listening. It is the ear, ahead of the listener, that appears as 
Kirkegaard’s primary subject, a focus that designates individuals not yet considered apart 
from their associated environment, from the conditions of hearing and the potentials of 
what can be heard. Kirkegaard once again brings to the fore that which one cannot help but 
hear but to which one seldom listens: audition itself. Kirkegaard’s work addresses the 
conditions of sound in a manner that situates one’s being in intensity; present in equal 
measure are sound and the possibility of its existence as such, the becoming sound of 
vibration. We are brought to the site where the virtual conditions of sonority become 
actualised, rendered sonorous ahead of their being signs, the intensive site of hearing. 
Douglas Kahn’s essay written to accompany the release of this piece as a recording 
describes how Labyrinthitis: 
creates a situation where the audience hears him [Kirkegaard] 
hearing and hear themselves hearing […] Knowledge of active 
hearing has developed since the late 1970s, due to an increased 
understanding of the mechanisms in the outer hair cells of the 
cochlea. These specialized hair cells change shape in response to 
electrical stimulation from the nervous system, and when they do it 
in concert they create vibrations in the fluid chambers of the 
labyrinth. To sound coming from the outside, they respond with a 
tiny amount of sound of their own. These sounds are called 
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otoacoustic emissions (OAE) and are thought to play a part in 
‘cochlear amplification’, a selective reinforcement of certain 
frequency characteristics […] When OAEs are evoked by external 
tones, they are called distortion products (DPOAE) and can be heard. 
Labyrinthitis consists of DPOAEs.273 
It is this situation that Kahn summarizes as ‘active hearing’, the act of listening to hearing 
whereby one hears the process, the working of the ‘mechanism’, through which one hears, 
and by the means of which one comes to listen. This site of active hearing, of hearing 
hearing, identifies the minimal and necessary potentials of a listening practice that must 
exist anterior to the complexities of culturally conditioned listening and auditory tuning, 
what we might refer to as a primary subtraction that renders a broader field of vibrations as 
audible possibilities, a field that nonetheless persists in excess of its audibility, its 
actualisation in qualities. The assertion of an ‘active’ hearing should not, however, suggest 
an otherwise passive sense, as Sterne points out: ‘the physiological notion of hearing as a 
pure capacity is not quite passive—receptive would be a more accurate adjective’.274 It is in 
addressing similar concerns that we might describe hearing in terms of a passive synthesis, 
its passivity or receptivity rendered active in its synthetic productions offered up for 
cognition, a receptivity that is nonetheless productive in its contraction of stimuli or 
elementary excitations.275 It is such an active receptivity that Kirkegaard’s piece draws 
attention towards, foregrounding its synthetic potential. In directly addressing and exciting 
the auditory apparatus in a manner that draws it to the foreground of attention, Kirkegaard 
uses sound to cut through the personalized space of listening to the individuating space of 
hearing, addressing the individual as a mode of being not distinct from the world. The 
proximity of headphonic listening is surpassed by sonorities that lodge themselves within 
the intimate space of the ear canal, the most precise localization of auditory headspace. This 
is an approach to sound and its perception that addresses the conditions of both, the 
contingent material potentials of sound, hearing and listening praxis. In its intensive 
somatic address, an auditory interpellation of resonant and fleshy assemblages, 
                                                
273 Douglas Kahn, ‘Active Hearing’, liner notes to Jacob Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis, available online at 
http://fonik.dk/works/labyrinthitis-kahn.htm, accessed 08/10/10. 
274 Sterne, Audible Past, 100. 
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Labyrinthitis establishes a collective experience of individual difference through a 
broadcast diffusion that attains headphonic intimacy in each instance of its reception. Each 
reception of the tones produced renders a third according to its specific organic conditions, 
while we hear Kirkegaard hearing this event is repeated in each instance and so one hears 
Kirkegaard and one’s self hearing. This third tone—also known as a Tartini or combination 
tone—produced by the ear appears as a marker of Kahn’s ‘active hearing’, the organism in 
operation. To reduce this situation to operations of the flesh is too reductive a move; in 
addressing perception we are never dealing solely with the physical or physiological; such 
things may comprise the conditions of sonority but where we are concerned with hearing 
and listening practices we are required to account for the cultural determination of such 
events, the tuning of perception that is as much cultural as physiological determination. In 
addition, the influence of sound is, as Kirkegaard’s work shows, not solely enforced from 
without and so in hearing we identify a site where the organism meets the world: 
There is no such thing as a sound in itself, or sounds in themselves in 
active hearing. What one hears is, at its physiological basis, the 
nervous system reaching out to sound with its own sound. Active 
hearing, in other words, clears a discursive pathway to better 
appreciate all the conditioning of hearing from the inside out, 
including acts of directing one’s attention.276 
What is important about Kahn’s statement, beyond is description of what Kirkegaard’s 
work reveals to us as listening subjects, is that he directs us towards attention. Lest we 
become bogged down in unilateral biological and physiological determinism, Kahn reminds 
us that the directing of attention, the decidedly cultural ‘mechanisms’ assumed and active in 
the tuning of perception also comprise a conditioning of sound as a synthetic and relational 
production ‘from the inside out’, a conditioning that by virtue of its complexity is perhaps 
better described in the terms of an infra and interpersonal extimacy. Despite the focus that 
runs throughout this argument on an assumed primacy of matter—necessary in avoiding 
ontological dualism—cultural, subjective and social activity is in no way discarded as mere 
residual effect; on the contrary, conscious activity is asserted as efficacious and an essential 
productivity that must be acknowledged if we are to avoid an oversimplified, linear 
determinism. The notion of active hearing, of a determination of what is heard at the point 
of its reception, directs attention towards the contingency of sound; insofar as we add to 
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Kahn’s statement that hearing is in fact never wholly passive, that both receptivity and 
perception indicate a state of active engagement, we can state that there is no sound in 
itself, that counter to autonomy, sound expresses the connections and interrelations of a 
contingent system, that sound is the active expression of an active system comprised of 
organic, inorganic, technical, architectectonic bodies and so on. Sound expresses the in-
between, the relations of elementary objects and events, the space between organism, 
architecture and environment and their forced excitation. 
 The individuating and individualized events engendered in Labyrinthitis are rendered 
more problematic in terms of perceptive and evental conditioning by the site in which they 
occur. A performance of Labyrinthitis during the summer of 2008 at Rundfunkhaus 
Nalepastraße, Berlin, accentuated a stark contrast between the cavernous hall in which the 
piece was performed and the alarmingly intimate proximity with which these sounds took a 
hold of those bodies present, the sounding of an interiority ordinarily the reserve of one’s 
organs. Labyrinthitis adds several layers of complexity to the determination of a 
headphonic space. By means of indiscriminate broadcast the most intimate of 
individualized listening experiences is provoked, a collectively articulated sound field 
addresses a common organ and capacity, a gesture that results in tonalities that express the 
finer details and individual differences of each auditory system. While being articulated at 
an individual level this is far from a selfless or wholly impersonal gesture; as Kahn points 
out, the audience hears Kirkegaard hearing, they hear the resultant tones of his particular 
DPOAEs which engender similar yet distinct events according to each individual’s 
physiological composition. To hear another hearing, to hear another, to hear, in a sense, 
through another are all alteritous auditory situations constructed by Kirkegaard. Within the 
sound-space constructed in this piece another is brought inside, this drawing of the outside 
within is not a privilege of sound but it is in sound that such a breaching of thresholds is 
most keenly felt.277 At the performance of Labyrinthitis at Nalepastraße, the audience is 
simultaneously subject to the cavernous envelope of the concert hall and an inescapable 
claustrophobia. Coupled are the grand and the intimate, the expansive and the 
claustrophobic. These latter adjectives are most adequate in describing the drawing together 
of a collective listening experience, normally assumed to be the collective experience of a 
common phenomenon, with the intimately individual experience of one’s own interiority, 
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the specifics of one’s auditory system: a collective experience of individual difference. It is 
this sonic extimacy that Labyrinthitis expresses so clearly: ‘in Labyrinthitis, sounds interact 
both inside and outside the confines of individual experience, as listening is introduced into 
the transductive flows of the world’.278 It is Kahn’s association of listening with 
transduction that is key here, as we identify transduction, in line with the work of Gilbert 
Simondon, as being the driving force or forcing of individuation: ‘a physical, biological, 
mental, or social operation by means of which an activity propagates itself from one 
location to another within a given domain’.279 As the influence of sound is felt from the 
outside in, an active conception of receptivity, of sensation and perception, witnesses the 
addition to this situation of a influence active from the inside out. Thus transduction 
designates a trajectory of influence, a process and transfer of information through material 
mediums.280 Listening and hearing as active processes are added to the complex of 
transductive forces, of individuating determinations and conditions that constitute the 
ongoing structuration of individuals. Complicit in networks of influence, the active 
conception of perception locates it amidst a confusion of interiority and exteriority, a 
complication necessary in avoiding simplistic linear causalities and hierarchically 
deterministic ideologies of influence. 
 While in some senses performing a most precise definition of headphonic space, it is 
in its reach beyond the notion of such a space as being strictly individualizing, in its cutting 
through the proxemic delimitations of headphonic space towards its material conditions, 
that Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis establishes connections between individuals and a broader 
individuating environment. The buffer zone ordinarily constituted by what we have been 
calling headphonic space addresses its listening subjects by means of a series of optional 
and subjective associations, a personalized synthesis of self and environment, what we 
could—by virtue of their orientation towards conscious perception—refer to in terms of 
‘free choices’, the choice to listen, to engineer an individualizing environment through the 
correlation of organic, inorganic and architectonic bodies along auditory lines, the 
reframing of an environment according to the structures of a personalized and personalizing 
sound field. Such individualizing assemblages or mechanisms are active, in a sense, ‘after’ 
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perception, insofar as such listening practices and theories of audition take modes of 
perception as given, assuming a certain consistency of what it means to hear and listen. 
Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis sets its sights somewhat ‘lower’, articulating its sonorities 
towards a receptive substrata, an ‘unfree’ forcing that identifies the body as inseparably 
enmeshed in its environment; in other words, the conditions of perception are taken as the 
subject matters of Labyrinthitis, the organic subtraction that provides a partial structure by 
which we can begin to identify a particular bandwidth of vibrations as sound. We are, then, 
drawing upon what we can call, after Bergson, a theory of ‘pure perception’. This theory 
describes a mode of perception possessed by a being ‘absorbed in the present and capable, 
by giving up every form of memory, of obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and 
instantaneous’.281 We might also describe such a mode of perception in terms of a ‘shock of 
the real’: a material event in which the nature of the material as opposed to representational 
or associative operation, its combination with memory, appears to us. Pure perception, then, 
names the immediate appearance or presence of matter and a certain immanence of 
influential forces. To the extent that it addresses what we have already referred to as the 
order of individuals, a state of pure perception describes what would perhaps better 
resemble a state of horrific or monstrous confusion, a world of unknown and unknowable, 
sub-representative signals, affects and events. Recourse to the theory of pure perception is 
made insofar as it describes periodic ruptures, transient events that appear as a dissolution 
or overpowering of representative, mnemonic structures which return after its passing. The 
particular relevance of the theory can be seen in Bergson’s statement that ‘pure perception 
bears, by definition, upon present objects, acting on our organs and our nerve centers’; such 
a description provides a concise overview of the approach taken to both the body and 
perceptive functions in Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis, but also more generally practices which 
articulate their actions towards bodies ahead of, yet, of course, not in the absence of, minds. 
Made present both within and without the individual towards its confusion is the vibrational 
reality of a sonorous objectivity or objectile, an event primarily articulated towards ‘organs 
and nerve centres’. This approach, which in addressing the conditions of sound, draws upon 
the possibility of pure perception, yet insofar as we can also identify at work the notion of a 
larger vibrational continuum from which sonority is derived, we draw more specifically 
upon the diminutive aspects of this theory, upon a particularly subtractive theory of 
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perception. This subtractive theory accounts for the notion, implied within the theory of 
pure perception, that what is perceived is but a small bandwidth of a larger vibrational 
continuum, that there is more to matter than is revealed in perception. This position is 
described by Bergson as follows:  
If there were more in the second term [perception] than the first 
[matter], if, in order to pass from presence to representation, it were 
necessary to add something, the barrier would indeed be insuperable, 
and the passage from matter to perception would remain wrapped in 
impenetrable mystery. It would not be the same if it were possible to 
pass from the first term to the second by way of diminution, and if 
the representation of an image were less than its presence.282 
It is precisely this diminutive trajectory that should be retained; more critically, it its 
important that this subtractive theory be maintained despite Bergson’s own understanding 
of this theory as being purely hypothetical and counter to its surrender to a perception fused 
with memory, as per the famous quote: ‘there is no perception that is not full of memories. 
With the immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a thousand details out of our 
past experience’.283 It is not, of course, my intention to suggest that we are dealing with 
events and situations where memory is wholly absent, but rather that the events of 
particular interest are not explicitly directed towards memory recall or representation, but 
more towards notions of a perception-action and -ascesis. In the practices and approaches 
under consideration, where intent is not symbolically but affectively or generatively 
orientated, the situation can be taken as one in which memory is not assumed as given but 
circumvented in attempts to appeal to the intensity of a nonrepresentational perception ‘in 
itself’. The potential for subjective ruptures and perceptive distortions found within 
Bergson’s notion of pure perception are catalytic in  approaches articulated towards the 
concrete individual. The present intention is, of course, not to merely describe the already 
complex and rich work done by the likes of Kirkegaard and Kahn in Bergsonian terms for 
the sake of a transposition of ideas into the reputable arguments of a particular 
philosophical discourse, but rather to draw attention to the fact that it is only with reference 
to Bergson and his critics that the idea of pure perception is shown to be nested within 
Kahn’s discussion of ‘active hearing’ and assumed as given with regard to the psycho-
physiological imperatives of Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis. More importantly, it is only 
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through reference to the concept of pure perception that we are able to establish a clear 
connection between  Kirkegaard’s work and the notion of perception-ascesis onto which it 
opens: a shaping of perception around the sonic events and objects received. It is this 
opening onto perception-ascesis that highlights the individuating potentials of this work and 
related approaches. Within this notion, built around the idea of a conditioning and training 
of the self or individual according to the presence of objects and events, we find a 
description of both a site and process of individuation, the training, conditioning and 
disciplining of the individual according to the immanent impressions of objects around 
which perception molds itself. In order to establish a framework by which to support the 
practical investigation of such  potentials and the events occurring within and towards the 
construction of a site of individuation, it will be necessary to extract the theory of pure 
perception from Bergson’s own work on the concept. To this end, we will be drawing upon 
Quentin Meillassoux’s critique of this very point, of Bergson’s submission of his own 
theory of a pure and subtractive theory of perception to memory and representation.284 This 
critique reinstates the individuating potentials that can be located in a notion of pure 
perception as both instantaneous, i.e., non-representational and distinct from memory-
recall, and  appearing within a site of utmost intimacy. Such a critical wresting of pure 
perception from the conclusions of Matter and Memory proposes a continuum between 
both subject and matter, space and time, a continuum contrary to Bergson’s own 
philosophy. To better map out the route to such a continuum we should make brief recourse 
to the consequences of Bergson’s elevation of time over space. 
 The privilege Bergson ascribed to the temporal—associating quality with duration 
which is unveiled according to the contractions of memory—holding it above the spatial, 
has, due to contemporary critiques and practices, come to be thought of as something of 
‘bald dichotomy’.285 In uncovering the complex, heterogeneous and qualitative temporality 
of matter—the productivity of matter itself, devoid of spiritual guidance—the boundary set 
up by Bergson in the defense of this dichotomy collapses in on itself. Where qualitative 
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duration is found to reside in the fluctuations of matter, matter is no longer conceived as 
homogeneous and in need of memory for the production of heterogeneous qualities, of 
properly subjective durations which privilege time as the revelatory force of qualitative 
heterogeneity over the spatial and material homogeneity. The razing of this dichotomy, a 
move made necessary in order to avoid positing an ontological dualism contrary to all 
efforts thus far of establishing a continuum of material influence, has a number of important 
repercussions. Embroiled in the Bergsonian time/space distinction are respective divisions 
between interiority and exteriority, mind and matter, spirit and body. Despite Bergson’s 
project of investigating the relations between such notions, it is with the maintained 
distinctions and resulting ontological dualism that we currently take issue. It is precisely 
such divisions that I have been at pains to problematize in what has already been said; in 
setting time in space, in acknowledging a qualitative temporality of matter, Bergson’s 
time/space distinction is found to be somewhat decrepit—yet nonetheless a peculiar and 
provocative relic. In dismantling the boundary established between space and time, the 
support is removed from Bergson’s related distinctions—between interior and exterior, 
matter and mind, and so on. If, by virtue of the acknowledged relation of space and time, 
qualitative temporality is not the reserve of a distinct consciousness or subjective synthesis 
then we are required to take a similar approach to matter and mind, to the material world 
and the structuration of the self. It is the privileged extensions of temporality that kept mind 
distinct from matter, in acknowledging the insufficiencies of such a privilege, in removing 
its support, one term slips into the other. In placing time-in-space, quality-in-matter, mind is 
situated in matter as the qualitative duration which was its privilege is found to be active in 
the productivity of space, of spatial-matters. The critical gesture performed is one of a 
debunking of dualism towards the establishment of continuum, a univocity in which the 
distinction between matter and mind is considered—contrary to Bergson’s formulations—
in terms of degree rather than kind towards the establishment of a continuist ontology. 
 A problem appears to surface when, after all this discussion of continuums, one 
acknowledges a difference between matter and mind, between body and self—as is the case 
in the above references to a notion of dyadic individuality. The appearance of this problem 
does not, however, impact negatively upon the current argument as it is taken as presenting 
a problematic difference assumed to be ‘internal’ to matter, a difference in degree as 
opposed to a difference in kind. Such a difference exemplifies a heterogeneous 
understanding of matter inclusive of ‘qualitative duration’. It is such a difference in degree 
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which is proposed by Bergson’s hypothetical pure perception, and as such highlights the 
necessity in referring to Meillassoux’s critique which wrests this concept from its 
subjection to memory and synthesis, and in doing so preserves the force of its continuist 
schema. 
 The particular relevance of this brief Bergsonian exegesis is found in the 
consideration of what we can—by means of a subtle distortion—describe as an account of 
individual or personal territories. Towards some kind of consistency with the approaches 
already discussed we will first address the body. Bodies constitute what Bergson refers to 
as ‘zones of indeterminacy’, a complex system through which stimuli and information are 
processed. It is this indeterminacy which accounts for a certain ‘delay’ which is associated 
with the capacity for thoughtful response, for choice in relation to action, that is 
distinguished from reflex action in the absence of a conscious decision. Where a ‘zone of 
indeterminacy’ is identified as primitive or non-existent, the response to received stimuli is 
one of immediate reflex action, a situation in which we can say that perception is action, 
insofar the act of perception necessarily entails an immediate response from the body. The 
complexity of this indeterminacy—the potential for delayed and considered reaction built 
upon memory and enabling choice—is in a sense proportional to a complexity of thought, 
and is considered constitutive of a consciousness. Interestingly, Bergson draws out a 
relation between perception and the complexity of this zone of indeterminacy, or more 
specifically between distance and the territory of the self, as Bergson puts it: ‘a variable 
relation between the living being and the more-or-less distant influence of the objects which 
interest it’.286 This idea of distance in relation to conscious perception and the delimitation 
of a subjective territory is of particular interest, as the proportionality between the 
complexity of a zone of indetermination and the distance or foresight with which events 
and objects can be perceived accounts both for a capacity for conscious consideration—for 
choice—and the well defined space of the self image. In other words, the relation of the 
body to more or less distant objects and events allows for the determination and 
identification of alterity. This relation between perception and the determination of personal 
territory can be seen in the following statement from Bergson: 
By sight, by hearing, it [the body] enters into relation with an ever 
greater number of things, and is subject to more and more distant 
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influences; and, whether these objects promise an advantage or 
threaten a danger, both promises and threats defer the date of their 
fulfillment. The degree of independence of which a living being is 
master, or, as we shall say, the zone of indetermination which 
surrounds its activity, allows then, of an a priori estimate of the 
number and the distance of the things with which it is in relation.287 
Perception expands potential for spatial relations and objective influence, yet, in the above, 
it is also charged with a certain determination of personal territory within which a duration 
or capacity for both foresight and memory inheres—a capacity summarized by the notion of 
a ‘zone of indetermination’. That an event being defined as ‘out there’ is easily construed as 
other is obvious, yet it is precisely the rigidity of the division between ‘out there’ and ‘in 
here’ that is problematized by post-Bergsonian critique, situating both terms within a 
continuum. It is clearly the very real possibility of the exterior arriving within in the interior 
that defines a certain notion of threat, and at the same time the variability and permeability 
of the self. Yet it is the particular way in which this proximally orientated identification 
relates to the consistency of subjective territory that is of interest. It is the appearance of 
alteritous events within that problematizes such delimitations, the appearance of the without 
within. We find an example of such an appearance in the DPOAEs capitalized upon by 
Kirkegaard, a sound that we know is projected from without appearing below the threshold 
of a certain minimal distance, that is, appearing as being indiscernible from the most 
intimate of interiors. Such internal alterity defines the alarming difference and 
interdependence of matter and self, exemplified by the sound in and of me that is not I. The 
appearance of sound events that are in a sense without distance, that are heard as a sounding 
of the body itself, do so by means of a perception-action, the ‘active hearing’ and 
‘sympathetic production’ discussed by Kahn and Sterne respectively. The intimacy of this 
appearance attests to a transgression of indeterminacy, an intimate appearance that in its 
dissolution of alteritous distance appeals to the perception-action of the concrete individual. 
It is in appealing to a radically limited zone of indeterminacy that such proximal events 
problematize the territory of the self—challenging personal space—in their orientation 
towards the individual. It is in this manner, in the forced hearing of the without within, that 
Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis articulates itself to the base materiality of individuals and 
operates explicitly within ongoing individuating processes, perception located at the site 
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where it molds itself around external objects. 
 This site or event can be considered in terms of a process of perception-ascesis, a 
coupling of perception and a practical discipline or determination of the self. What we find 
in  Meillassoux’s proposed restructuration of the theory of subtractive perception is an  
attempt to free the more radical theory of perception-ascesis from its Bergsonian 
submission to perception-synthesis, to rescue the notion of pure perception from Bergson 
himself. It is perception-ascesis which provides the opening for this discussion of 
perception to be coupled most clearly with the overarching concern regarding a theory of 
individuation, for perception-ascesis names ‘a perception […] absorbed, to the exclusion of 
all else, in the task of molding itself upon the external object’.288 This notion begins to 
account for somatic functions under the influence of environmental matters, an objective 
influence that assumes an environment that is in flux or metastable. The reason for this 
preference is that in adopting some of the details of Meillassoux’s critique we are better 
equipped in accounting for a theory of perception suited to the ‘active hearing’ to which 
Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis, is articulated. More broadly, such a theory establishes the 
conceptual ground for a theory of sound articulated to a material receptivity ahead of its 
conscious or subjective perception, a theory which goes some way to coupling perception 
with individuating forces. As Kirkegaard cuts through the individuated listening practices, 
through the identification active in representative listening, Meillassoux’s critique of the 
essential role of memory in Bergson’s theory of perception attempts to strip away layers of 
memory in order to arrive at the site of matter in action anterior to the representation of 
matter. It is, in Meillassoux’s speculative formulation, perception-synthesis which, by way 
of a temporal compression or durational envelopment, fuses perception with memory, the 
consequence of which is a strict division between the in-itself and the for-us, against 
Bergson’s own anti-Kantian critique. Such distinction asserts a impassable division 
between matter and subject, positing an unobtainable materiality and a subjectivity trapped 
within its own synthetic constructs. Meillassoux’s argument is of interest for the 
importance it places upon perception-ascesis, a theory that can be read as a coupling of pure 
perception with the force of individuation, and the manner by which his argument is framed 
by a critical approach to the notion of a vibratory reality of matter found in Matter and 
Memory. It is via a subtractive method that Meillassoux aims to establish a theory of 
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perception that operates not by the synthetic contraction of matter with memory, but by 
selection from the rhythms of matter, a selection from matters which comprise all possible 
and perceivable rhythms. Were we to equate rhythms with the peak of a waveform we 
might refer to such rhythmic perception in terms of frequency, a move which would render 
this argument congruent with the notion of tone as an isolation or reduction of frequencies 
derived from the Idea of sound, from the noise which constitutes the potentials of sonority. 
In many ways, then, the subtractive theory can be thought of as well suited to describing the 
relation between sound and the wider field of vibrations it appears amongst, or perhaps 
apart from; the suitability of this assumption can be addressed with reference to Sterne who 
notes that: 
The physiologist Johannes Müller wrote over 150 years ago that, 
“without the organ of hearing with its vital endowments, there would 
be no such thing as sound in the world, but merely vibrations.” […] 
Sounds are defined as that class of vibrations perceived—and, in a 
more exact sense, sympathetically produced—by the functioning ear 
when they travel through a medium that can convey changes in 
pressure (such as air) […] Sound is a little piece of the vibrating 
world.289 
Sound is thus figured as a territory of vibrations claimed by an organic agency,  a reduction 
of the vibratory reality of matter and as being subtracted from the—otherwise largely 
inaudible—noise of the world. The body’s obstruction and complication of vibrations—a 
complication that means vibrations do not simply pass unchallenged—constitutes a certain 
reductive filtration that renders sound-as-such and the body sonic. Sound constitutes a 
limited bandwidth of vibrations; while we can, therefore, characterize the bandwidth of 
vibrations we call sound as being in a sense subtracted from the world, Sterne’s statement 
does not allow us to take audition as a wholly subtractive theory, detailing, rather, a 
subtraction that is then subject to further production. It is this notion of a productivity 
performed after the subtractions of the body that seeks to account for a productive 
receptivity, a receptivity capable of novelty, that does not complicate an already defined 
terminology by positing a mysterious addition to an otherwise ‘monistic’ view of material 
activity. The subtractive selections performed by the body that define sound as such are met 
by the active receptivity of perception, the agency of the organism. This is expressed most 
clearly when Sterne clarifies his position by stating that vibrations are not simply or purely 
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subtractively perceived but also sympathetically produced by the ear. This attention to the 
complexity of vibrational events reveals certain inadequacies in too simple a subtractive 
model of perception. Sympathetic resonance and DPOAEs or Tartini tones—examples of 
active hearing or receptivity performed in Labyrinthitis—reveal an initial subtraction that is 
subject to a distorting and productive reception, yet a production that cannot be labeled as a 
function of symbolic memory-contraction. It is not memory or representation that ‘gives’ to 
received vibrations but the activity of reception itself, the response of matter, organic or 
otherwise, to fluxes in its enveloping environment. The sympathetic production of tone is 
of course not strictly the reserve of organic matter, of the functioning of the ear, nor is it 
restricted to listening subjects, but is an event that occurs in Helmhotz’s resonators, within 
architectonic and material bodies possessing audibly resonant frequencies. It is simply that 
only by virtue of a particular capacity is tone defined as such. This productivity does not 
negate subtraction, nor does it suggest that perception performs some kind of mysterious 
production of energy which it adds to the world, but rather points out that the simple notion 
of subtraction does not wholly account for, nor does it adequately explain, perception 
unless thought in the terms of a subtractive synthesis. The reason for drawing on the 
subtractive theory here—where the aim is, of course, not to provide a complete account of 
perception—is for the opening it creates into thinking individuating processes by means of 
a perception founded upon an initial active receptivity. It is this activity that, initially at 
least, is not apparent in the terms of a subtractive theory of perception, yet to which it 
necessarily appeals. The subtractive selectivity that defines a site of rarefaction, a site 
which for Meillassoux names the body, is defined according to an initial or primary 
subtraction—a becoming by means of which something does not simply pass 
unchallenged—to which it cannot be wholly reduced once receptivity is not limited to a 
passivity. The productivity of reception exemplified by sympathetic resonance—an action 
nonetheless anterior to conscious perception—means that subtractive selection or 
delimitation that defines the territory of a body must be met by responsive action. We take 
this productive activity not as an addition to matter but as a complexity within matter, more 
precisely, it is an event that is encompassed by the heterogeneity of matter; it is such a 
notion of an exclusive subtraction within an ‘inclusive’ heterogeneity of matter that is 
essential in avoiding ontological duality. 
 It is in articulating itself to the order of individuals that Labyrinthitis associates itself 
with the violence of individuating forces, with a state of unfree rarefactions active in the 
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conditioning of perception. This conditioning is, as explained by Meillassoux, conceived as 
being unfree by association when held in contrast to the ‘free choices’ of the mind: 
For if the mind is free, it is free in so far as it chooses, selects certain 
actions, from amongst the multiplicity of possible actions which it 
perceives in the world itself; but the mind cannot choose unless an 
anterior selection, itself unfree, is already in operation […] a 
selection which, this time, constitutes the terms of the choice. The 
body is like a continuous emission of an infinite matter whose 
particles constitute the terms of the choice offered to the mind. The 
body selects the terms, the mind chooses between the terms. There 
are thus three realities within perception: matter, body, mind. 
Communication, selection, action.290 
In its approach to the organic, the biological and audition, this approach to sound may be 
taken as deterministic in its orientation; it is by means of a degree of violence that hearing 
is forced, by which one is forced to listen to oneself hearing. Yet it is with the dissolution of 
a certain passivity—the dissolution of waxy substrates and the linear structure of causal 
influence characteristic of reductive determinisms—that this work is concerned. In focusing 
on an active receptivity, the notion of a passive impression is debunked towards an 
understanding of the event as being partially shaped in the act of perception, by its myriad 
means and conditions. Subject to such auditive constructs, the organ is figured as elemental 
agent, as being active in the determination of events as opposed to the passive receiver and 
decoder of external stimuli, the organic agent meets the object of excitation in a point of 
confusion, from which quality is engendered; regardless of the fidelity of this perception, 
the object persists in excess. In addition to this focus upon hearing and perception as active 
it is the attention given to how we hear, hearing as an active process, not taken as given but 
rather directly addressed and critically investigated, that sets the individuating sound-space 
of Labyrinthitis apart from the individualizing headphonic spaces discussed above; 
Labyrinthitis addresses the conditions of sound, articulating itself towards a certain (non)-
sound that inheres in the potentials of audibility. 
 Despite Bergson’s assertion that the theory of pure perception exists purely as a 
theoretical construct or thought exercise, we nonetheless find examples of experimental 
engagement with ideas resembling this theory in the more contemporary artistic and 
philosophical practices under consideration, as is most strikingly evident in Kirkegaard’s 
work while also present in Bain’s infrasonic approach to somatic matters. Deleuze, in his 
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consideration of sensory distortion, goes some way to reviving the consequences and 
‘exaggerated conclusions’ drawn from Bergson’s hypothesis of a pure perception through 
reference to situations whereby difference and intensity, as movements, events and 
interactions prior to their qualitative definition or punctuation and mnemonic 
representation, may be experienced ‘in itself’. The implication of pure perception within the 
experience of intensity can be seen in the references made to vertigo and pharmacodymanic 
experimentation:  
The point of sensory distortion is often to grasp intensity 
independently of extensity or prior to the qualities in which it is 
developed. A pedagogy of the senses, which forms an integral part of 
“transcendentalism”, is directed towards this aim. Pharmacodynamic 
experiences and physical experiences such as vertigo approach the 
same result: they revel to us that difference in itself, that depth in 
itself or that intensity in itself at the original moment at which it is 
neither qualified nor extended. At this point, the harrowing character 
of intensity, however weak restores its true meaning: not the 
anticipation of perception but the proper limit of sensibility from the 
point of view of a transcendent exercise.291 
In this attempt to define the intensive nature of sensory distortion as an experience in excess 
of representation and recollection we can identify the residue of a theory of pure perception. 
The sensible event grasped outside of extensity or quality describes an affective situation 
dissociated from recognition or representative memory. Performed within such situations is 
a ‘pedagogy of the senses’—pedagogy being, for Deleuze, a process of individuation—
which, as such, bares resemblance to what we have referred to above as perception-ascesis, 
the point at which perception is molded around an external event or object, shaped in 
encounter. It is in this situation that what is given is that which can only be sensed—as 
opposed to known, represented and diverted by way of recollection. It is this latter point 
that identifies what Deleuze here refers to as a ‘transcendent exercise’. The transcendent 
exercise is not, for Deleuze, an abstraction of the senses towards some kind of pure and 
eternal form or absolute transparency, but rather that which calls upon the particularity of a 
given sense and its objective excitation, on that which can only be encountered by way of 
sensibility. The particular relevance of this is that an object or event which can only be 
sensed is encountered in a situation that is distinct from common sense, from the formation 
of an identity for the encountered object by way of recourse to a combination of sensation 
                                                
291 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 297. 
 219 
and memory, for example, and therefore known by way of a sensory conjunction, by way of 
a distribution of the object or event encountered between both memory and sensibility 
towards the discernment of its symbolic identity and mnemonic recollection. The 
transcendent exercise of the senses, then, is an exercise of the senses which is distinct from 
recognition, that which exposes the ‘limit of sensibility from the point of view of a 
transcendent exercise’, that which appeals to sensation alone. The transcendent exercise of 
the senses, an encounter with that which can only be sensed, draws forth an experience of 
the peculiarity of a given sense, its ‘internal logic and structure’.292 Contrary to the concept 
of transcendence as a rising above, we find it here, as it is used by Deleuze, to signify a 
certain descent into the depths, into the particular extremes and potentials of sensation. 
With particular relevance to our present concerns, we might invoke the transcendent 
exercise of hearing, a revelation and exploration of the internal logic and structure of 
hearing. Such an exercise surely invokes what Kahn refers to as ‘active hearing’, the sense 
of hearing hearing which is forced upon us by Kirkegaard in Labyrinthitis. This can be 
taken more generally as a perceiving perception, as an encounter with the act of perception 
in itself and therefore a pure perception. The dynamics and structure of this situation 
currently being laid out can be made clearer with reference to Deleuze: 
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an 
object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter […] it may 
be grasped as a range of affective tones […] In whichever tone, its 
primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is 
opposed to recognition. The object of the encounter […] gives rise to 
sensibility with regard to a given sense […] It is therefore in a certain 
sense imperceptible [insensible]. It is imperceptible precisely from 
the point of view of recognition.293 
This passage provides a schema for what is laid out above, a situation or encounter in which 
an object or event is perceived ahead of its being jettisoned or ‘cancelled’ in its 
interpretation through recognition. In this encounter the object or event is taken as affective 
rather than symbolic and therefore as articulated towards sensation ahead of recognition. 
That an object or event ‘in itself’ is imperceptible is so due its being non-representational, 
due to its being of the sensible as opposed to the mnemonic. Yet the encounter with an 
object or event does not present to us the totality of an object itself, nor its mirror image, 
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but rather with an encounter that constitutes the conditions of a potential perception, which 
in any particular instance is just that, incomplete and but one particular rendering of a 
complex objectivity, auditory or otherwise, that persists in excess of its perception. 
 We are now in a position to be able to better identify the terms of the distinction made 
above between individuation and individualization, a distinction that refers to the order by 
which sense is made of an encounter which forces one to think. The distinction between 
orders—a distinction respective of that between individuation and individualization—can 
be made clear with reference to the division between matter and mind imposed by Bergson 
in his consideration of the ‘when’ of perception. While not adhering to the strict division 
raised by Bergson between matter and mind, nor  the implications such a fissure poses 
regarding the potentials of perception, the difference  that is necessarily identified ahead of 
such a dualistic split is nonetheless respected; a difference that is not manifest in division or 
dualism but one conceived as being established by way of continuity and complexity. 
Respective of this difference is that presently posited between individuation and 
individualization. In the processes accounted for by the former we locate the impressions, 
shocks and violence of a ‘pure perception’—an event that can only be sensed that functions 
according to a resonant capture. In the latter we locate the (re)structurations of the subject 
according to a common sense by which an event or encounter is not only sensed but also 
remembered and recalled—the perception of an event by way of mnemonic contraction and 
subjective synthesis. Individualization is taken as the process by which the subject bends or 
undergoes change according to matters and events that are perceived as given. 
Individuation is taken as referring to the means by which these events appear as given 
through the expression and excitation of the internal structure or logic of a given sense, the 
means by which that which appears as given is given. 
 This distinction, between individuation and individualization, is made in order to 
accommodate differences and divergences in practice; more specifically, to accommodate 
more detailed discussion of the differences between practices appealing to a pedagogic and 
hermeneutic shifting of perceptions by means of symbolic operations and associations—
practices that recode listening practice and the perception and understanding of place—and 
those that seek influence in excess of the symbolic, taking aim at the spatio-temporal 
dynamics constituting the conditions of place and territoriality. In short, a distinction is 
made in order to accommodate a difference within and between practices articulated 
towards an immanence of encounter and the means of its ‘deferral’ in memory and 
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recollection. This distinction does not assert that such approaches, nor the notions of pure 
perception and memory, are to be dualistically opposed, but rather that there is a difference 
to be discerned that identifies what are distinct notions of influence and of a ‘ways in’ to 
the subject. Having laid out the philosophical framework by which a theory of sonorous 
individuation can be thought as distinct from that of individualization, a mode of auditory 
influence particular to the individual considered distinct the listening subject of audile 
technique, I now wish to situate this discussion within the perhaps more familiar field of 
the Deleuze-Guattarian project that places particular importance upon sonority, while 
opening it up to broader field of sonic practice. 
 
An Intensive Ideology of Influence 
 
This text has so far placed a particular emphasis upon articulations of vibrational 
affectivity, constituting a bandwidth stretched between the infra- and ultra-sonic, with its 
constituent vibrations originating in, and affecting a determination of, the inaudible, 
movements and oscillations operative beyond an architectonics of the air. The primacy of 
affective flux, as the determinant actions of material interactions is necessitated by the 
praxes catalytic of this study and discussed herein. Tracing the vibrational productions of 
the works considered so far—chosen for the way in which they engage with and construct a 
problematic situation courting determinism, individuation and a vibrational materialism or 
realism—leads to a problematic complex of bodies, objects, or rather objectiles; the 
interactions of such objects—architectonic, organic, particular, …—constituting a 
problematic field. Vibrations traced as lines of affectivity lead from the movements of one 
body into another, an affective continuum punctuated in the instance of a qualitative 
rendering yet existent in excess. It is a collection of such lines, moving throughout and 
making a difference within the diverse bodies of broad somatic complexes, that I have been 
attempting to follow within this text. 
 This problematic affectivity constituted between and according to the interactions of 
objects—whether audible, inaudible, organic or otherwise—apparent in the practice 
considered below necessitates a particular notion of ‘pure perception’, as discussed in 
relation to Kirkegaard, Bergson and Meillassoux, a perception or active reception of events 
anterior to mnemonic recollection, objectile events that are not considered in so far as they 
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entail a recollection and signification but on the grounds that they force information. This 
particular theory of pure perception is necessary if we are to account for objectile 
interactions within the context of a theory of sonorous individuations, a process or protean 
being that is experientially apparent in itself in the sensory distortions or disjunctions 
yielding intensive sensations. Not disregarding the efficacy of the therefore posterior stage 
of representation, such an approach takes pure perception or active receptivity as a route 
into the individual and its conditions, it both enables and requires an understanding of ‘the 
anteriority of production as individuation’, a ‘production of heterogeneous space-times 
inseparable from the rhythms of matter’.294  
 This primacy of production conceived according to the ‘rhythms of matter’ posits a 
particular determinism that has been developed within this text so far, yet one which must 
now be once again redressed in order to avoid too strong an assertion of an apparent 
sufficiency. The emphasis placed so far upon material interactions has been carried out in 
the shadow of a certain ‘sufficiency of the virtual’, a position that it has been necessary to 
adopt in order to derive a richer account of Deleuze’s philosophy of individuation than is 
possible through direct and sole reference to his work with Guattari.295 Here it is my 
intention to better address a necessary distance from what Toscano has referred to as the 
sufficiency of the virtual—a position that to a certain extent haunts without consuming  
Difference and Repetition, due to its biological orientation—a structural or ‘genetic’ 
sufficiency that threatens to render the deterministic approach followed herein in terms of 
an overly simplified linearity. The sufficiency of the virtual describes the sense of overly 
hierarchized production one gets from a theory that holds the virtual to be the sole source or 
causal site of change and creation. What it is now necessary to affirm is the sense of the 
virtual that is more thoroughly or consistently developed throughout Delueze’s entire 
oeuvre, where the organization and structuration of the process of individuation becomes 
necessarily more complex. Where the virtual is taken as describing change as such—not 
changes in the organization of things and their already individuated components, but rather 
a change that is productive of a difference distinct from divergence, the source of 
Deleuzean purity and the ‘primary’ state of being conceived in terms of continuous rather 
than discrete multiplicities—its sufficiency would suggest that it be considered the sole 
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determinant of productivity, rendering actualized individuals as the purely passive subjects 
of such changes. Such a positioning grants a certain autonomy to the virtual which violates 
the univocity that persists throughout Deleuze’s work. To avoid slipping into an assertion 
of the sufficiency of the virtual, we should address the model of individuation we have 
adopted and the structure of its intensive, influential information. Arguments of 
determination, taken unilaterally, posit actualized individuals as the passive subjects of their 
virtual conditions, positing an overtly hierarchical schema of influence and ontogenesis that 
holds the virtual as autonomous and separate from the actual. In avoiding a 
misinterpretation of the virtual along the lines of a kind of genetic code, conceived as being 
the sole and defining source of individuality, we can conceive of the virtual in terms of an 
interference or deformational capacity making a difference within individuals, a structure 
more suited to detailing the potentials of auditory influence. In this sense the virtual is not 
purely considered as the originary ground beneath individuals from which they arise, but as 
that within which they reside, that which permeates their being and from which identity 
necessarily distinguishes itself in the maintenance of consistency through apparent pauses 
and blockages. In further detailing this shift we can refer to two diagrams which themselves 
can be read as reflecting the shift in models or schema of individuation as we find them 
expressed in Difference and Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus. In the first we find a 
graphical representation of the process of individuation derived from Difference and 
Repetition, a somewhat hierarchical model in which (i) the Idea constitutes the transcendent 
and ontogenetic ground whose internal differentitation of singularities, expressed here as 
points, provide the determinants of an (ii) intensive and individuating problematic, the 
points of which are differenciations of their virtual conditions, their becoming actual which 
constitutes (iii) cases of solution, actual responses to a common problematic rendered 
differently in each case of solution of actualization. 
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Figure 4 : Individuation expressed as a passage between Ideas, problems and solutions or Indi-
different/ciation. 
In addressing the sufficiency that such a schema can easily be thought to suggest, we 
should turn this organization on its side, positioning the virtual, not strictly beneath or 
above the actual productions it determines, but as that which persists alongside the actual, 
interfering in and distorting constituted actualities and individuals as much as it  can be 
thought to give rise to them when conceived in terms of ontogenesis. In this sense we 
undertake a transition from the schema of individuation found in Difference and Repetition 
to that found in A Thousand Plateaus, a shift clarified with reference to Toscano: ‘The 
individuations that Deleuze and Guattari foreground in A Thousand Plateaus are not of the 
sort that engender individuals; rather, they traverse already constituted individuals, drawing 
them towards impersonal becomings, compositions of one multiplicity with another’.296 It 
is this shift that adds necessary complexity to the determinism we have been concerned 
with herein, further distancing it from any unilateral orientation. Before moving into the 
consequences of this shift and the explicit impact that it has upon considerations of 
sonority, a summary account of Deleuze’s earlier philosophy of individuation is required, 
as it provides background and depth that does not appear, or is at least somewhat obscured 
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by the terminology applied, in A Thousand Plateaus, background which creates a more 
explicit and informative connection between the broader matters of our spatial concerns 
than we might otherwise obtain from the more explicitly sonorous references found in this 
later text. 
 Towards the construction of such an overview we should begin with the position 
expressed by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition wherein the process of individuation: 
[…] involves fields of fluid intensive factors which no more take the 
form of an I than of a Self. Individuation as such, as it operates 
beneath all forms, is inseparable from a pure ground that it brings to 
the surface and trails with it […] this ground, along with the 
individual, rises to the surface yet assumes neither form nor figure 
[…] The individual distinguishes itself from it, but it does not 
distinguish itself […] the I and the Self [are] undermined by the 
fields of individuation which work beneath them, defenceless against 
a rising of the ground which holds up to them a distorted or 
distorting mirror in which all presently thought forms dissolve.297 
Intensity names the site and means of individuation, operative ‘beneath’ apparent forms, 
understood as the identities clung to in the formation of objective consistency and 
determined in representation. That individuation is a process not describing the production 
or determination of identity—and is therefore considered as different from 
individualization, as discussed below—or appearance, being concerned more explicitly 
with the potential for such assertions, can be seen in the exclusion of the self and the I from 
individuating processes, processes otherwise described as impersonal becomings, influence 
articulated towards the individual in particular. Purity can be thought to describe the 
characteristics of Deleuze’s conception of the virtual, and so the ground referred to here is 
that of a constantly unfolding change, that of infinite, elementary and particular interactions 
constituting an imperceptible determination, a determination that is imperceptible from the 
point of view of its representation, the self and the I that it undermines. This ground from 
which the intensive processes of individuation are inseparable operates according to the 
distorting influence of that which draws the ‘I’ away from itself, knocking it off course and 
setting it upon another. The intensity of the situation in which and from which the subject 
distinguishes itself is that which is, in itself, an assemblage asserting a distorting influence, 
that in which such forms dissolve and are produced anew. Insofar as this ground which 
rises to the surface is considered to be pure it is to be thought in terms of a differential 
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noise, constituting the conditions of ecological relations and the ungrounding of ‘natural’ 
and defined orders, as discussed in chapter one. In attempting to establish such relations it 
is towards an ideal function of art that this argument is concerned, that which engenders 
change and, through an intensive pedagogy, a process of individuation in its active 
reception. It is such an ideal function that Deleuze also aims to identify in art, as can be 
seen in his claim that ‘paintings or sculptures are already such “distorters”, forcing us to 
create movement—that is, to combine a superficial and a penetrating view, or ascend and 
descend within the space as we move through it’.298 That such art objects force a distorting 
movement upon the observer, a relational situation, can be understood as instigating a 
particular theatricality, one which has been described otherwise as a negation of art. Where 
autonomy and the instantaneous manifestation of the art work itself, in its entirety, is 
sacrificed in the definition of a tension between object and observer or auditor, it is not so 
much the necessity of this specific relation for the existence of the object as such that is 
invoked, but rather a fundamental contingency in the determination of appearances within 
which a catalytic functionalism is brought forth, one which takes the work according to 
contextual influence and distortions as much as its own internal logic. Where we are 
concerned with the perception, determination and function of sound objects or sonorous 
objectility, relational theatricality—not limited to symbolic determination—is considered a 
necessity, insofar as qualitative determinations require a localized rendering in the ear of an 
otherwise inaudible perturbation of the air. This relational theatricality, understood as 
describing contingent and constitutive interactions can be considered a defining feature of 
Michael Fried’s famous criticisms of minimalist or ‘literalist’ art:  
the literalist espousal of objecthood amounts to nothing other than a 
plea for a new genre of theatre, and theatre is now the negation of art 
[…] Literalist sensibility is theatrical because, to begin with, it is 
concerned with the actual circumstances in which the beholder 
encounters literalist work […] the experience of literalist art is of an 
object in a situation—one that virtually by definition, includes the 
beholder.299 
The now common gesture of inverting Fried’s criticisms, their reframing as positive 
identifications of relational definition and determinations, is repeated herein. The repetition 
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of this gesture should not be thought to entail the determination of the object or event as 
purely the product of its external or extensive relations, that between object and auditor or 
observer, according to which the object is defined as such only insofar as it is seen or heard. 
The relational determinations and contingencies I have been at pains to express are not 
thought to be limited to a necessary inclusion of the beholder in the constitution of 
objectivity, but rather as referring to the internal or differential relations constitutive of 
objects and objectiles, as well as those external and extensive relations which define the 
instance of a perception, a perceptual and subtractive rendering apparent of an object that 
nonetheless persists in excess and inaudibility of the instance of its qualitative appearance. 
It is according to these two modalities of relations that the notion of the sound object is 
maintained insofar as it has come to describe sound in-itself—considered herein to be 
distinct from phenomenological essence and necessarily inaudible by virtue of its existence 
apart from and in excess of the ear—while being confused with an equally distorted notion 
of the Schaferian event that takes the appearance of sonority to be contextually dependent, 
the necessity of which is displaced towards the assumption of a more generalized and 
fundamental contingency considered anterior to symbolic relations. A distorting and 
productive theatre of relations is assumed insofar as it maintains matters beyond perception 
and the excessive ontology of objectility, maintaining functional intensity against the 
sufficiency of extensity. 
 The theatricality derided by Fried as the constitutive characteristic of minimalism, 
defined as the tension created between and including the art object, the space of its 
exhibition and the act of its observation, can be taken as an example of distortion, where the 
object, its setting and its observation are taken as irrevocably entwined, one impacting upon 
and distorting the other. The theatricality of minimalism, as described by Fried, gives an 
account of the way in which a painting or sculpture can be considered as one element of a 
theatrical network and process, constituting a distortion insofar as it draws the observer into 
interactions, becoming the catalyst of movements throughout a space defined in part 
through its distorting presence.300 That works be considered as ‘distorters’ is equally 
significant for the challenge this poses to perception and the discretion of representation. It 
should be noted that, for Deleuze, this distorting function forces movement on a number of 
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levels, not simply the movement of a body through space, but a distortion that reveals what 
otherwise remains imperceptible, forcing a sensory distortion upon the observer and 
creating an opening onto a field of individuating intensities, for Deleuze, ‘the point of 
sensory distortion is often to grasp intensity independently of extensity or prior to the 
qualities in which it is developed’.301 The art object and event as an agent of distorting 
influence forces not only the movements of bodies, an alteration of their positions or 
coordinates, but seeks out their internal and constitutive movements. In this way distortion 
conceived as an ideal function of art is understood to undermine form and representation in 
the constitution of an individuating situation and the catalysis of influential and informative 
movements within the individual. 
 Where Deleuze has referred to paintings and sculptures as the agents of an affective 
distortion, we are, of course, primarily concerned with an altogether more ephemeral 
object: the sound object, described according to the more complex notion of objectility. 
While this particular object is undoubtedly of a different kind to that of sculpture or 
painting, the extent to which it can be considered as another such distorter, implicating 
theatricality and forcing movement, remains undiminished. Forced upon the listening 
subject is a shifting and invisible topography—as mapped by Sabine—capable of 
emplacement yet more productive in individuating terms in its more characteristic and 
conditional state of displacement. This is perhaps clearest in installation settings or in 
sound-walking insofar as the latter is considered concomitant with Debord’s dérive, a route 
along which the listener is guided more by the durational unfolding of sound events 
themselves than a map or pre-established route that relies upon a certain stasis contrary to 
the ephemerality of auditory space. Here we can refer once again to the work of Bain and 
Lucier. In performance, Bain’s work establishes a shifting architectonic tension, an 
expression of frequencies that excite the volumes they occupy and also potentially destroy. 
Such performances constitute what is in some senses a shifting harmonic structure, one 
which saturates and redetermines the space it occupies along with other resonant bodies, 
setting the space in motion. Both architectural and organic bodies are affected, the listening 
or alternatively active receptors of the expressed vibrations. Zones of differing intensity are 
established and gradually shift throughout a space creating a terrain that influences the 
movement of bodies: particles of dust shift around a room realigning in patterns expressive 
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of the waveforms passing through them, human bodies move finding spots of greater and 
lesser intensity, testing themselves, opening up to a vibrational barrage or finding a point of 
relative calm.  
 A similar example can be drawn from Alvin Lucier’s performances of Bird and 
Person Dyning in which Lucier, wearing binaural headphones slowly paces around a 
performance space, often amongst the crowd, his body invested in the establishment of 
feedback loops. Lucier’s movements trace paths through the auditory field his presence—
amidst a broader technical assemblage—establishes to the location of known phantoms, 
positions within the room where the sounds being emitted by an electronic birdcall—a 
decoration intended to adorn Christmas trees, comprised of an electronic circuit and a small 
loudspeaker housed within a silver ball—interfere with the shimmering, structural feedback 
that saturates and distorts the given performance space, producing heterodyne components, 
tonalities produced through the interference of birdcall and feedback, tonalities that 
engender an extimate confusion of interior and exterior auditory events in the act of 
audition. 
 While the constitutive schema of the performance allows repetitions, granting it a 
certain independence or life beyond the instance of its execution, the particularity of this 
instance is nonetheless implicated within a fundamentally contingent relationship with the 
architectural space it occupies, being partly determined by its volumes, materials and 
dimensions. As Lucier traverses the auditory space, tones shift in a manner dependent upon 
the position of his head within the space. This dependency takes Lucier on a walk 
throughout the space in search of diverse tonalities and nodes of particular intensity. The 
assemblage comprised of performance space—encapsulating the audience and the layout of 
furniture in addition to strictly architectural matters—PA, birdcall and microphones 
constitutes a set inaudible determinants or potentials, waveforms made possible through the 
dimensions and materiality of the space, the speaker system being used and the emissions 
of the birdcall, yet excited, individuated or dramatized, rendered as qualitative audibility, 
only through Lucier’s insertion amidst them, his movements both constituent and catalytic 
in an intensive, sonorous individuation. As Lucier squats, climbs on chairs or tilts his head, 
new frequencies and harmonic structures are individuated, waveforms set in motion across 
the room, altering its audible topography. The performance is not an improvisation, but the 
negotiation of an invisible, intensive and amorphous structure, with Lucier slowly 
following the contours of the auditory field established between body, architecture, 
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microphones, birdcall and speakers. In Bird and Person Dyning Lucier is a walker, 
following paths that open up amidst a particular auditory space, taking routes between the 
peaks and troughs of greater and lesser acoustic intensity, pausing where he finds or 
uncovers the phantom objects and productions he is invested in seeking out. Engendered in 
the performance of this piece is a particular theatricality, an intensively relational and 
contingent situation established between the diverse elements of its constitutive 
assemblage. 
 Through the potential for distortion that objects present—auditory or otherwise—
their ability to make a difference, a particular theatricality is instigated, a theatricality 
derided by Fried according to its appearance in minimalist practice yet here cast in a 
positive light for its generative and relational productivity. It is to the details and 
dynamisms of this theatricality that we should now turn, a theatricality which, for Deleuze, 
defines the world: 
The world itself is an egg, but the egg itself is a theatre: a staged 
theatre in which the roles dominate the actors, the spaces dominate 
the roles and the Ideas dominate the spaces […] spatial dramatisation 
is played out on several levels: in the constitution of an internal 
space, but also in the manner in which that space extends into the 
external extensity, occupying a region of it […] A living being is not 
only defined genetically, by the dynamisms which determine its 
internal milieu, but also ecologically, by the external movements 
which preside over its distribution within an extensity.302 
Initially expressed is an organization of Idea, space, role and actor constituting a genetic 
function or somewhat unilateral, structural determination. Yet, beyond the explicitly 
biological references, we can take from the latter assertion of an external or ecological 
determination the interaction necessary to derail charges of unilateral determination. The 
world is here considered as an egg insofar as it is the site of creative production, comprised 
of virtual or genetic elements and their intensive interaction, complication and particular 
distortion necessary in the production of an actualized individual. While deterministic, this 
potential biological determinism does not remain sufficient insofar as actualisation is 
realized or distributed only through a  necessary ecological ‘interference’. The 
determination or actualisation of internal differences are here described as requiring 
external influence. Beyond Deleuze’s biological orientation, it is the nature of this 
                                                
302 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 269. 
 231 
theatricality taken as a schema of intensive individuation in general that is of interest, as it 
is here that we are able to make use of this schema for our discussion of the individuating 
dynamics and spatio-temporal intensities of particular instances of sound art and related 
practices. Here we have the expression of a schema according to which the individuals 
occupying a space are the subjects of this broader situation, subjects of the rhythms of 
matter. As discussed below, we consider Ideas not as purely conceptual or immaterial 
objects, but along Deleuzian lines as concrete, generative situations, as problematic-Ideas 
that ‘are of the order of events’, an assemblage of elements that rumbles and murmurs 
according to the unfolding of catalytic vibrations, both individuated and individuating.303 
We perhaps get a stronger sense of the importance of this concrete conception of Ideas for 
our subject matter insofar as problematic Ideas are considered, by Deleuze, to be ‘the 
ultimate elements of nature and the subliminal objects of little perceptions’.304 This 
situation broadly delimits the abstract schema according to which a materialist theory of 
determination operates; subjects, or rather individuals, informed by the material interactions 
that constitute an informative ground. Yet this trajectory from virtual Idea—from 
elementary, particular or molecular interactions—to individual is not to be thoughts as 
strictly unilateral, as ecological, actualized and external conditions constitute a necessary 
interference in intensive productions. Here we can think of a space saturated and 
determined according to intensive vibrations, vibrations rendered as sound but, of course, 
also productive of heat, light or haptic sensations within the infrasonic bandwidth, 
ephemeral spatial productions of the sort discussed in detail below. These material 
interactions are considered as the spatio-temporal determinants that come to ‘dominate’ the 
‘actors’ occupying such spaces, the subjects of forced movements and productive 
distortions. Yet these catalytic vibrations are themselves individuated according to more 
complex sets of conditions, audible vibrations whose conditions reside within the 
dimensions of an enveloping space, the materials of its construction and the various bodies 
that come to inhabit and in turn contribute to the determination of this space, whether these 
be human or otherwise. 
 In this theatrical model of individuation we can recognize two efficacious states, that 
of the concrete or problematic Idea, more generally described under the rubric of the 
virtual, and those extensive forms constituting an ecology of the actual that comes to bear 
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upon what can be rendered of the virtual. Where individuation is considered to be a 
movement between the virtual and the actual, this process operates according to the 
characteristics of dramatization. Deleuze’s theory of dramatization—which will be seen to 
be particularly useful in elaborating and clarifying a theory of sonorous individuation—
accounts for virtual-actual movements, yet this term also encapsulates what is described by 
Deleuze elsewhere as the processes of differentiation and differenciation. The former 
accounts for an organization at the level of the virtual through the internal relations of ‘pre-
individual singularities’, the structuring of virtual multiplicities. We might also consider 
differentiation as a kind of imperceptible organization constituting the potentials or 
conditions of appearance. With differenciation, on the other hand, Deleuze accounts for the 
actualisation of individuals, their formal appearance and extensive constitution. Yet the 
differentiated need not necessarily be differenciated, need not become apparent or 
recognizable, and insofar as it undergoes differenciation it may nonetheless remain in 
excess of this differenciation, as potentials that were not actualized or ‘realized’ in an 
individuated instance. Insofar as differentiation is thought as the internal structuration of the 
Idea of sound, that which has already been discussed in terms of a kind of white noise, the 
instance of its becoming audible is to be thought as the process of differenciation wherein 
in elements or a particular bandwidth of the audible potentials embodied within the Idea of 
sound are actualized as a sonority. Differentiation, as the internal and obscure organization 
of an Ideal noise, remains in excess of any differenciated instance, as in such an instance 
only a limited bandwidth of its audible potentials are rendered audible. Deleuze develops 
‘the concept of different/ciation to indicate at once both the state of differential relations in 
the Idea or virtual multiplicity, and the state of the qualitative and extensive series in which 
these are actualised by being differenciated’.305 Since the differentiated virtual multiplicity 
need not necessarily be actualised—need not become apparent or externally identifiable—
the fact that this occurs requires that the process by which it occurs must be accounted for 
in the development of a sufficient theory of individuation. To this end, Deleuze states that 
‘the totality of the system which brings into play the Idea, its incarnation and its 
actualisation must be expressed in the complex notion of “(indi)-different/ciation” […] 
Individuation ensures the embedding of the two dissimilar halves.306 Individuation names 
the intermediary productive force between the differentiated and the differenciated, that 
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which renders the virtual actual and substantiates what are only otherwise potentially 
informative events or changes. Yet in keeping with  Deleuze’s theory of immanence, the 
individuated does not remain strictly distinct from the virtual in its actuality, insofar as 
individuation constitutes an embedding of both the virtual and actual within being, within 
an individuated object, body or sonority, locating the potential for change within the 
actualized object, sonorous or otherwise, and accounting for its spatio-temporal 
deformation. That an object may be actually apparent, differenciated or actualized, does not 
exclude its potential for change—its actuality is only one unequal half of its existence, the 
other being its virtual component. It is these two ‘unequal halves’ combined that constitute 
the individuated body, its apparent actuality as well as its virtual capacity for change. It is 
this process of (indi)-different/ciation that we find encapsulated within the notion of 
dramatization. 
 Taking a step away from the exposition of this schema of individuation in what are 
somewhat, although necessarily for Deleuze’s project, abstract terms, towards the particular 
expressions of our subject matter, of sonority as a spatio-temporal determinant and as 
spatio-temporally determined, the particular relevance of this process of (indi)-
different/ciation or the method of dramatization is expressed more clearly where it is 
referred to as a function of ‘spatio-temporal dynamisms’. Discussed in relation to spatio-
temporal dynamics, the method of dramatization can be understood as embedding a theory 
of individuation within the rhythms of matter, identifying the generative force of production 
and distortion in relation to spatio-temporal fluctuations and deformations of the kind 
discussed below. Under this rubric we can include weather systems contributing to or 
activating material deformation, exciting the capacity for change in bricks, in dunes, but 
also more localized environmental fluctuations or dynamics such as those productive of 
sonorous vibrations. In the same fashion we may also consider sonorous vibrations as 
themselves being spatio-temporal dynamisms, affecting change and performing 
individuations according to the rhythms of spatio-temporal matters. Continuing with the 
functionalist or infraesthetic approach outlined below, the question we ask of these 
dynamics should be that of what they do, the way they affect systems, bodies or objects. 
Deleuze answers this question in stating that spatio-temporal dynamisms: 
create particular spaces and times […] they entail or designate a 
subject, though a “larval” or “embryonic” subject […] they 
constitute a special theatre […] they express Ideas […] It is through 
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all these different aspects that spatio-temporal dynamisms figure the 
movement of dramatization.307 
The movement of dramatization is a productive and individuating force, an attempt at 
accounting for spatio-temporal productions expressed in the dynamic rhythms of matter. 
This processual determination accounts for the stages of (indi)-different/ciation briefly 
outlined above, the expression of, or transition from, virtual Ideas to individuated yet 
nonetheless embryonic subjects, bodies that despite being individuated remain in 
development, retain the capacity for change expressed as their unequal, virtual ‘half’. The 
movements of dramatization entail the production or determination of not only subjects but, 
simultaneously, the spaces they occupy, a process from which spatio-temporal and 
subjective states are engendered as residual productions, the products of processual 
interactions. These interactions entail a chain of events constituting the conditions of the 
production of space and the determination of its occupying and embedded subjects.  It is in 
this manner that sonority is to be figured in the terms of spatio-temporal dynamisms, as a 
processual determination of space and occupying subjects, as an ephemeral yet nonetheless 
intensive productivity and individuating force. Rather than undermining relations to 
intensive potential, it is a particular ephemerality that expresses intensive being, being as 
subject to time, as spatio-temporally contingent and as being in relation to or oscillating 
around mutable, imperceptible potentials. Effecting a localized disturbance or deformation 
within both qualitative and infraesthetic orders, sonority contributes to a determination of 
space through displacement; as a distorter or distorting objectility, the intensive 
ephemerality of sound may contribute to the perturbation of space insofar as it is figured 
according to representation as recognizable place. In the agitative conditions of sonority, an 
event that is itself a spatial agitation, we find the audible expression of material 
interactions, an expression whose ambiguity constitutes a problem in excess of its 
representation and recollection. While in sound we may identify the possibility of an 
emplacement, the particular expression of a material and site specificity, its is in its 
existence and propagation as displacement that its individuating potentials are located. Such 
is the ambiguity of sound, being both expression and perturbation of location, its 
contingency, with regard to its immanent conditions, marks a particular specificity, yet this 
same expression marks a difference, a contribution to and distortion of a spatio-temporal 
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aggregate. Such processes must be conceived in the form of an oscillation insofar as such 
dynamisms are to be thought as differenciating agencies, as the displacements conditioning 
place, a distortion making possible consecutive consolidations. Sonority is thus conceived 
as both product and producer, as the individuated product of its inaudible and imperceptible 
conditions and as individuating producer of an intensive spatiality, a particular objectility 
operating according to perturbations, disturbances through which it expresses and reveals 
something of those imperceptible conditions through procedural information, functioning 
‘beneath’ its representation or anterior to its recollection. This ideal functionalism is to be 
thought as particular more than specific, insofar as the specific implies a certain fixity or 
definition of identity and a condition of recognition, serving symbolic operations ahead of 
the affects of individuations. It is only when considered in excess of symbolic 
representation and as operating according to a ‘pure’ perception or active receptivity that 
we can ascribe to sonority this ideal functionality, the agitative and dramatizing potential of 
noise whose primary affectivity resides beyond its symbolic reduction and organization: 
Beneath organization and specification, we discover nothing more 
than spatio-temporal dynamisms: that is to say, agitations of space, 
holes of time, pure syntheses of space, direction, and rhythm […] 
These dynamisms always presuppose a field in which they are 
produced, outside of which they would not be produced. This field is 
intensive, that is, it implies differences of intensity distributed at 
different depths. Though experience shows us intensities already 
developed in extensions, already covered over by qualities, we must 
conceive, precisely as a condition of experience, of pure intensities 
enveloped in a depth, in an intensive spatium that preexists every 
quality and every extension.308 
It is this description of spatio-temporal dynamisms that describes the ideal function and 
individuating force we are seeking to identify in sonorous dynamics amidst a broader 
aggregate of material expressions and rhythms, rhythms attesting to the constant and 
procedural deformation of space and its implication within ongoing processes of 
individuation. Where we seek to treat sonorous productions in a manner analogous with the 
notion of spatio-temporal dynamisms, we may render the abstract structure outlined above 
by Deleuze more specific in stating that auditory dynamisms always presuppose a field in 
which they are produced, a field that constitutes their conditions, such as the architectural 
infrastructures excited by Bain and Lucier, or the auditory system and organic 
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infrastructures confused by Kirkegaard. The necessity of these presupposed conditions 
asserts a contingency, the reciprocal determinations of an auditory event and its broader 
infrastructural assemblage. The constitutive interactions of such presupposed conditions 
constitutes their intensity, their generative potentials, as that which belies their localized, 
qualitative rendering in the act of audition. These presupposed fields or conditions are not, 
however, thought to remain autonomous from the dynamisms they help produce, insofar as 
it is in the nature of such dynamisms—sonorous, thermal or otherwise—to agitate spatial 
conditions according to the temporalities, directions and rhythms they express, themselves 
contributing to a spatio-temporal determination. Continuing our overview of Deleuzian 
individuation—taken as a schema appropriate to the description of sonic and vibrational 
productions beyond their symbolic organization—what we find in this excerpt is a clear 
explication of the way in which the virtual is not in itself causal, not considered—in a 
formulation that would be constitutive of a unilateral determinism—to be the sole agent of 
production, but rather one part of production that must be excited and may only be called 
into action under particular conditions. Intensity as a quasi-object, a catalytic objectile, 
excites response from virtual potentials or conditions, engendering individual instances 
from provisions which remain inexhausted in the production of such a particular instance. 
Following Lefebvre’s description of ‘fleeting objects’—that ‘which is not exactly an object’ 
and pertains more to a particular objectility—we might refer to an auditory event or 
sonorous objectile as one such excitation, an excitation constituting the catalyst of 
dramatization.309 
 In the rhythms of matter we identify a field of intensity, interacting matters and 
vibrational events that provide the conditions from which perceptible quality, tonality, 
brightness or roughness may be drawn, each instance being both production and reduction 
of its intensive set of conditional events. The contingency of such individuations is 
described according to its reliance upon a particular, presupposed field or set of necessary 
conditions, without which imperceptible or virtual potentials could not be actualized or 
individuated, could not be rendered audible. It is this field of intensive potentials that 
constitutes the imperceptible conditions of experience, that which remains inaudible but 
provides the possibility of audible qualities that constitute its extension, its externally 
recognizable qualities constituting the possibility of recognition. Within an appropriate field 
                                                
309 See Lefebvre, ‘Seen from a Window’, 219. 
 237 
situation, through agitation and excitation, an individuating dramatization unfolds, drawing 
out a spatio-temporally contingent being, performing an individuation of events, bodies, 
waveforms. It is this schema of individuation, as spatio-temporally and materially 
contingent, as being brought about through dramatization, through excitation and agitation 
according to spatio-temporal dynamisms, that particularly suits our concerns for both the 
production and consequent affectivity of sonority. The resonance of this schema of 
individuation—operating according to dramatization—with the production and productivity 
of sonority is well recognized by Deleuze and Guattari in their specific considerations of 
sound. Where individuation is considered according to the notion of dramatization, a 
method that adds necessary complexity and confusion to schemas sympathetic to 
unilaterally deterministic trajectories and an overly hierarchical organization of 
differenc/tiation, a particular resonance with sound is established and a more complex 
connection or continuation is made possible between the elements of Deleuze’s theory of 
individuation and the more specifically sonorous accounts provided in A Thousand 
Plateaus. It is in moving onto a consideration of such accounts that a second 
diagrammatical rendering of the process and schema of individuation is provided, one more 
suited to individuation considered as a process of dramatization or haecceity. 
 
Figure 5 : Individuation expressed as haecceity or a process of dramatization. 
 
 Developing the method of dramatization, haecceity is figured similarly as a 
processual individuation while being confused with the instance of protean, intensive being. 
In a graphical representation of this schema intended to express a difference of orientation 
from the model according to which individuation could be read as passage from virtual Idea 
to actual being we find, passing from left to right, a solid line representing the apparent 
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stability of the constituted individual existing beside the fluctuations of a virtual 
interference represented as a variable waveform. Where the waveform comes into contact 
with the line representing the individuated being the unilateral trajectory is dispersed and 
distorted, set in motion and set apart from itself through virtual interference, pulled towards 
the peaks and troughs of virtual flux, with the individual appearing as once again distinct 
from this intensive interference or problematic involvement in three differing positions. 
Drawn into impersonal becoming by the interference of a distorting virtual waveform, the 
individual reappears as differently individuated, being displaced yet nonetheless consistent. 
This difference of orientation is noted by Deleuze and Guattari who, in a passage that can 
be read as a warning against the ‘sufficiency of the virtual’ and an overly stratified schema 
of individuation holding the virtual to be an autonomous creative force, state that: 
It should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a decor or 
backdrop that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and 
people to the ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated 
aggregate that is a haecceity; it is this assemblage that is defined by a 
longitude and a latitude, by speeds and affects, independently of 
forms or subjects, which belong on another plane.310 
Here becoming or individuation is, through its expression as haecceity, distinguished from 
any assertion of an autonomous ground, being affirmed as the saturating interactions of 
elements that both surround and permeate individuals. Here we are talking of individuals as 
aggregates, individuals which, in being distinct from a self, do not distinguish themselves 
from the noise of the world, from the ‘background’ noise that in fact permeates and 
constitutes the individuating, generative and problematic field in which the individual 
resides, the generative chaos of material interactions that is, for the individual, foreground 
as much as background. A haecceity, as intensive being, aggregate and continuous 
multiplicity, while being individuated is not necessarily actualized, remaining an instance 
of protean, intensive being, embedded within a system of productive interactions 
constituting the presupposed field of individuating dynamisms. According to such a 
schema, determination is not figured as being carried out according to a generative structure 
or blueprint, but by means of interference and distortion. Understood in the terms of a 
haecceity, not as a fixed and finite but infinite and protean being, a body is figured not as 
the mirror of its virtual conditions nor limited to its apparent form, but as an aggregate of 
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intensive relations, as the sum of its material elements, rhythms and relations: 
A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a 
determinate substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the 
functions it fulfills. On the plane of consistency, a body is defined 
only by a longitude and a latitude: in other words the sum total of the 
material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement 
and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of intensive 
affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential 
(latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, differential 
speeds […] Latitude and longitude are the two elements of a 
cartography.311  
Here a body is described according to the cartography of continuous multiplicities, as a 
collection or assemblage of elements that define an internal relation according to durations 
and rhythm. A body, anybody, is thus figured as a collection of material rhythms, durations 
or vibrations, fluctuations and temporal determinations each being the subject of reciprocal 
interference. The somatic complex is thus conceived according to a fundamental mutability 
and defined in terms of frequency, as ‘the sum total of the material elements belonging to it 
under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness’. 
Thinking the body as relational aggregate, held in relation through deterministic 
intensity, we can figure such relations of movement and frequency in the terms of explicitly 
sonorous relations, differing objects and bodies set in motion and brought into relation 
according to their resonant capacities (latitude), establishing through sympathetic relation 
an extended somatic complex. A complex waveform excites and establishes relations 
between disparate objects that otherwise bear only the potentials of relation; the common 
agitation of a waveform excites the inherent resonant capacities of tissues, concrete and 
airborne particles performing an intensive individuation through a distortion of otherwise 
apparently discrete boundaries, personal or identifiable territories. We must here once again 
assert that this is not necessarily the  body but anybody and is perhaps better thought, in a 
broader sense, in the terms of objectility, the object-as-evental-objectivity, necessarily in 
motion. That the body being defined above by Deleuze and Guattari should be thought in 
terms of anybody can be seen in statement that ‘there is a mode if individuation very 
different from that of a person, subject, thing or substance. We reserve the name haecceity 
for it. A season, a winter a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking 
nothing, even through this individuality is different from that of a thing or subject. They are 
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haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between 
molecules and particles, capacities to affect and be affected’.312 Haecceity becomes the 
objectile of an ontology of constant and recursive individuation, an intensive anybody in 
motion. It is in this sense that we must think not only of the consistent objects or beings 
entering into intensive processes as the constituents of an intensive ontology but the 
intensive processes ‘themselves’ as its real and primary constituents, the temporal matters 
remaining obscure where attention is directed solely towards the snapshots of the apparent. 
The notion of haecceity is invoked here due to its use in the description of intensive 
spatio-temporal determinations, processes that arguably find adequate explication in the 
more abstract schema of dramatization. The necessity of this reference beyond mere 
repetition is found in the extent to which, under the rubric of haecceities, these processes 
are more explicitly related to the spatio-temporal dynamics that have been of particular 
concern throughout this text so far, an example of which is found in the statement that ‘a 
haecceity is inseparable from the fog and mist that depend upon a molecular zone, a 
corpuscular space’, the haecceity here being expressed as the relation of the particular or 
corpuscular to the molar aggregate of mist, to an amorphous spatial objectility.313 This 
reference to diffuse spatial matters, to the reciprocally determined orders of the particular 
and the broader somatic complex, is treated herein as being analogous to auditory spatial 
productions relying upon particular and often imperceptible agitations for their unfolding 
both within and as architectonically apparent space. A haecceity, as the necessarily 
processual objectility of an intensive ontology, is considered inseparable from the diffuse 
spatio-temporal state within which it is involved in processes of reciprocal determinations. 
With the fog and mist comes a consideration of the spatial divorced from its Bergsonian 
limitation to the extensive—more suited to the dynamic productions and nephological 
syntheses of Diller and Scofidio as well as Tetsuo Kondo—space not limited to 
representation, to the relation of points and coordinates, but figured in the terms of spatio-
temporal productions.314 Such diffuse and particular matters have been the subjects of this 
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text so far, the material agents of architectonic deformation, weathering and distortion. This 
material deformation might equally well be referred to in terms of a composition as the 
mode of individuation  appropriate to a haecceity, as an emission of particles, of the self, 
thing or subject emitted as particles into composition with a wider material environment, 
such as ‘the dying rat enters into composition with the air’.315 Likewise we conceive of an 
emission of sonorous particles or particular sonorities as the composition of fully 
individuated objectiles, objects that are nonetheless diffuse, their propagation expressing 
not the residual stench of decaying flesh but the audible collisions of otherwise inaudible 
bodies, the friction of particular matters. These particular emissions determine an intensive 
and individuating space within which material temporalities are necessarily implicated, a 
space both individuated and individuating, a confused somatic complex conceived as 
particular objectility. The definition of the somatic objectile accordingly depends upon its 
expressive and affective capacities, both in terms of emission and reception, as this 
affective capacity defines its intensive, protean being, and recurrent individuations 
functioning in a place constantly  slipping between that defined by discretion. 
Individuation expressed in the terms of haecceities, as the individuation of anybody, 
considered atop and as a development of the theory of dramatization and spatio-temporal 
dynamisms, provides the necessary framework for a theory of sonorous individuation that 
accounts not only for the individuation of individuals considered as the listening and 
occupying subjects of acoustic space but the individuation of sounds as equally protean 
beings, the sound event individuated alongside its listening subject, each constituting a 
node within a concrete and continuous assemblage. The individuation of the listener as a 
distortion of the same is considered equal to, or on the same ‘plane’ as, an individuation of 
sonorities, waveforms as individuated individuals which set any number of bodies in 
motion, organic or otherwise, intensive movements constituting progressive individuations. 
Individuated are sonorous, architectonic and organic bodies, through which waveforms 
pass, rendered different in each instance or their reception; equally we may also consider 
the individuation of each element to occur with a degree of independence from one another, 
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insofar as they can be identified as differently contingent, considered as the constitutive 
classes of diverse aggregates, aggregate anybodies. 
 Haecceity names a becoming or individuation that is progressive and procedural, a 
fact that finds expression in Deleuze and Guattari’s simple statement that ‘taking a walk is a 
haecceity’.316 This walk being taken in the name of haecceity is perhaps better thought of in 
the sense of Debord’s dérive than a walk to the bank, a walk driven not by the necessity of 
a goal or the need to make a deposit, but a drifting walk, driven by the contours of the 
environment as a collection of unfolding events that includes the walker’s immanent 
interaction with it. In the undertaking of such a walk, the walker must ‘release themselves 
to the solicitations of the site and of the encounters suiting it’, the walk or dérive being 
defined not solely by the human subjects in motion but by a certain openness to a far 
broader field of influences, agents and ecological dynamics.317 It is the definition of this 
broader field as the site of both subjective and impersonal interactions that is of particular 
interest as for Debord, ‘the objective field of passion in which dérive is propelled must be 
defined at the same time according to its own determinism and according to its relations 
with social morphology’.318 This definition outlines a field defined by the relation between 
intensive material or objective agencies and the socio-subjective relations informed by 
them, a space in which movements and changes of direction are propelled by the agitative 
or generative topology of this ‘objective field’, a field which is defined and determined with 
a degree of distance or independence from its appearance. In directing attention back 
towards the definition of haecceities, we are able to draw upon certain distortion or 
interference that adds necessary complication to what might otherwise be presumed to be a 
unilateral field of influence and determination. It is the walk as collective and aggregate 
process of individuation, walking that brings something new to light, uncovering new 
trajectories and movements through the production of an assemblage in motion that is 
encapsulated within the walk as haecceity. The grouping of new sensations, associations 
and thoughts inform and influence the walker, defined in relation to the path taken and the 
objects determining the route’s topography. Of the objects that contribute to this 
topographical determination—to the formation of an ‘objective field of passion’—we of 
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course include sound objects, the particular objectilities catalogued and described in 
precisely this faculty by Augoyard and Torgue, sound events and objectiles that inform the 
structuration of place.319 If we imagine this walk as having taken place in a city, we might 
then just as easily refer to the event of urban audition recounted by Lefebvre in ‘Seen from 
the Window’, where the noises of the city are allowed to drift into the home and inform the 
listening subject within, who is lead not only through nearby streets of Paris in the course 
of his rhythm-analytical exercise, but along the intensive lines of the invasive yet invited 
noises, enabling an opening or weathering of the consistent boundary of both home and 
occupying self. In this auditory exercise the  ear constantly reterritorializes those fleeting 
objects, the multiplicity of noises and fluxes that separate themselves one from the other 
and each from themselves, to be recomposed. An individuation according to the noises 
without that seep within: ‘To understand and analyze rhythms, one has to let go, through 
illness or technique, but not completely […] to capture a rhythm one needs to have been 
captured by it. One has to let go, give and abandon oneself to its duration’.320 To let go, to 
open up, to be captured and to capture; individuation according to a confusion of sound, 
space and listener, the listener lead along a path defined according to the trajectories of 
fleeting waveforms. We find a clear example of such a practice, an opening onto the 
auditory determination of movements, in Max Neuhaus’s Listen project, which took 
participants on ‘field trips through found sound environments’, a formative event in the 
now popular practice of sound-walking wherein environments are approached and traversed 
according to the contours of an acoustic topography as much as the more solid components 
of a landscape.321 Often the intention of such walks is to produce a heightened awareness of 
the auditory components of an environment through an opening onto ambient noise towards 
a restructuration of audile technique, elements that are frequently and easily ignored 
according to the relative thresholds and sensitivities of culturally determined perception and 
the delimitation of a common sense. Such a heightened awareness of auditory space may be 
attained through focused listening to the given sonorities structuring a particular domain, or 
through the uncanny displacement of  events, as is carried out in the work of Janet Cardiff. 
In the sound-walk, where we are concerned with the sonorous individuation of 
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assemblages, of somatic complexes, it is the individual in the act of walking, hearing and 
listening, opened up to noise as Lefebvre describes, considered as a constituent element of a 
larger somatic aggregate, that constitutes the processual individuation described under the 
complex rubric of haecceity, not simply the walkers themselves. It is the aggregate process 
of walking, listening, hearing that constitutes and  individuating process, one which 
captures the open individual and is reterritorialized in the emergent audile technique of a 
listening subject. 
 Of particular importance to this argument has been the notion of an opening onto 
noise as an opening onto difference as the generative site of material interactions. Of a 
more specific importance has been the attempt to consider ways in which this opening 
might be carried out by way of influential sonorities and agitative sound objects, by the 
affective power of a sound always leading beyond itself. Here we appeal to the extent to 
which sound can be considered to lead both beyond itself and beyond selves, as that which 
drags and impels movements beyond subjective discretion and delimited territories to the 
site of individual interactions and ‘impersonal becomings’. Such affectivity is thought to 
cut the apparent discretion of the self from its contingent and continuous conditions, 
affirming its protean being or becoming. Such a cut does not mark the dualistic opposition 
of matter and mind, but rather determines discretion and autonomy as appearance, 
determined as such according to thresholds of perception, drawing one beyond, beyond the 
apparent that nonetheless remains efficacious. We can here—once again—take the work of 
Alvin Lucier as an example. 
 Lucier is most commonly discussed for his approach to the physicality of sound, a 
bias which has been rightly addressed by LaBelle who affirms a necessary subjective 
dimension to his work.322 This affirmation is carried out most clearly with reference to his 
most famous work, I am Sitting in a Room, a piece which demonstrates, excites and draws 
to the foreground of perception the background influence of architectural acoustics shaping 
sonic expression and perception through resonant capture and determination. LaBelle draws 
specific attention to the fact that it is Lucier’s voice which constitutes the impulse sacrificed 
in the excitation of auditory spatial determinations, a space, a room, being excited and 
acoustically mapped by Lucier’s patient actions. This is all the more significant for the 
smoothing function that this process carries out, gradually removing the ‘irregularities’ or 
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stutter from Lucier’s voice, leaving a smooth shimmering waveform expressive of the 
architectonic volume it occupies as much as the speech which excites and rhythmically 
shapes this resonance. While there is, as LaBelle points out, an important implication of the 
subjective within Lucier’s fascination with the physical, we must take this assertion of the 
subjective further still in pointing out Lucier’s use of sound to strip something away from 
himself, to remove the specific, characteristic and identifiable irregularities of his speech 
through the aggregate mechanism of tape recorders, voice, and architecture. While the 
subjective element of this piece must undoubtedly be considered as catalytic amidst its 
conditions, we should also note that it is the identifiable subject of speech and language 
which is stripped away and set apart, leaving a waveform that runs through the individual 
that remains, the space he occupies and the mechanisms which have facilitated its 
extraction. While the subjective component is of specific importance it is nonetheless the 
case that the subjective is not all, even where our considerations are of the personal amidst 
this particular compositional assemblage; the self itself must be taken as a complex 
aggregate and a subtraction from the individual that persists in excess of the subjective and 
the personal through its connections with the noise of the world.  
 The voice is sacrificed to the room in soliciting a response, which is then inserted into 
a potentially endless machinic cycle, Lucier’s voice is stripped away from Lucier, and then 
from itself. The I is literally cut away from the voice—by the end of the piece the “I”, the 
opening enunciation, is unidentifiable—the voice from the body and the voice from itself in 
the production of a waveform that expresses its aggregate conditions more than subjective 
expressions of intent and identity. This particular and cutting affectivity of sound receives 
significant attention in A Thousand Plateaus, as we have already seen, yet it is where sound 
is described as possessing the power necessary for the catalysis of such openings—making 
possible recursive individuations—that these considerations are particularly important: 
Sound owes this power not to signifying or “communicational” 
values […] nor to physical properties, but to a phylogenetic line, a 
machinic phylum that operates in sound and makes it a cutting edge 
of deterritorialization. But this does not happen without great 
ambiguity: sound invades us, impels us, drags us, transpierces us.323 
The particular ‘power’ or ‘cutting edge’ of sound is here identified as residing not in its 
representational or communicative potentials, as a means of signification, but within its 
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saturating material affectivity, that which cuts into and cuts out an opening in the 
consistency and delimitation of a specific subjective territory. It is by means of this 
particular power or cutting edge that the sonorous attains the force of a pure perception 
outside of recollection, representation and signification. We should, however, ask what this 
ambiguous ‘power’ is that performs the saturation and cutting open of the subject, or to 
rephrase the question, how sound attains the power by which such openings are produced—
beyond the oblique prescription of an inherent ‘machinic phylum’ and ‘phylogenetic lines’. 
The ‘power’ by which sound cuts an opening is that defined in the notion of intensity, the 
drawing into relation and processual determination of bodies as an initial disorganization 
leading towards their redetermination through ‘impersonal becomings’. Cut through is the 
consistency of defined and delimited thresholds—both proxemic and perceptual—forcing 
new relations and interactions, a production of extimate events, objectile confusions of 
interiority and exteriority whose imposed rhythms draw the subject away from itself in an 
operation that can be thought as occurring through a sympathetic resonance. The squeaking 
and squealing of a knife on china, the breaks of a car coming to a halt, sounds whose 
frequency can be felt to cut into  and pierce the body, disturbing, distracting, distorting, 
drawing attention away from the thoughts occupying the mind to the intensity of the events 
occurring within and without the boundaries of somatic territory. Such sounds are only the 
most obvious examples of a material affectivity that operates not according to signification 
but intensity, transpiercing the body, often by more subliminal means. That a disc brake 
should find a particular resonance in the ear canal produces both disturbance and relation 
perceived near the threshold of pain, its intensity interrupting thought and forcing 
movement; it disturbs the autonomy and interiority of subjective thought—the inner world 
of the self—while forcing an objective relation between metal, air and ear, a relation that in 
its disturbance of interiority forces an experience of intensive extimacy. 
 
Why this Privileging of the Ear?    
 
The cutting power identified in sound by Deleuze and Guattari, the forcing of an opening or 
continuity upon the otherwise apparently discrete subject, has been described as operating 
according to the processual determination of intensity and the excitation of resonant 
potentials. Yet can we simply ascribe the privilege sound receives solely to resonance? The 
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particular privileging of sonority in Deleuze and Guattari’s work results from a comparison 
between ‘the powers or coefficients of deterritorialization of sonorous and visual 
components’, powers measured against the extent to which their respective 
deterritorializations lead to a ‘refinement’ and a freeing of objects—our particular interest 
lying, of course, with the sound object—from territorial determination or fixity.324 The 
privilege of sound is therefore ascribed according to its openness to deterritorialization, an 
openness that describes its being malleable and mutable, and therefore particularly 
susceptible to the production of new territorial assemblages, the circuit of which constitutes 
a process of individuation. Yet the driving function or mechanism of deterritorialization 
remains obscure. Deterritorialization can be thought as a certain mobility or movement 
between territories, a mobility attained by sound, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
through its refinement or simplification, a certain shedding of overtones and spectral 
complexity: ‘what is necessary to make sound travel, to travel around sound, is very pure 
and simple sound, an emission or wave without harmonics (La Monte Young has been 
successful at this) […] a material that is not meager but prodigiously simplified, creatively 
limited, selected’.325 This position would seem to identify a particular if not essential purity 
in simple tones as the clearest expression of non-referential frequency, temporality and 
duration, a frequency that nonetheless remains itself perfectly individuated as such. While 
this assertion of simplification and reduction must be taken in the context of the 
functionalism or infraesthetic orientation already discussed—a focus upon the impacts and 
implications of sound within a broader systematic assemblage—there remain aesthetic 
implications that should be addressed.  
 Overtones can be considered as the timbral signature of a sound’s material conditions, 
an expression of the diverse components constituting its possibility. Timbral qualities and 
the presence of overtones can be thought to assert the conditional or site specificity binding 
sound to its objective and inaudible origins. The simplification of sound can be thought to 
constitute its deterritorialization insofar as this specificity, the timbral and qualitative 
matters of expression, ties sound to the image of its somatic origins, asserting a specific 
referentiality. If what we hear sounds ‘metallic’ or ‘woody’, associations bound according 
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to that which is expressed spectrally or harmonically, it is better equipped to conjure the 
image of a metal pipe, a whistle, a hollow log or wooden flute. Each object or instrument 
may sound the same note, sharing a common fundamental frequency, but its overtone 
structure gives clues as to its origin, helping to tie it into a ‘territorial’ system comprised of 
the instrument or object, the way in which it is played or the circumstance of its sounding 
as well as its cultural and symbolic significance within a specific performance situation. It 
is this overtone structure that renders a common note emitted from each object or 
instrument—determined according to a fundamental frequency—different in each instance, 
according to a more complex overtone structure. The eradication of overtones effaces this 
potential referentiality in the production of a tone that does not appear to be of anything 
specific, a sound object determined as such through the presentation of a fundamental 
frequency alone. Concomitant with this reductionist trajectory is the difficulty in locating or 
localizing simple tones, a point that is significant considering Deleuze and Guattari’s 
isolation of simplicity and reduction in the deterritorialization of sound. The simple tone’s 
resistance to emplacement, to localization in spatial and somatic origins, contributes to an 
apparent autonomy, yet also, and more importantly, to a mobility constituting it as a 
material event capable of capturing other properties or qualities, drawing out extensive 
resonances embodying consecutive harmonic structurations according to the conditions in 
which it is reterritorialized or the instance in which it is rendered audible.  
 What we must take from this reductive position that appears as an aesthetics of the 
pure and simple is not that the simple tone alone is capable of affective displacement and 
the simultaneous production of differences, but that the emphasis placed upon it carried out 
according to its expression of a ‘pure’ and simple frequency that is more easily thought in 
terms of an intensive quantity than an expressive quality, and therefore constitutes the 
element of a pure infraesthetics. Accordingly it is not so much the qualities of the sound 
itself that are of concern but its particular impacts, displacements and affective 
consequences within a broader assemblage or somatic complex that are of primary concern. 
Furthermore, in moving beyond the insufficiency of Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis upon 
a pure and simple tone, appearing as a kind of naïve reduction, we must assert the 
infraesthetic context of this position whereby it is not the aesthetic qualities of the simple 
tone that are focused upon so much as the affective capacities of a wave that is conceived as 
a reduction or subtraction from the white noise of the Idea of sound, and therefore the 
element of a subtractive synthesis more than a pure formal element. Deleuzian purity is 
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thereby located at both extremes of the sound event, at the point of its absolute reduction to 
a pure, durational and intensive quantity, as well as  the point of its absolute confusion in 
the potentials of all audibility, both of which define the limits of the imperceptible.  
 The deterritorialization of sound as a process of refinement is thought to entail a 
shedding of timbral referents or bindings, whereby the sound event is not thought to refer to 
the sound of something but to sound itself, understood in this simplified form as a more 
direct expression of a pure frequency, temporality and therefore an uncomplicated duration. 
It is on the point of this durational orientation and reductionism that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reference to LaMonte Young is particularly apt. Before too hasty an adoption of this 
refinement or rarefaction as if uncovering the essence of sound in pure synthetic simplicity, 
a certain emphasis must be placed upon the prerequisite conditions of a deterritorialization, 
upon the ‘sober’ gesture of peeling away, a careful stripping back of territorially defined 
features and qualities, not as the revelation of an inner essence but an enhanced mobility 
through a lack of specificity, the amplification of intensive quantities towards enhanced 
affective capacities. Such a gesture that is clearly evident in Bain’s occasional use of 
synthetic simple tones to saturate and confuse the architectonic and somatic, wherein tones 
identify particular and common resonant capacities, as well as the use of such tones within 
Kirkegaard’s Labyrinthitis, wherein aesthetic qualities are sacrificed in order to attain a 
precise affectivity and excitation of the active event of audition. Yet, against too forceful a 
consolidation upon such an aesthetics of purity and a purity of tone we should bring to the 
fore the act of a procedural and selective subtraction, the determination of—with Young’s 
Composition 1960 No. 10 taken as a case in point—a line to be followed. Here we find an 
example of how a ‘becoming-sonorous’ is not necessarily the becoming of sound, nor a 
sonification, but is rather the adoption of its functional imperative: its inherent durations 
and spatio-temporal deformations, its determination of distinct territories, this being 
exemplified in the manner in which Young’s line has since run through the work of George 
Maciunas, Yoko Ono and Nam June Paik, amongst many others, and passed through while 
avoiding total explication within musical scores, poetic text, performance and visual art. 
Following Young’s line we find an example of how, just as becoming-sound is not 
necessarily the becoming of sound, the charge put by Deleuze to musicians—and by 
extension sound artists—of  ‘making audible forces that are not audible in themselves’ can 
be considered as a sound becoming-light, becoming-haptic, becoming-duration, a charge 
that can be read as a request for artists and composers to become-sonorous, as this simply 
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calls for artists to do what sound does, to follow the lines it carves out, to make available 
through audition otherwise inaudible and imperceptible interactions.326 
 While Young’s work is exemplary of this point, of Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis 
upon a refinement, simplification and effacement of overtones, this reductive position risks 
becoming fixated upon an aesthetics of purity at the expense of both more complicated and 
confused sonorities as well as a process of creative subtraction and selection as the 
prerequisite of deterritorializations, a reification that leads not towards the absolute 
definition of the sound event but to the amplified affectivity of a sound unbound. On this 
point of a rarefaction, subtraction and selection, it would appear that this particular process 
is expressed more clearly and thoroughly by Lucier than by Deleuze and Guattari. Here we 
once again refer to Lucier occupying and exciting that room, undergoing a process whereby 
his voice is stripped down to shimmering spectral presence, pulled away from both Lucier 
and itself, thoroughly deterritorialized, its timbral and identifiable personal traits having 
been utterly obliterated in the revelation or drawing out of a simple and refined tonality—
far simpler than the complexities of identifiable speech—that does not expose an 
autonomous inner essence, a fundamental frequency that persists, but rather the excitation 
of fundamental contingencies. Lucier established a situation and technical schema within 
that room, carefully constructed to allow for the iterative deterritorialization of his voice by 
means of patient extraction, subtraction and selection, a process that reveals not a vocal 
essence or pure fundamental but the contingency of a tone that is simple only in 
appearance, in its individuated frequency and spectral components, yet complicated and 
confused within the architectonic and technical conditions in which it is reterritorialized. 
What remains after that systematic extraction is a sound, simple yet fundamentally impure, 
that is not—and could not be—completely stripped of harmonics but nonetheless far 
simpler in comparison with the spectral form in which it was an identifiable and 
territorialized voice, engaged in a symbolic and signifying practice. The stripping away of 
the voice’s ‘signature’ harmonics, its simplification as a displacement and 
deterritorialization marks not an essence but a transience, the amplified mobility of 
originally vocalized sonority, which is inevitably emplaced, reterritorialized through its 
subjection to the resonant potentials of the occupied architectonic site in a process of  
complex deformation through the attainment of different harmonics and timbre, the matters 
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of expression making apparent its emplacement. 
 The singling out of sound within Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of individuation 
can be thought to have its origins in the perceptibility of its inherent temporality, the ease of 
its description in the terms of spatio-temporal dynamisms, of the temporality that is 
expressed in a manner far subtler at the frequencies of light and other forms of radiation. 
The importance of the temporal or rather durational—the reason why the perceptibility of 
flux and temporal variance might be considered important in the emphasis placed upon 
sound in Deleuze and Guattari’s work—can be considered to be of Bergsonian origin, 
wherein duration and continuity describe the proper state of being as a process of becoming 
and the appearance of the state, static identity or stability of a thing are considered to be 
‘artificially taken snapshots of the transition’ that subtends this appearance.327 This 
emphasis upon the temporal can be thought to underlie that bestowed upon the sonorous, 
insofar as sonority is understood to embody an inherent affirmation and clearly perceptible 
expression of ephemerality and duration. This emphasis and the consequently identified 
power or ‘cutting edge’ can in this way be thought as residing within perceptible 
fluctuations, a perceptibility enabling the description of events in the terms of spatio-
temporal dynamics—dynamics that force the openings, consolidations and contractions 
entailed in processes of individuation and actualisation. ‘Beneath’ the identification of 
pitch, phonemes and individuated frequencies, the experience and sensation of a 
waveform’s oscillations, its additive, subtractive and phase dependent relations, reveals a 
continuous temporality and ephemerality beyond its discrete representation and 
recollection. In attempting to discern the particular reasons for this privileging of sonority, 
we can contrast the assertions made regarding sound as both medium and object itself, with 
those of light. There is, of course, an informative intensity to light capable of bringing 
about a particular ideal function by way of sight—such as that exemplified in the work of 
Turrell and more explicitly in Rahm’s use of UV light within the Hormonorium, directly 
exploiting its metabolic affectivity—yet it is perhaps due to the difficulty with which the 
internal temporality of light is perceived that it is not the recipient of the particular privilege 
Deleuze and Guattari place upon sonorous affectivity, insofar as it operates at a speed 
inhibiting its perception as other than a static constant. This privilege might then be thought 
to receive further grounding in the confusion of the sonorous and the haptic, most clearly 
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and commonly felt at the thresholds of audibility wherein its durational determination and 
temporal fluctuation is most pronounced. 
 While there has been an emphasis upon the spatial aspects of sounds throughout this 
text it has not been without referral to its inseparable temporality, as to separate out the 
spatial from the temporal constitutes what Ray Brassier has referred to as Bergson’s ‘bald 
dichotomy, the interdependence of these terms being essential and the clear expression of 
the temporal and durational within and by the sonorous determination of space being a 
reason for Deleuze and Guattari’s singling out of sound as a deterritorializing force and, by 
extension, spatio-temporal dynamism.328 The perceptibility of an inherent temporality or 
duration within sonority, taken as a cause for this particular emphasis upon sonority, can—
as was briefly mentioned above—be recognized as being of Bergsonian origin, a claim 
clarified by the work of Christoph Cox. For Cox, the perception of sound’s inherent, 
‘unorganized’ or ‘non-pulsed’ temporality—a temporality wholly different from that of 
both meter and the clock, that which understands time as broken up into discrete units 
rather than the continuous passage between those units—serves to open perception onto the 
process of becoming according to duration, a perception of the time of things or the 
temporality of matter as specific to and inherent within bodies, as opposed to being 
externally enforced and organized according to discrete units. Perhaps the most important 
instance of such an opening onto time as qualitative duration or material temporality is, for 
Cox, Cage’s  0’0” and 4’33”, which opened the musical organization of sound onto the 
disorganized durations of noise, works which aimed to ‘open time to the experience of 
duration and to open musical experience to the domain of worldly sound. It is also to open 
human experience to something beyond it: the nonhuman, impersonal flow that precedes 
and exceeds it’.329 The notion of duration being inherent within the noises of impersonal 
and worldly things, in the movements saturating and perturbing environments while 
producing sonorous events, conceives of a sonority displacing temporality as organizing 
discretion towards time as durational continuity, while simultaneously being that which 
pulls us away from ourselves, opening us up to material interactions, to the noise that 
constitutes our impersonal (ungrounding) ground, both our conditions of existence and 
means of dissolution. Noise, as that which transpierces us, pulling us towards non-human 
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and impersonal becomings, to the material interactions of the world at large, is in this way 
understood to account for the force of the ‘cutting edge’ or deterritorializing power 
identified as being operative within the ideal function of sonority. In his discussion of the 
work of Max Neuhaus, Cox also foregrounds the Bergsonian origins of an ideal temporality 
inherent within sonority to be drawn out through its qualitative reduction, simplification or 
subtraction—realized in Neuhaus’s work in the form of the drones heard in Times Square—
drawing on the following passage taken from Duration and Simultaneity: 
A melody to which we listen with our eyes closed, heeding it alone, 
comes close to coinciding with this time which is the very fluidity of 
inner life; but it still has too many qualities, too much definition, and 
we must efface the difference among the sounds, then do away with 
the distinctive features of sound itself, retaining of it only the 
continuation of what precedes into what follows and the 
uninterrupted transition, multiplicity without divisibility and 
succession without separation, in order to finally rediscover basic 
time. Such is immediately perceived duration, without which we 
would have no idea of time.330 
Where listening opens out onto that which inheres beyond the pitch class and phoneme we 
find the material flux of both impersonal and imperceptible becoming. For Bergson, there 
inheres in sound a temporality or duration that lies just beneath the surface of its 
recollection and well within the grasp of perception and sensation. In opening listening onto 
such temporality one dissolves discretion through a disorganization  and confusion of 
sonorities, an act which while seeking to ‘efface the difference among sounds’ might also 
be thought, in a manner more consistent with the present argument, to occur through the 
letting in or heightened awareness of difference where difference is equated with noise. 
This effacement of difference is rather that of distinct appearances, carried out through an 
opening-up, a movement away from discretion and towards a point of confusion, towards 
duration as the becoming of things operative within a field of intensive material 
interactions. Here we are presented with an argument in which Bergson identifies in sound 
the potential for an ‘ideal sensuous presentation of duration’, the inherence in sound of a 
perceivable flux and temporality that draws both sound and subjects away from themselves 
and towards their constitutive and continuous multiplicities, towards the noise of an 
intensive field of material interactions.331 Yet the same openness to duration that entails the 
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dissolution of discretion—that which makes possible what Deleuze and Guattari identify as 
sonority’s ‘signifying or “communicational” values’—draws one not only towards the 
affectivity of sound itself but necessarily beyond sound, towards its conditions and 
fundamental contingencies. This opening onto a temporality or duration that remains 
perceivable, if just ‘below the surface’, within sonority, pulls not only sound from 
signifying practice but sound from itself; it is this process, when taken recursively, that 
identifies the force of the deterritorializing and ‘cutting edge’ in sound, that which leads 
beyond discretion and into the void. It is in the above excerpt taken from Bergson and 
through Cox’s elaborations that we are able to identify something of the origins in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s emphasis upon sound as both a deterritorializing and individuating force, 
operating according to the infraesthetic functionalism of spatio-temporal dynamisms. 
 We should now address what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the ‘great ambiguity’ of 
the opening or deterritorializing power identified in sound, that which describes its being 
always en route to or implicated within reterritorializations. The ambiguity of sonority is 
most clear when its particular operations or powers are considered within Deleuze and 
Guattari’s functionalist schema. Sound is considered as operating as a ‘cutting edge’, 
creating openings and dissolving territorial discretion, as that which saturates a subjective 
territory or personal space to the point of bursting, or at least forcing it to spring a leak, its 
interference impelling or dragging us away from ourselves towards the reconstruction of a 
territoriality according to the components of an inter-assemblage. The ideal function of 
sonority is ambiguous insofar as its intensive production of openings is accompanied by a 
necessary restructuration, by a spatial production and redetermination. We have discussed 
the extent to which sound can be identified as operating according to displacement, yet such 
displacements contribute or are easily subject to a consecutive emplacement. Displacement 
can easily be thought to entail a production of space, such as that of the burrow, a space 
which emerges around the movements of the body as it squirms within the earth. To burrow 
is to displace matter, to create a space around the body through its own movements. In an 
analogous fashion the movements of bodies cause displacements in the air, movements 
which therefore produce space through the displacement of matter.332 Burrowing or the 
displacement of matter, as a production of space, entails a corresponding emplacement: the 
burrow which becomes a home, the sounds which contribute to the construction of personal 
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territories and an auditory proxemics. 
 
Territorialization and the Refrain 
 
Awaiting each displacement is the instance of its emplacement; where we speak explicitly 
of proxemic determinations amidst the objective confusion we call noise, a vacillation is 
posited between the receptive audition of the individual embedded in the world, and the 
territorializing practice of the analytical ear which sets the auditor apart from the confusion 
of the world towards a selective definition of identity. Neither state is taken to be sufficient, 
as strict adherence to either leads only to catastrophe in either absolute confusion or stifling 
containment, thus it is the vacillation that is of primary importance. While throughout this 
text a particular emphasis has undoubtedly been placed upon the operations of the former 
position, a certain ‘celebration’ of an aberrant and anomalous audition opened up to a 
degree of confusion in noise, it is championed insofar as it undoes the tendencies of the 
latter, of an analytical constriction or singular and sufficient audile technique, which may 
cast the aberrant as detrimental negativity or as insidious and homogeneous informality. In 
closing, it is towards a more explicitly stated vacillation that I now wish to turn. 
 Displacement entails a consecutive emplacement, a fact disregarded insofar as 
deterritorialization is considered the attainment of an ideal and ‘pure’ state of being rather 
than one ‘side’ or component of an oscillatory movement. Each opening is an opening onto 
something else, a something that may nonetheless remain an imperceptible constituent of 
the void. In this constant motion of displacement and emplacement we find a description of 
the production of space, or, more specifically, a production of territories. The territories 
with which we are concerned are, in accordance with the informative durations of our 
subject matter, ephemeral and roughly localized in accordance with audible emissions and 
their immediate conditions. Such territories are not those of the nation-state but the refrain, 
the definition of which will be returned to shortly. The particular production of territories to 
which I refer describes a process of consolidation, a drawing or knitting together, a 
relational delimitation through resonance or prescription productive of inhuman and extra-
human somatic complexes. The production of a consistent territory, however fleeting its 
appearance may be, is synonymous with an internal organization, a contraction and 
containment of chaotic influences and trajectories always leading elsewhere. The definition 
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of a particular territory does not occur according to a single event or class of elements but, 
as in the cases considered so far, draws on and selects from a diverse field of objects and 
events; the territories with which we are concerned are, of course,  not solely comprised of 
contractions and rarefactions of the air, but delimit a field that encroaches upon or is 
inclusive of architectural, organic, geological, biological and technological matters and 
objects. It is in the subtractive and selective relation of elements and events from diverse 
and confused fields that the territory is determined, set apart, constituting the territory as a 
somatic complex. The territories with which we have concerned ourselves have drawn lines 
through the earth, the architectonic and human bodies, lines that mark out the trajectory of a 
sympathetic resonance in diverse matters, lines demarcating the passage of a waveform. 
The territory can, of course, be taken according to common understanding, according to a 
kind of proxemic determination, as ‘the critical distance between two beings of the same 
species’, beings whose boundaries or thresholds are not static but oscillatory.333 Yet the 
particular requirements we have of a territory to be understood as a functional process, a 
processual production of space with a particular capacity for sonorous determination, 
requires that we take the territory to be a specific modality of a more general understanding 
of assemblages: the territory as a particular structuration of elements.  
 Following the work of Deleuze and Guattari we take the territory as a well defined 
volume to be midway along a tripartite system, according to which an assemblage may be 
understood not as a fixed or static state of things but as a processual productivity. An 
assemblage is considered to develop according to three stages of progress: the infra-, intra- 
and inter-assemblage. The production of an infra-assemblage constitutes a transition from 
chaos to the production of a territorial threshold, a minimal definitional assemblage, a 
simple line or repetition marking a distinction from the chaotic noise of a pure difference. 
With the emergence of the intra-assemblage, comes the clear definition of a territory, 
entailing a minimum of organization and an internal dimensional complexity. It is this 
degree of organization—a transition from linear trajectories to volumes—that makes 
possible a personal architectonics and auditory proxemics, attained according to a complex 
process of internal definition and distinction from a chaotic point of confusion. It is this 
internal organization or structuration of the intra-assemblage that marks the consistency or 
consolidation of a territory, the point at which the elements from which it is drawn ‘cease to 
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be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional to become 
expressive’.334 It is with the production of a territory as intra-assemblage that it is well 
defined and recognizable according to its ‘expressive’ qualities, qualities which demarcate 
its thresholds, its identity and distinction, a tonality, timbre or rhythmic expression that sets 
a territory apart from the murmur of a background or subterranean noise. It is with the inter-
assemblage that the consistent volume of the territory is inevitably breached, as further 
development and deformation is sought out, opening the territory up once again to  
difference, to the noise simultaneously embodying the potential of its reproduction and 
dissolution.335 
 Particular emphasis is placed upon this theory of assemblages as a schema of 
territorial production as the elaboration of such notions is carried out in explicitly 
architectonic and sonorous terms within Deleuze and Guattari’s exposition of the process. 
The infra-assemblage demarcating a minimal territory is determined according to the 
sounding of a line whose shape is determined according to the contours of the simplest of 
melodies, selected through an interpolation of noise. The complex internal organization of 
the intra-assemblage marks the production of a proper domesticity, a complexity and 
fortification which keeps the unconditioned and chaotic generativity of pure noise or 
difference at bay. It is at this stage, in the production of the intra-assemblage as domestic, 
personal or individualized territory, sonority made familiar and as an expression of 
individual territoriality, that sonority is expressly considered as a material of spatial 
production in the form of ‘a wall of sound, or at least a wall with some sonic bricks in it’.336 
Here sound is expressly considered as a material component in spatial production and 
determination, one of the numerous elements of material states used in the production of 
space and the determination of personal territories. The specific examples given by Deleuze 
and Guattari are those of televisions and radios, machines which acoustically define 
territories through their spatial and subjective determination, their information of both place 
and subjective state, examples shared by McLuhan in his descriptions of auditory space. 
The instruments of acoustic determination—to which we can of course add the voice, the 
car, the washing machine, and many other objects that contribute to the production of 
domestic noise and the definition of space—operate according to a kind of atmospheric 
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occupation, producing and defining diffuse spatialities that overlap with, breach and 
confuse what might otherwise be visibly discrete territories. Such is the annoyance caused 
by the neighbour’s music that seeps through the walls, invading private spaces through an 
extension of both their space and their actions into yours, threats against which the 
commodification of silence detailed by Thompson protect the listening subject. In this way, 
where sound events are considered as material constituents of space, the passing of sound 
through the walls of a home is literally the extension of one place into another. Yet to limit 
the operations of diffuse spatial sonority to such instances of annoyance is, as Brandon 
LaBelle has discussed at length, to place an unproductive and conservative emphasis upon 
instances that serve only the compartmentalization, stagnation and negatively problematic 
alterity that limits both community and processual development of spatial praxis and 
territorial relations.337 It is where noise is invited within as the agent of a subtle and 
subliminal influence that the importance of difference is noted and that a heightened 
sensitivity towards sonorous spatial productions and their implications are developed and 
put into practice. It is such a nuanced awareness and refined praxis of noise as spatial 
determinant that can be drawn from the processual determination of the sonorous 
assemblage, which can be understood as putting into practice vibrational productions, 
organizations and a willful submission to noise and an openness to difference. 
 According to the necessity of change and difference, from within the territorialized or 
domesticated space of the intra-assemblage, one opens ‘a crack, opens it all the way, lets 
someone in, calls someone, or else goes out oneself, launches forth’.338 Such openings 
invite others into the territorial assemblage, into the domesticated situation is subjected to 
the agitations of alterity. We find examples of such openings assumed as a principal of 
spatial practice in the work of both Achim Wollscheid and Henri Lefebvre, both of whom 
are responsible for the opening out of architectonic territories onto the noise of the world. 
This gesture is performed by Wollscheid in Wallfield, a piece which enforces a further 
auditory extimacy upon the work of architects Seifert and Stoeckmann. The exterior walls 
of Seifert and Stoeckmann’s Livingroom—a house constructed in Geinhausen, Germany, in 
2005—are constructed of white aluminum, perforated by a uniform grid of windows, a 
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permeable exterior that caters in equal amounts for optical transferal and exclusion between 
interior and exterior. Should these potential openings be considered insufficient, the house’s 
master bedroom can be extracted from the main body of the building in the same way as a 
drawer is extended from the chest which houses it, exposing both the inhabitants and the 
bedroom—often the most personal and private of spaces within the home—to the open air. 
While exposing the bedroom to the elements, this opening occurs on the first floor, 
therefore maintaining a critical distance from the street and the town’s human inhabitants, 
an openness to the noise of the world that nonetheless maintains the consistency of the 
territory. Wollscheid’s intervention in this space contributes to a further and specifically 
auditory opening out, setting an array of microphones and speakers into the exterior wall of 
the building, both inside and out, allowing for the production of an extimate auditory 
environment that further opens up the boundaries of the dwelling. Yet this simple gesture 
finds altogether more elegant expression in Wollscheid’s Inlet Outlet (2006) in which a 
number of first floor windows automatically open and close allowing an influx of noise—
here invoked in a Cagean sense as much as any other—within the boundaries of an 
architectural interior. This influx of noise is punctuated according a rhythm—considered 
distinct from meter—determined by the occupants’ movements, a responsive sequencing—
algorithmically mediated—that allows for a certain control and limitation to be applied to 
this influx, a punctuating limitation that enforces a certain durational consistency of both 
interior and exterior as such, preventing a complete confusion of signals. We must submit 
once again to the most obvious of references in considering Lefebvre’s simple gesture of 
opening the window and listening, a gesture from which a wealth of information was 
drawn, providing depth and background to these later openings. From within his flat—an 
instance of the domesticated intra-assemblage—an opening is created in its defining 
threshold through which noise, the expressions of new elementary interactions are allowed 
to pass constituting a reconditioning of both the spatial and subjective components of the 
occupied territory. It is this act of opening, the production of a crack, that describes the 
productivity and potentials of the inter-assemblage, an opening of the defined territory to 
new elements and interactions, a break with the defined intra-assemblage towards the 
production of a new territoriality. This break is carried out by means of an immersion or 
submission to difference or noise, to the individuating interference of rhythms and 
frequencies that, in Lefebvre’s case, were the expressions, noises, rhythms and durations of 
Paris’ populous, machines and plant life. 
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Figure 6 : Seifert and Stoeckmann’s Livingroom, Gelnhausen (2005). 
 
 This elaboration of territoriality, emerging midway along a tripartite schema of 
assemblages, suggests a linearity that is something of an oversimplification, as within the 
territory operate the agents of its own undoing or endless deformation. We find that, 
somewhat paradoxically, it is precisely the force of deformations, openings and undoings 
that, for Deleuze and Guattari, maintains or determines the consistency of the territorial 
assemblage: ‘what holds all the components together are transversals, and the transversal 
itself is only a component that has taken upon itself the specialized vector 
deterritorialization’.339 Within the territory occur constant reorganizations and reformations 
of territoriality, the territory not being singularly defined but determined according to a 
constitutive set of oscillatory movements or the interferences of a polyrhythmic 
structuration. That the transversal elements of this deformation should be thought to 
determine its consistency is important where form is not understood solely as the result of 
geometrical prescription of hylomorphic assertion but as the product of material forces, 
where objective or territorial morphology requires the notion of an internal generativity and 
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dynamics, as is evident in the intensive architectonics described by Fernández-Galiano. The 
maintenance of a territorial consistency according to the generativity of transversal 
elements or objectiles is clearly not the assertion of a static form but rather an account of 
the maintenance of a capacity for change. The inter-assemblage as the ‘branching out’ of a 
territory is not necessarily to be considered, therefore, as its inevitable conclusion, as that 
which must follow the structuration of the intra-assemblage—a voluminous or dimensional 
production of domestic, personal or personable space—but rather as a necessary state of its 
protean being, as the internal dynamics of the territorial assemblage. 
 
 
Figure 7 : Achim Wollscheid’s Inlet Outlet (2006), photo by Régine Debatty. 
 
 Where there is a certain synonymity between the notions of territoriality and 
assemblages, the interest in this relation is driven by what we might refer to as a specific 
modality of the territorial assemblage, a modality summarized by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of the refrain. Our particular interest in this notion comes from its detailing of 
explicitly sonorous assemblages, refrains taken in what Deleuze and Guattari describe as 
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the ‘narrow’ sense of the term: ‘In the general sense, we call a refrain any aggregate of 
matters of expression that draws a territory and develops territorial motifs and landscapes 
[…] In a narrow sense, we speak of a refrain when an assemblage is sonorous or 
“dominated” by sound’.340 Once again we find the spatio-temporal assemblage defined 
according to a processual determination, the minimal delimitation of a territorial threshold, 
yet in this instance it is conceived as being determined more explicitly according to 
qualities, sounds, timbres, colours—‘matters of expression’. Such qualities become 
‘dimensional’ or voluminous in their determination of ‘motifs’, constituting the internal 
organization of a territory. Where the determination of a spatio-temporal assemblage or 
somatic complex is dominated by either incessant or subliminal sonority this processual 
determination is summarized under the rubric of the refrain.  
 In connecting this notion of the refrain to the schemas of spatio-temporal 
individuation outlined below, it should be noted that the transversal element maintaining 
both the consistency of an assemblage through an excitation of its capacity for change—‘a 
component that has taken upon itself the specialized vector of deterritorialization’—can be 
understood to function in accordance with the method of dramatization, constituting the 
precursor of actualisations, the fleeting ‘object which is not exactly an object’, the intensive 
determinant of the qualitative extensities marking the expressed limits of a territory.341 The 
refrain provides a summary notion for the territory dominated by, yet not solely comprised 
of, sonic events or a sonorous objectility that constitutes its transversal element. While 
qualities determine the identifiable boundaries of a territory, within the refrain the material 
emphasis shifts from that of matters of expression—of qualities—to that of ‘materials of 
capture’, matter understood according to affective capacities more than expressive qualities, 
a shift that marks the transition from an explicitly aesthetic orientation to one defined by an 
infraesthetic or particular functionalism. The production of a refrain, of a primarily 
sonorous territorial assemblage whose deformational progress is characterized not as a 
zealous charge into uncertainty and difference—a route which promises little other than 
ruin—but as an oscillation between consolidations and careful openings into a differential 
field of noise, a vacillation between displacement and emplacement. This progression is 
marked by a series of ‘sober gestures’, a rarefying selection or subtraction that serves less 
to impoverish than to ‘free up’ sound matter to territorial reformations and alternate 
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341 Here I refer again to Lefebvre’s sound object, See ‘Seen from a Window’, 219.  
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resonances constituting both capture and connection, a process that ‘molecularizes sound 
matter and in so doing becomes capable of harnessing nonsonorous forces such as Duration 
and Intensity’.342 This ‘freeing up’ or ‘molecularization’ of sound is understood in two 
ways, as an attention to the particular temporal conditions and intensive potentials of sound 
and its difference from symbolic extensity, being considered according to its affective 
capacities more than semantic operations. It is where we consider the potential harnessing 
of ‘nonsonorous forces’ that we focus our particular emphasis upon sound around an 
openness to its imperceptibility in itself and its inaudible conditions—an orientation laid 
out as a defining feature of the sound art practices considered at the beginning of this text—
as well as its rendering audible of durations and intensive determinations, the legibility or 
perceptibility of which inheres within Deleuze and Guattari’s privileging of the audible and 
the ear. 
 We can of course refer to sonorities implicated within the production of personal and 
interpersonal territories in a manner that does not rely upon their particular reduction or 
infraesthetic functionalism, but rather their symbolic extension; where territoriality is 
determined according to relational and signifying practices within subjective identity 
formation, the definition of a personal territory may of course be carried out according to 
the transmission of sound as sign, informing identity through association, appropriation and 
so on.343 From the position established herein, territorial productions as ‘molar’ symbolic 
operations are more closely aligned with a notion of individualization considered distinct 
from the primary interest placed upon a particular schema of sonorous individuation. Here 
we again assert the position that individuation acts upon and within the ‘background’ order 
of being, functioning within a ‘base’, a pool or reservoir of singularities, ‘a system of 
virtualities’ active and implicated within the determination of a differenciation.344 
Individualization is, therefore, considered to describe the organization and structuration of 
identities and the apparent, being operative within the domain of that which is given and 
qualitatively determined, implicated within both the expression and determination of 
subjective and personal identity. Such assertions in no way seek to belittle the notion of 
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343 I refer to such notions of identity formations in passing and with extreme haste as this topic has received 
extensive attention and been the subject of many excellent studies, most notably within the field of popular 
music studies and in particular the work of authors such as Tia DeNora, Keith Negus, Richard Middleton and 
Dick Hebdige. 
344 Simondon, Technical Objects, 63. 
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individualization and that which is implicated within it, due to its presiding over 
‘foreground’ expressions, as such expressions remain nonetheless efficacious, but it is with 
individuation, as a theory altogether more suited to a discussion of affective capacities and 
the material interactions of anybody, that primary concern must reside. Where our concerns 
reside with such a theory of individuation, in addressing that which persists in excess of the 
symbolically determined, we draw upon a ‘molecularization’ of apparent objects, their 
being understood in the terms of mutable multiplicities, open to movements and 
deformations rather than constrained to an ideal atemporal consistency; this 
molecularization or particular orientation is considered necessary in coupling a notion of 
territorial production to that of individuation, a notion that itself is considered inseparable 
from the particularly catalytic functions of the refrain as sonorous territorial assemblage. 
Described as a sonorous mode of the intra-assemblage, it is under the rubric of the refrain 
that we find the clearest expression of the territorial assemblage in the terms of catalytic 
spatio-temporal dynamics: 
The refrain is a prism, a crystal of space-time. It acts upon that which 
surrounds it, sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or 
decompositions, projections, or transformations. The refrain also has 
a catalytic function: not only to increase the speed of the exchanges 
and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to assure indirect 
interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity, 
and thereby to form organized masses.345 
The refrain emerges as a kind of structured volume amidst a saturated spatium, a distinction 
from (within) the void. It is in the consideration of its catalytic functions that the co-
implication of territorial productions and individuation is realized, the territory impacting 
upon the wider environment in which it subsists, drawing into relation disparate elements, 
objects and bodies in the determination of a territory as somatic complex. Sound here 
constitutes a principal matter in an architectonic production defined not as exosomatic 
artifact but extimate continuum, delimiting and defining a particular space, setting bodies in 
motion through an enforced resonant relation, a relation that while drawing on common 
capacities leaves something of the excitation to obscurity, imperceptibility, the void, a 
difference between instances of its actualisation. It is in this account of a sonorous 
territoriality that we find a description of the affective capacity of sound appropriate to the 
creative practices that have been of primary concern, an understanding of sound as an 
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active component and transversal objectility in anomalous individuations indissociable 
from spatio-temporal and territorial productions. 
 
Towards a degree of clarification regarding the structure of the argument that I must now 
bring to a close it should be pointed out that where chapters one and two provided a 
discussion of practices broadly and diversely concerned with the production of acoustic 
environments and expressing the contingencies of auditory space, the present chapter has 
sought to explicitly relate the spatial orientation of the works considered herein to a spatio-
temporally contingent model of individuation and the complexity of the individual, subject 
to diverse schemas of auditory influence. It has been a core concern of the present chapter 
to provide a detailed account of an identified difference within the self, engendering the 
notion of an auditory individual that remains distinct yet indissociably implicated within 
the listening subject, in order to properly account for the praxical expression of a theory of 
sonorous-individuation—as, it has been argued, is evident in the key works considered 
herein—that is essentially spatio-temporally contingent. The final half of this chapter has in 
many ways been concerned with reiterating and summarizing key points that appear in the 
preceding chapters, yet reframed in terms that reconnect the present argument with the 
valuable considerations of sound carried out by Deleuze and Guattari. Where each previous 
chapter has provided a discussion of reciprocal auditory influence or determination within 
the context of an assumed environmental contingency, it is the present chapter that has 
attempted to explicitly express the necessity of a relation between spatio-temporal 
determination and individuation, and more specifically the account given by Deleuze and 
Guattari that identifies sound as an agent with the processual production of contingent 
individuality, thereby outlining a theory of sonorous individuation. 
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